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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 May 2004
This is an important book about an important subject published at a critical juncture in the history of Iraq. Policy-makers as well as Iraq specialists will be well advised to study the many analyses that the author provides. The major contribution of this work is in its examination of the forces that shaped the rise and decline of agriculture in Iraq. Kamil Mahdi guides the reader through three stages of change and development. In all these stages, the state played a pivotal role, whether one speaks of Ottoman rule, the monarchy (up to 1958), or the republican regime that followed the monarchy. Mahdi informs us that, following the re-occupation of Baghdad by the Ottomans in 1831, a number of economic and administrative policies were introduced that set in motion a process of land tenure and agricultural taxation reform. These state-induced changes led to the expansion of agricultural production to meet the needs of both domestic and foreign markets, on the one hand, and to enhance the interest of urban capitalists in land acquisition, on the other. One of the outcomes of this expansion was the use of agricultural-export earnings to pay for imports of consumer goods to meet the demand of the more affluent urban population. It should be noted that this expansion was made possible by increasing traditional low-yield cultivation and by employing idle resources. An interesting side effect of this expansion of agriculture was the settlement of tribes. This relative decline in the power of tribes was to change under the British and monarchical regimes.
The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I found Iraq under British occupation. Instead of ruling the country directly as a colony, Britain opted to run Iraq as a mandated territory with its own king, which it installed, and its own government. To ensure a social base for the new regime, Britain, Mahdi asserts, found it in its interests to create a third pillar to support the political structure—in addition to the king and the government—composed of land-owning tribal shaykhs. These new arrangements had the effect of safeguarding Britain's interests in Iraq at a relatively low military cost. To strengthen this particular form of social and political structure, policies were adopted to encourage the acquisition of agricultural land by tribal shaykhs and wealthy urbanites. Moreover, the 1932 Land Settlement Law enabled the same upper strata to secure ownership of state lands against the customary rights of tribesmen. These policies of ownership led to an unparalleled degree of land concentration. Thus, by 1957 it was calculated that 1.7 percent of landowners possessed 63.1 percent of the area while nearly 84 percent of owners had 15.3 percent of the land. The combination of rural poverty and peasant indebtedness to landlords resulted in conditions of near-serfdom.
It was on the back of this Britain-induced structure of socio-economic relationships that the rise of oil revenue began to make itself felt in all sectors of the Iraqi economy. Increasing oil revenues prompted the government to create the Development Board to accelerate economic growth, provide employment, and diversify the economy to lessen its dependence on the oil sector. As far as the agricultural sector was concerned, development plans tended to concentrate investment in long-term and large-scale projects in such fields as flood prevention and water storage. Given the concentrated nature of Iraq's land-tenure system, it was not surprising that the benefits of such investment would accrue to landlords with considerable landholdings rather than to poor peasants and tribesmen.
The pro-landlord policies of the British and the monarchy came to a sudden halt when the government was overthrown in July 1958. One of the earliest acts of the new regime was the adoption of agrarian reform in September 1958. According to this new policy, land ownership was to be limited and excess lands were to be distributed to landless peasants. The agrarian reform law was a major political act that successfully broke up large landholdings and distributed some of the expropriated lands to designated beneficiaries. The problem with the reform law, according to Mahdi, was its failure to formulate a stable policy regarding the new class of small land holders to ensure their success. Attempts by subsequent governments to give priority to collective farms had the impact of further weakening the position of small land holders. Although considerable funds in successive development plans were allocated to the agricultural sector, such funds were never fully expended.
Looking back at the long history of agricultural and economic development between 1950 and 1980, one cannot help but notice that oil revenue overwhelmed economic policy-making. The most outstanding feature of policy was the increasing dependence of the economy on oil revenue and the continued rise in Iraq's dependence on food imports to meet more than two-thirds of its food requirements. There can be no more powerful testament to the failure of policy in Iraq.
The main shortcoming of this work, if one were to be pointed out, is its failure to treat developments in agriculture in the past two decades. But this perhaps is an error of commission rather one of omission.