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Rethinking Augustine's misunderstanding of the Stoic therapy of passions: a critical survey of metriopatheia and apatheia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 September 2019

Gao Yuan
Gao Yuan*
Affiliation:
Sun Yat-Sen University, China
*
*Corresponding author. Email: gaoshanyuanquan@hotmail.com
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Abstract

Augustine's identification of the Stoic therapy of passions (apatheia) as moderation (metriopatheia) has long been a focus of controversy. This article examines the theoretical foundation for Augustine's comments on the relationship between apatheia and metriopatheia in the Stoic and the Peripatetic contexts, with particular focus on whether Augustine misrepresents his predecessors’ doctrines. Based upon a critical examination of recent research and a systematic analysis of Augustine's position in various phases of his writing, this article argues for a dynamic scheme of the psychotherapy of passions in Augustine's late thought, in which he deliberately deviates from philosophical traditions by adopting new criteria to re-evaluate the quality of emotions from the perspective of theological anthropology. This dynamic theological vantage point contributes to Augustine's insight into passions as well as his new use of the philosophical terms in refuting the Stoic pride.

Keywords

apatheiaAugustinemetriopatheiapassionspsychotherapyStoicism

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Scottish Journal of Theology , Volume 72 , Issue 3 , August 2019 , pp. 308 - 323
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

During his early years, Augustine was influenced by Stoicism and NeoplatonismFootnote 1 and he often pondered whether passions indicate weakness and how to set free himself from these disturbances.Footnote 2 However, in The City of God 9.4, Augustine claims that the distinction between the Stoics and the Peripatetics regarding the therapy that aims at metriopatheia or apatheia is verbal.Footnote 3 This bold remark has provoked many controversies. Some critics argue that Augustine erroneously obscures the difference between apatheia and metriopatheia in the Stoic and the Peripatetic contexts, whereas some others are of the opinion that there is no misunderstanding and that Augustine is justified in pointing out that the doctrines of his predecessors are essentially the same. The following sections will examine these discussions and analyse the theoretical foundation for Augustine's real stance on the psychotherapy of passions. The first section addresses the contemporary disputes on Augustine's misunderstanding of the Stoic view of apatheia. The second section compares Augustine's opinions in his early, middle and late writings to determine whether changes occur in his interpretations. The third section explores his new criteria for evaluating the quality of passions. Building on a survey of his positions, this study will suggest that while Augustine followed the Stoic teachings in his early years, he deliberately deviates from philosophical paradigms in his later thought by adopting a theological synthetic perspective to reinterpret philosophical values and terminology. Augustine's deliberate equating the two philosophical therapies aiming at metriopatheia and apatheia (in a critical account that both are misleading without grace) do not derive from a misunderstanding, but rather follow from his attempt at constructing a new dynamic scheme of dealing with passions in his late theology.

Controversies over Augustine's interpretation of the Stoic theory of apatheia

Richard Sorabji claims that Augustine misrepresents the Stoic theory of apatheia and incorrectly obscures it with the Platonic-Peripatetic notion of metriopatheia. Footnote 4 Sorabji explains that a wise man, according to the Stoics, is able to maintain apatheia and defend himself against the perturbations of passions, but the Stoics do not think that the first movements which assail the wise are passions, because they regard passions as judgements of the mind and first movements (primus motus, propatheia) as mere impulses. However, Augustine thinks that the first movements are passions in the Stoics. Therefore, Augustine incorrectly assumes that it is impossible for Stoic philosophers to maintain apatheia and resist the sudden perturbations of involuntary passions. In other words, their so-called apatheia is actually the Platonic-Peripatetic metriopatheia.Footnote 5 Sorabji stresses that there are clearly substantial disagreements on the issue of the moderation and extirpation of passions between the Stoic and the Platonic-Peripatetic philosophers. First, the Stoics refer to passions as diseases, which essentially differs from the Peripatetic doctrine.Footnote 6 To the Stoics (i.e., Chrysippus and Seneca), moderating passions is basically tantamount to moderating diseases (morbi), evils (mala) or even vice (vitium). Moderation is nearly a scandal for Seneca, Cicero and some classical Stoics (such as Chrysippus).Footnote 7 Secondly, the concepts of metriopatheia and apatheia are based on two different theories of the soul. The Stoics defend the doctrine of apatheia, arguing that the soul is a unitary whole without a natural emotional part. Thus, they consider passions as perturbations or diseases which should be eliminated from the soul in order to keep the peace of mind and foster virtues; whereas the Peripatetics defend the notion of metriopatheia because they believe that the soul is tripartite and that emotions are a function of the lower parts of the soul which cannot be extirpated. Therefore, Augustine's claim that ‘metriopatheia and apatheia are only verbally different rather than things’ disregards the above substantial doctrinal distinctions.Footnote 8

By examining the history of attitudes of Christian predecessors (such as the Alexandrians, Cappadocians and Jerome) towards the Stoic ideal of apatheia, Sorabji argues further that the following reasons misguided Augustine and blurred the distinction between the two philosophical therapies, apatheia and metriopatheia:

  1. (a) Augustine was misguided by some Christian predecessors. Augustine was influenced by the Latin translations of works by some Christian fathers such as Origen, Jerome and the Cappadocians, who obscured the distinction between first movements and passions, mistaking primus motus as a reference to passions. Augustine adheres to their views and believes that it is a deceit for the Stoics to claim that they could keep apatheia and withstand these sudden passions.Footnote 9

  2. (b) Augustine was misled by Galen, who induced him to make the assumption of a ‘verbal distinction’. Sorabji refers to Galen's work On the Diagnosis and Therapy of the Distinctive Passions of the Individual's Soul, in which Galen asks whether moderation (metriopatheia) applies similarity to strong passions and to minor ones.Footnote 10

  3. (c) Augustine was misguided by Cicero. In his Tusculanae disputationes, Cicero assumes a Stoic position and characterises the Peripatetic way of moderating passions as moderating illness or even evils.Footnote 11 Sorabji points out that Cicero translating pathos as ‘perturbation’ led Augustine to the misconception that the Stoic impassibility and the Peripatetic moderation are similar, since both positions pertain to resisting passions as perturbations or diseases.Footnote 12

In contrast to the above argument, Terence H. Irwin argues that Augustine's notion of a mere verbal distinction between the Stoic concept of apatheia and the Peripatetic notion of metriopatheia is reasonable and defensible. Irwin states that Augustine understands the Stoics very well, and that there is indeed no essential difference between the Stoic and Peripatetic positions regarding these two conceptions. Irwin offers the following supporting evidence.

First, both the Stoic and the Peripatetic philosophers acknowledge the existence of the first movements (primus motus), but the former call this a stage of ‘suggestive appearances’, whereas the latter count it as a stage of ‘passions’. Augustine remarks that the two positions merely use different names to describe the same thing, preliminary passions. The only problem is that the Stoics will not acknowledge that a first movement is a passion.Footnote 13 Thus, the Stoic so-called fully controlled state of apatheia does not exist, and instead its essence actually lies in the Peripatetic way of moderation (metriopatheia).

Secondly, both the Stoic and the Peripatetic philosophers insist on the function of the judgement of the mind upon the operation of passions and they believe that people often go wrong living by passions alone without the analysis of their mind.Footnote 14 Thus, passions are regarded as the object of rational adjustments, whether moderation or elimination. In this sense, both metriopatheia and apatheia foreground the controlling of passions by the moral judgements of the mind, in order to realise the moral assessment of appropriate human actions.Footnote 15

On the basis of these observations, Irwin maintains that ‘the same distinctions between responsible and non-responsible actions will be marked in different terms, and the same agents will count as responsible because of the same features’.Footnote 16 Therefore, Irwin concludes that the Stoic so-called apatheia is in line with the substance of the Peripatetic position of metriopatheia, and that Augustine's remarks demonstrate the same feature.Footnote 17

Unlike Richard Sorabji and Terence H. Irwin, Sarah Catherine Byers argues that Augustine adheres to the Stoic doctrine of apatheia as well as some other core psychological principles.Footnote 18 Byers observes that Augustine understands the Stoic concept of apatheia very well and Augustine adopts various additives such as cognitivism and the Stoic ideal of apatheia in addressing his doctrine of dealing with passions. Byers states the following: ‘Augustine advocates a kind of passionlessness (apatheia) that is in keeping with the general definition of this state offered by the Stoics … He actually endorses the Stoic definition, saying that it is characteristic of the saints in heaven.’Footnote 19 According to Byers, Augustine's accounts are consistent with the central principles of propatheia, apatheia and eupatheia in line with the Stoic teaching, and on this basis, he develops his own theory: (1) Augustine advocates the Stoic view that propatheia as impressions of mind, and he regards these impressions as cognitions;Footnote 20 (2) Augustine appreciates the Stoic ideals of apatheia and eupatheia and transposes them into heaven.Footnote 21 Byers thus concludes that Augustine coherently combines cognitivism and impassibility in motivation and his account is in line with the Stoics.Footnote 22

Concerning the debate of whether Augustine misunderstands the Stoic theory of apatheia, it seems that all the above arguments have some correct insights and their evidence appears to be defensible and persuasive. Keeping in mind these controversies, let us turn to Augustine's accounts in his early, middle and late works, in order to evaluate the thesis of Augustine's alleged misinterpretation as well as other underlying reasons for his obscuring with these conceptions (apatheia and metriopatheia) the issue of the therapy of passions.

Augustine's varying positions on the Stoic therapy of passions

In order to examine Augustine's actual positions conveniently, I divide his writings into three time periods, adopting the years 395 and 411 as appropriate dividing points.Footnote 23 In some of his early writings such as De musica (dated between 387 and 390), De moribus ecclesiae Catholicae et De moribus Manichaeorum (written in 388 and revised in 390), De ordine (dated between 386 and 387) and Contra Academicos (dated between 386 and 387), Augustine refers to the Stoic apatheia and was profoundly influenced by the Stoic conception of impassibility (impassibilitas), pursuing the contemplative state of a fully controlled soul with no suffering or disturbances.Footnote 24 Augustine appreciated this type of impassibility and related it to the four virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice, as see in the following cases:

  1. (a) ‘“You indeed accepted my definition … you wished to teach that the mind of a wise man remains immovable” … he [the Stoic philosopher] said, “that the body makes a transition from place to place, but I deny that the mind itself, to which the name of wisdom is given, makes such transition”.’Footnote 25

  2. (b) ‘… will you deny that the soul, dwelling in this perfection and beatitude, is capable of seeing the truth and of remaining without stain and of suffering no trouble? … Thus, this contemplation, sanctification, impassibility and ordering of the soul, it is either those four virtues in a perfect and fulfilled state, or – not to waste energy on words, since there is agreement with respect to the things – some such faculties instead of the virtues, which the soul uses while laboring here, that are to be hoped for by the soul in the eternal life.’Footnote 26

  3. (c) ‘M: So, when the soul is active with the purpose of never again taking pleasure in this, does it not seem to you to fix its love in God and live in complete temperance and caution and security from all impurity? D: Yes, it does.’Footnote 27

  4. (d) ‘Who does not allow that the wise man should be free from all such pain? … Although he performs these [compassionate] acts with a serene mind, impelled by the duty of kindness rather than the sting of pain, he ought still to be called merciful, for the word does not lose all meaning when the feeling of pain is absent.’Footnote 28

  5. (e) ‘We lived in great mental tranquillity, keeping the spirit free from every stain of the body; and, far removed from the raging flames of desire, we were taking pains, as far as man is allowed, to cultivate reason – that is, to live according to the divine part of the spirit – and this we agreed yesterday was by definition the happy life.’Footnote 29

In excerpts (a), (b) and (c), Augustine discusses the significance of keeping the mind immovable (mens immobilis) in order to be free from the disturbance of emotions and to attain tranquillity of the soul (tranquillitas animi). He adheres to the Stoic domination of reason, and suggests that the wise should keep caution against all sorts of perturbations and develop impassibility (impassibilitas) and control (temperatissimus, cautissimus, securissimus). In this state, even some good passions, such as compassion, should be removed, as well, leaving merely the compassionate acts without a real feeling of pain, as explained in excerpt (d).Footnote 30 In (e) Augustine stresses the constant mastering of the soul, by which he would like to achieve two objectives: freedom from the flames of passions and contemplation with tranquillity of the mind (impassibility). His arguments show typical Stoic features in these works (c.386–92) and are also similar to Ambrose's idea of apatheia as fixing the focus of one's meditation on God and keeping the mind unified with Him in a harmonious state. This indicates that at the beginning of his Christian life, Augustine was familiar with the Stoic theory of apatheia and that he was also influenced by its Platonist interpretation in Ambrose.Footnote 31 Therefore, it is unlikely that Augustine did not know the Stoic doctrine of apatheia or that he misunderstood it.

In his middle-period works such as Confessiones, Augustine shows more pessimism concerning the human power to be apathetic in this life with respect to emotional experiences and evil inclination of the soul. Rethinking the Stoic classification of passions as pleasure (laetitia), appetite (cupiditas), fear (metus) and distress (tristitia), Augustine became convinced that, these passions are necessarily included in the uncontrollable concupiscible and irascible movements because of original sin. In fact, Augustine had read some Neoplatonic works around his conversion to Christianity in 386,Footnote 32 but being already influenced by Cicero and the Stoic psychological doctrines,Footnote 33 he did not lay stress on the Platonic way of moderation in his early works during the years between 386 and 390. It was only later in his Confessiones that Augustine began to question the Stoic notion of impassibility and to revise his perspective, particularly in reference to his weeping when faced with his mother's death:

I was glad to weep before you about her and for her, about myself and for myself. Now I let flow the tears which I had held back so that they ran as freely as they wished. My heart rested upon them, and it reclined upon them because it was your ears that were there, not those of some human critic who would put a proud interpretation on my weeping.Footnote 34

When referring to a proud criticism of weeping, Augustine seems to have in mind the Stoic vision of impassibility and their virtue of fortitude. As for maintaining impassibility or displaying passions at the death of his mother, he admits that it was impossible for him to bear the bitterness of grief.Footnote 35 Augustine thus concludes that emotions are often supported by voluntarily formed habits that tend to take a direction other than that of pursuing righteousness, even though he attempts to struggle: ‘I was responsible for the fact that habit had become so embattled against me; for it was with my consent that I came to the place in which I did not wish to be.’Footnote 36 This descending tendency reveals the weakness of the human will and the sinful conditions due to original sin. In this sense, Augustine argues that the reasons why emotions should be moderated is that our weakened will does not have complete capabilities to eliminate them on the condition of being a sinner:

I was sure it was better for me to render myself up to your love than to surrender to my own cupidity. But while the former course was pleasant to think about and had my notional assent, the latter was more pleasant and overcame me … The law of sin is the violence of habit by which even the unwilling mind is dragged down and held, as it deserves to be, since by its own choice it slipped into the habit.Footnote 37

Although Augustine was sympathetic to the uncontrollable passions on the death of his mother Monica (so that apatheia is impossible), he also suggests another level of the moderation (metriopatheia) that these involuntary emotions can be controlled by reason as well. He writes at the end of Conf. 9.12.33 that his weeping was eventually controlled for a fraction of an hour (flevisse me matrem exigua parte horae).Footnote 38

However, Augustine shifts his position and makes the puzzling comment in his late-period work De civitate Dei that that the two philosophical therapies, apatheia and metriopatheia, are essentially the same. This does not necessarily imply that he really omits the distinction between them in Stoicism and Platonism since these two notions both influenced him profoundly in his earlier years. Irwin argues that apatheia and metriopatheia indeed share many features and that Augustine merely reveals them, but Sorabji maintains that there are also many differences between them based on different theories of the soul. I think that both of these points reflect certain aspects of Augustine's thought, but the arguments of Sorabji and Irwin do not illustrate Augustine's real intentions, nor the crux of the matter. Augustine's remark reflects his mature considerations after long reflection. The main reason for Augustine making such a remark is that he addresses these philosophical conceptions from a dynamic and synthetic perspective of theological anthropology. Returning to the original context in The City of God 9.4–5 (and the related discussions in 14.5–9), we find that Augustine interprets the alleged ‘virtues’ and ‘goods’ of philosophers differently from the Stoics and the Peripatetics:

Certain philosophers, then, say that these disturbances or affections or passions assail even the wise man, though moderated and controlled by reason in that he imposes laws upon them by the mastery of his mind, by which they are reduced to their necessary limits. This is what the Platonists think, and the Aristotelians also … Others, however, like the Stoics, believe that the wise man is not subject to passions of this kind … The other philosophers simply use the language of ordinary speech and call these things ‘goods’; but they hold that, in comparison with virtue, which consists in living well, they are little things and of small value … For I consider that, as far as the pith of the matter is concerned, rather than the mere sound of words, the view which the Stoics hold is not different from that of the Platonists and Peripatetics.Footnote 39

Augustine argues that the essence of the Platonic-Peripatetic model of moderation (metriopatheia) and the Stoic way of impassibility (apatheia) are the same, since they both stress the mastery of a mind that is not dominated by passionsFootnote 40 as well as the corresponding virtues without the disturbance of turbulent passions. He adds that with respect to virtue and justice, their disputations on whether moderating or eliminating passions are not important at all.Footnote 41 In chapters 9 and 14 of The City of God, Augustine argues that, for Christians, the factors that are most crucial for judging the quality of passions are will, love, virtues, justice, as well as salvation through Christ. In a theological context, philosophical conceptions are transformed and attributed new connotations and the distinction between apatheia and metriopatheia loses its meaning. Thus, Augustine shifts the centre of the disputation and provides new criteria for evaluating the quality of passions. Following this observation, let us proceed to some new criteria in more detail, in order to explore the underlying reason for Augustine changing his previous account of philosophical concepts of apatheia and metriopatheia in his late thought.

The new criteria for evaluating the quality of passions

As distinct from the Stoic and the Platonic-Peripatetic doctrines, Augustine employs two pivotal theological concepts, original sin and grace, which allow his worldview to include various levels. In this new scheme, Augustine examines his philosophical predecessors from the perspective of theological anthropology, providing a pessimistic perspective, using the lenses of original sin to interpret the human condition; at the same time, he is optimistic about the redemptive state of the citizens in the city of God by the grace of Christ. Thus, the previous philosophical criteria for evaluating human passions have been modified in the light of new values and models.

The quality of the will (voluntas) as a new indicator and criterion

Augustine distinguishes the concept of will in these philosophers from that in Christians since they have rather different understandings of human conduct.Footnote 42 The Stoics and Peripatetics believe that passions should yield to reason and will, but Augustine states that human evaluation of reason is blurred and the human will has been weakened after the Fall; it is therefore impossible to fully trust such an unsound reason or rely on this distorted will. Due to original sin, the human will and passions are led by worldly temptations, and humans follow concupiscence and pride instead of pursuing genuine good. Under such conditions, the fundamental powers of the reason and the will that these philosophers based their views on metriopatheia or apatheia are, according to Augustine, not to be trusted.

Augustine maintains that the will of Christians should be governed and aided by God. Only in this way may passions become righteous and virtuous.Footnote 43 For Augustine, when the philosophers argue for metriopatheia or apatheia, they are overconfident in their own will and power, which attests to their arrogance and conceit. On the contrary, the Christian understanding of will is pious and modest, as Christians are aware of their weakened position in this life as members of fallen humanity. They know that only through divine grace is the will empowered in directing passions towards the good instead of the bad. Augustine transforms the discussion on reason and will into a theological consideration of the defect of the human will and the power of grace. This becomes the premise for evaluating passions, as Augustine explains in The City of God 14.6: ‘What is important here is the quality of a man's will. For if the will is perverse, the emotions will be perverse; but if it is righteous, the emotions will be not only blameless, but praiseworthy … Therefore, the man who lives according to God and not according to man must be a lover of the good; and it follows from this that he must hate what is evil.’Footnote 44 While the will is considered as one's basic motivational centre, love is another term that Augustine uses in the same manner; both are addressed in systematising the Stoic taxonomy of passions.Footnote 45

The orientation of love (amor) as a new measure

Augustine observes that the Stoic love is, in fact, disordered love full of pride and disobedience. He suggests that the contexts of love in these philosophers and the Christians should be distinguished. The will is free in its basic orientation, but it is not able to change its distorted orientation without supranatural causation (grace). The same holds true of love (amor).Footnote 46 The original sin is evident in the fact that human love has a tendency to choose evil and sinful objects. This tendency manifests itself in ‘the weight of will and love’ (pondus voluntatis et amoris).Footnote 47 In the fallen state, humans always direct their love towards themselves and their own honour rather than to the supreme and immutable good. This fallen tendency in people is pride (superbia) and a defect, since they love a wrong object in a reverse order. Thus, for Augustine the Stoic and Peripatetic love is actually self-love and pride which displays obvious defects. Therefore, Augustine maintains that it is inappropriate to use such distorted and disordered love to evaluate the quality of passions.Footnote 48

Augustine defends his idea as based on Christian teaching and maintains that genuine love is from the Holy Spirit, who pours love into our hearts. This principle of love is distinguished from that proposed by the Stoics because it attributes the root of love to the highest point in the hierarchical order: God, the immutable love and good. This reflects modesty and stands in contrast to philosophers who locate the principle of love in themselves. Therefore, Augustine argues that whether or not passions are good is based on the criterion of love that is derived from God rather than from the pride of philosophers.Footnote 49

Virtue (virtus) as a renewed value

From Augustine's perspective, what the Stoics and Peripatetics refer to as virtues are, in a certain sense, cool and even inhuman. As he remarks in De civitate Dei 9.4–5, both the Stoics and the Peripatetics attempt to control the fluctuation of turbulent passions, so as to direct the unfettered reason toward virtues and wisdom. The objective of both apatheia and metriopatheia is to pursue an unshaken mind without the perturbation of passions. To describe the Peripatetic control of passions, Augustine's cites from Virgil: ‘His mind remains unmoved; tears flow in vain’ (Mens inmota manet, lacrimae volvuntur inanes).Footnote 50 At this point, Augustine is emphasising that Peripatetics pursue the virtue of fortitude by controlling the non-rational part of the soul (passions) through the work of reason. This is not substantially different from the Stoic position that passions cannot assail the fortitude of a wise man's mind.

For the case of Christians, however, Augustine argues that passions genuinely affect and touch their minds in the course of their exercise of virtues, rather than dragging them into vice.Footnote 51 Their virtues involve passions. Augustine considers it to be impossible to resist all emotions in this life, since in some situations it is vicious to have no emotions. Therefore, Augustine asserts that the question is not whether one can eliminate passions in this life, but rather which type of passions a person should have and why:

We do not so much ask whether a pious soul is angry, as why he is angry; not whether he is sad, but whence comes his sadness; not whether he is afraid, but what he fears. For I do not think that any right-minded person would condemn anger directed at a sinner in order to correct him; or sadness on behalf of one who is afflicted, in order to comfort him, or fear for one in peril, lest he perish. The Stoics, indeed, are wont to reproach even compassion. But how much more honorable it would have been if the Stoic in Aulus Gellius’ story had been disturbed by compassion for a fellow man, in order to comfort him, rather than by fear of shipwreck!Footnote 52

In situations such as a shipwreck, what the Stoics refer to as apatheia without compassion, for Augustine, is tantamount to a scandal. This is not a virtue, but a vice.Footnote 53 Therefore, the concept of virtue has been transformed into Augustine's own context: it is not blameworthy but honourable to have passions; indeed, virtues with human kindness become the criterion that attests to Christian passions being honourable and praiseworthy.

Justice (iustitia) as a renewed concept

According to Augustine, the Stoic alleged justice is associated with insensitivity and negligence of human sociability. Referring to Gellius’ story of the shipwreck, Augustine argues that compassionate people are those who indeed feel in their heart about someone's misery which then compels them to offer aid. The emergence of these compassions involves three stages. First, one encounters someone's misery which moves the soul suddenly; secondly, such first movements should yield to right reason; and thirdly, just action follows:

what is compassion but a kind of fellow feeling in our hearts for the misery of another which compels us to help him if we can? This impulse is the servant of right reason when compassion is displayed in such a way as to preserve righteousness, as when alms are distributed to the needy or forgiveness extended to the penitent.Footnote 54

In this quotation, Augustine obviously changes his previous interpretation of compassion in De moribus ecclesiae (1.27.53) and Contra Academicos (1.4.11), and he does not follow the Stoic teachings of it any more. He points out that the reason why compassion is admirable is that it proceeds from justice; however, the Stoic argumentation on compassion is superficial, without involving real care or feelings. The real compassion, according to Augustine, is required by God's justice, which becomes the criterion to evaluate the character of passions. If emotions are called for by the justice of God, then they are righteous and blessed; if they are derived from mundane matters and a sinful life, they are evil.Footnote 55 Therefore, the concept of justice has been replaced by a new model in the light of the divine justice.

The mediator and saviour, Jesus Christ, as a new model

The central criterion, according to Augustine, is the mediator between humans and God, Jesus Christ, as he possesses all of the above virtues and represents a perfect unity between the divine and the human emotions. Christ's incarnation and emotional life reveal the profound mystery in the context of the issue of apatheia and metriopatheia. At this point, the disputation on apatheia and metriopatheia between these philosophers has lost their meanings. To Augustine, Christ's passions express humility and love and offer a good example for mankind. Moreover, His passion is a vital part of the divine economy of salvation in delivering sinners from suffering and sinful state and allows them to take part in his immortality and divine nature.Footnote 56 In De civitate Dei 9.6, Augustine argues that according to the Stoics and the Platonists, demons can become mediators and keep apatheia in front of the assailing of passions, since they possess the capability to use the superior part of the soul (reason) to govern and moderate the turbulent movements of lower part (passions). Augustine refutes this as impossible, as the demons’ minds are also subject to the passions of fear and lust and unable to show true virtues and love.Footnote 57 Augustine puts forward three principles as the fundamental conditions for judging who is suitable as a mediator to save humans from sinful passions:

  1. (1) In order for this mediator to understand true human passions, he must have as weak a body as humans do.

  2. (2) This mediator must have a just spirit and a soul that is free of disease.

  3. (3) This saviour and mediator does not lust for the temporal world and has the full power to redeem us.Footnote 58

However, the demons, to whom these philosophers attribute passions, are always contaminated by bad desires and are unable to save even themselves. Certainly no one implies that they are better than humans, as they are regarded as wretched and thought to suffer from passions forever in eternal misery.Footnote 59 This eternal misery pertains to the punishment in hell that will involve both the body and the mind by the “lake of fire and brimstone” (Luke 16:24; Isaiah 66:24; Mark 9:43-48).

Therefore, Augustine holds that referring to demons as examples and criterions of dealing with passions (aiming at apatheia or metriopatheia) is foolish, because their passions reflect eternal misery and deceit, and consequently indicate their unrighteousness, pride and inhumanity. Demons cannot be true mediators, while Jesus Christ, by comparison, has real human passions (both voluntary and involuntary) as well as the divine ‘emotion’ (immutable and transcendent), which reflect His perfect unity of divinity and humanity. Thus, Augustine states that Christ, displaying a perfect emotional unity of apatheia and metriopatheia, indicates the road toward freedom and eternal happiness.

It is thus evident that Augustine presents a dynamic understanding of the philosophical doctrines of apatheia and metriopatheia, instead of adhering to any of them consistently. In his early period from the year 386 to the mid-390s, he followed the Stoic teachings, and his concept of apatheia was influenced by the interpretations of Cicero and some Christian predecessors (such as Ambrose and Origen). Later, in Augustine's middle works, he realises the significance of metriopatheia and adopts a position on moderation that is influenced by Neoplatonists. These two periods reflect his rather clear understanding of the two concepts. This also suggests that his later remarks regarding the lack of any essential distinction between apatheia and metriopatheia constitutes a deliberate formulation rather than something resulting from ignorance or a misunderstanding. In his late works, Augustine transforms many significant categories, such as will, love, virtue and justice, into theological language and distinguishes them from their philosophical usage. Thus, Augustine suggests a new interpretation of apatheia and metriopatheia, arguing that it is not important to make this distinction between philosophical positions as a theological guide. Adopting a new model of a mediator that incorporates the union between divinity and humanity, Augustine demonstrates that Jesus sets an example of dealing with passions, in contrast to the proud philosophers who claim to be able to maintain apatheia or to moderate their emotions with an unshaken mind. Observing from these new criteria, he deliberately states that the doctrines of apatheia and metriopatheia are essentially the same, in that both are misleading without grace. It is therefore clear that Augustine's position has shifted to a synthetic and dynamic theological perspective with various conditions of life: the perverted and sinful orientation of emotions in this life, the suffering of emotions as a punishment in hell, a divine perfect emotional unity of apatheia and metriopatheia, and the deified spiritual life in heaven. These domains form the fundamental context for Augustine's compound doctrine of emotions in his late theology.

Concluding remarks

Thus far I have traced Augustine's thoughts in his early, middle and late works related to his ideas of the therapy of passions. Based on these discussions, some general conclusions can be drawn. It can be observed that Sorabji, Irwin and Byers do not take into account Augustine's true intentions, even though they offer insight into certain aspects of Augustine's terminology and ideas. As for Sorabji's argument that Augustine is misled by some predecessors’ formulations of apatheia and metriopatheia, I find that it might be partially correct, since Augustine was indeed once influenced by the Stoics and Cicero. However, Sorabji's conclusion that Augustine misrepresents the Stoic apatheia as metriopatheia seems hasty. Irwin and Byers correctly point out that Augustine had a rather sound understanding of philosophical positions, but they do not reveal his real stance on the controversy. These three critics fail to consider Augustine's complicated shifts in positions during his life. Irwin might be correct in arguing that the notions of apatheia and metriopatheia share many common elements, but Augustine's interest does not lie here. Augustine is familiar with these two philosophical doctrines, and he deliberately remarks that there are no differences between them because he interprets the issue from a theological vantage point. The theoretical foundation for his theological doctrine of passions is formed by the assumption of a perverted human living pattern and a faith in a divine equitable value system as well as an eschatological fulfilment. In this sense, Augustine's remark is reasonable and reveals the doctrinal weakness of both the Stoics and Platonists from the perspective of Augustine's theological anthropology.

To summarise, Augustine deliberately deviates from philosophical traditions and adopts new criteria for re-evaluating the philosophical terminology and values in his late theological anthropology, which should not be misrepresented, as some critics maintained, as the misunderstanding of the Stoic theory of the therapy of passions.Footnote 60

References

1 In his writings, Augustine does not distinguish among the Platonic, Peripatetic and the Neoplatonic positions on the psychology of passions. When he mentions either the ‘Platonic’ ‘Peripatetic’, or “Neoplatonic” notion of passions, Augustine refers to their coinciding views as an eclectic alternative to Stoicism. As he explains in De civitate Dei 9.4: ‘There are two opinions among the philosophers as to those motions of the mind which the Greeks call pathe … Certain philosophers, then, say that these disturbances or affections or passions assail even the wise man, though moderated and controlled by reason in that he imposes laws upon them by the mastery of his mind, by which they are reduced to their necessary limits. This is what the Platonists think, and the Aristotelians also, since Aristotle, who founded the Peripatetic school, was a pupil of Plato. Others, however, like the Stoics, believe that the wise man is not subject to passions of this kind.’ I accordingly do not differentiate between the terms ‘Platonic’, ‘Neoplatonic’ and ‘Peripatetic’ when referring to Augustine's (Neo)platonic-Peripatetic eclectic views. For a discussion of a Platonic-Peripatetic position in Augustine's context, see Van Riel, Gerd, ‘MENS INMOTA MOTA MANE: Neoplatonic Tendencies in Augustine's Theory of the Passions’, Augustiniana 54 (2004), pp. 507–31Google Scholar; King, Peter, ‘Dispassionate Passions’, in Pickavé, Martin and Shapiro, Lisa (eds), Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy (Oxford: OUP, 2012), pp. 9–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Augustine accepted the Stoic and the Neoplatonic ideas of passions in his early years and blamed himself for his uncontrollable emotions on the death of his mother, Monica. In Confessiones 9.12, he asks, ‘Did I blame the weakness of my passion, and refrain my flood of grieving?’ (increpabam mollitiam affectus mei, et constringebam fluxum maeroris, cedebatque mini paululum). For the influence of Stoicism and Neoplatonism on Augustine's psychology of passions, see Sorabji, Richard, Emotion and Peace of Mind (New York: OUP, 2000), pp. 1–13Google Scholar. Cf. Knuuttila, Simo, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 152–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Byers, Sarah Catherine, Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis (Cambridge: CUP, 2013), pp. 60–69Google Scholar.

3 De civitate Dei 9.4: ‘It seems to me, therefore, that here also, when it is asked whether the passions of the mind affect the wise man or whether he is entirely a stranger to them, the controversy arises out of words rather than things. For I consider that, as far as the pith of the matter is concerned, rather than the mere sound of words, the view which the Stoics hold is no different from that of the Platonists and Peripatetics.’ In the present article, the English translations of Augustine's De civitate Dei and Confessiones are, if not otherwise stated, from The City of God A gainst the Pagans, ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: CUP, 1998); Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: OUP, 1991).

4 Sorabji states in the following: ‘It has often been said that the dispute on apatheia and the other disputes … are merely verbal. On the whole, I believe the opposite is the case … sometimes the idea that the dispute is merely verbal rests, I believe, on misunderstanding the distinctions that I have been analyzing … what is going on here, I think, is not a verbal dispute at all, but an attempt to disguise a substantive dispute as if it were merely verbal.’ See Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, pp. 207, 209.

5 Sorabji contends that the reason for Augustine's misunderstanding the Stoic apatheia is that he first misinterprets their notion of first movements and then falsely conceives that the Stoics cannot attain apatheia because they have first movements. Sorabji writes, ‘emotions are not seen in the Stoic way as necessarily having the permission of reason. This can help to explain how in City of God 9.4 Augustine can so ignore the Stoic position as to claim that the wise man has emotions’ (Emotion, p. 383); ‘We saw him [Augustine] in the City of God defending his belief in moderate emotion for humans in this life by claiming (erroneously) that even the Stoics would allow a little fear in a storm at sea. That was how he (mis)-interpreted the Stoic recognition of first movements … If we take Stoic apatheia to involve freedom from love and gladness, he says, it is not desirable at any time’ (Emotion, pp. 397–8).

6 ‘But their [Stoic] seeing emotions in terms of disease represents a substantive disagreement’. Sorabji, Emotion, p. 207.

7 Sorabji argues that Chrysippus is the main contributor of the Stoic view of apatheia, rather than Zeno, Panaetius or Posidonius. Chrysippus is a classical representative of the Stoics, who contends apatheia and regards passions as false judgements. Sorabji, Emotion, pp. 206–7.

8 De civitate Dei 9.4: de verbis eos potius quam de rebus facere controversiam.

9 Sorabji, Emotion, p. 382.

10 Sorabji addresses the influence of Galen upon Augustine in the following: ‘The wittiest verbal legislation along these lines is that of Galen, who says: It is no longer so clear whether being moderately disturbed in mind at a great loss of money or esteem belongs to the class of path ē, and similarly for being rather out of control in eating cakes’. Emotion, p. 209.

11 Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes 4.6.12–14.

12 Sorabji, Emotion, pp. 208–9.

13 Irwin, Terence H., ‘Augustine's Criticisms of the Stoic Theory of Passions’, Faith and Philosophy 20/4 (2003), p. 437CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 ‘Both Peripatetics and Stoics believe that passions explain actions; people go wrong because they live in accordance with their passions.’ Ibid., p. 438.

15 Ibid., p. 439.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., p. 440.

18 See e.g. the section of ‘Augustine's adherence to core Stoic psychological principles’ in Byers, Sarah C., Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis (Cambridge: CUP, 2013), pp. 60–9Google Scholar.

19 Ibid., pp. 68–9.

20 Ibid., pp. 45, 100–101.

21 Ibid., pp. 68–9.

22 Ibid., pp. 52–3.

23 The dividing points of Augustine's writings are based upon his altering ideas of passions during various stages of his life. For the dividing years, we adopt Peter Brown's suggestions in Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 177–81, 279–83. However, such a threefold periodisation of Augustine's writings is neither exclusive nor arbitrary. For a discussion of Brown's divisions, see also Kolbet, Paul R., Augustine and the Cure of Souls: Revising a Classical Ideal (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), pp. 14–16Google Scholar.

24 For the date of Augustine's writings, see Fitzgerald, Allan D. (ed.), Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1999)Google Scholar, pp. xliii–il.

25 De ordine 2.5.17–2.6.19: Nam definitionem meam tu probasti…cum quo mentem sapientis manere immobilem me, quantum assequi ualeo, docere uoluistis… inquit, corpus illud de loco in locum transitum facere, sed mentem ipsam nego, cui nomen sapientis inpositum est. The English translation comes from Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil: A Translation of St. Augustine's De ordine, trans. Robert P. Russell (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger, 2010), p. 58.

26 De musica 6.16.55: tu negabis in illa perfectione ac beatitate animam constitutam, et conspicere ueritatem, et immaculatam manere, et nihil molestiae pati posse? … Haec ergo contemplatio, sanctificatio, impassibilitas, ordinatio eius, aut illae sunt quattuor uirtutes perfectae atque consummatae, aut, ne de nominibus, cum res conueniant, frustra laboremus, pro istis uirtutibus, quibus constituta in laboribus utitur anima, tales quaedam potentiae in aeterna ei uita sperandae sunt. For the English translation, see Jacobsson, Martin, AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS.DE MUSICA VI: A Critical Edition with a Translation and an Introduction (Stockholm: Institutionen för klassiska språk, 2002), p. 109Google Scholar.

27 De musica 6.16.53 (ET, p. 107): Magister: Cum ergo id agit, ne ulterius id delectet aliquando, nonne tibi uidetur amorem suum figere in Deo, et ab omni inquinamento temperatissime et cautissime et securissime uiuere? Discipulus: Videtur sane.

28 De moribus ecclesiae 1.27.53: quis non concedat ab omni miseria liberum esse debere sapientem … etiamsi id faciat mente tranquilla, nullis aculeis doloris instinctus, sed adductus officio bonitatis, misericors tamen uocandus est. huic enim nihil obest nomen, cum absit miseria. For the English citation, see The Catholic and Manichaean Ways of Life, trans. Gallagher, Donald A. and Gallagher, Idella J. (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1966), p. 42Google Scholar.

29 Contra Academicos 1.4.11: Uiximus enim magna mentis tranquillitate ab omni corporis labe animum uindicantes et a cupiditatium facibus longissime remoti, dantes, quantum homini licet, operam rationi, hoc est secundum diuinam illam partem animi uiuentes, quam beatam esse uitam hesterna inter nos definitione conuenit. For the English citation, see Against the Academicians: The Teacher, ed. and trans. King, Peter (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1995), pp. 13–14Google Scholar.

30 Augustine's view of compassion (or pity) in case (d) is in accordance with the Stoics, who believe that compassion is a form of mental pain and mistaken judgement of the mind which should be extirpated as well. For the Stoic teaching of compassion, see Inwood, Brad, ‘Why do Fools Fall in Love?’, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 41 (1997), p. 63CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 See Ambrose's De officiis 1.47.228–32; 1.48.233–9. Both Ambrose and Augustine refer to emotions as perturbations and harmful phenomena, stressing that the reason should supervise the soul like a watchman in order to avoid any harassment (boni speculatoris est ita praetendere animo). In addition, both Ambrose and Augustine state emphatically that impassibility may help to attain mental tranquillity and happiness when the focus of one's contemplation is fixed on God. Ambrose and Augustine also share many significant concepts, such as the four virtues (iustitia, prudentia, temperantia and fortitudo) as well as the theory of emotional impulses (motus animi or impetus). For Augustine paralleling Ambrose's view on apatheia, see Colish, Marcia, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages (II) (Leiden: Brill, 1985), p. 222Google Scholar.

32 Augustine mentions that he obtained some Neoplatonic books from a man who puffed up with pride. Conf. 7.9.13: procurasti mihi per quendam hominem, inmanissimo typho turgidum, quosdam Platonicorum libros ex graeca lingua in latinum versos. Peter Brown states that ‘they [these books] seem to have included many treatises of Plotinus, in the Latin translation of Marius Victorinus, and, possibly, one work at least, now lost, by Porphyry’. Brown, Augustine of Hippo, p. 85.

33 Augustine mentions that when he read Cicero's Hortensius at the age of 18, his feelings were changed and he was deeply influenced by Stoic teachings of happiness, immortality and wisdom. He realised the vanity of the lower desires. Conf. 3.4.7: liber ille ipsius exhortationem continet ad philosophiam et uocatur Hortensius. Ille uero liber mutauit affectum meum et ad te ipsum … uiluit mihi repente omnis uana spes et immortalitatem sapientiae concupiscebam aestu cordis incredibili et surgere coeperam, ut ad te redirem. See comments in Chadwick, Confessions, pp. 38–9; cf. Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, p. 164.

34 Conf. 9.12.33: et libuit flere in conspectu tuo de illa et pro illa, de me et pro me. et dimisi lacrimas, quas continebam, ut effluerent quantum uellent, substernens eas cordi meo: et requieuit in eis, quoniam ibi erant aures tuae, non cuiusquam hominis superbe interpretantis ploratum meum.

35 Conf. 4.5.10: ut dicas mihi, cur fletus dulcis sit miseris?… sed tantum dolebam et flebam. miser enim eram et amiseram gaudium meum. an et fletus res amara est et prae fastidio rerum, quibus prius fruebamur, et tunc ab eis abhorremus, delectat?

36 Conf. 8.5.11: sed tamen consuetudo adversus me pugnacior ex me facta erat, quoniam volens quo nollem perveneram. Cf. De sermone Domini in monte 12.34. See Knuuttila Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, p. 169. For the power of habit in Augustine, see Rist, John M., Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), pp. 175–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

37 Conf. 8.5.12: Ita certum habebam esse melius tuae caritati me dedere quam meae cupiditati cedere; sed illud placebat et uincebat, hoc libebat et uinciebat … lex enim peccati est uiolentia consuetudinis, qua trahitur et tenetur etiam inuitus animus eo merito, quo in eam uolens inlabitur.

38 Conf. 9.12.33: ‘Let anyone who wishes read and interpret as he pleases. If he finds fault that I wept for my mother for a fraction of an hour, the mother who had died before my eyes, who had wept for me that I might live before your eyes, let him not mock me …’

39 De civitate Dei 9.4: H as ergo perturbationes si v e affectiones si v e passiones quidam philosophi dicunt etiam in sapientem cadere, sed moderatas rationique subiectas, ut eis leges quodam modo, quibus ad necessarium redigantur modum, dominatio mentis inponat. H oc qui sentiunt, P latonici sunt si v e A ristotelici … A liis autem, sicut S toicis, cadere ullas omnino huiusce modi passiones in sapientem non placet … H aec autem isti simpliciter et ex communi loquendi consuetudine appellant bona; sed in comparatione v irtutis, qua recte v i v itur, par v a et exigua … N am et ipsos nihil hinc aliud quam P latonicos et P eripateticos sentire existimo, quantum ad v im rerum adtinet, non ad v ocabulorum sonum.

40 De civitate Dei 9.4: Q uae si ita sunt, aut nihil aut paene nihil distat inter S toicorum aliorumque philosophorum opinionem de passionibus et perturbationibus animorum; utrique enim mentem rationemque sapientis ab earum dominatione defendunt.

41 Augustine stresses that the Stoic philosophers’ trembling and growing pale with fear should be regarded as passions, just as they are among the Peripatetics. Their dispute is concerned with mere terminology rather than fact, because they both pursue virtue and justice, arguing that passions should yield to reason and the mind (see De civitate Dei 9.4). The Stoics do not refer to the objects of the affects as good, but as advantages. In Augustine's opinion, this is merely playing with words. For a detailed discussion, see Dodaro, R., Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), pp. 58–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42 In commenting on the Stoic eupatheia of will, Augustine states: ‘But a distinction is to be made between the depravity of an evil will and the will of which the angels spoke when they proclaimed “On earth peace, good will toward men.” The addition of the word “good” here is redundant if will can only be good … Such an indiscriminate use of these terms is seen also among secular literature authors.’ See De civitate Dei 14.8.

43 De civitate Dei 9.5: ‘Scripture, indeed, places the mind itself under the governance and help of God, and the passions under the mind, so that they may be moderated and bridled and turned to righteous use.’

44 Ibid., 14.6: Interest autem qualis sit voluntas hominis; quia si perversa est, perversos habebit hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt … Quapropter homo, qui secundum Deum, non secundum hominem vivit, oportet ut sit amator boni; unde fit consequens ut malum oderit.

45 Ibid., 14.7: ‘Love striving to possess what it loves is desire; love possessing and enjoying what it loves is joy; love fleeing what is adverse to it is fear; and love undergoing such adversity when it occurs is grief. Accordingly, these feelings are bad if the love is bad, and good if it is good.’

46 Conf. 13.9.10: ‘A body by its weight tends to move towards its proper place … My weight is my love. Wherever I am carried, my love is carrying me. By your gift we are set on fire and carried upwards: we grow red hot and ascend … Lit by your fire, your good fire, we grow red-hot and ascend, as we move upwards “to the peace of Jerusalem”.’ Cf. De civitate Dei 13.5: ‘we cannot love or take delight in true righteousness unless with the aid of divine grace’.

47 Augustine applies the notion of pondus voluntatis et amoris in many places in his late writings, such as De civitate Dei 11.16; 13.18; 19.12; 22.11, etc. He also mentions it in his earlier works such as Mus. 6.11.29, Gen. litt. 4.3.7–4.5.12; 4.4.8; 4.18.34, De Trinitate 6.10.12; 11.11.18, Conf. 13.9.10; 4.15.27; 7.17.23. For a detailed discussion of the concept of ‘the weight of will and love’, see Ruokanen, Miikka, Theology of Social Life in Augustine's De civitate Dei (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), pp. 48–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48 De civitate Dei 14.13: ‘For it is a perverse kind of elevation indeed to forsake the foundation upon which the mind should rest, and to become and remain, as it were, one's own foundation. This occurs when a man is too well pleased with himself; and he is too well pleased with himself when he falls away from that immutable good with which he ought rather to have been pleased than with himself … For if the will had remained unshaken in its love of that higher and immutable Good by Which is bestowed upon it the light by which it can see and the fire by which it can love, it would not have turned aside from this Good to follow its own pleasure … This is why, according to Holy Scripture, the proud are called by another name: they are called “self-willed”. For it is good to lift up your hearts; not to self, however, which is pride, but to the Lord. This is obedience, which can belong only to the humble.’

49 Ibid., 14.9: ‘If these emotions and affections, which come from love of the good and from holy charity, are to be called vices, then let us allow that real vices should be called virtues.’ For the pride of philosophers, see Irwin, ‘Augustine's Criticisms’, pp. 418–27.

50 For Augustine's citation of Virgil's values of passions, see Van Riel, ‘MENS INMOTA’, pp. 507–31.

51 De civitate Dei 9.5: Quod passiones quae Christianos animos afficiunt non in vitium trahant, sed virtutem exerceant.

52 Ibid., 9.5: Denique in disciplina nostra non tam quaeritur utrum pius animus irascatur, sed quare irascatur; nec utrum sit tristis, sed unde sit tristis; nec utrum timeat, sed quid timeat. Irasci enim peccanti ut corrigatur, contristari pro adflicto ut liberetur, timere periclitanti ne pereat nescio utrum quisquam sana consideratione reprehendat. Nam et misericordiam Stoicorum est solere culpare; sed quanto honestius ille Stoicus misericordia perturbaretur hominis liberandi quam timore naufragii.

53 For Augustine's objections to the Stoic values of compassions, see also Irwin, ‘Augustine's Criticisms’, pp. 405–6.

54 De civitate Dei 9.5: Quid est autem misericordia nisi alienae miseriae quaedam in nostro corde compassio, qua utique si possumus subvenire compellimur? Servit autem motus iste rationi, quando ita praebetur misericordia, ut iustitia conservetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur paenitenti.

55 Ibid., 14.9: ‘We must, then, lead a righteous life if we are to attain a life of blessedness; and such a righteous life will exhibit all these emotions righteously, whereas a perverse life exhibits them perversely.’

56 For the role of Christ as the mediator and the saviour, see Kelly, J. N. D., Early Christian Doctrines, 5th edn (London: A&C Black, 1977), pp. 386–94Google Scholar.

57 De civitate Dei 9.6: sicut iste Platonicus confitetur, salo perturbationum fluctuat. Subiecta est ergo mens daemonum passionibus libidinum formidinum irarum atque huiusmodi ceteris … cum eorum mens passionum vitiis subiugata et oppressa, quidquid rationis naturaliter habet, ad fallendum et decipiendum tanto acrius intendat, quanto eam magis possidet nocendi cupiditas?

58 Augustine demonstrates these three principles ibid., 9.17: sed tali, qui nobis infimis ex corporis mortalitate coaptatus inmortali spiritus iustitia, per quam non locorum distantia, sed similitudinis excellentia mansit in summis, mundandis liberandisque nobis vere divinum praebeat adiutorium. Qui profecto incontaminabilis Deus absit ut contaminationem timeret ex homine quo indutus est, aut ex hominibus inter quos in homine conversatus est.

59 Ibid., 9.13: Ipsa est autem illa daemonum misera aeternitas vel aeterna miseria. Qui enim ait ‘ animo passiva’, etiam ‘ misera’ dixisset, nisi eorum cultoribus erubuisset. Porro quia providentia summi Dei, sicut etiam ipsi fatentur, non fortuita temeritate regitur mundus, numquam esset istorum aeterna miseria, nisi esset magna malitia.

60 The research for this article is funded by China's Ministry of Education National-Level project ‘The Maritime Silk Road: A Study of the First Latin Translations of the Confucian Classics in the Western World’ (19YJC720012). I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to my two supervisors, Professor Simo Knuuttila and Professor Miikka Ruokanen, who gave me careful direction during the first draft of this article. I am equally grateful to Lucy Melville who has generously offered the permission to use original sources from my work ‘Freedom from Passions in Augustine’ (2017). With their support, I could make further explorations and rethink Augustine's varying positions on the issue of metriopatheia and apatheia. Finally, I wish express my deep gratitude to the anonymous readers. Their comments and suggestions are very insightful and helpful. Certainly, all remaining errors are my own.