Introduction
There is a long-standing interest in analysing welfare provision from an equality perspective (e.g., Bolderson, Reference Bolderson2011; Wilson, Reference Wilson2000) and in critically examining policies in this regard (e.g., Page, Reference Page2007). Recently, a gradual shift in redistributive policies towards interventions in early childhood has been noticed, coinciding with a paradigmatic shift from equalising outcomes to equalising opportunities (Staab, Reference Staab2010). This shift can be noticed both in developed countries (e.g., Council of the European Union, 2009) and in developing countries. International organisations such as United Nations agencies (UNICEF and UNESCO) and the World Bank largely concur in identifying the first years of life as key to neutralising inequalities of opportunities. This focus on the early years is much debated in developmental psychology, brain research and education as is illustrated by the special issues of The Lancet and Science, both published in 2011 (Engle et al., Reference Engle, Fernald, Alderman, Behrman, O'Gara and Yousafzai2011; Alberts, Reference Alberts2011). It is however less well analysed from a social policy perspective.
In the present article, we critically review how justice and equality are conceptualised in international organisations (e.g., the World Bank), leading them to consider Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) policies as a solution to inequality. In so doing, our focus is on both the developing and developed world. Space prevents us from exploring conceptual discussions of what ‘opportunities’, ‘outcomes’ or ‘equality’ may mean. Instead, we focus on how these concepts are used in international organisations. We argue that international organisations’ claim that ECCE is the most important equaliser should be considered with some caution. We also argue that the apparent consensus on this claim may entail a depoliticisation of welfare policies.
Regarding the first claim (ECCE as the most important equaliser), this is what the Director General of UNESCO, Irina Bokova, had to say in her opening speech for the World Conference on Early Childhood Care and Education 2010:
[Early childhood programmes] increase education attainment and productivity, resulting in higher earnings and social mobility. No matter what internationally agreed goal you take, it is the poorest and marginalized groups that are deprived of education, health care and other basic human entitlements required to live in dignity. Early childhood care and education is a starting point for levelling the playing field. It is the greatest of equalizers. (UNESCO, 2010b: 3–4)
This quote eloquently illustrates the assertion that ECCE has the potential to ‘level [. . .] the playing field’, as UNESCO (2010b) and World Bank (2006) claim, creating a situation where ‘a person's life achievements are determined primarily by his or her talents and efforts, rather than by pre-determined circumstances such as race, gender, social or family background’ (World Bank, 2006: xi). This distinction between personal effort (responsibility) and predetermined circumstances that lie beyond an individuals’ responsibility is inspired by contemporary egalitarian philosophy, notably the work of Rawls (2001), Sen (Reference Sen1979, Reference Sen1992, Reference Sen1997, 2009), Dworkin (Reference Dworkin1981a, Reference Dworkin1981b) and Roemer (Reference Roemer1993, Reference Roemer1998, Reference Roemer2002, Reference Roemer2005). As we will explain in more depth later, the terms ‘effort’ and ‘responsibility’ are particularly important here, since it can be assumed that the youngest of children cannot be held responsible for their effort and therefore it is ‘just’ or ‘fair’ to invest in them.
International organisations outline that inequality in life achievements, i.e. educational performances, job position and earnings in adulthood, are to a large extent moulded by disadvantage in accessing opportunities, associable with cognitive, physical and socio-emotional development, which are generated at birth by inherited ‘circumstances’ (e.g., gender, socio-economic status) and reinforced in the early years (Engle et al., Reference Engle, Fernald, Alderman, Behrman, O'Gara and Yousafzai2011). Economics Nobel laureate Heckman states that these inherited circumstance have cumulative effects on skill formation over the years and therefore labels this as ‘the accident of birth’ (Heckman, Reference Heckman2008: 49). His thesis is strengthened by recent findings in neuroscience underlining that the first years of life represent a sensitive period for brain development and that the development of synapses in the brain is significantly nurtured through social connections and emotional, cognitive and physical stimuli (Shonkoff and Phillips, Reference Shonkoff and Phillips2000), therefore by circumstances in which the child is born and grows up in. Assessments of the impact of ECCE programmes on early as well as later development have gained momentum in developed countries, in particular through longitudinal studies in the US (Barnett, Reference Barnett2011; Barnett and Masse, Reference Barnett and Masse2007; Cunha and Heckman, Reference Cunha and Heckman2006; Heckman, Reference Heckman2000, Reference Heckman2008, Reference Heckman2009; Heckman and Masterov, Reference Heckman and Masterov2007; Heckman et al., Reference Heckman, Moon, Pinto, Savelyev and Yavitz2009) and in Europe (Burger, Reference Burger2010). More recently, similar studies, as well as cross-sectional assessments of ECCE programmes, have also emerged in developing countries (Alderman (ed.), Reference Alderman2011; Engle et al., Reference Engle, Fernald, Alderman, Behrman, O'Gara and Yousafzai2011). This vein of research shows robust evidence of the positive effects of ECCE on cognitive, physical and non-cognitive development in early childhood, leading to higher educational performance and earnings; these positive effects are particularly salient for children identified as at risk for being disadvantaged. Hence, ECCE programmes are identified by international organisations as a powerful playing-field leveller with the potential to reduce the impact of inherited determinants on the unequal distribution of opportunities (defined, among others, as access to higher education, better-paid jobs, etc.). In doing so, international organisations explicitly refer to the present global knowledge economy and society in which human capital is crucial.
It needs to be noticed, however, that in many of the studies underpinning this policy, disadvantaged children enrolled in ECCE programmes are compared to equally disadvantaged children not benefiting from ECCE, rather than to their better-off peers (Barnett, Reference Barnett2011; Engle et al., Reference Engle, Fernald, Alderman, Behrman, O'Gara and Yousafzai2011). Moreover, the conceptualisation of disadvantage or risk in childhood generally refers to a restricted bundle of circumstances, namely those which can be measured (e.g., gender, socio-economic status, geographical location, ethnicity). As a consequence, most studies neglect the incidence of unobservable circumstances constructed by formal and non-formal social structures that shape disadvantage beyond childhood (such as racial or gender discrimination), influencing life outcomes in unfair ways. As we will further argue in more detail, despite the robust evidence that is produced in many effectiveness studies, the claim that ECCE programmes as such are ‘the greatest of equalisers’ should be considered with some caution.
Regarding the second claim, international organisations highlight the consensual character of interventions in early years aiming at equalising opportunities. We analyse this with a focus on World Bank policy documents geared at developing countries, although the conclusions may be applicable beyond the developing world. The alleged consensus is believed to overcome political and ideological cleavages. As Marcelo Giugale (in Paes de Barros et al., Reference Paes de Barros, Ferreira, Molinas Vega and Saavedra Chanduvi2009: xvii), World Bank Director of Economic Policy and Poverty Reduction Programs for Africa, states:
Much more important than inequality of outcomes among adults is inequality of opportunity among children . . . The idea of giving people equal opportunity early in life, whatever their socioeconomic background, is embraced across the political spectrum – as a matter of fairness for the left and as a matter of personal effort for the right.
Despite attempts to reach a consensus, redistributive policies remain highly controversial and a source of ongoing debate between left and right (e.g., Page, Reference Page2007; Wilson, Reference Wilson2000; also see Mouffe, Reference Mouffe2005). The alleged consensus on ECCE resides in the simple fact that all can agree that circumstances at birth are beyond the individuals’ control and that effort or responsibility do not play a crucial role in early childhood. The assumption that international organisations (and nation states for that matter) should primarily invest in those circumstances that are beyond the individuals’ control and effort is legitimised by a specific interpretation of contemporary philosophers’ work, as will be explained in the next section. This alleged consensus might, however, mask a dissensus or ‘antinomy’ (Mouffe, Reference Mouffe2005) on other aspects of social welfare policies.
One of the core aspects of disagreement is indeed precisely whether to also include interventions that reduce gaps in parents’ material capital (i.e., income), such as redistributive measures. It can be argued that in order to equalise opportunities (of children) one would need to reduce the inequalities of outcomes of parents, as they shape children's opportunities, making the alleged ideological and political ‘consensual’ character of ECCE less obvious.
In what follows, we adopt the definition of early childhood care and education (ECCE) used in UNESCO's (2007), Education for all Global Monitoring Report, including a broad array of formal, informal and non-formal services related to health, wellbeing and education from birth to primary school.
Egalitarian philosophy and the World Bank
Among international organisations, the World Bank has dedicated important resources to defining and ‘measuring’ equality of opportunities. This process started with the World Development Report Equity and Development (World Bank, 2006), which included a review of egalitarian philosophical scholars, leading to a definition of equality. The World Bank's rationale for justice and equality refers to the work of Rawls, Sen, Dworkin and Roemer. Despite the differences in various aspects of their thinking, these scholars agree to recognise, either explicitly (Dworkin and Roemer) or implicitly (Rawls and Sen), individual responsibility as accounting for life outcomes along with factors beyond individual control, and therefore make a clear distinction between unfairness of inequalities (of outcomes) determined by the latter and fair inequalities if due to free and responsible choices or actions or to effort. Accordingly, they move from equalising outcomes to equalising opportunities.
Contemporary philosophy indeed contributed to deepen the discussion on defining the equalisandum: the ‘what to equalise’. Rawls (2001: 78) described the what as an index of ‘primary social goods’ that rational individuals want in order to pursue their life plans: opportunities, wealth and income, social basis of self-respect (along with rights and liberties). Those ‘goods’ reflecting socio-economic positions in the society – or, broadly, ‘opportunities’ (Van Parijs, Reference Van Parijs2009) – should be made available for everyone, or ‘open to all’ (Rawls, 2001: 53), and distributed in accordance with the ‘difference principle’ (Rawls, 2001: 65). This is also known as the ‘maximin’ principle, maximising the advantage of groups belonging to the lowest positions in society.
Sen (Reference Sen2009) outlined that primary goods are means, enabling an individual to ‘achieve those things that one has reason to value’ (p. 231) or desire to be. Yet the transformation of goods into a function that a person can effectively use (to be free to choose or pursue a choice) is shaped by variations, i.e. personal heterogeneities, environmental diversities, variations in social climate, differences in relational perspectives, distribution within the family (Sen, Reference Sen1997: 385–6). Sen advocates prioritising the equalisation of ‘basic capabilities’, representing a set of functions that every individual should acquire in order to be ‘able to do certain basic things’ (Sen, Reference Sen1979: 218), thus meeting minimal living conditions – i.e., nutrition, housing, participation in social and community life.
While Rawls and Sen imply the importance of individual responsibility, Dworkin (Reference Dworkin1981a, Reference Dworkin1981b) more explicitly develops individual responsibility as a factor determining life outcomes (and thus inequalities). He highlights that individuals are responsible for their preferences, yet he acknowledges that circumstances beyond the individual's control can determine poor outcomes, including innate talent. Dworkin associates the equalisandum with ‘resources’, and states that their distribution should be focused on compensating individuals for poor results due to factors for which they cannot be held responsible, but not for results of preferences and actions. In the same vein, Roemer underlines the role of ‘effort’ as an individual responsibility in determining outcomes, which he calls ‘advantage’ (Roemer, Reference Roemer1998: 24), together with uncontrolled ‘circumstances’. Therefore, an equalising policy should allocate (or redistribute) available resources so that people showing a similar degree of effort will gain similar outcomes, independent of circumstances. From this literature, the World Bank extracts a normative definition of equality, recalling commonalities among the four authors:
We do not dwell on the fine distinctions between Sen's capabilities and Roemer's opportunities. As in both frameworks, we acknowledge the central role of individual responsibility and effort in determining outcomes. We focus on eliminating disadvantage from circumstances that lie largely beyond the control of the individual but that powerfully shape both the outcomes and the actions in pursuit of those outcomes. (World Bank, 2006: 78)
As a result, the playing field is levelled when opportunities (capabilities, resources) are equalised and pre-determinants do not account (or account less) for unequal life achievements. Inequalities are then solely the result of responsible and free choices, actions, efforts or talent. It is to be noticed that the World Bank's definition of justice and equality differs from the philosophers’ views. One example of this refers to the concept of ‘talent’: the World Bank considers inequalities due to talent as acceptable (based on the rationale of economic efficiency), while most contemporary philosophers identify talent as part of the ‘circumstances’ that should not affect outcomes (Paes de Barros et al., Reference Paes de Barros, Ferreira, Molinas Vega and Saavedra Chanduvi2009; World Bank, 2006).
The World Bank's approach towards justice and equality assumes that the shift in the equalisandum from outcome to opportunities will lead to an ‘ideologically neutral’ or politically consensual conception of equality, since it takes into account the concern of the left regarding fairness (the role of circumstances) as well as the concern of the right to include the reward of effort:
The inequality caused by unequal opportunities is viewed by most people as fundamentally unfair. Thus, shifting the debate from inequality of income or earnings to inequality of opportunity, and to the policies needed to tackle that inequality, might facilitate a political and policy consensus. When the focus of the debate is on inequality of income or any other outcome, the views about how much to redistribute – if any at all – and through which mechanisms would vary from left to right across the political spectrum. However, when the focus shifts to the equalization of opportunity, political consensus about the need to reduce inequity is easier to achieve, and the direction this principle gives to policy is clearer. (Paes de Barros et al., Reference Paes de Barros, Ferreira, Molinas Vega and Saavedra Chanduvi2009: 27)
The next step for the World Bank was to operationalise the concept of opportunities in order to make it measurable. As admitted by the World Bank, this is quite a complex exercise, since choice of circumstances is beyond the individual's responsibility, or ‘morally irrelevant’ (World Bank, 2006: 26). Likewise, indicators of ‘opportunities’ as inputs necessary for individuals to pursue life plans vary according to normative considerations, influenced by cultural or political contexts (Roemer, Reference Roemer1998; Sen, Reference Sen1979, Reference Esping-Andersen2009), and their measurement can be difficult due to lack of data, particularly in developing countries. Despite these difficulties, the World Bank developed a tool for comparing countries’ progress towards equality of opportunities: the Human Opportunity Index (HOI), focusing on ‘basic opportunities for children’ identified as (a) the completion of six grades of education and enrolment at ten to fourteen years (education opportunities), and (b) access to drinking water, electricity and sanitation (housing opportunities). The index measures whether (a) and (b) are distributed regardless of a limited bundle of circumstances (measurable across countries): gender, birthplace, race or ethnicity, educational attainment of parents and their occupation (Paes de Barros et al., Reference Paes de Barros, Ferreira, Molinas Vega and Saavedra Chanduvi2009). The World Bank acknowledged that these only provide ‘a partial, and often rudimentary, picture of the full range of inequity that might exist in a country’ (World Bank, 2006: 44). While the HOI is less applicable in developed countries, operationalisations of opportunities’ may vary and other indicators may be used to measure equality of opportunity for children, such as completion of compulsory education and access to higher education and culture, opportunities for leisure and recreational activities, good health and nutrition status, body integrity (i.e., Burchardt, Reference Burchardt2006; Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum2011). This is, of course, especially salient in the realm of the human capital paradigm.
From equality of opportunity to early childhood
International organisations highlight the role of human capital as a major opportunity in the context of globalisation, innovation, knowledge and technologies. The connection between equality and childhood refers to global economic and social dynamics, entailing a radical mutation of the nature of the workforce from manpower to brainpower (Castells, Reference Castells1996; Dicken, Reference Dicken2003; Giddens and Diamond (ed.), Reference Giddens and Diamond2005; Heckman, Reference Heckman2000), associating opportunities with human capital, as cognitive skills, but also physical and non-cognitive abilities (Alderman (ed.), 2011; Cunha and Heckman, Reference Cunha and Heckman2006; Eming Young (ed.), Reference Eming Young2002, Reference Eming Young2007; Esping-Andersen, Reference Esping-Andersen2008, Reference Esping-Andersen2009; Heckman, Reference Heckman2000, Reference Heckman2008, Reference Heckman2009; Heckman and Masterov, Reference Heckman and Masterov2007; Naudeau et al., Reference Naudeau, Kataoka, Valerio, Neuman and Elder2011). Heckman (Reference Heckman2008) outlines that ‘cognitive abilities are important determinants of socioeconomic success . . . so are socio-emotional skills, physical and mental health, perseverance, attention, motivation, and self-confidence. They contribute to performance in society at large and help determine scores on the tests that are commonly used to measure cognitive achievement’ (pp. 49–50).
Early childhood is identified as a fundamental period in life when opportunities related to human capital are developing and inequalities can be seen as the sole product of circumstances. Neuroscience affirms that these skills (or opportunities to ‘play in the current field’) substantially develop before school-age and much of their development is moulded by interactions between the child and its environment (Shonkoff and Phillips, Reference Shonkoff and Phillips2000). Brain growth, as well as physical, socio-emotional and intellectual abilities (e.g., language), is to a large extent shaped before entrance into schooling, particularly in the first three years of life (Alderman (ed.), 2011; Eming Young, Reference Eming Young1997, Eming Young (ed.), Reference Eming Young2002, Reference Eming Young2007; Irwin et al., Reference Irwin, Siddiqi and Hertzman2007; Naudeau et al., Reference Naudeau, Kataoka, Valerio, Neuman and Elder2011; UNESCO, 2007; UNICEF, 2008). Despite some severe critiques of the too-deterministic nature of this assumption (e.g., Bruer, Reference Bruer1999), it is generally accepted that mutually rewarding interactions between the child and a responsive adult stimulate the formation of brain routes and the development of complex skills and abilities. The contribution of neuroscience to the debate on equality is clearly illustrated by the following quote from the World Bank:
The stimuli (experience) from the sensing pathways to which the sensing neurons are exposed during critical, sensitive early periods of development (including in utero) set most of the brain's capability to interpret the signals and pathways in the brain which govern or control language, intellectual, emotional, psychological, and physical responses . . . The nature–nurture debate has, until recently, led to a strong view that the major factor in human brain development was primarily genetically driven regardless of experience. Today we know that although genetics are important, experience and the environment in which individuals exist from the in utero period through to adult life have a significant effect on gene activation and expression. (Eming Young (ed.), 2007: 43)
Furthermore, international agencies unanimously agree that low socio-economic status of parents is strongly associated with negative developmental outcomes in children aged three to four years and that these deficiencies increase during primary education and beyond, since ‘learning begets learning’ (Heckman, Reference Heckman2000; Heckman and Masterov, Reference Heckman and Masterov2007). As a result, inadequate exposure to stimuli is basically the result of circumstances. While to some extent the debates on the fairness of gaps determined by nature do not reach consensus (economic efficiency vs. ethical concerns), the disadvantage in ‘nurture’ associated with negative socio-economic and demographic characteristics is perceived as totally unfair.
To conclude, evidence from neuroscience and its interpretations by economists reinforce the thesis that the acquisition of fundamental opportunities, such as critical thinking and problem solving, readiness to learn, stress management and social cooperation, is founded in early childhood. The unequal distribution of such is clearly due to circumstances. As a result, a policy to equalise opportunities is supposed to intervene as early as possible and to aim at ‘human capital’ acquisition.
The greatest of equalisers?
Now that the problem of unfair inequalities has been located in early childhood, we can move on to look at ECCE as the solution. Over the past few years, leading international organisations and academic scholars have joined forces to publish evidence on the impact of ECCE in top journals (Engle et al., Reference Engle, Fernald, Alderman, Behrman, O'Gara and Yousafzai2011; Gormley, Reference Gormley2011; Lake, Reference Lake2011). In particular, three well-known longitudinal studies are frequently mentioned in publications by international organisations: the High/Scope Perry Preschool Study, the Chicago Child–Parent Centers and the Abecedarian Project. These are also programmes economists refer to when computing the return on investments of ECCE in affluent countries (Barnett and Masse, Reference Barnett and Masse2007; Cunha and Heckman, Reference Cunha and Heckman2006; Heckman, Reference Heckman2000, Reference Heckman2008, Reference Heckman2009; Heckman and Masterov, Reference Heckman and Masterov2007; Heckman et al., Reference Heckman, Moon, Pinto, Savelyev and Yavitz2009). Both in developed and developing countries, longitudinal and observational studies have received increasing attention from international organisations (Alderman (ed.), Reference Alderman2011; Eming Young (ed.), Reference Eming Young2002, Reference Eming Young2007; Engle et al., Reference Engle, Fernald, Alderman, Behrman, O'Gara and Yousafzai2011; Nadeau et al., Reference Naudeau, Kataoka, Valerio, Neuman and Elder2011; UNESCO, 2007). In these studies, children are identified by a variety of risk variables, along the same lines as the Human Opportunity Index and the UNESCO Global Monitoring Report series (UNESCO, 2009, 2010a): ethnicity, gender, family or household income, parents’ occupational status and level of education, geographical residence, housing conditions (e.g., siblings, sanitation, availability of books and toys), physical environment and family type (e.g., single parents, teen parents, orphans).
In terms of measurement of cognitive, physical and non-cognitive development (basic human capital opportunities), a range of indicators is used: IQ, memory, learning readiness, language comprehension, literacy and numeracy, school absenteeism, dropout, repetition, completion, problem solving, behaviour and sociability, motor and physical development (stunting, body mass, anaemia, immunisation, hygiene), looking as well at the effects of opportunities in childhood on school results, employment status, earnings, income and consumption in adulthood. Studies generally show positive associations between better outcomes and participation in ECCE programmes. Yet there are some methodological remarks to be made that question the certainty with which ECCE is proposed as the solution for inequality.
In order to evaluate the equalising impact on opportunities of whatever policy, the ‘treatment’ (i.e., ECCE) has to reduce the association between circumstances and selected indicators, assuming that innate differences in talent might be acceptable for economic purposes or, in any case, difficult to compensate through interventions. Diverse techniques can be envisaged (Ferreira and Gignoux, Reference Ferreira and Gignoux2011; Paes de Barros et al., Reference Paes de Barros, Ferreira, Molinas Vega and Saavedra Chanduvi2009; Van de Gaer, Vandenbossche and Figueroa, Reference Van de Gaer, Vandenbossche and Figueroa2011). Following Roemer's approach (Reference Roemer1998), we could for instance group children based on combinations of circumstances (inherited) and construct types of circumstances, expecting to observe higher gains for the worse-off, as an implementation of the Rawlsian ‘maximin’ principle. However, the present studies rarely allow for such unambiguous conclusions about the opportunity-equalising strengths of ECCE, since they are characterised by perfect homology, in terms of circumstances, between disadvantaged children receiving treatment and those who are not benefiting from ECCE (e.g., Barnes et al., Reference Barnes, Belsky, Broomfeld, Frost and Melhuish2005; Barnett, Reference Barnett2011; Barnett and Masse, Reference Barnett and Masse2007). Unambiguous conclusions would require that children belonging to different combinations of circumstances (well-off as well as disadvantaged children) are studied and that higher benefits are observed for the worse-off children. Such a study design would account for the reality in most countries, where ECCE is targeted at children identified as being ‘disadvantaged’ but where one could expect that more fortunate children also access high-quality provision of their own means. Only if disadvantaged children have higher benefits then their better-off peers can it be concluded that ECCE has an equalising effect. Yet most studies do not include such a design. In few cases where comparison of low versus higher socio-economic status is made, the impact of ECCE in reducing the gap is more limited (Burger, Reference Burger2010). This is not to say that ECCE does not influence later outcomes, as there is robust evidence that it does, but our point here is that the equalising power of ECCE might be overestimated.
There are some additional problems – both technical and ethical in nature – in identifying the long-term outcomes (i.e., educational attainment, earnings and consumption, social behaviour or participation in political life in adulthood) of equalising policies. In general, studies do not take into consideration the increasing influence on life opportunities and achievements of ‘cultural’ or ‘systemic’ circumstances (Sen, Reference Sen1997), produced by formal or informal social structures (families and societies) such as racism and discrimination (Burchardt, Reference Burchardt2004, Reference Burchardt2006; Rigg and Tefton, Reference Rigg and Sefton2006). These circumstances may particularly influence the fairness of the ‘process’ from opportunities to outcomes (Nozick, Reference Nozick1974), or the openness of positions (Rawls, 2001). As an example, in many developed and developing countries, ‘systemic’ cultural circumstances such as discrimination in terms of gender or ethnicity not only affect chances in childhood and beyond, but also influence outcomes and access to positions, regardless of merit (Paes de Barros et al., Reference Paes de Barros, Ferreira, Molinas Vega and Saavedra Chanduvi2009; UNESCO, 2009, 2010a; World Bank, 2006). Other aspects that tend to get lost in the dominant vein of research are the multi-dimensionality of opportunities and the interactions among policies (Burchardt, Reference Burchardt2004, Reference Burchardt2006; Van Lancker, Reference Van Lancker2013).
The selection of a limited set of circumstances (those more easily measurable) in the studies we mentioned excludes more complex interactions with ‘systemic’ formal and non-formal determinants. In brief, even when assuming that ECCE levels the playing field by equalising human capital, the persistence of possible ‘unfairness’ in the playing field during life paths makes it hard to ascertain the equalising power of ECCE (Staab, Reference Staab2010).
To conclude, while research presented by international organisations shows beneficial effects of ECCE for children identified as ‘at risk’ or disadvantaged, its claim that ECCE is the greatest of equalisers should be interpreted with caution and would better be considered as a ‘partial’ equaliser (Burchardt, Reference Burchardt2006; Paes de Barros et al., Reference Paes de Barros, Ferreira, Molinas Vega and Saavedra Chanduvi2009; Van de Gaer et al., Reference Van de Gaer, Vandenbossche and Figueroa2011).
Depoliticising inequality
It is precisely the avoidance of broader inequalities in society that lies at the basis of the alleged consensus supposedly overcoming cleavages between left and right. The rationale for supposing this consensus resides in a particular normative interpretation of equality that presents outcome (i.e., income) redistributions as potentially unfair and inefficient, since it denies effort or personal responsibility and economic incentives. Defining the equalisandum as opportunities early in life, before effort plays a role, rather than as outcomes in adulthood is believed to meet the concerns of the ‘left’ (fairness) as well as of the ‘right’ (reward of effort):
The debate about public policy and inequality reduction must recognize that inequality is made of heterogeneous components, some much more unfair, undesirable, and unnecessary than others. Most people would probably view income gaps that arise from different choices as less objectionable than those related to ethnicity, location of birth, gender, or family background, which are all factors beyond the individual's responsibility and thus might be deemed unfair. Consensus could easily be reached about the need for policies devoted to reducing or eliminating the unfair influence of some of these components. However, other potential sources of inequality may be necessary to give people proper incentives to provide the effort to require education and translate it into earnings . . . Equality of opportunities is desirable, equality of outcomes (earnings, income, wealth) not necessarily. (Paes de Barros et al., Reference Paes de Barros, Ferreira, Molinas Vega and Saavedra Chanduvi2009: pp. 26–7)
Restricting the perspective of equality – distinguishing unfairness of unequal distribution of opportunity in childhood from fair outcomes in adulthood – prevents the discussion of possible compensation for negative results later in life and thus what Mouffe (Reference Mouffe2005) calls ‘the political’ – disappears from the debate. As Waldfogel (Reference Waldfogel2004) states, ‘there is an important role for early childhood education policy to play, but there is a role for other policies as well’ (p. 5). However, enlarging the ECCE scheme to interventions for families would provoke a fracture in the alleged political ‘consensus’ for reducing inequalities of opportunities in childhood.
From an economic perspective, families’ capacities to invest in their children's opportunities are an important vehicle of inequality transmission (Heckman, Reference Heckman2000), and therefore could also be considered a potential lever for change. International studies concur that home circumstances affect children's physical, cognitive and non-cognitive development (Alderman (ed.), 2011; Bennett, Reference Bennet2008a, Reference Bennet2008b; Eming Young (ed.), Reference Eming Young2002; Irwin et al., Reference Irwin, Siddiqi and Hertzman2007; Naudeau et al., Reference Naudeau, Kataoka, Valerio, Neuman and Elder2011; UNESCO, 2007, 2009, 2010a, 2011; UNICEF, 2010a and 2010b). The extent to which they do so (and consequently the potential for intergenerational socio-economic mobility) differs highly from one country to another, as is demonstrated in the work of Wilkinson and Pickett (Reference Wilkinson and Pickett2009) and OECD reports (e.g., 2012) showing that inequality highly influences social mobility. It is therefore highly questionable that an egalitarian social policy can be reduced to an early childhood policy without also addressing other policies (e.g., employment policies) and tackling unequal opportunities at their source, including parents’ material, social and cultural capital (Van Lancker, Reference Van Lancker2013).
A more integrated approach to early childhood could include interventions that impact indirectly on parents’ ability to promote the best interests of children (e.g., taxation and benefits, adequate housing, working hours), as well as interventions that have more immediate consequences (e.g., perinatal health services for mother and baby, parent education, home visitors) (United Nations, 2006). Accordingly, most international agencies propose social safety nets (i.e., income transfers) as a valid measure to enable parents’ investment in their children's opportunities and as part of an high-quality ECCE policy, particularly in developing countries, where extreme poverty and absolute deprivation touch a majority of families and children (Alderman (ed.), Reference Alderman2011; Engle et al. (Reference Engle, Fernald, Alderman, Behrman, O'Gara and Yousafzai2011), UNICEF, 2008; World Bank, 2006, 2009; Inter-agency, 2009). An example of such an intervention in the case of developing countries, promoted by international organisations, is the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) (World Bank, 2009; UNESCO, 2007). CCTs transfer cash to poor or vulnerable households on the condition that beneficiaries invest in their children; this is controlled by periodic check-ups for children and pregnant mothers, vaccination programmes and education enrolment and attendance. Recent assessments of the Mexican Opportunidades Programme have shown positive effects in opportunity-equalising terms, with higher gains for children in worse-off groups (Van de Gaer, Vandenbossche and Figueroa, Reference Van de Gaer, Vandenbossche and Figueroa2011).
The point here is not to advocate for CCTs as the ultimate solution to inequality of opportunities. As a matter of fact, CCTs can also be severely criticised, as their emancipative aims inevitably go hand-in-hand with increasing control of the ‘responsibility’ of the poor. This paradox of social policy, in which emancipation and control are inextricably intertwined, has been extensively discussed both in history (Donzelot, Reference Donzelot1994) and in the present (Lister, Reference Lister2006; Lorenz, Reference Lorenz2005). Our point is rather that different options on how to deal with this paradox are at the core of social political discussions and therefore way beyond consensus in developing and developed countries (e.g., Penn, Reference Penn and Yelland2010; Rosanvallon, Reference Rosanvallon1995). As an example of this political dissensus, it can be argued that income redistributive policies (as unconditional transfers) in the Nordic countries of Europe, together with extended parental leave policies and universal access to high-quality preschool provision, are associated with more socio-economic mobility (Bennett, Reference Bennet2008a, Reference Bennet2008b; Giddens and Diamond (ed.), Reference Giddens and Diamond2005; Esping-Andersen, Reference Esping-Andersen2008, Reference Esping-Andersen2009; Waldfogel, Reference Waldfogel2004; UNICEF, 2008). Others obviously would argue that such unconditional redistributive measures would be unfair, as they redistribute outcomes independent from effort and responsibility. Our point is not to have this political discussion here, but rather to point at the absence of it in the discourse on ECCE as equaliser, as well as in the research that supports this equalising claim. The World Bank, quoting Shonkoff, most eloquently expresses this:
[ECCE] is not about government raising children. This is about government strengthening the capacity of families and communities to do the job well. This is not about seeking equality in outcomes. This is about striving for equality of opportunity. This is not about liberals versus conservatives. This is about wise investors who defy ideological labels. (Eming Young (ed.), Reference Eming Young2007: 31)
Conclusion
Over the past decade, there has been an increasing focus in social policy on the early years, based on a particular reading of contemporary egalitarian philosophy and informed by neuroscience, developmental psychology and economy. International organisations concur that the early years represent a crucial period for equalising opportunities, or ‘levelling the playing field’. According to the normative definition adopted by the World Bank (2006), a fair policy requires that outcomes in life become less dependent on circumstances, i.e. morally unacceptable features beyond the control of individuals. In the present knowledge economy, lifelong learning and human capital are considered essential opportunities, and these are founded in the first years of life. Longitudinal and cross-sectional studies in both developing and developed countries showed beneficial effects of ECCE programmes for disadvantaged children. Based on these studies, international organisations tend to claim that ECCE is the greatest of equalisers and that investments in ECCE are an obvious social policy, beyond debate.
We have critically analysed these claims by looking at publications of international organisations, at contemporary philosophers cited by the World Bank and at studies that form the rationale for these two claims. Our point was not to dwell on the (obvious) differences between developed and developing countries, nor to explore how local contexts influence the outcomes of ECCE, but rather to document how a shift in social policy is globally legitimised. In so doing, our purpose was not to question the importance of ECCE. Rather, it was to bring some nuance into the discussion, as well as to repoliticise the debate.
Nuance is much needed when looking at the beneficial effects of ECCE. Indeed, when following Sen's concept of capabilities (Burchardt, Reference Burchardt2004, Reference Burchardt2006), features such as unobserved circumstances, luck, inter-connections among opportunities influencing processes and outcomes in the life of individuals are all to be taken account of. However, the studies on which ECCE policies are based very often do not make comparisons that allow doing so, and/or consider rather restricted bundles of circumstances that categorise disadvantage. The complexity of interactions between circumstances, effort and outcomes, embedding both individual and systemic features, suggests the need for more cautious statements about a single policy as the greatest of equalisers. The risk for international organisations to focus solutions on a ‘magic bullet’ (Waldfogel, Reference Waldfogel2004: 5), namely intervention at pre-school level, is for it to be ineffective in reducing inequality of opportunities for children.
As international organisations also acknowledge, programmes that wish to ‘compensate’ for the deprivation of disadvantaged children also need to look at reducing the socio-economic inequalities of parents. Yet when considering programmes and policies at that end, the alleged consensus disappears, since tackling disadvantage at the source (parents) can only mean that one must also somehow consider the redistribution of outcomes (i.e., income). Clearly, depending on the size of the redistribution, the political right would claim denial of effort and therefore of economic efficiency, while the political left would have concerns over social justice. The rationale for considering ECCE as a consensual policy is based on the principle of a separation between opportunity and outcomes, thus circumstances and responsibility in life cycles, as supposedly preserving individual incentives and economic efficiency. Yet this separation in childhood is blurred and this inevitably reintroduces potential political cleavages.
While it may be unavoidable that international organisations look for consensual policies, given the specific ideological and political contexts in which they operate, dissensus should not be considered worrying. On the contrary, dissensus is the essence of the political (Mouffe, Reference Mouffe2005). Presenting ECCE as the ultimate and consensual solution for inequality not only masks the complexity of social problems, in this case the inter-generational transmission of disadvantage, it might also shape what Moss (Reference Moss and Moss2013) labels the dictatorship of no alternative. Children, in this vein, are considered ‘in perspective’ of becoming responsible (and economically efficient) adults in a supposedly meritocratic society, meaning that their need for equality and justice and their voices ‘here and now’ might be undervalued. As a consequence, the very meaning of early childhood does not lie in early childhood itself, but in later adult life (Moss, Reference Moss and Moss2013). These conceptions also shape the curriculum of early childhood provision, which is then focused on mere learning outcomes for economic efficiency, rather than on social and cultural values.
