London water was the first integrated urban infrastructure network, a precursor to the nineteenth-century rise of integrated networks for water, gas, sewers, and electricity in cities throughout Europe and North America. By the end of the eighteenth century, well over 20 percent of houses in London received piped water from a private company, usually delivered to the lower floor or basement. By 1820, only 15 percent of houses in London were not connected. By contrast, in 1850, no more than 20 percent of houses in Paris had a network connection.

Leslie Tomory has written an engaging and convincing book arguing that the successful development of London's water network required various technical and institutional factors to come together. No single explanation is sufficient. London's large population, a middle-class consumer revolution, technological innovation, and supportive business, legal, and political environments all contributed to the takeoff of network infrastructure. The earliest companies had a secure foothold and the network model of water supply was established by 1700. Further innovation improved pressure and reliability, making London's water network a model for Philadelphia and other cities by the late eighteenth century.

In 1580, the City of London provided water for all at public conduits, with many citizens paying water-carriers to deliver it to their house. An inability to keep up with population growth prompted the city government to turn to skilled engineer Peter Morris and an innovative way to deliver water from the River Thames via a water wheel under London Bridge (chap. 2). Morris brought to London European mining technology in the form of piston pumps to raise the water. He used an imported pipe-boring machine and copied Hamburg's model of providing water through a network of wood pipes (p. 27). Morris's innovation was to take these technologies to a larger scale, creating an extensive physical network of pipes.

Later innovations allowed for network expansion. Ballcocks developed in 1720 prevented waste, iron mains required less frequent replacement and allowed for higher pressure in the mains, while the introduction of steam engines slowly improved pumping capacity. Innovations also presented challenges to incumbents and encouraged entry. The rising cost of elm during the Napoleonic wars encouraged new companies to build networks using only iron pipes, as the old model of wooden service pipes was no longer viable.

Tomory argues that London's water industry manifests a slow process of innovation, not just technological but also in organizational structure. After growing organically throughout the seventeenth century, the two oldest and largest companies—the New River Company (NRC) and London Bridge Waterworks (LBWW)—realized in the eighteenth century that further expansion required a network and organizational reassessment. The NRC addressed this first, seeking guidance from Christopher Wren and George Lowthorp. Both emphasized the need to rethink the pipe network from scratch, to deal with technical issues such as air blocks in the pipes, and to address customer behavior and the waste of water (pp. 142–43, 167). The NRC spent many years reorganizing its network, moving customers off the mains and equalizing the water pressure across regions. The LBWW undertook similar reorganization during the later 1700s, addressing practices that were once successful but proved a hindrance as the size of the market increased.

Political and legal institutions, local and national, were important for the success of the water industry from 1582 onward. Both the LBWW and NRC initially received financial support from the City of London, in addition to legal rights to water and land. At a time of contested national governance, both royal and parliamentary recognition could prove essential. The only failure of a waterworks due to the revocation of water rights occurred in 1664, when Charles II refused to recognize rights granted to Edward Ford by Oliver Cromwell in 1655 (pp. 71–72). The LBWW used patents as a form of Crown patronage while Hugh Myddleton proved adept at securing broad political support. The NRC used joint-stock financing and incorporation at a time when both were rare, while the LBWW transitioned from a partnership to joint-stock structure in 1700, though without incorporation. Broad political and financial support allowed both companies to survive the seventeenth century and expand during the eighteenth.

H. W. Dickinson's Water Supply of Greater London (1954) provided a classic history cataloging the technological innovations, companies, and characters playing leading roles in London's water industry. Tomory tells a richer story, adding an emphasis on the necessity of institutional support for the water companies and the importance of people as customers and workers in this labor-intensive industry. Primarily presented as a chronological history, the book switches to a thematic focus on consumption in chapter 6 and on purity in chapter 7 in a way that fits comfortably within the chronology.

Modern concerns with water quality and public health did not enter public discourse until the nineteenth century. Company concerns with water purity focused primarily on the prevention of leaves and animal dung from entering the water. In the late 1700s, as medical opinion started to consider the connection between water and disease, human waste from privies became a concern. Public opinion viewed water purity differently, focusing on river contamination from bathing, generating a class-based debate over the relationship between cleanliness and morality. Negative views of river bathing were themselves a result of the pervasiveness of piped water, as indoor bathing became the middle-class norm. The real price of a water connection fell from about 13 percent of an average worker's annual income to about 4 percent by 1800, bringing it within reach of all but the poorest by the end of the eighteenth century.

Tomory draws on an impressive range of sources, making particularly good use of archival records, including some not used previously—such as Samuel Hearn's 1745 report on the LBWW, which Tomory has the engineering expertise to explain clearly (chap. 5). References are extensive and secondary sources are checked. Illustrations are well chosen and Tomory has created some impressive maps of mains networks and customer density based on company minutes and rent books.

A reader who knows the area well might find minor repetition redundant (for example, Morris's experience in Chester is mentioned on both page 13 and page 32), and a reader in London would be surprised by the use of “faucet” rather than “tap,” but these are minor quibbles. The only typographical error of importance is that the map labels on page 157 seem out of place, identifying the Chelsea Company south of the river. The text makes the company's correct location clear.

The History of the London Water Industry is a well-written book that will reward anyone interested in the development of urban infrastructure, London's growth as a world city, or the broader innovations surrounding Britain's industrial revolution.