Notwithstanding recent attempts to shift attention away from vision in the history of the senses, Stuart Clark unhesitatingly asserts its primacy in the early modern Western sensorium. However, he vigorously contests the assumption that the Renaissance discovery of linear perspective led progressively to a new, rational way of seeing which exactly matched the natural reality of visual perception. Instead Clark argues for a more complex notion of early modern visual culture, a context in which both old and new questions about the nature of vision consistently disrupted the established relationship between European intellectuals and the world they saw around them. As the author of Thinking with Demons (Oxford, 1997) he is particularly – but by no means solely – interested in exploring the destabilizing effect on early modern visual culture of belief in immaterial beings capable of manipulating both the workings of the senses and the world of perceived objects. The book spans a period between the early fifteenth century, when Aristotelian theories of cognition were the norm, and the late seventeenth century, by which time the new philosophy, with its mechanical account of sensation, had come to the fore.
After mapping out the parameters of ‘normal’ vision and its limitations as underpinned by the Arisotelian doctrine of species, Clark considers the three main types of visual error identified in the early modern period, namely natural, artificial (i.e. man-made) and demonic phenomena, all of which powerfully challenged Aristotelian assumptions about visual rationality. Clark marshals an impressively wide array of sources and genres, ranging from medical texts, treatises on the imagination and stage plays to works on dreams and demonology in which sensory delusion was a constant theme. The Reformation was a major source of debate as ‘vision became a subject of fierce and unprecedented confessional dispute’ (p. 161). At the heart of this struggle were the rites of the Catholic Mass, as Protestants saw transubstantiation as the falsest miracle of all – a claim based on a fundamentally different theory of vision from that of their opponents. Another focus for discussions on truth and illusion was the literature on apparitions, a context in which Protestants and Catholics were agreed on the uncertain foundations on which seeing ghosts, spirits and apparitions were based. A further sign of this ‘radical uncertainty’ (p. 211) was the popularity of phantoms on the seventeenth-century English stage, with Macbeth proving to be especially preoccupied with the problematic nature of vision.
At this point Clark turns towards philosophy, specifically Pyrrhonian scepticism, and explores how this movement seemed to chime with the visual paradoxes that confronted sixteenth-century intellectuals. Between the 1570s and 1630s a host of writers including Montaigne and Descartes, vigorously attacked Aristotelian realist understandings of the world and substituted a relativism that seems almost modern in character. Witchcraft theory was especially intense during this period, with the status of dreams and their likely instigation by the devil (or not) being a central theme. Clark observes that eventually dreams were explained in a purely naturalistic manner, being removed from the spheres of the demonic and divine, and discussed chiefly in medical terms. This shift in explanation brings us to the last chapter, in which Clark finally considers the attempts to restore visual confidence that are familiar to historians of seventeenth-century science and philosophy, most notably the mechanical philosophies of Descartes and Hobbes. Before doing so, however, he observes that there was a transmutation or decline of much of the intellectual activity that had brought about the derationalization of sight in the first place.
One of the most important changes was that most people ‘ceased to believe that the devil intervened physically in human affairs and manipulated them to the point of absurdity’ (p. 329), but there were other debates, too, which effectively became irrelevant as Europeans adjusted to confessional pluralism. Rather than accounting for these changes in detail, Clark concentrates on the new philosophy and the way it successfully sidestepped the difficulty of distinguishing the visually true from the visually false. Instead all sense perceptions were to be seen as signs which had no resemblance to the mental events presented by the brain to the soul. The only problem was to know how such signs are correlated with mental perceptions and come to have the meaning that they do – a problem which Descartes solved by making them arbitrary relationships established by a God ‘not willing to allow us to be fundamentally deceived’ (p. 343).
This is a densely argued work, and a brief review can scarcely do it justice. The blurb on the back of the book describes it as ‘original, highly accessible, and a major contribution to our understanding of European culture’. I fully agree with the first and last of these claims, and think that historians of science, philosophy and medicine will find much in it to interest them, not least its treatment of categories such as natural magic and mechanical marvels. There is a wealth of primary sources cited here that would repay closer investigation. However, with the ideas under consideration so intrinsically complex and the learning that Clark brings to bear on them so formidable, it is a touch misleading to present the book as an easy read. There is no avoiding the fact that the transition from Aristotelian to mechanistic theories of vision was a messy, complicated and contingent affair, a sense of which is conveyed by Clark's fine-grained account of the visual paradoxes that frequently confronted intellectuals in the early modern period.
