The first chapter introduces the major theme of this book, which originated from a conference in Cambridge in 1985 at which mainstream Europeanists are said to have “placed too much emphasis on the invention of something called ‘capitalism.’” “[They] neglected the contributions of other societies to the achievements of the Industrial Revolution and, in particular, [they] overlooked the contributions of the east to ‘modernization’, mechanization and industrialization” (2). This book was also inspired by John Thompson, who suggested that Goody “deal more specifically with the question of ‘why capitalism in Europe?’” (2). The last chapter, “Alternation in Eurasia,” succinctly sums up the major arguments of this book. It emphasizes that evolution of “capitalism” was not the monopoly of “Western” civilization. In contrast to Western mainstream scholars who support the notion that “the modern world has evolved out of antiquity, feudalism and capitalism, a line of development which was not open to the Orient” (106), Goody pleads for recognition of the contributions made by all (major) Eurasian civilizations in different periods, thus creating a pattern of “alternation in Eurasia” (106).
Goody approaches these themes from his main scholarly discipline as professor of social anthropology at the University of Cambridge. Perhaps surprisingly, he does not refer to the concept “clash of civilizations,” already a major focus of debate in East Asia roughly a century ago, rekindled by Samuel Huntington in the nineties. Goody's references include studies published mainly in English and French. He does not place his arguments in the framework of “world history.” Chapter headings include “Eurasia and the Bronze Age” (41), “Merchants and Their Role in Alternation” (57), “Merchant Wealth and Puritanical Asceticism” (66), “Knowledge Society” (79), and “The Temporary Advantage in Alternation of the Post-Renaissance West” (94). Subheadings emphasize Goody's major interest in social anthropology, such as “Kingroups” (21), “Kinship” (25), “Individualism” (27), “Malthus and the East” (32), and “The Mechanization of Writing” (91). There are scattered references to Goody's field of research in Africa not directly related to Eurasia. His anthropological approach is also evident in the analysis of different cuisines as indicators of important characteristics of social structure (45 and elsewhere).
Goody prefers L. H. Morgan's concept of civilization and the culture of cities. Those are linked to “the concept of the urban revolution of the Bronze Age … associated with … the prehistorian Gordon Childe” (41). The Bronze Age “brought together east and west in a single set of achievements” (41); Goody refers to “trade networks [that] had continued to extend from the Bronze Age, in Ceylon, in south-east Asia, in the Near east, and the Indian Ocean” (49).
Since he attaches great importance to the global exchange of civilizational achievements, one may also expect him to outline the importance of conquest, military power, and the rise and fall of empires in this process, but in vain. Goody's geographic focus is on Eurasia, and it is therefore surprising that he avoids analyses of the consequences of the Mongol conquest of Eurasia and does not deal with the subsequent penetration of Central Asia and Eastern Europe by the growing Russian Empire and its Soviet aftermath. The Osman Empire on the southwestern fringe of Eurasia receives little attention; none is paid to the Malay Empire that linked East Africa and Eurasia. Goody perceives contacts between various parts of Eurasia in terms of linkages between societies, civilizations, and religious systems such as Islam and Christianity (105). These, however, are vague concepts operating at different levels of analysis. Goody largely refrains from discussing issues involving the role of political organization and institutions.
For several decades social scientists, including political scientists, historians, and academics focusing on “culture,” have been able to find common ground by using “identity” as a concept that allows scholars from widely different disciplines to study and compare the interaction of mankind at numerous levels. Goody may not find “identity” a useful concept for his kind of analysis, but he does not give any explanation for this. His attention is drawn to comparisons of the products of civilizations, such as the role played by writing and other means of communication such as the arts. He uses the concept “puritanical complex” to discuss alternations between cultural expressions that are heavily influenced by religion (or ideology) and those who tend to be relatively free of strictures imposed by belief systems. “Greek writers … did not adhere to a hegemonic religion. Among them, thinking was freer, more ‘pagan’, polytheistic; Homer, though ubiquitous and ritualized, did not restrict knowledge in the same way. Nor did Confucianism” (88). Anthropologists of China are deeply aware that the three main currents of Chinese philosophical thinking—Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism—must not be confused with their operation as (religious) belief systems at the level of popular culture, where we may observe Confucian “saints” in a garb similar to Taoist and Buddhist saints. No surprise that Mao Zedong has already entered the realm of popular saints similar to European emperors who for centuries had been credited with working miracles.
Chinese culture tends to be much more syncretistic than is often suggested, and rigid classifications of Confucianism as a more “secular” system are usually based on interpretations of texts rather than on social reality. “The reason for China's so-called ‘backwardness’ in the nineteenth century did not need to refer to any deep-seated cultural factors, but was the result of an alternation. For example, after the Tang, the Song dynasty became more secular, more Confucian (or rather Neo-Confucian) and experienced a revolution in the arts and in the sciences, a period which had a certain flavour of Renaissance about it since it involved a looking-back and a going-forward along a wide front” (97–98). It is rather ironic that while attacking “Europeanists,” Goody applies the concept of a European period, “Renaissance,” to compare “the return to classical society in Renaissance Europe and to Confucianism in Song China, jumping over the hegemony of Christianity in one case and of Buddhism in the other,” and links this to “literacy, a process which characterized all written cultures in Eurasia, Christianity, Islam, India and China, to name but the major ones. … From time to time such a looking-back is to a less demanding ideology that gives more space to the secular” (98–99).
The religious, social, cultural, economic, and political functions of Buddhism in various parts of Eurasia are far too different to conceptualize Buddhism in terms of a hegemonic religion akin to Christianity. One reason is to be found in the fact that the Roman Catholic Church relied heavily on highly centralized religious and political institutions, quite different from the decentralized character of Buddhist institutions.
One may also take issue with Goody's use of “secularism.” There is no denying that religious fervor and its relative absence do wax and wane with time and place, but both the notion of Renaissance and secularity applied by Goody do not tell us why “secular” art is such a late phenomenon in Indian art compared to, let us say, landscape paintings in China.
Throughout his book Goody raises a number of issues that are certainly thought provoking. This reviewer agrees very much with a more global approach toward culture and its many expressions. I also sympathize with his criticism of the role of Marx and Weber in perpetuating Eurocentric tendencies. However, Goody's criticism of Europeanists is no longer original at present when such criticism has itself become a major stream of global scholarship. The Eurasian Miracle is a slim tome, but very poorly edited. The structure of chapters is uneven, often creating the impression of a patchwork of previous papers and articles: one example is Goody's chapter “Domestic Aspects of the ‘Miracle,’” which centers on a lengthy discussion of Lee and Feng's study on Malthusian mythology and Chinese reality (in One Quarter of Humanity, Harvard University Press, 1999) (32ff.). Goody's summary of the arguments of his intellectual opponents, called “Europeanists,” is found only in Appendix 1, and the arguments of Appendix 2, “Water in East and West,” should have been integrated in the main text rather than left standing isolated. Goody is obviously widely read, and he refers profusely to writers and figures that will not be known to many of his readers, such as historians Furet and Ozouf, the autobiography of the Jewish philosopher Maimon (i.e., Solomon Maimon), and the story of Enlil. His bibliography cites only very few works by scholars in the fields of Japanese, Chinese, and Indian studies, and most of those are dated. His sources are limited to publications in English and French (with a lone exception in Italian).
One can only agree with Goody when he notes that “History did not and does not move in the straight lines that essentialist accounts assume” (104), but one wonders whether one needs to read The Eurasian Miracle to acquire this insight. Goody spends 130 pages attacking “Europeanists” and “Essentialists,” but a reader interested in the role of China, India, the Osman Empire, Russia, and Central and Western Europe in the interactions that took place in Eurasia during the past three millennia is well advised to look for more substantial studies.
