Focusing on Russia’s 2023 citizenship law, “On Citizenship of the Russian Federation” (О гражданстве Российской Федерации), this article examines how Russia increasingly uses citizenship and naturalization to promote its “Russian World” ( Russkii Mir ) project. Since the 1990s, millions of people have acquired a Russian passport. Most came from Kazakhstan and Ukraine, followed by Central Asia and the Caucasus (Chudinovskikh and Denisenko Reference Chudinovskikh and Denisenko2017). Naturalized citizens include disparate groups, including targets of “passportization” in territories occupied by Russia, labor migrants working in Russia, people who joined the Russian armed forces, and so-called compatriots. Their decision to naturalize is the result of a complex mix of pressure, coercion, incentives, limited alternatives, strategic decisions, and, in some cases, cultural and spiritual attachment to what Russia represents.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has adopted three citizenship laws: in 1991, 2002, and 2023. The first two laws were followed by numerous amendments, presidential decrees (or executive orders), and several bilateral treaties on dual citizenship. These changes indicate ongoing debates about the country’s national identity and borders (Shevel Reference Shevel2012). This article argues that the 2023 legislation cements two overarching trends of Russia’s citizenship regime, both of which underline the extent to which Russia is increasingly instrumentalizing passports.
The first trend is a renationalization of citizenship, evidenced by new naturalization requirements and by the coupling of naturalization and military service. New naturalization rules are reemphasizing citizens’ responsibilities at a time when the Kremlin is promoting “traditional” values and defining national identity in terms of language, culture, history, and religion. As noted by Blakkisrud (Reference Blakkisrud, Kolstø and Blakkisrud2016 and 2023), since the early 2010s, Vladimir Putin has elevated a version of Russian national identity as civilizational and more explicitly “Russian” ( russkii )Footnote 1 — but with a focus on culture and values (rather than ethnicity), and in an instrumental, somewhat ambiguous fashion that serves both domestic and geopolitical objectives. Laruelle, Grek, and Davydov (Reference Laruelle, Grek and Davydov2023, 25 and 27) note that such developments mirror the “culturalization of citizenship” happening in Europe, but also the autocratic turn of Russia under Vladimir Putin.
Second, and as shown by both academic experts (Bahovadinova and Borisova Reference Bahovadinova and Borisova2025; Jain 2023; Kingston 20203; Knott Reference Knott2023; Schenk Reference Schenk2023) and in media reporting (Dickinson Reference Dickinson2020; Hyde Reference Hyde2023), Russia is “weaponizing” citizenship, which, following Kingston (Reference Kingston2023b) and Bahovadinova and Borisova (Reference Bahovadinova and Borisova2025), I broadly define as using citizenship as a political tool to punish or reward. For example, the 2023 law rewards those enlisting in the armed forces with a Russian passport. Conversely, the law vastly expands the scope of crimes punishable by revocation of citizenship, while a 2024 amendment compels naturalized citizens to register for military service. Recent studies have documented the impact of this new citizenship regime — along with mounting migration crackdowns — on labor migrants in Russia (Bahovadinova Reference Bahovadinova2024; Bahovadinova and Borisova Reference Bahovadinova and Borisova2025). This article complements their findings by taking a broader look at policy changes, including the 2023 law, the new naturalization test, and several recent decrees. With these measures, Russia appears to instrumentalize citizenship to achieve a mix of goals, especially since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine: bolstering loyalty to the regime, framing citizenship primarily in terms of responsibilities, propagating what the Kremlin defines as “conservative values,” recruiting for the military, and punishing dissent (here among naturalized citizens).
Understanding how Russia is instrumentalizing citizenship matters for several reasons. Citizenship and passports are tools of Russia’s foreign policy, which has become increasingly belligerent and threatening to world security (Erez Reference Erez2023), with far-reaching consequences for countries in Eurasia. In the most extreme cases, Russia has carried out campaigns of “passportization,” defined as the “large-scale extraterritorial naturalizations of individuals resident on the territory of another state” (Jain Reference Jain2023a, 3). Such “passport imperialism” (Dickinson Reference Dickinson2020) or “passport aggression” (Zevelev Reference Zevelev2021) relies on a mix of coercion and incentivesFootnote 2 and has happened in Crimea in 1991 and 2014 (Peters 2020, cited in Jain Reference Jain2023b), Abkhazia and South Ossetia starting in 2002 (Jain Reference Jain2023a),Footnote 3 then in Donetsk, Luhansk, and other parts of Ukraine (Jain Reference Jain2023a). High naturalization rates become pretexts for political or military interventions, predicated on claims that Russian nationals are being oppressed (Knott Reference Knott2023; Laruelle Reference Laruelle2015).
Russia also offers an unusual case for the literature on citizenship. Experts have long argued that mainstream theories of citizenship are not helpful to understand non-Western countries (Schenk Reference Schenk2020; Shevel Reference Shevel2012; Vink Reference Vink, Shachar, Bauböck, Bloemraad and Vink2017). Similarly, most cross-national studies of citizenship laws focus on Western democracies or high-income economies, with only a few exceptions (see, for example, Koopmans and Michalowski Reference Koopmans and Michalowski2017). Russia is particularly unlikely to be included in large-N comparisons given the complex legacies of Soviet citizenship and passports. The Kremlin’s approach to dual citizenship and its practice of issuing passports to compatriots abroad bear some resemblance to the policies of “non-resident ethnic citizenship” implemented in Central and Southeast Europe countries (Zevelev Reference Zevelev2021) — although Russia’s reliance on coercion and its territorial ambitions set it apart from these cases. Similarly, debates about dual citizenship, residency requirements, and language and civics proficiency are ongoing in Western democracies too (see Hampshire Reference Hampshire2011). But the geopolitical ambitions of the Kremlin’s efforts and the scope of their potential outcomes mean that understanding these dynamics is an urgent research agenda.
Finally, the article fills a gap in our understanding of the “Russian World.” Scholars have analyzed this concept in the context of foreign policy and soft power, but few have looked at its impact on citizenship policy.
After summarizing its theoretical framework, the article describes the context in which the current citizenship regime in Russia must be understood: the “Russian World” and compatriots project, as well as the growing promotion of conservative values. Following a brief summary of prior legislation, and before concluding, the article analyzes key provisions of the 2023 citizenship law (and of several decrees adopted shortly after) and explores the extent to which they reflect the Kremlin’s renationalization and weaponization of citizenship.
Theorizing the global transformations of citizenship
Several changes to Russia’s citizenship policy since the early 2000s mirror what has happened in other parts of the world. Summarizing broad trends in citizenship policies in recent years, Joppke (Reference Joppke2019) observed that many Western countries have simultaneously “de-nationalized” citizenship (for example, by tolerating dual citizenship) and “re-nationalized” it through new requirements meant to emphasize certain values.
The “denationalization” of citizenship follows the rise of more flexible practices of, and instrumental attitudes toward, national membership (Harpaz Reference Harpaz2019), in a world with expanding ability to live and engage across borders (Vertovec Reference Vertovec2004). One indicator of citizenship denationalization is the spread of dual citizenship. In Europe and the Americas, for example, 80 percent of countries allowed dual citizenship in 2010, compared to less than a third in the 1990s (Harpaz and Mateos Reference Harpaz and Mateos2019). Dual citizenship can provide a range of potential benefits, from tax avoidance to an exit strategy in the event of a crisis (Bauböck Reference Bauböck2019; Harpaz and Mateos Reference Harpaz and Mateos2019; Spiro Reference Spiro, Shachar, Bauböck, Bloemraad and Vink2017) — as exemplified by members of the Russian elite seeking to acquire second passports after 2022 (Najibullah Reference Najibullah2023). In Russia, dual citizenship is typically supported by right-wing nationalist parties and leaders (Zevelev Reference Zevelev2021) and became broadly available after 2020.Footnote 4 As noted by Džankić (Reference Džankić2023), while dual citizenship can be an indicator of democratic inclusion, in the case of Russia and other passportizing states, it generally serves geostrategic purposes.
The global trend toward the denationalization of citizenship has led to the emergence of a passport industry (Džankić Reference Džankić2019 and 2022). For example, since 2022, some law firms are promoting Kyrgyzstan as a welcoming, Russian-speaking country to Russian clients, charging up to $14,000 for a Kyrgyz passport (Najibullah and Shambetov Reference Najibullah and Shambetov2023). In a few countries, passports are essentially sold, with Malta and Cyprus as notorious examples. Interestingly, many golden passports allocated in Cyprus in recent years were to Russian nationals (Džankić Reference Džankić2022).
In a countertrend, many countries are also seeking to “renationalize” citizenship (Joppke Reference Joppke2019) by introducing or strengthening naturalization requirements such as civics tests, language exams, oaths, and ceremonies. Evidence suggests that these requirements are often adopted or revised in response to concerns about migrants’ ability to assimilate (Etzioni Reference Etzioni2007), following political crises (Wright Reference Wright2008), or due to geopolitical concerns. For example, Latvia initially implemented a difficult citizenship test to limit Russia’s political influence, although questions were simplified later (Kruma Reference Kruma, van Oers, Erbøll and Kostakopoulou2010). Globally, language proficiency is relatively common, but civics or history tests are more controversial (Etzioni Reference Etzioni2007; Hampshire Reference Hampshire2011), and there is broad variation in terms of content and passing rates. These tests are currently in place in roughly half of the 38 countries covered by the Migrant Integration Policy Index.Footnote 5
Several provisions of Russia’s citizenship laws since the early 2000s likewise seem to pull in opposite directions: broader access to dual citizenship and simplified naturalization for some groups on the one hand, language and civic exams and an increasing focus on conservative values on the other. These dynamics must be understood within the framework of the Kremlin’s efforts to promote a civilization model, which is described in the next section.
The “Russian world” and compatriot program
As noted by Melvin (Reference Melvin2020) and Mühlfried (Reference Mühlfried2010), Russia is seeking to build a transnational community of post-Soviet citizens. This community centers on the concept of the “Russian World”—an “elastic” (Laruelle Reference Laruelle2015:15), “catch-all” (Pieper Reference Pieper2018: 771) term, both geographically and thematically. Broadly speaking, it is a transnational project (Pieper Reference Pieper2018: 763) that posits the existence of a large community of people (“compatriots”) who are strongly connected to Russia despite living outside of its current borders and who arguably share a set of values. This community of compatriots is self-identifying (Laruelle Reference Laruelle2015) and conveniently ambiguous, both in legal documents and political discourse (Shevel Reference Shevel2012). In a 2001 speech to the first Congress of Russian patriots, Putin referred to those “who speak, think and — what is perhaps most important — feel Russian” (Suslov Reference Suslov2018).
Being a compatriot of Russia may rest on one’s Soviet past, Russian ethnicity, nationality, the ability to speak Russian, or place of residence (Suslov Reference Suslov2017), religious affiliation, or even shared historical memory, such as the Soviet Union’s defeat of Nazi Germany (Kallas Reference Kallas2016, 7). In 2010, changes to the law on compatriots redefined the term to include not only Russian citizens living abroad and former Soviet Union citizens and their descendants, but also “people who have freely chosen to enter into a spiritual, cultural, and legal relationship with the Russian Federation” (Suslov Reference Suslov2017).
With Russia’s expanding geopolitical ambitions, the concept of the “Russian World” became a pillar of foreign policy (Myhre Reference Myhre2017: 69, Williams Reference Williams2020). Protecting compatriots was, for instance, included as an objective in the 2008 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (Kallas Reference Kallas2016). A “Resettlement of Compatriots” program was launched in 2006, offering financial assistance and simplified naturalization procedure to individuals with professional qualifications, work experience, and knowledge of the Russian language wishing to resettle in Russia (Michlin-Shapir Reference Michlin-Shapir2021; Peuch Reference Peuch2007).Footnote 6
Crucially, the “Russian World” concept, and what it means to be a compatriot, have become more conservative in recent years — emphasizing anti-Western, “traditional” values (Laruelle Reference Laruelle2015), and Russia’s “civilizational distinctiveness” (Dysart Reference Dysart2021, 60), with language and political allegiance as core characteristics (Dysart Reference Dysart2021). A November 2022 executive order on “Approving the Fundamentals of State Policy to Preserve and Strengthen Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values”Footnote 7 describes what Russia’s traditional values are according to the Kremlin. Passed on from generation to generation, they are “the foundation of Russia’s national civic identity” (Article 1.4). According to the text, they include relatively classic civic ideals (such as human rights, patriotism, and civic consciousness), but also “strong families,” “collectivism,” and “high moral ideals.” The document further depicts a global crisis of values undermining traditional, spiritual, and moral principles. These “destructive ideologies” propagated by various organizations, including the US government, promote anti-Russian ideas such as “permissiveness and immorality,” ignore “Russia’s contribution to global history and culture,” and undermine family values by “promoting non-traditional sexual identities.”Footnote 8 As noted below, these principles are reflected in a 2024 decree offering expedited visa and residency applications to foreigners who share “traditional Russian spiritual and moral values.”
The alleged existence of a “Russian World,” as well as the Kremlin’s recent emphasis on traditional, conservative values, has shaped the country’s citizenship policies in recent decades, a topic explored in the next section.
Russian citizenship legislation since 1991
Russia’s citizenship regime has evolved substantially since 1991. After briefly summarizing the key trends of the previous two laws, the article examines in detail the most recent legislation.Footnote 9 The analysis reveals the extent to which Russia is renationalizing citizenship (with new naturalization requirements) and using it for rewards (for military service) or punishment (through denaturalization) (Bahovadinova and Borisova Reference Bahovadinova and Borisova2025). Taken together, these changes also show the extent to which the Kremlin is framing citizenship and naturalization as matters of responsibilities over rights.
The 1991 and 2002 laws: increased restrictions and targeting of specific constituencies
Russia’s citizenship laws have been modified frequently in recent decades (Myhre Reference Myhre2017). A summary of key laws, amendments, and bilateral agreements is provided in Table 1. The three main laws were adopted in 1991, 2002, and 2023.
Summary of Key Citizenship Legislation in Russia Since 1991
Table 1. Long description
The table consists of four columns: Date, Law, Key provisions, and References.
* 1991: Federal Law Number 1948-1. Residents of Russia automatically naturalized; simplified naturalization for former Soviet citizens (3-year residency).
* 1993: Amendment Number 5206-1. Former Soviet citizens no longer required to give up prior citizenship.
* 1993: Treaty. Dual citizenship treaty with Turkmenistan (withdrawn 2003).
* 1996: Treaty. Dual citizenship treaty with Tajikistan.
* 1996: Bilateral agreements. Simplified naturalization with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
* 1999: Multilateral agreements. Simplified naturalization with Belarus and Kyrgyzstan.
* 2002: Federal Law Number 62. Ends simplified naturalization for most not born in Russia; requires Russian language proficiency and giving up other citizenships.
* 2003: Amendments to 2002 law. Reinstates simplified access for former Soviet citizens who arrived before 2002, W W 2 veterans, and military personnel.
* 2008: Amendment to Article 14. Simplified naturalization for 2006 Compatriot Resettlement Program participants.
* April 2014: Amendment to 2002 law. Simplified naturalization for Russian native speakers.
* August 2014: Federal Law 142. Citizens must inform migration services of additional passports.
* 2017: Federal Law Number 243. Ukrainians no longer need home government consent for naturalization.
* 2019: Decree number 187. Fast-track naturalization for parts of Ukraine (Donetsk, Luhansk).
* 2020: Amendments to articles 33, 35, and 41. Naturalized citizens can keep other passports; fast-track for Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Kazakhstan; language exam waived for Belarus and Ukraine residents.
* 2022: Decree number 823. Dual citizens can be drafted into the Russian army.
* 2022: Decree number 690. Simplified naturalization for foreigners signing 1-year military contracts.
* April 2023: Federal Law 138-F Z. Simplified access for those with direct relatives born in Russia; cancels simplified access for Russian speakers and specific nationalities; expands reasons for citizenship revocation.
* June 2023: Federal Law Number 212-F Z. Military conscripts’ passports kept in storage.
* November 2023: Decree number 889. Applicants must take the oath.
* December 2023: Decree number 962. Kazakhstan and Moldova nationals exempt from residency/civics; Belarusians exempt from all three.
* January 2024: Decree number 10. Citizenship decision for enlisted foreigners reduced to one month.
* January 2024: Decree number 11. Simplified procedure for Ukrainian citizens in Russia, including orphans.
* 2024: Amendments to Article 22. Naturalized citizens must register for the military or lose their passport.
* August 2024: Decree number 702. Humanitarian support for individuals sharing traditional Russian spiritual values.
* December 2025: Amendments to Articles 21 and 37. Naturalization oath age lowered from 18 to 14.
1 Admission to the citizenship of the Russian Federation under simplified procedure.
Text of the laws available from Garant (an online reference system on the legislation of the Russian Federation) and from Sobranie Zakonodatel′stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii (szrf.ru), an official publication of Russian laws, presidential decrees, and resolutions
During the Soviet Union, almost anyone in the world could become a Soviet citizen (Shevel Reference Shevel2009). After the fall of the USSR, Russia maintained a relatively liberal citizenship regime for former Soviet citizens. According to the 1991 citizenship law, residents of the territory of Russia were automatically naturalized, while former Soviet citizens not residing in Russia could apply for simplified naturalization, generally through a three-year residency requirement (Chudinovskikh and Denisenko Reference Chudinovskikh and Denisenko2017; Michlin-Shapir Reference Michlin-Shapir2021; Myhre Reference Myhre2017). By comparison, the residency requirement was five years for most other applicants. As argued by Michlin-Shapir (Reference Michlin-Shapir2021), though relatively inclusive in theory, the 1991 law was more limited in practice: it initially prohibited dual citizenship (until a 1993 amendment) and maintained the Soviet system of local residency registration (“propiska”), which could be prohibitively expensive.
Roughly ten years later, during Putin’s first presidential term, and in a context marked by rising labor immigration and growing terrorist threats (Molodikova Reference Molodikova2017; Myhre Reference Myhre2017; Zevelev Reference Zevelev2021), Russia’s citizenship regime was drastically overhauled (Michlin-Shapir Reference Michlin-Shapir2021). The 2002 law ended simplified naturalization for individuals not born in Russia or those who could not demonstrate high achievements — though a 2003 amendment allowed several groups (including veterans or individuals with residency permits issued before 2002) to regain access (Shevel Reference Shevel2012). According to Shevel (Reference Shevel2012: 27), the goal of the 2002 law was likely to reduce immigration from Central Asia and the Caucasus, but, until the 2003 amendment, its immediate effect was to denationalize hundreds of thousands of former Soviet citizens. It meant that most post-Soviet citizens not born in Russia had to meet certain criteria for naturalization, including five-year residency and Russian language skills. Accordingly, data show a steep decline in naturalizations between 2002 and 2003 (from 272,400 to 31,500), with the numbers rebounding after the 2003 amendment (to 330,400).Footnote 10
The 2002 law was amended several times in subsequent years. Two broad types of policy emerge from these changes, both of which sought to increase the naturalization rates of groups of “compatriots.” The first policy is expanding opportunities for “accelerated” (also referred to as “simplified,” or “fast-track”) naturalization — a procedure that entails shorter residency requirements and the waiving of provisions such as the language test. A second change is broadening access to dual citizenship by allowing naturalized citizens to keep another passport.Footnote 11 Ukraine has been a particular target of both sets of policies. For example, a 2014 amendment offering fast-track naturalization to “native-speakers” of Russian was adopted shortly before the invasion of Crimea, clearly to fasten its absorption by Russia (Kalybekova Reference Kalybekova2014; Melvin Reference Melvin2020; Michlin-Shapir Reference Michlin-Shapir2021; Molodikova Reference Molodikova2017).Footnote 12 Three years later, Ukrainians were encouraged to seek dual citizenship: while a 2014 law specifies that naturalization applicants must inform Russia’s migration services about their additional citizenships (Michlin-Shapir Reference Michlin-Shapir2021; Molodikova Reference Molodikova2017), a 2017 law lifted that requirement for Ukrainians (Zevelev Reference Zevelev2020 and 2021). Two years later, a presidential decree allowed fast-track naturalization for all residents of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.Footnote 13 Finally, in 2020, a presidential decree extended simplified naturalization procedures to citizens of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Kazakhstan (Melvin Reference Melvin2020), though the 2023 citizenship law recently cancelled this path. Naturalizations almost tripled between 2018 and 2021 (when 735,385 individuals acquired a Russian passport). The increase seems to be largely driven by Ukrainians. For example, only 83,000 Ukrainians naturalized in 2018, but close to 300,000 and over 400,000 did so in 2019 and 2020, respectively.Footnote 14
The 2023 law: renationalization and weaponization
In 2023, about a year after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian government adopted a new citizenship law.Footnote 15 Press releases published on official websitesFootnote 16 state that “The [2023] Federal Law aims to grant citizenship of the Russian Federation to individuals who live in Russia and who are able to integrate themselves organically […] and become full members of Russian society. Citizenship […] may be granted to persons who speak the Russian language, know Russian history and the basics of Russian legislation, comply with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and do not pose a threat to security, law, and order.”
The legislation was introduced by President Putin to the State Duma in late 2021. A transcript of the bill’s second and third readings in the Duma (along with official publication of the Federal Assembly) indicates that representatives from the Ministry of Internal Affairs were present during the debates.Footnote 17 Overall, the transcript suggests limited dissension,Footnote 18 except for Konstantin Zatulin’s criticism of the new grounds for citizenship termination, a point that is discussed below. 62 amendments were submitted, and 31 were eventually adopted. Artem Turov, then Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots, argued that the law establishes citizenship as “a stable legal relationship between an individual and the state.”Footnote 19 Reporting by Rossiiskaia Gazeta also quotes him as saying that the law would allow “our compatriots, people who feel a connection to our country and want to link their future with it” to be “able to return to their historical homeland and receive this opportunity.”
As stated in Article 15, regular naturalization entails a 5-year residency as well as knowledge of language, history, and the “fundamentals of legislation” — topics which are explored in more depth below. In contrast, simplified naturalization is available to former USSR citizens who were born in, or were permanent residents of, the territory of Russia (as well as to those who have direct relatives with those characteristics). It is also open to refugees, individuals who sign a contract with the Russian armed forces, and those who graduated with honors from a higher education program in Russia. Participants in the Compatriot Program have access to simplified naturalization without having to submit residence registration permits.
However, the legislation ended simplified access for several groups who previously enjoyed it: Russian speakers, investors, and citizens of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Ukraine (Ganohariti Reference Ganohariti2023). A few months after the law was adopted, a presidential decree (number 962) moderated this change: it granted individuals from Kazakhstan and Moldova a dispensation from the five-year residency and civics requirement (but not from the language exam) — while Belarusians were exempted from all three. It is also worth noting that naturalization through marriage is now only possible in cases where the couple has a common child (Ganohariti Reference Ganohariti2023). Overall, these changes have restricted paths to simplified naturalization.
Regarding dual citizenship, the 2023 law retains the opportunity introduced by the 2020 amendments: Article 15 does not mention an official notification that the applicant has terminated citizenship of another state as a document to submit (a step that was mentioned in the 2002 law). The law also presents a new concept, “multiple citizenship.” In contrast to dual citizenship, which only applies to countries with which Russia has concluded an international treaty, multiple citizenship describes cases where no such agreement exists (Ganohariti Reference Ganohariti2023).Footnote 20 Rumors circulated online in 2024 about a potential ban on dual citizenship (Khrushchev Reference Khrushchev2024), showing the salience of this topic.Footnote 21
My analysis of the law’s key provision reveals the extent to which Russia is renationalizing and weaponizing citizenship (see Figure 1). It explores three key provisions: new requirements emphasizing citizen responsibilities, citizenship for service, and the vast expansion of the causes for denaturalization.
Main Features of the 2023 Citizenship Law and Related Legislation.
Figure 1. Long description
The flowchart consists of two separate blue-boxed hierarchical structures.
Left Cluster: Weaponization
* The top header reads Weaponization: citizenship as a tool to reward and punish.
* Two sub-boxes branch downward from this header.
* Left sub-box: citizenship for signing a contract with the armed forces.
* Right sub-box: drastic expansion of causes for denaturalization.
Right Cluster: Renationalization
* The top header reads Renationalization: responsibilities and values.
* Four sub-boxes branch downward from this header.
* First sub-box: knowledge of Russian language, history and civics fundamentals.
* Second sub-box: compulsory oath for 14 and above.
* Third sub-box: 2024 presidential decree on traditional values and residence permit.
* Fourth sub-box: compulsory military registration (2025 amendment).
Renationalization: Language, civics test, oath of allegiance, and conservative values
Russian language proficiency, first introduced in 2002, was reaffirmed in the 2023 law. Knowledge of Russian history and of the “fundamentals of the legislation of the Russian Federation” is a new requirementFootnote 22 — although a similar civics exam has been used since 2015 for labor migrants applying for a work permit (Ruget Reference Ruget2018). The Federal Institute for Pedagogical Measurements (a unit within the Federal Service for Supervision in Education and Science) oversees the implementation of these examinations. Sample study material is available on its website, as well as from Tomsk State University. The 90-minute computer-based test includes five language sections (speaking, listening to short recordings followed by questions, reading, letter-writing,Footnote 23 and vocabulary and grammar), as well as questions about history and laws.
The institute’s website displays 38 practice modules (25 about language, seven about history, and six about law), presenting a good overview of the tests. Although many of these questions are standard history or civics topics, it is noteworthy that, among the 42 posted history items, six specifically concern the 2004 annexation of Crimea — asking euphemistically about the territory “becoming” a subject of the federation “after a referendum.” Two practice questions ask, for instance: “Before joining Russia as a result of the referendum, Crimea was part of (Spain/ France/ Ukraine), and “In 2014, [this place] became part of Russia (Kola Peninsula/ Sakhalin Island/ Crimea peninsula). There is also a question about the location of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy.
Of the 36 posted law study questions, roughly half relate to migration legislation (such as residence permits, deportation, compulsory medical insurance, taxation, and marriage for foreign residents). There are relatively few items about the Russian constitution and institutions. One of them asks whether, in the Russian Federation, ideological diversity presupposes the “presence of a multi-party system,” a “single ideology,” or “censorship,” and another whether the highest value of the Russian state is “state sovereignty,” “man, his rights and freedoms,” or “democracy.”
Additionally, two recent changes regarding the naturalization oath, a requirement introduced only eight years ago (Tass News Agency),Footnote 24 are noteworthy. According to a 2023 decree, naturalized citizens’ passports can be taken away if they have not taken the naturalization oath. In December 2025,Footnote 25 two amendments lowered the age for this requirement from 18 to 14, to “enhance the patriotic spirit” and strengthen compliance with the laws (see Meduza 2024 for reporting on the initial bill).
Finally, a 2024 presidential decree related to residence permits underlines the extent to which the Kremlin is attaching “traditional values” to political membership. The decree exempts foreigners and stateless individuals from 47 Western (mostly European) countries applying for a residence permit from any quota limitations and from the language and civics tests as long as they have expressed interest in moving to Russia “due to their rejection of the policy implemented by states that impose destructive neoliberal ideological attitudes that contradict traditional Russian spiritual and moral values.”Footnote 26 According to information shared on Russian consulate websites, the application process is quite minimal. Beyond classic administrative forms and documents, applicants must submit a simple declaration that they are moving to Russia because they disagree with policies in their home country that clash with Russian spiritual and moral values.Footnote 27
Taken together, the introduction of a civics test, asking minors to recite the naturalization oath, and the 2024 decree exemplify the renationalization trend of Russia’s citizenship regime. These requirements underline new citizens’ responsibilities, a trend also illustrated by offering passports for military service.
Citizenship and military service
Citizenship in exchange for military service exists in several countries, most famously in the United States, Israel, and France. In Russia, the provision is very recent and clearly prompted by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The first change came in November 2022 when a presidential decree allowed the drafting of dual citizens — formerly exempted from conscription (Simmons Reference Simmons2022). The decree was followed by several others granting access to fast-track naturalization in exchange for a six-month service in Ukraine (Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty 2022), then simply for signing a one-year contract with the military (van Brugen Reference van Brugen2023) — a relatively short time commitment in global comparison.
Citizenship for service was then codified in the 2023 legislation. The 2002 law only offered fast-track naturalization to former Soviet citizens who served three years in the armed forces. The new law vastly expands the provision by offering simplified naturalization to all foreign citizens who have signed a contract with the armed forces for at least one year (even if they have not served). This provision was added during the second reading.Footnote 28 The importance of this clause (“entering into a contract for service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops or military formations for a period of at least one year”) is clear in the text: it is the first item listed on the almost two-page-long list of criteria allowing foreign or stateless individuals to naturalize. A separate 2024 law reduced naturalization processing time for applicants who join the military from three months to one month (AP News 2024). As noted by Bahovadinova and Borisova (Reference Bahovadinova and Borisova2025), coupled with frequent raids in migrant communities, these legal changes (which created what they call a “militarized citizenship regime”) show that the Russian government is weaponizing citizenship, including by framing military service as a requirement to prove one’s loyalty during naturalization procedures. Citizenship for service also reveals the extent to which Russia’s citizenship regime is increasingly stressing naturalized citizens’ responsibilities, while simultaneously restricting their rights — as discussed in the next section.
Denaturalization
Citizenship revocation of naturalized citizens (denaturalization), or, much less commonly, of native-born citizens (denationalization), shows how “citizenship can be granted or taken away in pursuit of state interests” (Kingston Reference Kingston, Bloom and Kingston2023a, 105). Citizenship revocation is often justified on terrorism grounds and sometimes used as a sanction for fraud; its practice “feeds into us vs them narratives” (Fargues and Winter Reference Fargues, Winter, Fargues, Winter and Gibney2020, 5) and often targets categories of people (generally based on race) rather than specific individuals. Both denaturalization and denationalization (which remains quite rare) have been used to oppress minorities, punish political opponents, or disempower groups identified as threats (Open Society Justice Initiatives 2019). Recent examples include the USA, the UK, and Canada following the September 11 attacks (Kingston Reference Kingston, Bloom and Kingston2023a; Gibney Reference Gibney2013).Footnote 29
Russia’s 2023 law is an extreme case of this trend. Article 24 (“Termination of Citizenship for Committing a Crime) sharply broadens the range of violations triggering citizenship revocation for naturalized citizens (Ganohariti Reference Ganohariti2023), referencing over 40 articles from Russia’s Criminal Code. In contrast, the 2002 law (article 22) cited only a dozen articles from the Criminal Code. In addition to crimes such as sabotage, terrorism, and destruction or damage to military graves, Article 24 lists the following items: creating a non-profit organization that infringes on the personality and rights of citizens (Article 239 of the Russian criminal code), discrediting the use of the Russian armed forces (Article 280.3), carrying out the activities of a foreign or international organization whose activities are seen as “undesirable” (Article 284.1), evading military service (Article 328), violating procedures for the activities of a foreign agent (Article 330), and rehabilitation of Nazism (Article 354).Footnote 30 A separate revocation article (number 26) refers to “actions that pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation” and stipulates that the Federal Security Service (FSB) determines what constitutes such actions. During debates in the State Duma, Deputy Artem Turov argued that the provision will allow the state to act swiftly when the Russian Federal Security Service assesses that a naturalized citizen threatens security.Footnote 31 Finally, a 2024 amendment adds another ground for the termination of citizenship: failing to register for military service (Putz Reference Putz2024; Bahovadinova and Borisova, Reference Bahovadinova and Borisova2025). According to Article 24 of the 2023 law, revocation of citizenship from naturalized citizens takes place regardless of when the crime was committed, when the court issued a verdict, or when the individual was naturalized.
With these new measures, and by evoking threats to national security as ground for revocation, the 2023 law securitizes naturalized citizens and further undermines their rights — while simultaneously requiring more displays of their loyalty during naturalization procedures.
Conclusion
With new legislation, an ongoing war, and rapid changes in immigration and emigration patterns, Russia’s citizenship regime is in flux. The pace at which new laws, amendments, and decrees are adopted only seems to have increased since 2022. These changes underscore the imperatives that the Kremlin is grappling with, including a dire need for military recruits, a declining population and workforce, and growing anti-immigrant sentiments in the wake of recent terrorist attacks.
The changes also show the extent to which Russia is instrumentalizing citizenship to achieve several goals, including military recruitment, limiting dissent from naturalized citizens, enhancing “the patriotic spirit,” and propagating “traditional”, “spiritual” values. As such, the study furthers our understanding of oppressive practices of citizenship (Jain Reference Jain2023a) in Russia and builds upon ethnographic accounts of the impact of citizenship weaponization on labor migrants (Bahovadinova Reference Bahovadinova2024; Bahovadinova and Borisova Reference Bahovadinova and Borisova2025). It also complements studies on passportization abroad (Dickinson Reference Dickinson2020; Hyde Reference Hyde2023; Jain Reference Jain2023a; Melvin Reference Melvin2020; Nagashima Reference Nagashima2019; Zevelev Reference Zevelev2021), which have shown how Russia is using citizenship to consolidate power (Jain Reference Jain2023a), oppress (Kingston Reference Kingston2023b), and exert “imperialism by civic means” (Mühlfried 2020, 13).
The wide range of grounds for citizenship deprivation included in the 2023 law is particularly concerning and seemingly contradictory with the long-term objective of bringing back compatriots. What is clear is that for the Kremlin today, there are wanted and unwanted citizens, based on criteria such as geopolitical goals and political values, both encapsulated in the “Russian World” idea. As such, the 2023 law is an extreme illustration of how citizenship revocation policies separate “desirable” from “undesirable” citizens (Fargues and Winter Reference Fargues, Winter, Fargues, Winter and Gibney2020; Fargues 2020). As Fargues and Winter (Reference Fargues, Winter, Fargues, Winter and Gibney2020, 6) note, “the unmaking of citizens through revocation constructs two classes of citizens. It creates a category of accidental citizens […] and opposes them to essential citizens whose memberships [are] never called into question.” This issue was even highlighted by Konstantin Zatulin, a deputy from the presidential party (United Russia) and strong advocate for the compatriot programs (Zevelev Reference Zevelev2020).Footnote 32 Zatulin opposed some of the citizenship termination clauses, arguing that they contradict Article 6 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (which states that “A citizen of the Russian Federation may not be deprived of his or her citizenship or of the right to change it”) and divide citizens — some of whom can be stripped of their passports. Zatulin was the only deputy to abstain in the final vote in the Duma (there was no vote against).Footnote 33
Citizenship is inherently hierarchical. At the global level, passports reflect a country’s place in the global order (Castles Reference Castles2005) and largely determine individual opportunities. Domestically, bestowing citizenship upon some means “the partial or full exclusion of many others” (Castles Reference Castles2005, 24). Some experts go further and challenge the binary distinction between citizens and noncitizens, noting that policies around immigration, revocation, and naturalization create different types of citizens (Troy Reference Troy, Fargues, Winter and Gibney2020, 13).
By instrumentalizing passports, Russia is magnifying these issues. As a result, having a Russian passport is a very different legal reality based on modes of acquisition (natural born versus naturalized citizens, especially given new provisions on denaturalization) and on location (including within versus outside of Russia). In the case of naturalized labor migrants in Russia, for example, Bahovadinova (Reference Bahovadinova2024) found that Russian citizenship has become “subalternized,” as new citizens continue to be marginalized based on race — for example, naturalized migrants are often called “migrants with Russian passports” (Bahovadinova and Borisova Reference Bahovadinova and Borisova2025). Outside of Russia, such as in the occupied territories of Ukraine, coerced naturalization happens along with many other human rights violations. By 2024, almost all residents of these territories had been issued Russian passports (Freedom House Reference House2024), even though these passports make them second-class citizens, including through the risk of denaturalization (Yale School of Public Health 2023).
Regardless of legislative changes, the threat of conscription and an increasingly punitive domestic context have already had a significant impact on naturalization rates. Applications for a Russian passport declined sharply in 2023, to less than one-third of their 2022 numbersFootnote 34 (see also Strelnikov Reference Strelnikov2024). Interest in the Resettlement Program of Compatriots seems to have plummeted as well (Civic Assistance Committee 2024).
Because Russia is an authoritarian regime at war, where reliable information and statistics are difficult to come by, analyzing the government’s goals and strategies through legislation can reveal important trends. But there are also limitations to focusing on laws in an autocracy. When evaluating citizenship legislation across different contexts, researchers must consider how it is implemented, not just how it is written (Chopin Reference Chopin, Bauböck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk and Waldrauch2006; van der Baaren Reference van der Baaren2024). To understand these “implementation gaps” (van der Baaren Reference van der Baaren2024), one needs to look beyond legislation and judicial decisions (Vink Reference Vink, Shachar, Bauböck, Bloemraad and Vink2017). For example, regardless of what the law says, naturalizing in Russia often entails bribing authorities, an “expected part” of the process (Michlin-Shapir Reference Michlin-Shapir2021, 47), or paying for intermediaries (Borisova Reference Borisova2020). Critically, a focus on laws also overlooks individual agency and people’s motivation to naturalize or to renounce a passport, which are naturally complex.
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to my colleagues at the Skytte Institute of Political Studies for their valuable comments when I presented prior versions of this manuscript during the Institute’s research colloquium and at the annual Tartu Conference on East European and Eurasian Studies.
Financial support
The work for this article was partially completed during my affiliation with the Skytte Institute of Political Studies at the University of Tartu, as part of a Fulbright Scholar Grant for Estonia, February-June 2025. The findings in this publication are not endorsed by the government of the United States, the funder of the Fulbright program.
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