LEGAL FRAMEWORK

An analysis of the legal protection system in force in Argentina may be carried out in two different ways: either by following, in a chronological order, the changes in legislation that have occurred over time or by approaching the present day situation on the basis of what is written in the supreme law or National Constitution and introducing the current perspective. This second option is the one we will follow to describe the regulations of cultural heritage protection applicable in our country. However, we should say that the current system is only the sum total of all of the changes that have been introduced over time, and, thus, the legal regulations in force are not necessarily in full agreement with the higher order rules.

Cultural heritage is explicitly considered in section 41 of the National Constitution, which was amended in 1994. It states that “authorities will be in charge of preserving the natural and cultural heritage,” specifying that “the Nation must pass the necessary rules and regulations containing the basic protection premises, and the provinces must pass the necessary complementary legislation in such a way that the former does not interfere with local jurisdictions.” That is to say, it acknowledges the authority of the provinces (or the nation, in the case of the federal territories) even though the authority to legislate over activities related to such heritage is shared by the nation and the provinces. In addition, it enables the state to lodge an amparo ^{Footnote 4} action on the grounds of unconstitutionality, whenever “the rights protecting the environment ... as well as those rights considered of collective nature in general,” among which cultural heritage preservation could be included, are at risk. This proceeding can be lodged by the affected party, by the ombudsman, or by any organization dealing with the preservation of cultural heritage (section 43). In matters related to indigenous peoples, the new constitutional text acknowledges their “ethnic and cultural pre-existence,” granting them, together with the provinces, “respect for their identity and participation in reference to the management of their natural resources and other interests that may affect them (section 75, sub-section 11). This last paragraph has been interpreted as an acknowledgement of their right to participate in the management of the cultural heritage of their ancestors. ^{Footnote 5}

The amendment of the National Constitution settled the question of control over archaeological and paleontological sites between the nation and the provinces. As mentioned earlier, Law 9080 stated that the national state had control over ruins and sites, disregarding their jurisdiction. However, the amended Civil Code of 1968 introduced a substantial change in this matter by adding, in section 2340, sub-section 9, that “archaeological and paleontological ruins and sites of scientific interest” are property under public control and stating, in section 2339, that “things are public property of the General State which constitutes the Nation or of the particular States that constitute the Nation, in accordance with the powers granted by the National Constitution.” Such a division was settled by section 121 of the National Constitution, which states that “the provinces reserve to themselves all the powers not delegated to the Federal Government by this Constitution, as well as those powers expressly reserved to themselves by special pacts at the time of their incorporation.” From this time on, it was understood that if there was not an explicit delegation from the provinces to the national state in reference to archaeological and paleontological sites, the national state, as well as the provinces, reserved their entitlement to those ruins and sites located within the boundaries of their territories. ^{Footnote 6} This criterion was included in the majority of the heritage laws passed by the provinces after 1968.

The 1994 National Constitution also adds a provision stating that all treaties concluded with other nations and international organizations, as well as concordats with the Holy See, “have a higher hierarchy than laws” (section 75, sub-section 22, paragraph 1). In this sense, it is important to note that Argentina has ratified a significant number of international conventions that protect cultural and natural heritage, such as the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, according to Law 23618/88 and additional protocols ratified by Laws 26115/06 and 25478/99; ^{Footnote 7} the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, according to Law 19943/72; ^{Footnote 8} the 1972 Convention for the Protection of Natural and Cultural Heritage, according to Law 21836/78; ^{Footnote 9} the 1995 Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, according to Law 25257/2000; ^{Footnote 10} the 2001 Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage, according to Law 26556/09; ^{Footnote 11} the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, according to Law 26118/06; ^{Footnote 12} the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, according to Law 26305/07; ^{Footnote 13} and the 1976 Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological, Historical and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations, which was ratified in 2002 by Law 25568. ^{Footnote 14}

At the national level, there is no general “framework law” concerning cultural heritage that may help the provinces pass their own regulations. ^{Footnote 15} Nevertheless, some of the national laws that have been passed—before and after the constitutional amendment—legislate over different types of heritage and work as a general legal framework. These are the previously mentioned Law 12665/40 on Artistic and Historical Heritage (and the corresponding Regulatory Decree 84005/41, which was issued in 1993); Law 25197/99 on a Single Registry of Cultural Heritage, which has not been regulated and, thus, is not applicable; and Law 25743/03 on the Protection of the Archaeological and Paleontological Heritage and its Regulatory Decree 1022/04, which repealed Law 9080.

The purpose of this last law is to “preserve, protect and be in charge of the Archaeological and Paleontological Heritage as an integral part of the Cultural Heritage of the Nation as well as of its scientific and cultural use” (section 1). ^{Footnote 16} In regard to the jurisdiction of archaeological and paleontological property, it has been established by sections 2339 and 2340, sub-section 9, of the recently repealed Civil Code and section 121 and related sections of the National Constitution (section 9) that such objects are under the control of the national, provincial, or municipal states, according to the territory in which they are found. This law also defines the property that is considered archaeological and paleontological heritage. Thus, it states that “movable and immovable property or remains of any nature which are found on the surface, underground or underwater in territorial waters which may provide information about the socio-cultural groups that inhabited the country since pre-Columbian times until more recent historical times”—that is, “the last hundred years since the time of occurrence of the referring events or actions, are part of the Archaeological Heritage” (section 2, Regulatory Decree 1022/04). Regarding paleontological heritage, the law considers that “organisms or their parts, or traces of life activity of organisms which had lived in the geological past, and all the natural fossil concentration appearing on rocks or exposed sediments either on the surface or underground or underwater in territorial waters are part of the Paleontological Heritage” (section 2). ^{Footnote 17}

With respect to the rights of indigenous communities, the constitutional amendment has consolidated a policy of positive discrimination that had started to be developed after the country moved towards democracy, and this policy was made evident in a series of successive laws. In 1985, Law 23302 on Indigenous Policy and Law 23505 on Support to Aboriginal Peoples were passed. In 1992, Argentina ratified, through Law 24071, the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Convention no. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. ^{Footnote 18} This convention states that governments must “assume the responsibility to develop, with the participation of the interested peoples, coordinated and systematic actions in view to protect the rights (social, economic and cultural) of said peoples and also to guarantee the due respect to their integrity” (sections 2.1, 2.b). It also obliges member states to adopt “the special measures which were deemed necessary to safeguard people, institutions, property, work, cultures and the environment of the interested peoples” (section 4.1) and also specifies that

Among these rights, “the right to participate in the development, application and evaluation of plans and programs of national and regional development that might directly affect them” (section 7.1) is acknowledged. The convention also states that “the values and social, cultural, religious and spiritual practices proper of said peoples must be protected” (section 6). In reference to indigenous participation, it establishes that the governments must “determine the means through which the interested peoples may participate freely, at least in the same way as other sectors of the population do, and at all levels, in the process of decision- making within elective institutions and administrative organisms and others which are responsible of the policies and programs which to them refer” (section 6(b)).

Moreover, it explains that “the enquiries carried out in the implementation of this Convention will have to be completed in good faith and as appropriate to the circumstances, with the aim of reaching a consensus or obtaining consent as regards the proposed measures” (section 6.2). The last point is of particular interest since it creates the obligation of providing free and prior-informed consent. ^{Footnote 19} It should be noted that this agreement did not come into effect until the year 2000, when the Argentine government deposited its instrument of ratification with the ILO. Convention no. 169 constitutes the most important international norm of binding character on the subject of indigenous rights and, having been ratified by the Argentine state, it has become part of the current legislation in the country. On the subject of the rights of indigenous peoples regarding their cultural heritage, the provisions in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was approved by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 2007, are much more specific and forceful. Nevertheless, it is necessary to clarify that a declaration can only have the character of recommendation and is not binding on the states that have signed in favor of it. ^{Footnote 20}

After the constitutional amendment and prior to the enactment of Law 25743/03 on the Protection of the Archaeological and Paleontological Heritage, Law 25517 on Indigenous Human Remains held at museums was enacted in 2001. This law regulates a complex and controversial matter, namely the location of human remains that are found in museums or form part of scientific collections. This rule establishes that museums should put the mortal remains of aboriginal people that are part of their collections at the disposal of “indigenous peoples or communities of belonging that might claim them” (section 1). It also requires of all organizations that in order “to perform any scientific enterprise related to aboriginal communities, including their historical and cultural heritage they should have the express consent of the interested community” (section 3). This law was not regulated until 2010, when the national government enacted Decree 701, which gives the National Institute of Indigenous Affairs (INAI) authority and made it “responsible for coordinating, articulating and assisting in the control and study of the compliance with the directives and actions enforced by Law 25517, being the Institute authorized to issue the necessary complementary norms for its implementation.” ^{Footnote 21}

This institute can carry out the required studies to identify the mortal remains of aboriginal people that are held in museums and/or collections (public or private), facilitate the availability of the remains and their effective restitution, and coordinate and collaborate with the relevant organizations in such matters pursuant to Law 25517, especially with the National Institute of Anthropology and Latin-American Thought. It also establishes that the INAI can “participate in requests for the restitution of mortal remains from the communities and/or indigenous peoples, issuing through established administrative act, the historical, ethnic, cultural, biological and legitimate interests backgrounds that may concern each claim” and “express opinion in the case of conflicts of interest of reclaiming people and/or communities, upon request” as well as “gather reports and express opinion on scientific undertakings that relate to aboriginal communities, referred to in section 3 of Law N° 25.517.” It is authorized to “take action in order to assess compliance with Law No. 25.517, suggesting additional or correction instruments” that may be deemed necessary for compliance with its goals (section 2, sub-sections a, b, c, d, e, f, g).

The INAI also provides that “public or private organizations that possess mortal remains of Indians that were, at the time of the restitution claim, the subject of scientific studies may require an extension period of up to twelve months from the above-mentioned claim, for the purpose of realizing the return of their remains.” To do so, all of the evidential documentation of the course of investigation will have to be submitted, as well as the support of the highest authority of the organization in such matters” (section 3).

THE NEW UNIFIED NATIONAL CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE

The new code contains few provisions that concern cultural heritage. In fact, cultural heritage is not explicitly mentioned in any of them. The only reference that is made deals with “the ruins and archeological and paleontological sites” in section 235, which refers to property belonging to the public jurisdiction and which replaces the text of former section 2340, sub-section 9, which was excluded—that is, the one indicating that they had to be of “scientific interest.” The new text states:

In this regard, Peralta Mariscal notes that “goods considered public property are intended to meet the needs of general usefulness and are meant to be of public use. This constitutes a special category as it is not an in rem right of ordinary jurisdiction: it lacks essential attributions such as the power of disposition, since the goods in this category are inalienable and imprescriptible. It is rather a power of regulation of the use of or, in any case, of a right to property different in sense from regular property.” ^{Footnote 22} In accordance with the doctrine, public ownership may be natural or artificial. In the first case, the mere legislative arrangement to be declared as such is enough, while, in the second case, a specific creation of the property by the state is required, though, whether the public property of the state may or may not be disencumbered is a matter of debate.

These goods are inalienable and not attachable because they cannot be mortgaged, sold, or subject to attachments. Only their use and exploitation can be granted. They are imprescriptible since they are not subject to usucapion (that is, purchasing prescription by prolonged possession over time), nor are they lost over time if they are not used. It must be added, as Mariscal points out, that these goods can be used by the general public. ^{Footnote 23} This is not contrary to the idea that the state can decide that a fee must be paid to the state or to a licensee who is assigned the exploitation for a period of time. One example is the payment of an entrance fee to a museum that falls within the public jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Buenos Aires established that

In relation to the archaeological and paleontological heritage, it is observed that the new code reproduces the terms of Law 9080 when referring to ruins and archeological and paleontological sites, even though it is certainly ancient terminology and even though the concept of site has been equally referred to in the most recent law of archaeological and paleontological heritage, as previously stated. ^{Footnote 25} Law 9080 meant, at the time it was passed, a step forward with respect to the Velez Sarsfield Code (1869) passed by Law 340 because it separated the archaeological and paleontological sites from the soil property, which was governed by the general law, and made them goods that were publicly owned. Such a division was created because of the scientific value of such property and the significance that this value would have for the development of a science of national standing and the importance that would be gained by the collections in public museums. ^{Footnote 26} This high rating justified that “the owner of a farm where there was a site ceased to be the unique, exclusive and unlimited owner of such a territory, to become a mere depositary of property belonging to the Nation and thus made public and at the same time, protector of its integrity.” ^{Footnote 27} This same concept was adopted in the comprehensive amendment of the 1968 Civil Code, which was approved by Law 17711. Sub-section 9 was added to section 2340, and it established that the ruins and archeological and paleontological sites of scientific interest are public property.

Thus, as observed, the defining criterion to establish whether or not sites are publicly owned by the state lies in their scientific interest, assuming that there may be sites that are not relevant for science and, therefore, should not be protected by the state. This concept has been criticized by Eduardo Berberián since it relies on an outdated conception of archaeology in which the archaeological record is mostly concerned with extraordinary objects or museum pieces. ^{Footnote 28} As a result, the principle of scientific interest acknowledged in the legislation has received a great deal of criticism. For Berberián, it is an outdated criterion and, therefore, has “to be suppressed from all modern archaeological legislation” since all traces of the past are equally important and significant. ^{Footnote 29} It has also been criticized since it is the only assessment that Argentine national legislation explicitly recognizes, while, at the international level, the idea of the multiplicity of values that archaeological heritage contains and the need to provide sustainable management for all of them has already been accepted. ^{Footnote 30}

The truth is that scientific interest has generated a certainly unnecessary uncertainty to legal protection, especially if the existence of this type of heritage is not made evident by the presence of visible ruins on the ground or by the existence of museum pieces but, rather, by the discovery of any trace of human presence in the past, which is at least a minimum of 100 years old (according to the criteria established by Law 25743 and its regulatory decree). The other question to elucidate is whether the ruins and the archeological and paleontological sites constitute a natural or artificial public jurisdiction. The criterion that has been supported is that they constitute a natural public jurisdiction because, despite not being natural (like a river or a lake) but, rather, products of human action, their value does not depend on the will of the ruler. Instead, it is given by its condition of remain that is in the archaeological or paleontological record from the past. ^{Footnote 31}

COLLECTIVE RIGHTS

Protecting collective rights in our country began one decade before the 1994 constitutional amendment, ^{Footnote 32} which included them in one of its most important transformations, by conferring the hierarchy of new rights and constitutional guarantees and developing a specific procedure for their protection, ^{Footnote 33} namely the collective amparo. Despite the introduction of this action as a protection tool, the National Constitution did not encourage the determination of the nature or content of these rights, ^{Footnote 34} to which it refers in section 43 as the “rights of collective incidence in general” ^{Footnote 35} in an original formulation, ^{Footnote 36} distanced from the doctrinal proposals that refer to diffuse interests ^{Footnote 37} and from comparative law, which adopted other nomen iuris. ^{Footnote 38} Thus, the notion of collective rights goes beyond the classic distinction between a ‘subjective right’—with full administrative and judicial supervision—and a ‘legitimate interest’—with eventual protection in administrative procedure ^{Footnote 39} —which had been at the core of the debates between the judicial and administrative representatives until that point.

The absence of normative foresight concerning the nature and content of these rights gave rise to an interesting debate in reference to the main features of the collective rights to which the National Constitution refers, which can be simplified in two basic perspectives centered around the divisibility of rights: (1) a broad one, which considers them to be a comprehensive type of divisible and indivisible rights and (2) a restricted one, which understands that collective rights are limited to those on goods, which, even when they are shared by a plurality of individuals, cannot be divided and individualized for the purposes of ownership. The issue was finally settled in 2009, when the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ), favoring the broad thesis, extensively defined them in the Halabi case. ^{Footnote 40} In this leading case, the SCJ included the following statement within section 43 of the National Constitution that rules the amparo proceeding: “[T]hree categories of rights: individual, collective—involving collective goods ^{Footnote 41} —and collective—related to homogeneous individual rights” (whereas clause 8). ^{Footnote 42}

In a similar way, the SCJ in whereas clause 11 of this same ruling stated that:

We understand that the human right over cultural heritage falls under this category, due to the fact that, although the owners are an indefinite plurality of individuals who belong to a social group or a community, they represent as the object of protection a general aspiration of use or of the possession of a legal good that cannot be divided for each individual petitioner to be used or owned. In this sense, it is worth mentioning that the constitutional processes that took place concurrently in most of the Argentine provinces with the 1994 National Constitution amendment helped to overcome the lack of definition regarding the content of collective rights in the National Constitution and to move forward with their consolidation since they included specific protection rules related to the human right to cultural heritage. ^{Footnote 43}

As stated by Cançado Trindade, all human rights have an individual, as well as a social, dimension because they are applied in the social context. ^{Footnote 44} Nonetheless, certain rights are more closely related to life within a community, which has led jurists to describe a new category of rights that falls outside of the general instruments of human rights and which most scholars have called “new human rights” or “solidarity rights” ^{Footnote 45} and which we prefer to call, as Alejandro Medici does, “rights over relational public goods.” ^{Footnote 46}

Within this context, the CCCU was discussed and drafted in 2012, and it is considered an improved option to the individualistic nineteenth-century tradition that characterized the Velez Sarsfield Code, ^{Footnote 47} with its resulting unequivocal distinction between public and private law. This alternative has been put into practice under the principle of the “constitutionalization of private law,” which arises as one of its axiological assumptions. ^{Footnote 48} Thus, the aim is to achieve coherence between civil law and the federal constitutional law, which includes the National Constitution and the international instruments of human rights with constitutional hierarchy. ^{Footnote 49}

Accordingly, the addition of a preliminary title is one of the many methodological decisions made by the Writing Committee. This title follows the historical tradition of the Velez Sarsfield Code but with a new perspective, represented by the addition of section 14 of this title, which states that the new legal text acknowledges not only individual rights but also “collective rights.” This regulation is considered to be one of the most valuable aspects of the new text and was included by the Writing Committee on this basis ^{Footnote 50} when they described it as the “Code of individual and collective rights.”

While most of the Civil Code makes exclusive reference to individual rights, the Bill, in accordance with the Brazilian legislation, has also decided to include collective rights within the scope of its implementation, which, in turn, represents one of the most transcendental changes in the amendment to the 1994 National Constitution through section 41 (environmental rights and cultural heritage), section 42 (consumers and users’ rights), and section 43 (individual and collective amparo proceedings). In this preliminary title, which assumes that the Code constitutes the core of the private legal body of laws, ^{Footnote 51} all of the general rules of the whole system are stated—rules that are not addressed exclusively to judges but also addressed to citizens and rules that exercise rights, together with general notions, over individual and collective goods providing valuable orientation. ^{Footnote 52}

Thus, section 14 of the CCCU, with amendments introduced by the Executive Power, ^{Footnote 53} prescribes:

Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that the CCCU succeeds to a certain point since it has avoided a definition of the characteristics and content of these rights. In this sense, the bill has proposed a core regulation of the collective rights that were “mutilated” and replaced by some basic rules in the past text. ^{Footnote 54} We were especially sorry about the omission by Congress of the legal entity of dissuasive pecuniary sanctions that were regulated in sections 1714 and 1715 of the bill submitted by the Executive Branch as an instrumental measure to protect collective rights and also about the suppression of Chapter 5, which is entitled “On the Damage Caused to Collective Rights,” and which was originally considered to be included in the bill. Consequently, the civil responsibility derived from the damage caused to collective rights was restricted to a mere reference within the concept of damage compensation, anticipated in section 1737. ^{Footnote 55}

As can be seen from the following dicussion, section 14 of the CCCU states in its second paragraph that “[l]aw does not protect the abusive exercise of individual rights shall they affect the environment or rights of collective incidence in general.” This is a significant change and was celebrated by the academic and judicial community because there was a gap in the implementation of collective rights, despite the fact that they were recognized in the 1994 National Constitution, due to a lack of regulation and specific public policies. ^{Footnote 56} Considering that this is a new issue in our legislation, the Writing Committee decided to provide a more specific regulation in Title III, Book One, General Part, section 3, and entitled Goods, in relation to collective rights. This section states that subjective rights acknowledge certain collective rights that are the object of tutelage such as development, sustainable consumption, and the environment. ^{Footnote 57}

This decision is in agreement with the principle of the social function of private property, as stated in Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and it enjoys constitutional hierarchy within Argentina’s legislation. ^{Footnote 58} The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador (2008) states the following:

Consequently, the new section 240 reads as follows:

Section 240 is innovative in relation to the Velez Sarsfield Code and other amendment proposals. Unfortunately, the text that was passed in 2014 suppressed the right to information and participation in relevant decision making, which had been explicitly included in the bill ^{Footnote 62} and which constituted a set of operational rules in relation to the exercise of collective rights. ^{Footnote 63} Indeed, if this formulation had been kept, it would have highlighted the interdependence between collective rights and democratic participation in the different degrees of citizen cooperation and interaction that we have advocated, such as: (1) participation as the right to have access to information; (2) participation as enquiry; (3) participation as co-decision making; and (4) participation as co-administration. ^{Footnote 64} The minimal assumptions necessary to exercise the collective rights referred to in the new code must be the subject matter of a special law.

INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES

The rights of indigenous communities is another topic that was superficially treated in the new code. It is only mentioned in section 18, which states:

It is worth mentioning that, due to the criticism raised by both indigenous communities and doctrinal authors towards the code amendment bill in relation to the community ownership of lands of indigenous communities, several sections were suppressed, and the only one that remained was section 18, in an abridged version, which partially reproduces the constitutional contents and leaves the discussion of the topic to be covered by a special law. ^{Footnote 65} In this section, the suppressed part makes reference to the management of natural resources and other interests that affect indigenous communities and which are included in section 75, subsection 17, of the National Constitution. Interestingly, the code amendment bill went further in relation to the management right, stating that “such exercise is carried out by means of collective rights” (section 2028).

It could be affirmed, without doubt, that a chance was lost in this case if we take into account the legal achievements that have been made in relation to the rights of these communities. In this sense, the SCJ—in the case of EbenEizer Indigenous Community v. the Province of Salta—established that:

FINAL REMARKS

As can be seen, the new CCCU does not introduce much novel material in regard to cultural heritage, museums, and cultural goods. It just repeats what has been previously discussed in relation to archeological and paleontological heritage with only minimal changes. Obviously, these issues have not caught the attention of the amendment’s authors. Clearly, something different happened with the issues related to indigenous communities since the original bill was much more complete, but it was disregarded in the end.

The changes related to collective rights deserve a separate comment. Their inclusion in the CCCU constitutes an important initiative, but it could have been more effective if the contents of the proposal of the bill had not been cut off. Even the project submitted by the Executive Branch, which included interesting regulations related to damages caused to collective rights as well as regulations for the participation of civil organizations, was more extensive and significant than the one that was finally enacted.

Nonetheless, the achievements on these matters could be the source of new judicial decisions, which, as long they comply with the criteria for the protection of human rights within international organizations and of the SCJ itself, might acknowledge the participation of individuals and communities who wish to protect cultural heritage and include mechanisms such as public hearings and previous enquires in decision-making processes, all of which have deep-rooted constitutional status. However, all of this will depend on the legal operators and the special laws to be passed because the CCCU has paid little attention to the operational contents included in the bill.

It must be pointed out that it will not be possible to make real and effective advances in the protection of cultural heritage without federal and provincial laws governing the implementation of collective processes, including class actions. In practice, the criteria set by the SCJ are applicable, but they fall short in terms of the need for appropriate measures for prevention, such as deterrent financial penalties or civil fines and damage repair. Regarding the latter, it is worrying that the new code has limited the responsibility of the state and public officials since these limitations of general character also effect the damage caused to public property, including the environment and cultural heritage.

On the basis of the information presented, it can be stated that the most interesting aspect of the amendment is the acknowledgement of collective rights as well as the change of approach in regard to private property and the reinforcement of regulatory powers of the provincial and municipal states over private property, which is liable to be applied in order to protect cultural goods. ^{Footnote 69} The submission and approval of special laws to settle unresolved matters in the CCCU, as well as the revision of existent national laws, will definitely be part of the future agenda.