The publication includes six studies on armaments and the arms trade in eastern Europe during the interwar era. The author assumes that after the First World War it was necessary for east European countries to adopt a new arms strategy and to successfully anticipate the future of arms exports while strengthening their own arms industry. Among other things, Jonathan Grant repeatedly attempts to dispel some myths, such as misconceptions about the role of “Merchants of Death.” As stated: “A survey of the many armament deals negotiated and signed in Eastern Europe does not generally confirm the popular, conventional critique of ‘Merchants of Death’” (220–21). In this context, he also rejects the idea of the crucial role of bribes associated with the egoistical behavior of arms producers while negotiating arms deals in order to maximize the volume of supplies. He concludes that the major initiative towards the implementation of the arms trade usually originated directly from the east European countries, not from the arms producers themselves.
The role of the Škoda Works and the relationship between this Czechoslovak arms producer and its majority owner the French concern Schneider et Cie are repeatedly discussed in the book. Grant considers the Škoda Works to have been a very significant participant in the arms trade during the interwar years in Europe. In essence, he rejects the perception of the relationship between Schneider and Škoda as the relationship between the dominant foreign partner and the Czechoslovak enterprise. He refers to the growing activities of the Škoda Works, which played a much more significant role in the east European arms trade than Schneider did in the 1930s. The relationship between Schneider and Škoda is presented here as an example of entities that cooperate (the market sharing arrangements for artillery can be regarded as the main outcome) and compete. For example, he discusses the different interests of the Škoda Works and Schneider (respectively the French and Czechoslovak governments) in the case of arms supplies to Yugoslavia and Romania, which together with Czechoslovakia formed the Little Entente. In this context, Grant also restates the Czechoslovak efforts to serve as the “Arsenal of the Little Entente” (51). His effort to emphasize the role of the Škoda Works and his assessment of Škoda's position in interwar arms trade are one of the greatest benefits of the book. He also comments on the general lack of attention paid to this topic and regards more detailed research into the role of the Škoda Works as a challenge for the future.
Furthermore, Grant considers the fact that any alliance by itself does not guarantee the sale of weapons. He gave an example of the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance (1935) and showed that plans for the sale of French weapons to the Soviet Union were perceived differently in France, and Schneider's approach to Soviet orders was influenced by his anticommunist beliefs and memories of Soviet nationalization of business interests in Tsarist Russia. On the other hand, Grant reminds the reader about the general interest of the Soviet Union in western arms technology (including the purchase of licenses) and the fact that the USSR, in contrast to other east European countries, acted as a responsible customer in terms of paying punctually and in full.
Grant also considers the meaningfulness and results of the concept of joint ventures, for example, when a significant expansion in domestic arms production could be achieved through the direct involvement of a major foreign armaments producer. He states that this model repeatedly failed and most east European countries showed a considerable dependence on arms imports, with Czechoslovakia as an exception. More broadly, he also assesses the role of pacifist moods after WWI and their notable impact on the realization of the arms trade, despite the fact that a comprehensive disarmament agreement never materialized.
Grant reached the conclusion that the key factors influencing the interwar arms trade in eastern Europe included the Schneider-Škoda alliance and the British refusal under the Trade Facilities Act to provide credit guarantees for anything having to do with armaments. He also highlights the impact of developments in eastern Europe in the 1920s and 1930s on the situation after the outbreak of World War II, for example the German absorption of the well-developed Czechoslovak armaments industry.
The book provides an interesting and important contribution to the research of the interwar arms trade. Grant demonstrated a deep knowledge of the topic. He utilized a wide range of the US, English, French, and Czechoslovak sources, including unpublished documents. The text is very readable and is intended for both professional and wider use. Although it includes separate studies, they collectively form a comprehensive picture of the armaments and arms trade in eastern Europe during the interwar years. The publication contains valuable information regarding arms production and the armaments of countries that are usually neglected by researchers.
The publication has no significant weaknesses. It might have benefitted from having a more suitable title that better reflects its content and its focus on eastern Europe. More detailed statistical reports, additional summary tables and figures would make a further improvement to this work. As a clear challenge for future researchers, one feels that the utilization of unpublished materials stored in east European archives (for example, a large collection of documents from the Archives of Škoda Plzeň) would be essential in order to gain a greater understanding of the topic.
