Splits and radicalism in the IRA after Irish independence

The IRA of the 1920s to the late 1930s is often presented as containing distinct groups in which hawks and doves coexisted uneasily. The composition of those forming the IRA changed as splits empowered militants:

The embrace of Marxist ideology by the IRA leadership and disillusionment with the republican rhetoric of the Irish leader, de Valera, at a time when the Irish Free State had emerged (via Dominion status like present-day Canada), ensured that many IRA members gave up involvement in politics (English, Reference English2003: 49; Smith, Reference Smith1997: 62). Many socialist intellectuals left to fight in the Spanish civil war, whereas others defected to form the ‘short-lived, fissiparous Republican Congress’ (English, Reference English2003: 49).

The net result was that a hardcore residual group remained. This hardcore residual was crucially far more committed to violence than those who had left the organization. Sean Russell, a member of this militant faction, was elected IRA Chief of Staff at the IRA Convention of 1938. Russell advocated an IRA bombing campaign against England. It is noteworthy that Russell's election as leader led to the further defection of several relatively less militaristic figures such as Seán MacBride and Tom Barry (Smith, Reference Smith1997: 62–63).

By the end of 1939, there had been 291 bombs exploded in Britain. These attacks resulted in 96 injuries and seven deaths. A tough security response followed: In Eire (Ireland), a Special Branch raid in September 1939 led to the arrest of virtually the entire IRA General Headquarters (GHQ) (Bell, Reference Bell1990: 168). In Northern Ireland, IRA members were interned for the duration of the War, and the tight security response broke the organization apart. The bulk of the membership was jailed in the UK and Eire, or had been shot down, and, as late as 1950, 12 IRA members were still imprisoned in Belfast's Crumlin Road prison. By 1945, the IRA had ‘apparently died, defeated, another romantic cord in the pattern of Irish history frayed and broken’ (Bell, Reference Bell1990: 235). Neither the British at war, nor the ostensibly neutral Irish, wanted to risk misunderstandings over nationalist conflict during WWII: both therefore cracked down hard. Moreover, as the following section shows, the IRA was revived briefly within a decade, but it would face similar internal tensions as it did in the 1930s and 1940s. Ruthless responses to terrorism in the late 1930s and early 1940s seemingly broke the IRA for a time, perhaps under special circumstances, and not dependent on amnesties or similar leniency programs. The period supports an interpretation a narrowly drawn application of deterrence principles, with a measure of incapacitation of combatants thrown in for good measure. Nonetheless, before the run up to WWII, it is clear that a post-independence division emerged between moderate and more extreme republicans, with the later remaining as a militaristic hardcore in a much reduced IRA.

The IRA border campaign 1956–1962

The planning for this campaign began in 1950, but the initial attacks started later in 1956. However, the IRA's prospects for success in the border war ‘melted away’ by 1957 as the (by then) Irish Republic's government introduced internment. By the end of 1958, nearly all the Army Council, GHQ staff, and Sinn Féin executive had been jailed (Smith, Reference Smith1997: 71). Inevitably this diminished the IRA's capacity for waging attacks, though there were over 500 incidents 1956–62 (English, Reference English2003, p.76). The IRA had to call off its campaign by February 1962 (English, Reference English2003, p.75). A lack of widespread public support, poor organization, successful co-operation between the Gardai (the Republic's police force) and the RUC in Northern Ireland, and the effective use of internment in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic all explain the failure of the IRA border campaign (English, Reference English2003: 76). Again, ruthless counterterrorism based on intelligence and military suppression proved to be decisive in containing terrorism.

The failure of the border campaign provoked an internal review led by Cathal Goulding, the IRA Chief of Staff from 1962. The response within the IRA was tension between those advocating a socialist-republican analysis and those favoring a more militant traditionalist approach. Initially, and again as in the 1930s, a leftist group came to dominate the IRA; history repeated itself and tensions soon resurfaced between those who were more committed to paramilitarism and those more committed to revolutionary politics. When Goulding came to power, he inherited an IRA that lacked arms, money, or volunteers (English, Reference English2003: 83), which, even by the spring of 1969, was still weak as well as increasingly divided; British Intelligence estimated that it had just 500 members. Although morale was good, arms, and ammunition were in short supply and financially the IRA was weak (Hanley and Millar, Reference Hanley and Millar2009: 114). The IRA had not split as a result of the border war, but the organization was altered by the experience: Membership had been lost but a hardcore residual remained within the IRA disillusioned by the political direction of its leadership. By the end of the 1960s, the tensions between the traditionalists and the radical leftists would come to a head.

By the late 1950s, leniency programs toward the IRA had emerged. In both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, IRA prisoners were often given early release. In December 1958, two prisoners in Northern Ireland, who had split from the IRA over the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy's condemnation of republican violence, were released. By April 1961, the Northern Irish government had released all its internees. Of the 256 IRA prisoners interned in Northern Ireland 89 ‘signed out’ pledging themselves to renounce violence in return for their freedom (Bishop and Maillie, Reference Bishop and Mallie1987: 31), which indicated remarkable faith being placed in promises. Moreover, as the level of the violence declined, de Valera's government in the Republic of Ireland began to show leniency toward internees imprisoned at the Curragh jail. In November 1958, 25 were released unconditionally (Flynn, Reference Flynn2009: 172). Furthermore, in February 1959, five more IRA internees were released. De Valera's willingness to release internees may have resulted from his campaign for the Irish Presidency in 1959. In terms of the model in Dnes and Garoupa (Reference Dnes and Garoupa2010), these releases would have a similar effect to rewarding defectors for acts of betrayal: They imply, for the new recruit, an easier time in returning to mainstream society after a period of involvement with terrorism.

Flynn (Reference Flynn2009: 204) argues that the roots of the modern factions within the broader IRA movement can be traced back to the failure of the 1956–62 border campaign. At the end of the Irish civil war in 1923, following independence from the United Kingdom, when de Valera ordered the IRA to bury its weapons, the failure fully to decommission weaponry signaled that violence could easily return. At the end of the 1956–62 border campaign, Ruairi O Bradaigh's last order as IRA chief of staff was to ‘dump arms’ (Maloney, Reference Moloney2002: 492). In other words, whatever became of the IRA's financial and human capital after 1962, the little physical capital that remained was to be preserved. It was in part the historical precedent of 1923 and 1962 that made pro-Agreement Unionists so keen to ensure that weapons decommissioning occurred in the wake of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. Decommissioning in the Irish context can be understood in economic terms is a kind of credible commitment device, aimed precisely at preventing the continued operation of a hardcore residual that had already been seen at several points in history.

The leniency shown toward prisoners in the late 1950s and early 1960s operated to put terrorists back into circulation in the case of unconditional releases. In the case of conditional releases, recirculation could occur if terms of release were flouted, but, at any rate, release would signal ‘life after terrorism’ to newer recruits. The IRA was positioned to become stronger again as the 1960s progressed.

The official and provisional IRA split 1969–70

A well-known rift within Irish republicanism was sparked by the IRA leadership's 1969 decision to end abstention from election to parliaments in Belfast, Dublin, and London. This decision represented a softening of outlook and a break from republican orthodoxy. It was a final straw for traditionalists like Seán MacStíofáin who formed a new body, the Provisional Army Council, following the Sinn Féin general meeting known as the Ard Fheis held on 11 January 1970 (English, Reference English2003: 106). The resolution to end the policy of abstention was pushed through and about one-third of the delegates walked out and reassembled to announce the formation of Provisional Sinn Féin (PSF). They also announced that a Provisional Army Council had been established to recognize this new IRA faction (English, Reference English2003: 107).

Alonso's analysis based on a series of interviews suggests that the IRA split in the late 1960s was the consequence of tactical more than ideological differences. The evidence he presents indicates that different assessments of the value of pursuing the bullet and ballot box were instrumental in leading to the split:

There were now two separate groups claiming to be the Irish Republican Army – one a more leftist grouping led by Goulding, referred to as the Official IRA (OIRA), and the other a more traditional and militant republican grouping led by MacStíofáin – the PIRA (Hanley and Miller, Reference Hanley and Millar2009: 146–147; Smith, Reference Smith1997: 83). Intelligence sources at the US Embassy in Dublin concluded that ‘most of those associated with the Republican Movement since 1962 remained with the “Officials”. . .who [have] retained most of the Movement's brains, trained men, money and arms as well as much of the movement's Dublin and Cork bases’ (Hanley and Miller, Reference Hanley and Millar2009: 151). Support for the two IRAs was ‘patchwork’ within Belfast (Hanley and Miller, Reference Hanley and Millar2009: 152–154)

The PIRA, by relying initially on the pursuit of political objectives by exclusively violent means, was a more violent organization than the OIRA it eclipsed. Smith (1977) argues those who joined PIRA in the split from OIRA were in turn a coalition of three factions who differed in their willingness to engage in violence. First, there were residual veterans of the 1956–62 campaign. Second, the biggest group of hardliners comprised northern republicans. Third, there were those like Gerry Adams who, although hailing from the north, saw little prospect for reforming Northern Ireland (Smith, Reference Smith1997: 84–86). This third (and most hard-line faction) was ‘undoubtedly the smallest and least important faction at the time of the split, but being highly motivated politically they were to move swiftly through the Provisionals’ ranks [occupying] positions of influence in the years ahead’ (Smith, Reference Smith1997: 86). The conditions enabling the Provisionals to develop in this manner included the easing back on tough criminal justice measures, such as those seen in the 1940s, and leniency/amnesty measures in the 1950s and 1960s.

The motivation of individual PIRA members has been well covered by both investigative journalists and academics (English, Reference English2016; O'Doherty, Reference O'Doherty1998; O'Leary, Reference O'Leary, Heiberg, O'Leary and Tirman2007). While a complete assessment is well beyond the scope of this paper, it is the case that the evidence presents a number of findings particularly relevant to economists. Following Frey's distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, we can see evidence of both. English noted that membership of the IRA was not without its extrinsic rewards. He highlighted that it could give members celebrity status within some communities (English, Reference English2016: 143). English also noted that some members exploited this celebrity status to secure financial and sexual rewards for themselves. Furthermore, English saw excitement as a motivation for some members (English, Reference English2016: 143). However, English notes that the dominant motivations were often intrinsic. English highlights the role of sectarian impulses as an intrinsic motivation and he argues that Marxist ideology was a secondary motivation (English, Reference English2016: 108–109).

The formation of PIRA was caused by disillusionment among hardliners that an excessive focus on Marxism and seeking electoral success would diminish what they saw as the IRA's primary function: its military role.

The Provisional's greater willingness to engage in tit-for-tat violence and the OIRA's initial reluctance accounts for the separate paths followed. When OIRA did attempt to stem the hemorrhaging of its support to PIRA and engaged in more high-profile acts of violence, such as the Aldershot bombing of 1972 and the murder in 1971 of the Unionist politician Senator Jack Barnhill, it was too late. The OIRA could never out-militarize PIRA in the competition for support. By May 1972, OIRA had announced a ceasefire, but this announcement was made after widespread internal dissent and the ceasefire was not immediately implemented. By the end of 1973, the OIRA ceased military operations (Smith, Reference Smith1997: 90).

In terms of the support for the Provisional IRA, evidence suggests that it was more complex than is often supposed. For example, location mattered, O'Doherty has noted that patterns of support even within West Belfast differed. Support for PIRA in the New Lodge was far more related to sectarian tensions than those on the solidly Catholic Falls (O'Doherty, Reference O'Doherty1998: 133). English additionally observes that those discussing IRA support should note that Sinn Féin became the electorally dominant party within Irish nationalism after the Provisionals started to bring violence to an end (English, Reference English2016: 119). Scholars have long pointed out that the Provisional IRA faced considerable opposition even from communities where it received support, and this had repercussions for the organization (Burton, Reference Burton1978). Even when observers have noted the role of punishment beatings and shootings in maintaining popular support they have noted that the situation was a complex one (O'Doherty, Reference O'Doherty1998; Smith, Reference Smith1997). Indeed O'Doherty's insight is that the high level of PIRA violence exerted within working class communities was not a measure of any overwhelming support, rather he suggests such violence allowed republicans to generate an impression of a coherent republican community in an area like West Belfast’ (O'Doherty, Reference O'Doherty1998: 150).

Critics of the symbolism of the ceasefire announcement argued that PIRA would extend their influence at the expense of the OIRA (Smith, Reference Smith1997: 89). The winding down of OIRA military activities created yet another split. Militants opposed to an OIRA ceasefire broke away to form the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) in December 1974 (Hanley and Miller, Reference Hanley and Millar2009: 283). The IRSP had an extremely violent military arm known as the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). However, the INLA in turn split apart in the 1980s as it too was beset by factionalism (Smith, Reference Smith1997: 90). The growth in factionalism may be seen as a process in which milder elements of the IRA were drawn back toward mainstream society by a combination of leniency programs and tough criminal-justice measures: PIRA and similar subsequent splits were then a hardcore response to this process.

Deterrence as well as leniency programs were both part of the UK response. Furthermore, social and interventionist economic policies were developed in response to the recognition of a linkage between social deprivation and political violence (Bean, Reference Bean, Edwards and Bloomer2008). In addition, the ability of the UK government in the early 1970s to respond to the Provisional IRA's ‘economic war’ by increasingly subsidizing Northern Irish industrial and commercial life arguably acted as a signal to Republicans that violence would not cause enough economic damage to attain their objectives (Brownlow, Reference Brownlow2012). Roy Mason, who served as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland between 1976 and 1979, strongly advocated the need to pursue both inward investment and tough security policies within a counterterrorism signaling strategy (Brownlow, Reference Brownlow2012).

Another vital component in Northern Irish counterterrorism was the role of intelligence. English (Reference English2016) observes that more generally the role of intelligence, and the use of informers and technical surveillance in particular, was crucial in undermining the capacity of PIRA to engage in violence (English, Reference English2016: 125). English suggests that by the late 1980s and early 1990s the intelligence advantage of the state was such that the Provisional IRA was made receptive to a compromise deal (English, Reference English2016: 126).

All other things remaining equal, technical and organizational progress should have enabled PIRA to increase their military capacity. The increasing effectiveness of the security response from the RUC, British Army and MI5 was to prove vital in forcing the PIRA to the negotiating table. Security force infiltration forced organizational change on PIRA. PIRA as a response to infiltration shifted away from the old structure of brigade/battalion/company toward a cell structure, but the small scale of such a structure increased the risk of engaging in attacks. Increased monitoring and infiltration led to an increase in counter-ambushes. Between 1978 and 1988, 30 PIRA members were killed in Special Air Service (SAS) operations (Smith, Reference Smith1997: 188).

It should equally be recalled that it was a failure of security intelligence that led in 1971 to the disastrous reintroduction of internment in Northern Ireland. This botched operation made things worse rather than better in that it provided an opportunity in the 1970s and 1980s for political protest via hunger strikes and similar acts of defiance by internees, who could claim to be political prisoners for media purposes: Media outlets by then being more developed than before. Nonetheless, at the time, more general benevolent policies, coming from Westminster and aimed at encouraging economic development and the creation of a political process supportive of peaceful political participation, had the gradual impact of encouraging the PIRA and Sinn Féin eventually to shift away from violence.

As Figure 1 indicates, violence in Northern Ireland peaked in 1972 and largely declined after the mid-1970s.

Figure 1.

Deaths and injuries (numbers) associated with the security situation in Northern Ireland, Republic of Ireland, and Great Britain, 1969–2009.

Sources: Deaths (NI) – PSNI (http://www.psni.police.uk/5._08_09_security_situation.pdf) Injuries (NI) – PSNI (http://www.psni.police.uk/persons_injured_cy.pdf) Deaths (ROI and GB) – author's calculations from data supplied by ICR Note the various forms of these figures and different measurements offered by different sources (see text for details). Some of the previous data offered by the RUC/PSNI have been provisional and altered later Source: Data provided by Professor Peter Shirlow, School of Law, Queen's University Belfast.

Contemporary dissidents

Just as the shift away from political abstention in the late 1960s forced the previous dissidents, the more hard line PIRA, to split away from the Official IRA, so similar disagreements explain the break away of the various currently active dissident groups.

The Provisionals initially announced their ceasefire in 1994 (ended by the 1996 Canary Wharf bombing in London, but reinstated in 1997). Gradually, the electoral success of Sinn Féin, and the introduction of power sharing into Northern Irish politics led to the final shift from bullets to the ballot box. Power sharing is actually the reservation of a proportion of representative government for what would otherwise be an electorally disadvantaged minority, and is a major element in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 that is widely credited with ending conflict in Northern Ireland. The developments in the 1990s and 2000s can be interpreted as the realization by IRA factions of gains from their activities as rogue groups, with such gains being unevenly distributed (Dnes and Garoupa, Reference Dnes and Garoupa2010: 525). In particular, the leaderships of factions have a strong incentive to participate in peace processes, when gaining high office becomes a possibility, which has happened in several cases, including Gerry Adams and Martin McGuiness. By September 2005, the Provisional IRA had decommissioned all of its weapons, its campaign in 2008 was declared ‘well and truly over’, and its leadership ‘no longer operational or functional’ (Independent International Monitoring Commission, 2008: 8). The shift from violent to peaceful means took around a decade and a half culminating in the negotiations that led to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 (Moloney, Reference Moloney2002). The former dissidents had slowly succeeded in finding a way out from terrorism.

Peace does not suit all factions. Dissidents see their role as sticking to the true path of authentic Irish Republicanism. As one leading member of the 32-County Sovereignty Committee has expressed it,

The CIRA along with its political wing – Republican Sinn Féin – owes its origins to a split within the Provisional Republican Movement in 1986 when former Sinn Féin President and PIRA Army Council Member Ruairi O'Bradaigh refused to back the Adams leadership plan to abandon the traditional strategy of abstention (Moloney, Reference Moloney2002: 289). As with some previous rivals to PIRA, such as OIRA or INLA they lacked enough critical mass in membership to become a serious threat. The CIRA was so fragile initially and so fearful of reprisals from the Provisionals that it was some years before the CIRA even revealed its existence (Moloney, Reference Moloney2002: 289).

The CIRA did not become active until after the Provisional IRA ceasefire of 1994. It has remained active in the period after the Good Friday Agreements and shows that even when the terrorist swamp is drained, a hardcore group is likely to remain (Dnes and Garoupa, Reference Dnes and Garoupa2010: 526). This dissident group has been involved in a number of bombings, bomb hoaxes, criminal activities, killings of its own members and has claimed responsibility for the murder of a police officer in 2009, according to the Independent International Monitoring Commission. However, the recurrent tendency toward splits reasserted itself and a new faction emerged even from within the CIRA. This new group calls itself Óglaigh na hÉireann (Irish Republican Army). Both factions of the CIRA include large numbers of ‘ordinary criminals’, who use the cloak of the organization to engage in non-terrorist criminality.

The Real IRA (and its political wing, the 32-County Sovereignty Committee) was formed after yet another split within PIRA. This time the 1997 split was caused by a faction within the organization objecting to republicans signing up to the Mitchell principles of non-violence, a necessary pre-condition to Sinn Féin entering the all-party negotiations which led to the Good Friday Agreement and power sharing (English, Reference English2003: 316). The new dissident organization also confusingly took the title Óglaigh na hÉireann but was soon referred to by the media as ‘the Real IRA’ (Maloney Reference Moloney2002: 479). Such was the momentousness of the 1997 decision that it was inevitable that a split would occur. The fundamental questions concerned the timing, scale, and damage that the split would cause. It is a reflection of discipline within PIRA that it took until 1997 for the split to emerge, after two Provisional IRA ceasefires had been called and maintained (Maloney Reference Moloney2002: 479). The Mitchell principles enabled early prisoner release, after which this discipline gave way to yet another split.

Another modern faction, the Real IRA views itself as the continuation of the armed struggle and has adopted Provisional tactics of sustained bombings and shootings in both Northern Ireland and on the UK mainland. The Real IRA that was responsible for the Omagh bomb which killed 29 people and injured over 200 in 1998. The group called a cease-fire in 1999 but recommenced violence in 2000 (English, Reference English2003: 318). Primarily because it includes former members of PIRA with significant technical skills and experience, it is regarded currently as the most dangerous of the dissident groups and the Independent International Monitoring Commission (2010: 12) concluded that it still constitutes the most serious threat to Ireland north and south as well as to the mainland UK.

Despite its generally stark assessment, the Independent International Monitoring Commission (2010: 5) does not view the Real IRA's campaign as comparable to the earlier PIRA campaign. In the Commission's optimistic view, the PIRA lacks the personnel, money, organization, and cohesion to match PIRA's former activities. The pessimist might observe that a similar assessment could have been made of PIRA's capabilities in 1970. It is another example of a ‘nasty residual’, showing that terrorist problems rarely completely disappear. A recent study on the emergence of dissident Republican groups suggests that the police reform that has occurred in Northern Ireland, while having political benefits in terms of securing political agreement on policing, has had operational costs as well. This cost is of particular concern because the operational capacity of the contemporary dissidents is high, as the leadership of the modern dissidents, unlike the leadership of the Provisional IRA in the early 1970s, has accumulated organizational and technical knowledge from decades of terrorism (Frampton, Reference Frampton2010: 34).

The lessons from the history of the IRA

This paper has examined Irish Republican paramilitarism by applying the insights from a model to the available historical material. The approach followed complements the valuable work of social scientists who have used interviews with former paramilitaries to establish the emergence, actions, and eventual disappearance of the Provisional IRA as an effective paramilitary force (Alonso, Reference Alonso2007; English, Reference English2016). An emerging literature about dissidents has recently emerged which follows similar approaches as well as discourse and data analyses (Edwards, Reference Edwards2011; Morrison and Horgan, Reference Morrison and Horgan2016; Whiting, Reference Whiting2012). Likewise, the insights of these scholars are also acknowledged.

Several important lessons arise from examining the history of IRA activity. First, events reveal the periodic emergence of gaps in human-capital characteristics between IRA leaders, terrorist foot soldiers, and the wider population. However, the gaps are more like a dotted line than the bipolar dichotomy envisaged by Dnes and Garoupa (Reference Dnes and Garoupa2010). The gap is indeed consistent with the model of human capital formation in gangs, but is characterized by much more detail than an insider-outsider view would suggest. In reality, at least in the case of the IRA, we have seen associations between several groups of distinct terrorist types, albeit that this gradation ultimately preserves a distinct gap between normal society and the terrorists.

Amnesties and, more generally, leniency programs, have operated to alter the incentives for remaining inside IRA groups. Outside incentives operated through amnesties that were typically offered to incarcerated terrorists, but which had implications for lowering the cost of getting out of active terrorism for individual IRA members. In particular, the Good Friday agreement provided a mechanism allowing members of the Provisional IRA to rejoin mainstream politics and realize gains from terror campaigns.

Factions and terrorist actions continue to exist, after the conclusion of the peace process, illustrating the theoretical prediction in Dnes and Garoupa (Reference Dnes and Garoupa2010) that nasty residuals remain after amnesty arrangements are put into place. It is indeed a rarity to find the terrorist swamp completely drained.

An implication is that authorities using amnesties to draw terrorists back into mainstream society should be realistic about what will happen: The terrorist problem will not completely disappear. A general observation is that where amnesties have been associated with enforced requirements for terrorists to disarm and to do so credibly, any residual faction has been weakened in resuming effective terrorism: A very clear practical illustration of the importance of devices supporting credible commitments (Williamson, Reference Willamson1983). The case of Northern Ireland shows the learning of that lesson early on, and then its repeated application to the peace process.

The pattern of factionalism is consistent with Dnes and Garoupa's (Reference Dnes and Garoupa2010: 523) modeling of betrayal possibilities in gangs, but it shows up in practical terms as pressure building within a terrorist organization as outside opportunities lead different groups in different directions. A connection may be made between an organization's splitting and some of its members being in a position to betray others, or feeling betrayed by others who are seen as losing connection with the terrorist cause, so that a split typically amounts to the emergence of a hardcore residual faction. Betrayal also reflects a breakdown in the leadership's ability to provide solidarity, which has public-good characteristics within the group (compare Skarbek, Reference Skarbek2014). The long tradition of splits within Irish republican terrorist groups often reflected left-leaning leaderships falling out of step with the wider population, including IRA foot soldiers. This division created tensions and led to departures resulting in a hardcore residual that pursued bombing campaigns in Ireland and England, reflecting some of the intra-organizational commitment issues associated with other rogue groups such as pirates (Leeson, Reference Leeson2009). After WWII, the IRA border campaign of 1956–62 was a total failure and subsequent amnesties for political prisoners north and south of the Irish border may have facilitated later violence. Conversely, deterrence policies (notably internment, which incapacitates terrorists) were successful in most periods in combating the IRA. Really hard crack downs, on both sides of the Irish border, as happened between the late 1930s and early 1940s, appear to have controlled IRA violence for significant periods of time as a kind of ‘corner solution’ in the extreme conditions surrounding WWII. Dnes and Garoupa (Reference Dnes and Garoupa2010) emphasized the sophisticated manner in which incentives operated within gangs: But really harsh, crude imprisonment measures, almost alone, did in fact control the IRA in the 1940s. A key ingredient in containment was cross-border co-operation ensuring that the terrorists had nowhere to go, at least for a period of time.