Following the electoral victory of the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [AKP]) in 2002, scholarly interest in Turkish politics has grown substantially. Some analysts have portrayed Turkey as a democratic role model for other Muslim societies. After all, Turkey has a history of multiparty politics dating back to the early 20th century and has been holding regular elections since 1946. Many others have noted that the country grapples with economic liberalization, minority rights, and the relationship between Islam and democracy. Hence, most recent studies focus on political parties, identity politics, and the challenges of democratic consolidation. In Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey, Ergun Özbudun follows a different approach: he offers a historical overview of the origins and development of the Turkish party system and its underlying social cleavages. The book addresses the dearth of systemic-level analysis in Turkish political science, while making an important contribution to the literature.
Anchoring his argument on Martin Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan's classic study, Özbudun traces the party system in Turkey to a “cleavage developed between the ardent secularizers and the devout Muslims, combined with center–periphery cleavage” (p. 6). Because military and bureaucratic elites rather than the national bourgeoisie (like in the West) were the driving force of secularization, the book claims, the center–periphery conflict was inextricably linked to a culture-based church–state cleavage, giving the peripheral opposition a more Islamic character (pp. 19–20). This center–periphery cleavage is the author's main tool in explaining the party system's development in Turkey. Throughout the book, Özbudun attempts to account for the factors driving both the “basic stability” (p. 3) of the Turkish party system and its occasional abrupt changes.
In Chapter 2, the author examines the historical roots of the Turkish party system, tracing the rise of the center–periphery cleavage back to the dominance of Ottoman state officials over the unstratified masses. This division was pronounced by the fact that the empire had “no hereditary aristocracy comparable to that of Western Europe, no independent church hierarchy, no strong and influential merchant class, no self-governing cities, and a ruling institution almost entirely staffed with persons of slave status” (p. 17). This Manichean dichotomy accounts in turn for the development of the Turkish party system from the authoritarian single-party era of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [CHP]) to the 1950s, when the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti [DP]) attained power. While the rise of several minor parties after the 1960 military coup has complicated this stable two-party system, Özbudun contends that the center–periphery cleavage held, albeit in more functional terms with the growing salience of left-right divisions. After the CHP's brief leftist interlude in the 1970s, the party reversed back to its bureaucratic, tutelary stance against the rising peripheral challenges to the center in the 1990s. Despite criticisms that this framework can no longer explain contemporary Turkish politics, the author is confident that “the cleavage persists in both an ideological and a psychological sense” (p. 57).
The remaining three chapters provide a more substantive look at this political history. In Chapter 4, the author focuses on fragmentation, volatility, and polarization, “the three maladies of the Turkish party system from the 1970s through the 1990s” (p. 65). The book attributes fragmentation in large part to the military's frequent interventions in politics and to changes in the electoral system, which paved the way for a polarized multiparty system that lasted until the 2002 elections. Though fragmentation gave rise to electoral volatility, resulting from individual vote switching between parties, the author makes the astute observation that in Turkey interbloc volatility has remained much lower than interparty volatility (p. 78). Özbudun strengthens his claims with an effective use of electoral data and statistical analysis, including an index of fractionalization and electoral volatility. Interestingly, he finds polarization to be the most serious and persistent problem in Turkish politics, counterintuitively attributing it “less to ideological than to cultural and psychological factors” (p. 87). Given the author's emphasis on the strong influence of electoral laws on the Turkish party system, it should perhaps come as no surprise that he dedicates one chapter (Chapter 5) to a historical overview of Turkey's electoral laws since the transition to a multiparty system in 1946. The author's main point is that such electoral engineering efforts rarely produce the anticipated outcome, as seen in the 1950 general and 1961 senate elections (p. 109). He concludes with a short summary of political parties’ positions on the electoral system and individual proposals for electoral reform over the past decade.
Several problems underlying Özbudun's analysis merit attention. In recent years, the center–periphery thesis has become a convenient narrative for academics to analyze almost any topic in Turkish politics. With his book Özbudun joins these academics, while offering limited new analysis, interpretation, and evidence. Nowhere in the book does the author make an attempt to operationalize this cleavage or provide criteria for classifying parties. For instance, Özbudun characterizes the National Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) both “as a party of the center because of its strong commitment to Turkish nationalism and statism” and also “as a party of the periphery” (p. 56). This conceptual confusion impairs much of the book's analysis. More problematically, the author stretches the center–periphery cleavage to such a degree that it loses its analytical power. Özbudun argues that his cleavage theory is based less on geographical location than sociocultural values and beliefs. But this argument, when devoid of geographical context and political perspective, runs the risk of becoming a tautology. If this cleavage is defined as a sheer distinction between the masses and elites, then naturally the parties for which the masses vote will always come to power in a democratic system. At what point does a peripheral actor become part of the political center? For instance, after twelve years in power, should we not assume that the ruling AKP is no longer a peripheral actor?
In the Turkish context, this is not merely a point of academic debate, but rather a fundamental political question. From AKP's first victory in the 2002 elections until the Gezi protests in 2013, a host of liberal democratic intellectuals—Özbudun included—portrayed the AKP as a moderate, conservative democratic party carrying the banner of peripheral opposition against the defensive, nationalist, elitist, tutelary, and secularist CHP, whose leadership was purportedly allied with the state bureaucracy. Lamentably, this view ignored the AKP's growing hold on power, corrupt practices, and Islamist cultural and educational policies, and turned a blind eye to the creeping authoritarianism in the country. During the 2002–13 period, many dismissed the defense of institutional checks and balances as an attempt at bureaucratic tutelage. Given this background, it was this reviewer's hope that Özbudun would have addressed this deeply unsettling trend in Turkey before the violent suppression of the Gezi protests made apparent the AKP government's authoritarian nature. The book's classification of Turkey as a predominant party system belies the fact that growing pressures on civil society and the media have created an uneven playing field between the government and the opposition. A more appropriate term for the current Turkish regime is therefore either “electoral authoritarianism” or “competitive authoritarianism.”
Another problem I see in the book is its largely historical reading of the underlying cleavage structure of Turkish society to the exclusion of socioeconomic changes in recent times. The growing salience of new issues in the post-1980 period, which spurred regional, ethnic, and religious variation in voting behavior, rendered any national-cultural cleavage inadequate in accounting for the party system in Turkey. Even if we are to assume that the center–periphery cleavage was salient at some point, other points of division such as Islamism versus secularism, left versus right, and Turkish nationalism versus Kurdish nationalism now characterize contemporary Turkish politics. The aforementioned conceptual problems and the author's failure to address any of the alternative cleavages seriously limit the validity of his claims. When Özbudun's claims are scrutinized closely, the suggested evidence begins to flounder. Even during the 1950s, for instance, when the center–periphery cleavage was supposedly most salient, the peripheral opposition, the DP, received the bulk of its votes from the economically developed coastal provinces and urban areas, while the ruling CHP, thanks to its strong ties with feudal elites and landed notables, only won in provinces east of Sinop—that is, in regions where the electorate was mainly composed of illiterate Kurdish and Alevi voters. Özbudun himself notes this phenomenon (pp. 39–42) but it does not seem to have influenced his general claims.
Özbudun's excessive reliance on the center–periphery cleavage at times makes his narrative static. The book lacks a theory to explain the rise of new parties and major ideological shifts within existing parties. For instance, it has little to say about the CHP's shift to the left during the 1970s, which, according to the logic of this analysis, pushed this quintessential center party into the periphery. Due to his over-reliance on a Eurocentric cleavage thesis, Özbudun also misses an opportunity to engage other literature and to analyze the Turkish case within a larger context of late-developing countries. The book's arguments would have benefited from consideration of other factors driving party system change, such as retrospective economic voting, inadequate institutionalization, and growing political conflict.
Another disappointment is the book's disregard of elite defection. Contrary to the notion of a sharp struggle between center and peripheral forces, Turkish political leaders tend to come from similar social backgrounds. Most successful parties arose not from scratch but rather as a result of internal dissent leading to party splits. For example, the DP grew out of a split in the CHP, and the AKP arose out of fissure within the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi). The issue of splinter party formation remains key to understanding changes in the Turkish party system. What accounts for the frequent number of party splits in Turkish politics? Why do political elites decide to form splinter parties instead of switching to an existing party? These are precisely the questions the book should have answered. Nevertheless, this book is certainly worth reading and can be especially useful to those looking for a succinct academic summary of Turkish political history. Özbudun's effort to focus on social cleavages and electoral systems underpinning the party system in Turkey is admirable. The final two chapters of the book, which provide a detailed summary of the electoral systems and proposals for reforming electoral laws, will be of interest to students of Turkish politics and law. In sum, Özbudun tackles an important question with which other scholars of Turkey should engage.
