The Political Thought of America's Founding Feminists makes a significant contribution by uncovering and establishing the theoretical importance of some early American feminist writers who have been undeservedly neglected, while at the same time enhancing our understanding of the complex lineage of some more widely recognized strands of the American political tradition. The book discusses six early American feminists—Frances Wright, Harriet Martineau, Angelina Grimké, Sarah Grimké, Lucretia Mott, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton—devoting a chapter to each and arguing that, taken together, the work of these women represents a “constituent moment” in American history by laying the groundwork for “a transformative understanding of democratic citizenship” (5, 6). Vetter builds on existing scholarship but also advances it by delving into the work of these early feminists to highlight their distinctive theoretical contributions (where they exist) while also relating their writings and ideas to other major influential thinkers such as Tocqueville, Smith, and Bentham. Vetter thus situates her analysis of early American feminism within a broader, contextualizing discussion of how the Scottish Enlightenment “crossed the pond.”
The first chapter, on Frances Wright, seeks to counter the typical representation of Wright as a mere popularizer of better-known theories such as Bentham's utilitarianism and Robert Owen's utopian socialism. Vetter argues that Wright “expands and improves upon these theories to develop an insightful and original analysis of the American project” (24). For example, Wright advances “an early version of socialism that envisions itself as the extension and fulfillment of American democratic ideals” (43), especially those articulated in the Declaration, and not simply as a source of critique. Moreover, Wright's implicit theory of citizenship anticipates some aspects of American pragmatism, while her trenchant critique of slavery contains elements that would later form part of critical race theory.
Vetter's second chapter, on Harriett Martineau, is especially groundbreaking, establishing Martineau as a significant political theorist in her own right. The chapter analyzes Martineau's Society in America as well as her methodological treatise How to Observe: Morals and Manners. Vetter carefully and persuasively lays out how Martineau's understanding of the problem of majority tyranny both builds on and departs from Tocqueville's. Furthermore, Martineau adapts Adam Smith's theory of sympathy “to accommodate greater diversity among observers and observed,” generating a model that more easily encourages individuals to “empathize with those who are radically different from themselves” (26) and thus encourages recognition of the injustices that such “others” (disenfranchised women and slaves) face. Emphasizing Martineau's originality as a political thinker, Vetter makes a strong case for situating her work more prominently within the canon of American political thought.
Chapters 3 and 4 address Angelina and Sarah Grimké, respectively. Vetter closely analyzes Angelina Grimké’s use of rhetoric, situating it within the context of the Scottish Enlightment's debate about the proper use of rhetoric in moral and political life. Vetter draws fruitfully on Smith's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, presented as an extension of Smith's political and moral thought, to argue that Grimké not only employs some of the strategies Smith discusses, but also, like Martineau, draws on his understanding of sympathy in order to advance her own arguments about abolition and the advancement of women. Turning to Sarah Grimké, Vetter takes up the scholarly debate about the role of religion in her thought. Neither dismissing the religious foundation of Grimké’s thought nor allowing it to overshadow the political dimension, Vetter argues that “Quaker constitutionalism” provided a robust framework for Grimké’s defense of the constitutional rights of both black and white women.
The subject of chapter 5 is Lucretia Mott, who left behind “no treatises or lengthy writings to include in the canon of political thought” (145) but who nevertheless, Vetter argues, deserves greater attention because of her forty-nine speeches and sermons, which were later transcribed and published. Vetter's detailed analysis of this body of work uncovers a considered view of citizenship that rests on a radically egalitarian conception of power and individual autonomy, as well as a distinctive view of political decision making that strikes a dynamic, “antidogmatic” balance between collective deliberation and individual dissent. Like Sarah Grimké’s, Mott's views were informed by early Quaker constitutionalism, which offered “a model for peaceful reform and political change” (215).
Chapter 6 focuses on Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who is hardly neglected in the history of American feminism but is frequently criticized for what are deemed racist and elitist features of her work. Vetter engages some these criticisms directly and also seeks to expand the framework for analyzing Stanton's work by focusing on Stanton's use of ridicule as a rhetorical technique. Vetter argues that Stanton applies a nuanced understanding of Smith's discussion of ridicule in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres in order to move her audience through various stages of moral instruction and ultimately to induce recognition of the need for reform. Vetter also discusses Stanton's indirect invocations of Smith's impartial spectator in her effort to widen her audience's scope of sympathetic identification. Vetter's attentiveness to the rhetorical dimensions of Stanton's work adds new considerations for assessing Stanton's legacy. And in this and other chapters, she develops a new lens through which we might read the work of Smith, Tocqueville, and others.
In chapter 7, Vetter discusses Sojourner Truth's “important but neglected contribution to American political thought” (198). Although Truth's “lack of a written record might lead us to doubt that [her] theoretical contributions can be analyzed in a substantive way” (199), Vetter presents Truth's destabilization of entrenched stereotypes in both speech and action as emblematic of early feminists’ “alternative means of theorizing beyond the conventional written treatise” (199).
These brief summaries have provided an overview but cannot fully convey the richness of each chapter. Throughout the book, Vetter highlights the complexity and diversity of the early women's-rights movement and its relationship to the abolitionist movement in a way that challenges some long-standing assumptions while deepening our understanding of more settled points. For example, when discussing the influence of religion, Vetter offers a nuanced discussion of how theological ideas were both absorbed and critically deployed by the feminists. She argues that religious convictions did not simply have the effect of making the early feminist arguments more conservative, but rather, in some cases, more radical. Vetter also teases out an early and distinctive strand of American socialism, as well as an early appreciation for the interrelated causes of inequality that she argues is a precursor to what we today term intersectionality.
The result is a well-researched and beautifully written book that weaves together discussion of the contributions of several early feminists with several long-standing theoretical debates, in a compelling and fruitful way. The book should be of serious interest to scholars of feminist theory and history, as well as to those who focus more broadly on the political thought and political movements of the time period.
