Habermas's latest book does not question the place he assigns to religion. He still argues that it is only relevant for modern societies when translated into “secular” terms and that it cannot recover the important role it once played for science and philosophy. In AGPh, however, Habermas fills a different gap by addressing the philosophically interesting and politically pressing question of moral motivation.
Although Kant continues to play a leading role in AGPh, the book goes beyond him. This is clear in Habermas's postmetaphysical conception of motivation, which connects individual and collective processes of moral learning. At first sight, this notion of the encouragement to act reasonably or rationally might seem to represent a psychologically meager proposal. However, it unfolds its explosive power against the background of additional assumptions concerning trust, mourning, and the openness of the future. Despite its strengths, Habermas's narrative of progress has a blind spot, as it is insufficiently dialectical.
1. Postmetaphysical Motivation
In AGPh Habermas develops a theory of motivation based on a contrast between transcendental and ontological approaches. His question regarding moral motivation is initially situated in the theological tradition of hope. Understood in these terms, what one hopes for is the personal salvation of one's soul. Unfortunately, a postmetaphysical theory of motivation cannot access the religious sources on which the assurance of salvation draws. In this respect, the encouragement to act morally must be effective without the religious certainty concerning a divine plan of salvation.
The shift in emphasis from Kant to Habermas is already clear: ambitious concepts of hope in theology and in the philosophy of religion are translated into a conceptually manageable notion of encouragement. The transcendental idea of God is replaced by an empirically informed understanding of history. And confidence in inner-worldly transcendence is replaced by a reflexive practice that appropriates the world by questioning its political constitution. Habermas sees this rational justification of political conditions as a decisive motivating force of social change. Proceeding in an archeological manner, he uncovers a history of humanity that provides reasons to regard ourselves as autonomous rational beings and to recognize others as such. It is this historically evolved understanding of ourselves that makes us immune to any doubts over whether being moral is preferable to individual self-interest.
We must ask how the insight into historically located rationality is supposed to motivate us to act in the future. Habermas offers two reasons. First, through an extended genealogy of reason, he shows that since the Axial Age, in tandem with the development of rational freedom, political rule became desacralized in all civilizations, including Buddhism, Taoism, and ancient Judaism. The paths of religion and philosophy diverged: they abandoned an unwieldy profusion of divine powers and developed dualistic worldviews involving a division into ecclesiastical and secular rule. This laid the groundwork for the emergence of the cross-cultural conception of universalistic rational freedom.
Second, Habermas sees in this the mainspring of individual and collective moral progress. In moral progress, which he associates with growing universalism and the increasing inclusiveness of liberty rights, he identifies an encouraging development which shows that, despite historical setbacks, further advances in freedom are possible for more and more people worldwide. His suggestion, therefore, is that we can assume that similar developments will continue to occur.
Despite this detranscendental account of postmetaphysical motivation, a wide gap remains between the insight into my individual rationality and the moral progress of humanity as a whole. Following the Young Hegelians, Habermas distances himself from Hegel's ontological figure of the world spirit and, to a greater extent than in his earlier writings, builds on the political, social, and cultural effectiveness of institutions, practices, and everyday routines, which he identifies as enabling or inhibiting conditions for moral motivation. Enabling conditions are, for example, the rule of law and democratic constitutions, as well as educational institutions based on equal opportunity. Inhibiting conditions, by contrast, are unjust regimes, racism, and other forms of exclusion from political codetermination, whether based on money, law, or power.
Habermas speaks in this context of objective mind as a symbolic product of subjective mind that has, as it were, congealed into objectivity (2:756). The narratives of progress are not propelled by a driving force in the ontological shape of a world spirit or a “self-movement of the concept.” The ontological form of a singular driving force is replaced by the dispersed impulses generated by a multitude of concrete institutions, practices, and routines. This multiplicity is not only the result of institutional problem-processing that exceeds the practical capabilities of individual actors. Progress is also promoted by a moral “ratchet effect”—that is, a barrier against regression to an earlier stage of moral and legal insights and institutions—which allows for an increasing (but not boundless) juridification.Footnote 1 Thus, the emergence of a normative institutional order is driven—and this is what connects individual and collective progress—by autonomous, rational subjects who are aware of their rational freedom but are always situated in an institutionally shaped context.
2. Past Learning Processes and Future Struggles
A postmetaphysical strategy of encouragement that ultimately relies on the conception of reason found in history and its realization in institutions seems to be a rather meager answer to the question, why be moral? The suspicion remains that the bridge between historical reconstruction and future moral action is not sufficiently robust. Even if we understand ourselves as autonomous rational beings and believe that historical examples of moral progress exist, we still lack a conclusive answer to the question of why we can reasonably assume that this development will continue. Don't the current signs point to regression?
The reason for such encouragement is supposedly provided by moral progress and the genealogy of reason. However, the foregoing interpretation of Habermas's approach gives rise to a major problem. Presumably, the parties involved experience the futility of their actions as discouraging, crushing, and paralyzing. But if they are to avoid discouragement and defeatism, they must also be able to recognize the progressive development from within their own perspective. What exactly enables us to conclude from past experience that social transformation for the better will succeed? Here it might help to consider some additional points that reveal the explosive power of Habermas's position.
Trust. The narrative of progress can mobilize an autonomous and rational self-understanding based on the contribution of independent institutional dynamics to processing problems. Past progress reflects the internal dynamics of institutional problem-solving that exceeds the practical capabilities of individual actors. This problem-processing power goes beyond the effects that participants can achieve through their actions alone. These internal dynamics generate a surplus that surpasses the perceptual horizon of discouraged participants. Looking back on past progress, the participants learn to base their own practical possibilities on it (2:807).
Mourning. This form of encouragement is reinforced by the idea of mourning the loss of moral, political, and cultural achievements. This negative approach, taking its inspiration from Walter Benjamin, makes use of the imagined dystopia of a world in which there is no progress. Mourning refers to the imagined scenario of a democracy in need of some form of improvement but which loses its ability to extend justice and statehood. Even imagining such a loss can mobilize the willingness to rescue what has been achieved thus far and to preserve the achievements of others.
Open horizon. The concept of rational freedom itself has the potential to become a motivating force. Habermas understands rational freedom to mean that we are rational beings whose lives have an open future horizon (2:802). This is the very insight that we seem to be losing sight of. As inequality increases, we have the feeling that living conditions are deteriorating, cultural values are diminishing, and opportunities for exercising political influence are dwindling. In the words of Mark Fisher, we are experiencing the loss of a sense of the future.Footnote 2 Nevertheless, every generation must liberate itself from concrete relations of oppression and subjugation through painful processes of emancipation—and does so by clinging to the possibility of change.
These three proposals are conjectures about how the growing gap between the assumption of historically reconstructed reasonable freedom and a moral motivation that must be mobilized on a daily basis could be bridged. Of course, the tide can turn and we can feel justified in disobeying existing moral rules that were the result of fair communicative procedures—for example, because we conclude that too little change, or the wrong kind of change, is occurring. But such a rejectionist stance entails high costs. Ultimately, we might lose not only the freedoms we have achieved, but something much more fundamental, namely, the confidence that reason can be shaped. We could liberate ourselves from requirements to continually reappropriate rational argumentation by consciously avoiding argumentation. But that would exact a high price in the shape of a lack of freedom.
3. A Different Narrative
This theory of counterfactual motivation, which goes beyond Habermas's earlier reflections, is of major import given the decline of the liberal world order. And yet, although we do not question the reliance of the project on the performativity of rational freedom, what is missing in this narrative of moral progress is a perspective informed by phenomena of regression, by the conditions of the relapse into barbarism and into encrusted, repressive structures that, rather than enabling emancipation, reproduce repression. We do not question the idea of moral progress, either at the empirical or the normative level. In our view, however, the narrative of cognitive, collective progress neglects one aspect.
Faced with the brutal suffering caused by the Nazis, Benjamin and Theodor Adorno rejected the idea that reason develops in a teleological, progressive direction and concentrated instead on signs of historical regression. Habermas also addresses this: “And with the element of self-responsible regression, the actual breakdown in civilization which we experienced in the twentieth century opens up: it has nothing to do with a ‘relapse into barbarism,’ but is the completely new and henceforth always present possibility of the moral disintegration of an entire nation which had regraded itself as ‘civilized’ by the standards of its time” (1:141–42, italics in original). And even though Habermas chooses not to address the topic of “unreason in history” (1:141), his reconstruction of rational learning processes implies that at any time things could develop in a more hierarchical, undemocratic, unequal, and repressive direction. The neglect of this other side of reason sometimes lends Habermas's narrative the appearance of an unproblematically successful and rational sequence of developments.
Although Habermas is, of course, well aware of the abysses of reason, one seldom gets the sense that the development of rational freedom was accompanied from the outset by the annihilation of large parts of the indigenous populations, the colonization of entire parts of the world, human trafficking, the continuing enslavement of people, and the unequal treatment and discrimination of entire population groups. Not only were these brutal practices conducted with missionary zeal and cold economic calculation justified with reference to the supposed irrationality of the “others”; they also never disappeared entirely, often reappearing in somewhat different form (racism, sexism, anti-Semitism or Islamophobia, and modern slavery).
To cite more examples of the manifest simultaneity of freedom and unfreedom: the French Revolution paid scant attention to the concerns of proletarians and women, the Haitian Revolution went virtually unnoticed in the Enlightenment, slavery persisted well into the nineteenth century despite existing notions of equality, the American Revolution did not concern itself with the rights of indigenous peoples, the Nazi era broke with all existing notions of the rule of law and humanity, and the exploitation of the Global South persists despite the United Nations Charter.
This sensibility for the “other side of reason,” for the interplay of destruction and scientific justification, of missionary and Enlightenment thinking, and of colonization and liberal freedom rights, for world trade, raises the question whether Habermas's reconstruction is sufficiently dialectical. What difference would it have made to the narrative if it had been told more from the perspective of rational subjects, acknowledging that the development of rational freedom was accompanied by the acceptance of unfreedom?
One could, of course, object that Habermas's main concern in this book is to show that, contrary to blatant injustice, moral progress occurred and continues to occur. But to fail to narrate this as an ambivalent, dialectical history of progress and regression is to miss an opportunity to tell a story of the “in-spite-of-everything” and to fail to make use of a theoretical tool that reveals the obstacles to the use of reason. The story can be told in a different way, as one of liberation. But it can be told differently when presented from the perspective of the oppressed subject who realizes how thin the ice is on which rational subjects are walking.
Translated by Ciaran Cronin
