Harry Jaffa has now far surpassed his biblically allotted three score and ten years, and has even gone beyond the nation's four score and seven when Lincoln delivered the Gettysburg Address. Although we hope that he has many years and much writing left in him, we may still take his arrival at ninety as a moment to look back over his aims and accomplishments as a student and teacher of political philosophy.
It is only since the year 2000 that it is possible to attempt such a recapitulation of his career, for it was only then that he redeemed his very longstanding promise to follow up his classic study of the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Crisis of the House Divided, with a sequel on Lincoln called A New Birth of Freedom. So long as that promise remained unfulfilled, getting a full sense of the overall trajectory of Jaffa's thinking was not possible. Of course, when it takes forty and more years to write a promised sequel, one suspects that some sort of hitch appeared in the intervening years, a hitch that stood in the way of a more timely completion. When one notices that A New Birth of Freedom contradicts many of the central points of Crisis of a House Divided, one is justified in concluding that the New Birth that appeared in 2000 is not the same book Jaffa promised and projected in 1958. And yet, Jaffa still presents New Birth as the promised sequel.Footnote 1 Therefore, despite our sense of great change, we must take seriously his implicit claim that there is some sort of deep continuity between his two studies.
Although Jaffa wrote on many other topics—Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, Shakespeare, and Mark Twain, the errant ways of the Supreme Court and the errant ways of his fellow students of Leo Strauss—nonetheless Lincoln, read capaciously and against the background of the entire western tradition, has clearly been the centerpiece of Jaffa's intellectual efforts. And an impressive centerpiece it has been. Crisis of the House Divided propelled Lincoln scholarship in altogether new directions and set an agenda for the study of American politics and American political thought for a whole generation or more of scholars. He has been a giant in the field of political philosophy and a teacher with rare impact on his students. He has also been a controversial and contentious figure, a polemicist of great talent and vigor, impartially attacking friend and foe alike. He has been a figure to reckon with. To establish just what the reckoning ought to include is my purpose in this essay.
Some Prefatory Questions
The preface to New Birth is striking for the amount of information it conveys and for the questions toward which it points the serious reader. Jaffa identifies New Birth as the sequel to Crisis. He excuses the long delay by observing that Plato's Laws was separated by roughly the same length of time from Plato's Republic. Republic, according to Jaffa's teacher Leo Strauss, is a work without practical intent, but rather a work of theory: it attempts to bring out the nature and limits of the political as such. Laws, however, is identified by Strauss as Plato's only genuine work of political philosophy; it is more practical in intention than Republic. Jaffa suggests that a similar relationship exists between Crisis and New Birth. That suggestion is perhaps confirmed by the title of the central substantive section of Crisis, “The Political Philosophy of a Young Whig,” indicating the philosophical or theoretical character of the central argument in Crisis. In a somewhat parallel way, the central chapter of New Birth is titled, “The Mind of Lincoln's Inaugural and the Argument and Action of the Debate that Shaped It.” That title ties New Birth back to Plato's Laws, or more precisely to Strauss's reading of Plato's Laws, for Strauss's book-length interpretation was called The Argument and Action of Plato's Laws.
Jaffa tells us in his preface that New Birth is conceived as a commentary on the Gettysburg Address, an extremely odd claim for the book contains extensive commentary on several of Lincoln's speeches, but has no sustained analysis of the Gettysburg Address.Footnote 2 Likewise, chapter 2 is titled, “The Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg Address and the Historians,” but contains only about two pages directly about the Gettysburg Address itself. Jaffa perhaps explains his odd characterization of the book when he tells us that “a commentary on the Gettysburg Address is necessarily, and above all, a commentary on what is meant by dedication to ‘the proposition that all men are created equal’.”Footnote 3 Does the reverse hold then? Is a commentary on “the proposition that all men are created equal” “necessarily” a commentary on the Gettysburg Address? If so, then we have here a clear indication of the main substantive theme of this sprawling, often apparently unfocused book: it intends to bring out what dedication to that proposition about equality means.
If explication of the proposition about equality is the matter of the book, then, Jaffa makes clear, its “form” is a “commentary.” The commentary, he informs us, is one of Thomas Aquinas's “characteristic forms,” an interesting observation in light of Jaffa's further divulgence that Crisis “imitated the disputed question of the Scholastics,” the form, Jaffa implies, of Aquinas' Summa.Footnote 4 The subject of Jaffa's books is human equality, an apparently modern theme; their form, however, follows the decidedly unmodern Aquinas.
Yet Jaffa goes out of his way to emphasize that “this commentary obviously must be different from that of Thomas on the Nichomachean Ethics … because a text of Aristotle's is virtually a self-contained work with its meaning altogether within that of the speech by which it is conveyed.”Footnote 5 Apart from the fact we have already noticed that New Birth is not in any conventional sense a commentary on the Gettysburg Address (since it does not address the Address directly), Jaffa also emphasizes that one needs to look at the Gettysburg Address “as part of a drama”—the larger historical drama of the Founding and then unraveling of America in the crisis of the Civil War.
Jaffa means to apply in his commentary the interpretive methods not of Aquinas, but of his teacher Leo Strauss.Footnote 6 “According to Leo Strauss, great books are works of art, and as such they are governed by what he … called logographic necessity.” Everything, including the smallest details that go counter to the apparent drift of the whole, including likewise the “silences,” must find a place in such a reading.Footnote 7 Jaffa intends to read the drama of history according to the principles Strauss applied to the most artfully written books. Jaffa anticipates the commonsense reaction:
It may be objected that history is not poetry and that I have confused them. To this I would reply … that the place of necessity in great poetry imposed by the art of the poet may be occupied by a providential order in history.Footnote 8
Jaffa attributes this view of history to Lincoln himself. But does not Lincoln's great Second Inaugural Address say the opposite? “The Almighty has his own purposes.” In saying that, does not Lincoln mean to correct those both North and South who thought they understood the divine purpose in history, for one cannot, to paraphrase a well-known saying of Strauss's, “understand its Author as the Author understood Himself.”
Neither Lincoln nor Strauss nor Aquinas appears to be a model for Jaffa's practice. Of the three figures that he mentions in this context, he is closest to Aquinas, because he more unambiguously and consistently affirmed divine, particular providence of a robustness that could begin to support Jaffa's idea of history as a text constructed with logographic necessity. Strauss most definitely never saw history in that way, and Lincoln either fails to identify history with providence (most of the time) or, as in the Second Inaugural, identifies history with an unfathomable providence.
The premise, or rather assumption, for it surely is not proved, of Jaffa's study is the providential guidance of history. This observation brings New Birth close once again to Plato's Laws. In the one reference outside the “Preface” to that work, Jaffa calls attention to the opening of the Laws where Kleinias the Cretan affirms that the laws of both Crete and Sparta are said to derive from gods, a thesis that the philosophic spokesman, the Athenian Stranger, retains in much modified form in his presentation of a natural theology toward the end of the Laws. A deeper connection between New Birth and Laws thus comes to sight: New Birth represents the sort of theologization of politics that Plato presents in Laws.
Lurking above or within all the themes Jaffa's pregnant preface raises is the question of the relation of Jaffa's thought to that of his teacher, Leo Strauss. Throughout his career, Jaffa professed loyalty to Strauss's thought. That loyalty is visible in such aspects of New Birth as the chief opponents against whom he takes up arms: “[H]istoricism, positivism, relativism, nihilism.” These four horsemen of the modern apocalypse were, of course, targets of Strauss's work as well. Yet Jaffa also clearly breaks with central features of Strauss's thinking. The character of Jaffa's modification of Strauss probably best comes to view if we note that Strauss was a thinker of dualities— ancients and moderns, Jerusalem and Athens, philosophy and poetry, the city and man. Jaffa, on the contrary, is a thinker of unities: he collapses Athens and Jerusalem, poetry and philosophy, and goes a long way toward assimilating Strauss's ancients and moderns, for example, when he argues that John Locke, a preeminent modern according to Strauss, is presenting what Aristotle would have said had he lived at Locke's time. What Strauss has put asunder Jaffa attempts to join together.
We might collect some of the themes or puzzles posed in the preface under the following heads:
1. How, despite so many apparent discontinuities between Crisis and New Birth, is the latter properly a sequel rather than, say, a correction of Crisis?
2. How is New Birth the more practical book, like Plato's Laws, and Crisis the more theoretical book, like the Republic?
3. What does New Birth in particular tell us about “dedication to the proposition that all men are created equal”?
4. What are we to make of Jaffa's “theologization” of history? Is this a serious doctrine for which he has some sort of proof?
5. What are we to make of Jaffa's repeated and insistent efforts to hold together the dualities Strauss constantly pushed apart? How does Jaffa relate to Strauss?
The Crisis of Crisis
The most efficient way to see the differences between Crisis and New Birth is to notice what Jaffa has to say about the American Founders, and about Lincoln's relation to them. The most prominent feature of Crisis was the claim that Lincoln went beyond and corrected the work and political understanding of the Founders. Indeed, Lincoln as refounder, Lincoln as the statesman-poet-philosopher who put the nation on a sounder footing than the Founders had left it, was the dominant theme of that book. But in the later New Birth, Jaffa no longer presents Lincoln as critic and corrective to the Founders. He argues that Lincoln continues and confirms the Founders' political deeds and political understanding. The later Jaffa thus appears to be a real critic of the earlier Jaffa.
Jaffa's critique and reformulation takes its point of departure from his Strauss-inspired identification in Crisis of the Founders as Lockeans, all of whom “read the Declaration [of Independence] as an expression of the sentiments of Locke's Second Treatise of Civil Government.”Footnote 9 As Lockeans, the Founders affirmed two doctrines that Jaffa believes Lincoln did not accept: they understood the proposition that “all men are created equal” as equivalent to the Lockean doctrine of the state of nature, and they understood natural rights in the Hobbesean-Lockean manner as “an indefeasible desire or passion.”Footnote 10 In Lockean theory, the state of nature is a state of equality because it is a condition where no person rightly can claim authority over any other.Footnote 11 Lockean-Jeffersonian equality is thus the beginning point; the movement into civil society is a movement away from it, indeed is an abrogation of it, for the coming of government is the coming of legitimate authority of some over others. For Lincoln, however, according to Jaffa, equality is not that from which we move but that to which a just society moves. As Lincoln said in the Gettysburg Address, the nation is “dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.” That dedication is forward looking, not merely a status to be left behind; equality is an attainment, or what Jaffa calls a “transcendental goal.”Footnote 12
The early Jaffa also modifies the Founders' Hobbesean theory of rights. As Jaffa sees it, rights, as understood by the Founders, are indefeasible passions. Because human beings are constituted in such a way that the strongest moving forces in them, their passions, drive them to preserve themselves, they cannot be blamed for doing what they cannot help doing. It is right, at least in the sense that it is not wrong, that they do what they must. Rights of this sort impose no obligations on others, however, for they merely pronounce morally blameless the agent who pursues his preservation.Footnote 13 Such a doctrine of rights lacks all nobility, Jaffa objects; it does not even secure the equality and right it aims to secure, for it contains no genuinely moral restraint. If one can get away with enslaving another group, then this Hobbesean doctrine has very little to say against it.
The solution to which Jaffa appeals in Crisis was an Aristotelianization of the regime. Lincoln's greatness resided not merely in his reaffirmation of the principle of equality in such a form as to stand unequivocally against slavery and in favor of government by consent—government of, by, and for the people. More than that, Lincoln reconceived the good of equality in Aristotelian terms. Those terms involved affirming the deeper truth of human inequality: some human beings belong to “the tribe of the eagle” and are indeed “better” and deserve to rule. Such, in effect, was Aristotle's argument in book 3 of his Politics. But the greatness of a man is moral greatness, superiority in virtue. The peak of moral virtue, as Jaffa presents the Aristotelian-Lincolnian position, is magnanimity: the great-souled man who, in his greatness and virtue, is beyond concern for honor and power. The great-souled man is truly superior, but has no interest in asserting his superiority. The theoretical truth, then, is inequality because of the differential achievement of virtue or excellence, but the practical or political truth is equality, for the truly excellent man will not raise claims to honor and rule, and those who do raise such claims are not truly excellent. “Like Aristotle's great souled man … he alone is worthy of the highest honor who holds honor itself in contempt.”Footnote 14
Forty years later, in New Birth, Jaffa has transformed many elements of his story. Lincoln is no longer presented as quiet critic and improver of the Founders; he and they agree on a (basically) Aristotelian doctrine of human equality and right. Lincoln, Jefferson, and behind them Locke emphasized doctrines that seem very different from Aristotle's, but Jaffa expends considerable energy establishing how, on Aristotelian grounds, they might arrive at such doctrines as are affirmed in the Declaration of Independence. The aim of this account is very similar to the earlier account in Crisis: to show that on Aristotelian grounds the American regime aimed at the rationally noble and just, that is, at virtue as understood by Aristotle. Jaffa's modification of the doctrine of Crisis probably has many causes, but the most apparent cause is the crisis in our understanding of Lincoln that Jaffa's account in Crisis produced.Footnote 15 In his effort to enlist Lincoln in a Strauss-inspired reformulation or refounding of America, Jaffa unwittingly fell into a serious self-contradiction. A central part of Lincoln's refounding or reformation of the regime was the effort to instill a reverence for the laws and the source of the laws, the fathers, and the principles on which they based their legislation. But one cannot carry out this Lincolnian project by, in effect, discrediting the Founders as Jaffa did. Crisis of the House Divided was itself a book divided. It tells us: follow Lincoln, the higher path, because the Founding was modern, and, therefore, imperfect and inadequate. Yet Lincoln tells us: follow the Founders. We are to follow the imperfect Founders as the solution to the imperfections of the Founders. That is the crisis into which Crisis of the House Divided fell.
Nonetheless, Crisis was a book that fit comfortably into what Jaffa had learned from Strauss. The problematically modern origin of the regime required improvement via a “return to the ancients,” effected through Jaffa's Aristotelianizing Lincoln. But so far as this solution made Lincoln unintelligible and also served to undermine the very reverence Lincoln sought to instill by revealing the original foundation of American law to be low and ignoble, it left much to be desired. Nonetheless, it is possible to see the thread of deep continuity between Crisis and New Birth despite Jaffa's change of mind or rhetoric about the Founding and the nature of Lockean modernity. That continuity consists in the ongoing effort to reinterpret the regime in Aristotelian terms and thus to elevate it. Although that project of redescription is consistent with the kind of political science of modern liberal democracy that Strauss had called for,Footnote 16 nonetheless, Jaffa's approach to that redescription drove him ever farther from Strauss as a more detailed look at New Birth makes clear.
Jaffa's New Birth
In many ways Strauss is a much more obtrusive presence in New Birth than he was in Crisis. For example, Strauss's name appears only twice in the earlier book, once in the acknowledgments section, once in the footnotes.Footnote 17 Strauss appears many more times in New Birth: in the preface, as the source for Jaffa's hermeneutic, once in a quotation that serves as one of four epigraphs to chapter 2; another time quoted in chapter 2, and three places in the footnotes.Footnote 18 More significantly, the polemical setting for New Birth very noticeably echoes Strauss. Jaffa frequently inveighs against positivism, historicism, relativism, and nihilism, all well-known targets of Strauss's work. Moreover, as Tom West, a close student of Jaffa, points out, “the first two chapters of New Birth are devoted, respectively to natural right and history,” the title topics of Strauss's best-known book.Footnote 19 West concludes from that and other observations that “Jaffa's achievement [in New Birth] was made possible by the work of his teacher, the political philosopher Leo Strauss.”Footnote 20 Another close student of Jaffa, Edward Erler, goes even further in drawing the link: “I believe that Harry V. Jaffa's A New Birth of Freedom is the book (or nearly the book) that Leo Strauss would have written had his principal concern been the crisis of America rather than the crisis of the West.”Footnote 21
There are, however, a number of strong counter-currents to those obtrusively Straussian elements of New Birth. In the one place in the text of New Birth where Jaffa quotes and then discusses a passage by Strauss, Jaffa disagrees with him. Jaffa quotes Strauss on the triumph of German historicism in post-World War II America, and then comments: “This victory of historicism and relativism, culminating in nihilism … actually occurred long before the date assigned it here by Strauss.”Footnote 22 Moreover, as we have noticed, Jaffa identifies himself as an heir of Thomas Aquinas in his two Lincoln books.Footnote 23 Strauss most definitely did not consider himself an heir of Aquinas; indeed, he is well known for arguing that the kind of synthesis of reason and revelation that Aquinas attempted to construct was impossible to achieve, perhaps even misguided to attempt. Jaffa's relations to Strauss are somehow central to understanding the trajectory of his own thinking, but New Birth, at least on the surface, is decidedly ambiguous about that relation. The implication is that we must probe beneath the surface. Except for the preface and the echoes of the titles of Strauss's book on Plato's Laws in the titles of Jaffa's chapters 4 and 5, all other explicit references to Strauss appear in chapter 2, “The Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg Address, and the Historians.” In addition to being the one place in New Birth where the Gettysburg Address is highlighted at least to the degree that it appears in the chapter title, chapter 2 is also the concentrated locus of Strauss's presence in the book.
Chapter 2 of New Birth is in many ways an odd chapter. It is surely the most wide ranging in the book, concerning among other things, the Western political and philosophic experience from antiquity into the twentieth century. On the surface, the chapter is a critique of Becker's historicizing account of the Declaration; Jaffa uses the confrontation with Carl Becker to present his own nonhistoricizing account and defense of the truth of the Declaration's central proposition (as he, Jaffa, understands it): “[T]hat all men are created equal.” So far as Jaffa's book is a rumination on the central claim of the Gettysburg Address, chapter 2 is the place where that occurs. Yet the scope of the chapter is epic. Jaffa's obtrusively odd organization of the chapter is provided by the four epigraphs Becker attached to his book. Indeed, a discussion of the epigraphs replaces a detailed discussion of Becker's book itself. Jaffa defends his odd procedure as follows:
Becker prefaces his book on the Declaration with four epigraphs that declare in advance his disbelief in the truth of the document to which he has given such devoted labor. These epigraphs define, perhaps better than his text, the climate of opinions, within which his mind moved and within which American historiography has moved ever since.Footnote 24
Two of Becker's epigraphs are drawn from Pascal's Pensées, one of which expresses doubt about nature, the other about the rationality of law; the two together about natural law (or natural right). The third is by Thomas Burnett, who speaks of the various changes in the English polity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and implies that changes in political opinion, especially opinions about the grounds of legitimacy, occur in response to changes in the political facts “on the ground” and serve as rationalizations for those facts, or, at best, as “ideologies.”
The fourth epigraph, which proves to be most important for the argument of Jaffa's chapter, is taken from Joseph de Maistre, the French counter-revolutionary. De Maistre, rejecting the universalism of the French revolutionaries, famously said, “I have seen, in my time, Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, etc, … but as for Man, I declare I never met him in my life; if he exists, it is without my knowledge.” There is no existing entity “man,” to which the proposition “all men are created equal” could apply. All four epigraphs certainly have as their central tendency exactly what Jaffa says: a denial of the truth of the claim raised in the Declaration of Independence.
What makes Jaffa's use of Becker's epigraphs so striking is the fact that he prefaces his chapter with four epigraphs, all of which, like Becker's four, bear on the question of the truth of the claims raised in the Declaration.Footnote 25 Taking a page from Jaffa's own book, I propose to discuss Jaffa's chapter 2, and therewith the question of the relation between his late thought and that of Strauss, as well as the other topics we saw him raising in the preface via focusing on his four epigraphs.
The first of Jaffa's four epigraphs is by Lincoln, the next by Becker; the third is by Adolph Hitler, and the fourth by Strauss. All four concern, directly or indirectly, the “self-evident truths” affirmed in the Declaration of Independence. The quotation from Lincoln praises Thomas Jefferson for including in the Declaration, a document produced for a single people at a single moment in their national history, “an abstract truth, applicable to all men and all times.” Lincoln identified as true the claims raised in the Declaration, whereas Becker, in the second epigraph, avers that it is “essentially a meaningless question” to ask if these claims are true. To say that the question is “meaningless” presumably means that the question cannot be given a yes or no answer; claims of that sort are mere values, neither true nor false.
The third epigraph is, perhaps surprisingly, taken from Hitler, who is quoted as saying, in effect, that it has been all down-hill for America since the South lost the Civil War. The civilization of the South, “based on the principle of slavery and inequality” contained “the embryo of a fundamentally great America.” The Southern slavocracy principle of “slavery and inequality” is superior to, because presumably true, Jefferson and Lincoln's “all men are created equal.” So Hitler shares with Becker a rejection of Lincoln's view that the Declaration presented “abstract truth” but on an entirely different ground. He does not find the propositions in the Declaration to be meaningless, but false.
The interesting question, however, is how Strauss relates to these various orientations towards the critical propositions in the Declaration. As opposed to Hitler, who saw America's greatness and prosperity stunted by the rejection of the system of slavery and inequality, Strauss attributes America's great power and prosperity, at least in part, to its dedication to the propositions of the Declaration. More significant in the context of Jaffa's book, however, is the way the quotation from Strauss relates to the quotation from Lincoln. Where Lincoln in his own voice had unequivocally declared those propositions to be an “abstract truth,” Strauss refers to them as “the faith in which [America] was conceived and raised.” Strauss pointedly does not call them truths. Their power, in Strauss's rendition, does not derive from their truth, but from their being “held.” Strauss does not endorse the Lincolnian view: what he says could but need not be compatible with it. The quotation is taken from Strauss's Natural Right and History, the book Jaffa's first two chapters are so clearly echoing. Elsewhere in Strauss's book, in elucidating the thought of the ancients to whom he thought we must return, Strauss gave his judgment on the issue raised by Jaffa's four epigraphs: “Since men are then unequal in regard to human perfection, i.e., in the decisive respect, equal rights for all appeared to the classics as most unjust. They contend that some men are by nature superior to others and therefore, according to natural right, the rulers of others.”Footnote 26 Strauss is closer to those who deny the truth of the propositions in the Declaration than he is to those like Becker who consider them meaningless, or to those like Jefferson and Lincoln, who hold them to be true.
If, as seems evident, the two guiding stars in Jaffa's firmament are Strauss and Lincoln, then here at the opening of chapter 2 of New Birth Jaffa makes clear the problem with which he is grappling: his two authorities are at odds with each other. In this disagreement, he sides with Lincoln and against Strauss.
The core of the chapter must be, then, an argument on behalf of the Lincolnian over the Straussian position. At the same time, that argument in favor of the proposition that “all men are created equal” is the commentary on the Gettysburg Address that Jaffa has promised. The examination of de Maistre's claim to know “Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, etc.”, but not to know man provides context for Jaffa's effort to prove the truth that all men are created equal. Jaffa is very emphatic in endorsing the Lincolnian position: “[T]he equality proposition in the Declaration and Gettysburg Address is not merely a truth but a truism.”Footnote 27 It is “a permanent truth,” that is, not historically relative in any sense.
The argument Jaffa gives is not at all the same argument as he gave in Crisis, where he, in effect, distinguished between the abstract or theoretical truth of inequality (we now see, in agreement with Strauss) and the practical truth of equality. New Birth is more intransigently egalitarian, but it is still rooted in an Aristotelian argument. New Birth's argument for equality is based on “the human capacity to abstract or separate what is intelligible from what is sensible.” Equality is, therefore, “self-evident.” It is not a mere matter of faith or belief. Indeed, its truth is “in no way dependent upon its recognition.”Footnote 28
The theory of the Declaration, Jaffa now argues, rests on “metaphysical freedom,” that is, on “the freedom by which human minds perceive the universal in the particulars by which they denominate anything denominated by a common noun.”Footnote 29 The mind is free because it can “abstract from all sensible qualities,” from all matter in order to “think the universal.” “Sensible reality can become intelligible reality.”Footnote 30 This power allows us to identify the “whatness” of any being; to use Jaffa's example, to perceive a dog as a dog, rather than a mere collection of sensible qualities. The universal, “the idea of the dog,” is “an abstraction from every possible dog,” but essential to the perception of any dog.Footnote 31
Metaphysical freedom allows us to perceive nature, and is the ground of “all the other freedoms that we … hold dear.”Footnote 32 It is also the foundation of the equality claim:
When the Declaration [of Independence] asserts that all men are created equal, it is asserting what is in one sense not merely a truth but a truism. All human beings are equally human beings, in the same sense that all dogs are equally dogs, and all chairs are equally chairs. Anything denominated by any common noun partakes equally in the class characteristics referred to by that noun.Footnote 33
That equal participation has, Jaffa insists, direct political relevance. It dissolves, for example, the professed racial basis for slavery and discrimination:
If we say then that the Constitution, being based upon the principles of the Declaration, is color blind, we say what must be true because the idea of man is color blind. It is color blind because every common noun is lacking color or any other sensible quality. Dogs and chairs, as dogs and chairs, are not white dogs and chairs or black dogs and chairs. And human beings, as human beings, are not white or black human beings, or humans of any other color.Footnote 34
The mind forms these classes by induction, not deduction. These truths of class character are not deduced or derivative from other truths—they are “self-evident.”Footnote 35 The classifications made or discovered by the mind have an order to them, the order of genus, species, and variety.Footnote 36 The largest politically relevant classification appears to be into the classes of God-man-beast.
The distinction between man, beast, and God, as set forth in the first book of Aristotle's Politics, remains the framework of the thought of the Declaration of Independence, and the difference between man and beast, on the one hand, and man and god on the other, remain self-evident and definitive.Footnote 37
By “definitive” he seems to mean “definitional,” identifying the truly essential differences.
From the threefold classification of God-man-beast, Jaffa derives a more precise notion of what the equality of human beings qua human beings means or implies. From the differences among the three,
we know that any attempt of human beings to rule other human beings, as if the former were Gods, and the latter beasts, is wrong. That is why the rule of law—ruling and being ruled in turn—is the only intrinsically just arrangement by which human beings can rule one another. This is a permanent truth, and one in no way dependent upon its recognition.Footnote 38
Slavery or anything other than democratic rule is wrong because it involves, Jaffa implies, a kind of “class-jumping”—it involves raising claims to godliness by some and a reduction to beastliness for others. If that kind of class-jumping is ruled out by nature or being itself, then the mandate that “all men are created equal” follows.
This argument supplies not only Jaffa's vindication of Jefferson and Lincoln, but also his refutation of Strauss. The argument undoubtedly has elegance and a certain simplicity, but is it true? Do we not require a good deal more in order to draw the political conclusions Jaffa wishes to draw? What about the classical position to which Strauss adverted? All men may be equally men but some men have virtue to a higher degree than others and thus derive a claim to rule. Does the argument about species character really rule this out? All chairs are chairs, but are not some chairs better chairs than others? Sturdier perhaps? Or more comfortable? All wolves are wolves, but are there not leaders, even natural leaders of the pack?
Jaffa does not even pause to consider the kinds of moral/political critiques of essentialist argument raised by postmodern critics like Jacques Derrida. If each being is what it is by virtue of a species-defining quality, then that quality provides grounds for hierarchical ordering or ranking of the members of the class. If man is defined as the rational animal, the traditional definition that Jaffa appears to accept, then it certainly appears that some human beings are, indeed, more human than others to the degree that their rational faculties are more developed and rule the whole man to a greater degree. This is precisely the idea that Aristotle himself endorsed and Strauss was explicating in his observation that the classics rejected human equality as “most unjust.” Jaffa's way of construing the being of the beings leaves no room for the central Aristotelian categories of actual and potential and thus ignores the inegalitarian implications or possibilities of classical metaphysical realism.
Jaffa's account of equality in New Birth is more theoretical than the argument in Crisis. Like the argument in Crisis, it looks to Aristotle and Aristotelian themes for support. Instead of looking to Aristotle on the human things, however, it looks to Aristotelian ontology, another major break with Strauss's way of reading the ancients. In New Birth, Jaffa reminds us more than a little of Dante, who, in his De Monarchia, presented an argument for universal monarchy on the basis of Aristotelian metaphysics, not his political science.Footnote 39
Jaffa's New Birth represents a turn not only in the substance of what he concludes about the American Founders and Lincoln's relation to them, but more deeply in the type of reasoning that Jaffa deploys. His new account of the truth of equality (and rights?) allows him to escape some of the tangles and troubles that beset him in Crisis, but it brings its own set of difficulties. Probably the greatest of these should be apparent from the earlier quotation from Natural Right and History: the classics, including Aristotle, “contend that some men are by nature superior to others and therefore, according to natural right the rulers of others.” From their common ontological premises, Aristotle himself draws the very opposite conclusion from the one Jaffa draws.
Jaffa recognizes the problem when he asks, how is it “that in the long experience of mankind, the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence had never, before 1776, been the basis of the experiment of popular self-government?”Footnote 40 Prior to 1776 the trichotomy of God, man, and beast led not to political life based on equality, but to divine rights of kings, or to the classical doctrine of human inequality, as in Plato's “myth of the metals.”Footnote 41 “Thus one sees that the inequality between man, beast, and God has been the source of two diametrically different doctrines of the proper relationship between man and his government: the doctrine that human government requires inequality as its principle, and the doctrine that it requires equality.” Jaffa embarks on the enterprise “to discover the cause or causes of this difference.”Footnote 42 This inquiry must, at the same time, be the quest for the differences between Jaffa and his teacher Strauss.
Jaffa presents a long and quite interesting account of how Christianity grew up within the Roman Empire, and of how its first fruit was divine right of kings rather than the Declaration's equality doctrine. The details of Jaffa's story are not needed here, but several observations about his account are necessary. The structure of his broader argument would seem to require that he give an explanation of why Plato and especially Aristotle (and Strauss) did not see the political implications of species equality as Jefferson and Lincoln allegedly do, but he does not address this question. Instead, he begins his account with the advent of the Roman Empire and the growth of Christianity within it. In passing, he concedes that the ancient world (pre-Roman Empire) was “a world of inequality” that was transformed into a world of equality by the leveling and universalizing effects of the Roman conquest. That is, the account does not even begin to explain what most requires explaining. Although Christianity did not realize the equality principle right away, the ground for it was laid in the Gospels. “Through Jesus, God's promise to Abraham became promises for all mankind. In respect to these promises, it can now be said ‘that all men are created equal’.”Footnote 43 Most significantly, Jaffa concludes his long discussion with the following very telling admission: “Whether the doctrine of equality in the Gospels was knowable by unassisted human reason as a doctrine of the natural law, apart from divine revelation, is not a question that needs to be decided here.”Footnote 44 Jaffa speaks of “the doctrine of equality of the Gospels”; he does not tell us if this is the same as the doctrine of human equality he has derived from the nature of species and the trichotomy of God, man, and beast, or something different. If the same, then Jaffa's dodging of the question of whether reason alone could establish it seems out of place, for he has just professed to do just that, insisting while doing so that the claim of equality is a “truism” and “self-evident.” If Gospel equality and species equality are different from each other, then we are forced to wonder how they relate to each other and to the “all men are created equal” assertion of Jefferson and Lincoln. Can it be that Jaffa's deeper view is that the equality claim of the Declaration requires an amalgamation of both species equality and Gospel equality, the latter of which apparently cannot be established rationally, or at least has not been established rationally by Jaffa? Is Jaffa's point that, despite his many claims about reason's power, politics in America must be theologized in order to find its ground?
In any case, the statement about Gospel equality and unassisted human reason occurs long after Jaffa has provided what seemed to be his rational proof for the equality proposition in his argument for species equality and the trichotomy of God, man, beast. Jaffa's late admission can mean only that he does not consider that he has as yet established the “doctrine of equality … by unassisted human reason.” This is a telling admission, for it coheres with the impression that the arguments he has forwarded for equality are not very solid. That all men are men, that is, participate in the universal man, says nothing whatever about whether there is a natural principle of authority within the species.
By the time Jaffa comes to the end of his narration of the supplanting of divine right of kings by divine right of the people (i.e., by the doctrine of the original equality and the doctrine of rights), he has quietly but clearly withdrawn his earlier claim that the equality proposition can be rationally established on the basis of the arguments he has produced. The equality proposition is a result of Christianity, not reason, and Christianity, he very strongly suggests, is the (necessary?) result of purely secular developments, that is, of the overcoming of the ancient city by the Roman Empire. “After Rome conquered the ancient world and Caesar conquered Rome, there was but one city, and there could be but one paramount law and, with equal reason, but one God.”Footnote 45 The condition of the world under Rome required the rule of the one God. “Only a transcendent God whose rule of the universe was unchallengeable, since he was the only God, corresponded with Rome's supposedly unchallengeable rule of the human world.”Footnote 46
Jaffa's analysis sounds like a naturalistic account of the coming of Christianity, reminiscent of Machiavelli, Gibbon, Hegel, or Tocqueville. That analysis leaves us with a series of puzzles about Jaffa's position, however. It would appear that the equality principle is not rationally true (at least not on any grounds Jaffa presents), but has become persuasive to mankind because of a certain history. Equality is not a truism, nor a self-evident truth; it is a contingent belief, a matter of faith, persuasive for reasons Jaffa thinks he can explain. But as Jaffa quite forcefully points out, “what is persuasive is not the same as what is true.”Footnote 47 It is in that very context that Jaffa reminds us that the “limits of action are not the limits of thought, [but] the limits of action may … impose limits upon the manner in which the thought that directs action is expressed.”Footnote 48 The immediate subject of this sentence is Dante, but it is difficult not to apply Jaffa's observation to himself. As Jaffa says,
Sometimes the best argument is the least persuasive, and the most persuasive is far from being the best. That those who dissemble often do so in the cause of injustice does not mean that those who dissemble may not do so in the interest of justice.Footnote 49
The various lines of the argument converge in the suggestion that Jaffa is himself the one who dissembles in the interest of justice. His dissembling takes the form of distorting the thought of the American Founders by assimilating them into the classics and Christianity to a much greater degree than is warranted. It takes the form also of apparently endorsing the equality proposition and apparently endorsing arguments like ontological realism and the trichotomy of beings as supports for the equality proposition. Perhaps most revealingly, his dissembling takes the form of obtrusively endorsing Strauss, while only slightly less obtrusively breaking with Strauss. In the deepest bowels of his argument, however, Jaffa appears to return to the surface of his claims—he remains with Strauss, but dissembles greatly in order to do so. At the end of the day, Jaffa seems to endorse a position rather like Strauss's: belief in the propositions of the Declaration is a matter of ancient faith. They may be useful beliefs but, he implies, it is not evident that they are true beliefs.
We can make sense of Jaffa's peregrinations along the following lines. He started with Strauss, but Strauss had a tension-filled and nearly contradictory position on America. He saw America in a dual light—as a product and partaker (in large part) in modernity, but also as the “last best hope on earth” for all that is politically valuable in the world today. For all his reservations about modernity, Strauss was, nonetheless, a friend and partisan (so far as his philosophic temperament allowed partisanship) of America.Footnote 50 But he necessarily came across as a lukewarm friend of America. Not only some of Strauss's students and friends understood him thus, but so did many, indeed most of his enemies—and his enemies are many. His suspect political loyalties remain one of the sources of enmity to him. He sought to support America in the modern world as part of reviving the political philosophy of the ancients. But reviving the ancients stood in tension with supporting America.
Jaffa, in effect, attempts to domesticate Strauss, to make a warmer defense of America that at the same time remains loyal to the broader causes Strauss championed— political philosophy as opposed to positivism and historicism (two targets of New Birth), and the ancients as opposed to the moderns. Jaffa has had to modify Straussian orthodoxy substantially, in the expression of his thought if not in his understanding of things, in order to effectuate the deeper rapprochement between Strauss and America that he seeks. In a great act of loyalty, Jaffa became disloyal to Strauss. By his own testimony that is perfectly legitimate. If I am correct in my attempt to reconstruct the levels of Jaffa's project, it should come as no great surprise that many of his historical arguments are less than persuasive, and that some of his philosophic arguments are inadequate.
Let me close by paraphrasing a passage quoted already from a review of New Birth by Edward Erler. New Birth is definitely not a book Leo Strauss would have written, but it is a book that Jaffa thinks Strauss should have written if he (Strauss) took as seriously as he should have the great importance of America in the modern world. So far as America is the political hope for a solution to the crisis of modernity, both modernity and America, Jaffa thinks, require a different presentation than Strauss gave them.
