Both in its extent (more than 450 pages) and with regard to the time spent on it (more than twenty years) this project is a worthy tribute to Seneca philosophus. It shows Braund's well-known strengths, not least of all an excellent, readable translation that is precise, pays conscious attention to terminology and yet — as far as a non-Anglophone can judge — captures much of Seneca's emotional tone and rhythm.
The commentary is judicious, relevant and helpful. It is intended to illuminate ‘linguistic and stylistic characteristics’ and ‘the literary, philosophical, historical, and cultural contexts relevant to De Clementia’ (90). There is a considerable amount of good old-fashioned explanation that is also accessible to the more ambitious undergraduate who can live with untranslated Greek and Latin quotations. B. is adept at foreseeing questions and suggesting plausible answers. She does not strive for originality at any cost, but gratefully acknowledges work done by others, in particular making extensive use of Ermanno Malaspina's edition (20042), on which her own text is based. Although she does not believe that Hildebert of Le Mans offers quotations from lost parts of De Clementia, B. argues that the work was planned, like its counterpart De Ira, as a three-volume treatise in which Seneca would have completed the programme set out in 1.3.1 (45, 57, 70–3). Whether he actually wrote the intended three books or only the transmitted fragment, is a question that she regards as unanswerable (43).
A large part of the introduction is devoted to summaries of ‘Kingship Theory’ and conceptions of clementia. B. highlights the differences between Seneca's treatment, which she characterizes as ‘pragmatism’ (70), and the views attested for other Stoics, referring to Clem. 2.7.3, where Seneca distinguishes between ‘judgements … according to the letter of the law (sub formula)’ and ‘according to what is right and good (ex aequo et bono)’, that is, according to B., ‘a level of justice higher than that of human institutions’ (70). Here a more systematic attempt to assess and explain Seneca's position as a Stoic pragmatist would have been helpful. As the commentary indicates (419), an answer would have to be sought in metaphysics, a field of Stoicism that does not receive as much attention as it should have, for example in the discussion of the mind-body or the father imagery (57–61). Indeed, there are a number of places where more extensive discussion of the philosophical context would have been helpful. For example, Aristotle's notion of epieikeia in N.E. 5.14, which might have been a model for Seneca, deserves mention, especially the solution that the written law is in some way insufficient and that epieikeia is itself also just and, in the cases where it is applicable, better, i.e. in a sense ‘more just’, than law-abiding justice. B. discusses Fortuna (e.g. 7, 162) but omits the Stoic definition of this function of god (SVF 2.966–7: ‘cause not clearly perceptible [adēlos] for human reasoning’), which can explain the various uses of the term in Seneca, but also creates interesting undertones if the emperor is described as Fortune's mouthpiece (1.1.2). On 1.3.5, B. does not mention the Stoic distinction between soul (that permeates the whole body) and the leading part of it, the hēgemonikon (in Seneca often animus), which orthodox Stoics locate in the heart, contrary to the Platonic view that it is in the head (Seneca himself professes agnosticism in Ep. 121.12). At 1.8.3, where Seneca compares Nero's obligation to serve his subjects with the necessity that binds the gods to the sky, a reference to Benef. 6.20–4 might have been helpful, if only to underscore the completely different nature of the necessity in each case. 2.3.1, in contrarium abducat, and 2.4.4 might have been further clarified with a reference to Ep. 45.6 and 120.8.
In generic terms, B. characterizes De Clementia as a ‘complex hybrid between different models: didactic kingship treatise addressed to a new ruler, panegyrical oration, and philosophical disquisition on one of the classic virtues of a ruler’ (1). Equally complex are B.'s views of the audience. She identifies three intended audiences: (1) the addressee Nero, (2) ‘the elite in Rome, Italy, and the provinces’, and (3) Seneca's ‘peers’ (23). Accordingly, the first function of the text is to encourage Nero to practise clementia. For the élite readership, the text serves both as a justification of absolute imperial rule and as an encouragement to co-operate with the young emperor. In its third function, with regard to the same élite and Seneca's peers, the text is a demonstration of ‘Seneca's didactic authority over Nero and his capacity to influence him’ towards an ‘acceptable’ ‘mode of conduct’ (23). The purpose of this self-representation is to reassure and alleviate anxieties or to show ‘the practical value of Stoic philosophy’ (56), rather than to spin-doctor Seneca's own image as advisor and friend of the emperor. At this point the compartmentalized form of the introduction leaves the reader dissatisfied. Instead of a sustained discussion, B. allows herself only a few paragraphs under various headings, and in her desire to present a levelled doxography she seems to be somewhat too hesitant to speak her mind. Thus, it does not become clear how the disparate functions of the text could be achieved together, without cancelling each other. B. highlights hortatory and therapeutic features of the text. Even if Seneca turns out to be an expert therapist, a contemporary reader might not feel reassured to learn that the emperor is in need of such treatment, and even less so if ‘Seneca hints at Nero's capricious nature to validate the influence that he, as Stoic counsellor, can apply behind the scenes’ (57). This counteracts a more straightforward method of reassurance that one could see used in De Clementia, namely stressing Nero's abhorrence of any form of violence. Nor is it easy to believe that members of the senatorial élite could be brought to accept and even co-operate, when they are to envisage themselves as an inert body at the mercy of a divine emperor-mind ruling with absolute power, a problem of which B. seems to be well aware (56).
This leads me to a final point where B.'s scholarly self-effacement does not quite work as intended. De Clementia cannot be adequately discussed without addressing the person and motives of its author. B. does not idealize Seneca; she assumes that he was involved in Agrippina's murder (3) and dates De Clementia after Britannicus’ death, which she regards as more likely to have been brought about by Nero (16f.). Nevertheless, for her Seneca is a positive figure rather than an evil hypocrite (e.g. 47 n. 164). The problem with this is not the view itself but the way it is implied and not explicitly defended. There is a widespread opinion, based on the historical accounts, that in De Clementia someone who had co-operated with a murderess to overthrow his personal enemy addresses as a divine being this woman's son, whom he himself had helped raise to the throne by dubious means. Someone professing to be a philosopher attributes superhuman access to higher levels of justice to a person that had benefited from murder and committed murder himself. I come away with the hunch that B. does have a theory how De Clementia can be read without assuming that Seneca is an unprincipled, self-serving flatterer. All the same, B.'s disjoined remarks (e.g. also 63 on Nero's innocentia) leave me at a loss as to what exactly this theory is.
