What role should Islam play in Muslim-majority states? Should shariʿa be enforced by the governments of these countries? Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naʿim, a Sudanese scholar who teaches law at Emory University, grapples with these questions in his new book, Islam and the Secular State. His contribution to the general debate about the place of religion in liberal democracies, and to the more specific debate about the compatibility between Islam and democracy, is significant.
An-Naʿim argues for a secular state, that is, one that is neutral toward different religious communities and therefore does not seek to enforce shariʿa. A secular state is, however, distinct from “secularism.” In other words, although An-Naʿim favors the institutional separation between religious and political authority, he does not favor secularism as the privatization of religion or, in his own words, the “total relegation of Islam to the purely private domain and its exclusion from public policy” (p. 9). He maintains that although Islam should be separated from the state, it need not be separated from politics (p. 7).
An-Naʿim justifies his argument through an account of the Islamic tradition on the one hand and the modern state on the other. The argument about Islam is both theoretical and historical. The theoretical argument is that one cannot be coerced to be a Muslim. According to An-Naʿim, genuine piety “must be completely voluntary according to personal pious intention (niyah).” He adds that “coercive enforcement promotes hypocrisy (nifaq), which is categorically and repeatedly condemned by the Qurʾan” (p. 4).
The historical argument, developed mainly in the second chapter of the book, is meant to show that a secular state is more consistent with Islamic tradition than the Islamic state advocated by 20th-century Muslim modernists such as Sayyid Qutb and Abu al-Aʿla Mawdudi (p. 45). An-Naʿim traces the differentiation between religious and political authority in Islamic history as far back as the times of the first caliph Abu Bakr. In fact, An-Naʿim maintains that it is only Prophet Muhammad who ever combined political and religious authority in Islam's history. He also notes that this experience of combining religious and political authority is unique to the Prophet and cannot be replicated, for Muslims do not believe in the possibility of prophets after Muhammad (p. 53). An-Naʿim is thus able to maintain that his own proposal to separate religious from political authority is faithful to the Islamic tradition. The proposal of an Islamic state, by opposition, is a postcolonial legacy, seeking to promote a “European, positivistic view of law and a totalitarian model of the state that seeks to transform society in its own image” and is not true to precolonial Islamic experience (p. 20).
An-Naʿim favors a different model of the state. Because the state has ultimate authority and coercive power over a given territory, the seizure of power by one societal group to the detriment of others should be avoided. Within the broader framework of constitutionalism and the application of human rights, the state should ensure the existence of a public space, grounded in fairness, where different groups in society can attempt to influence public policy (p. 92). This public space is regulated by citizens' use of what An-Naʿim calls “civic reason,” that is, reasons not based solely on religious grounds. Thus, if Muslims want to argue that the state should collect and distribute alms (zakat), then they should give reasons for their proposal that are not merely religious (p. 93). The implementation of constitutionalism, human rights, and “civic reason” requires that Muslims change the way they think about shariʿa. An-Naʿim contends that such a transformation is possible because shariʿa is “always the product of human interpretation and action in a specific historical context” (p. 20).
An-Naʿim devotes three chapters of the book to case studies illustrating successes and failures in the negotiation, both historical and contemporary, of the role of shariʿa in India, Turkey, and Indonesia. The Indian case shows that state secularism has been more or less successful, although religious tensions arise out of the fact that the Indian state also favors some religious communities over others and subordinates the rights of nonbelievers to those of believers (p. 177). An-Naʿim also discusses the failures of what he calls “authoritarian secularism” in Turkey. “Authoritarian secularism” is the attempt to impose secularism (as the privatization of religion) from above without addressing the connectedness of religion and politics (pp. 182–83). The Indonesian case allows An-Naʿim to argue that diversity in religious, ethnic, linguistic, and other groups should translate into pluralism in values, attitudes, and institutions (p. 225). An-Naʿim reports approvingly on a lively and constructive debate in Indonesia on the proper relationship between Islam and the state.
An-Naʿim emphasizes that his book is written by a Muslim for Muslims to rethink their conception of shariʿa. The book is thus intentionally meant to address a broad audience and to advocate a secular state for Muslims: An-Naʿim explains that an initial “concept paper” was circulated and discussed among scholars and leaders of Muslim communities in a few countries. The ensuing comments and suggestions were taken into account in the final manuscript.
Although the attempt to appeal to a wide audience is a laudable aim, the downside of the project, like most similarly conceived projects, is that it skirts some important problems. For example, the idea that shariʿa should be reinterpreted from within a human-rights perspective leaves underdeveloped the question of whether the acceptance of human rights is based on principled or pragmatic reasons: An-Naʿim suggests that Islam and shariʿa principles are compatible with human rights except for specific injunctions concerning women, non-Muslims, and the freedom of religion and belief. These exceptions are, however, significant. To say, therefore, that human rights naturally follow from Islam would not be totally correct according to An-Naʿim's account. The need to uphold human rights can thus either be based on pragmatic reasons–Muslims uphold the human rights of others because they also want their own right to practice their religion to be protected (p. 95)–or on principled reasons that are not Islamic: Muslims uphold human rights because they are the necessary ethical corollary to the idea of sovereignty and the territorial state (p. 115). An-Naʿim shifts between these three lines of argument without making clear distinctions among them.
The stated difference between the idea of “civic reason” and John Rawls's conception of “public reason” is also vague. An-Naʿim writes that his idea is basically the same as Rawls's except that he does not want to use Rawls's distinction between “political conceptions” and “comprehensive doctrines,” which An-Naʿim finds to be specific to the United States (p. 101). It is unclear, however, how “civic reason” is supposed to work if the distinction between political conceptions and comprehensive doctrines (especially religious ones) is not maintained. Finally, An-Naʿim leaves unexplored the tension between the connectedness of religion and politics and the requirement of “civic reason.” If “civic reason” is to prevail in the public sphere, and “civic reason” rejects religious arguments, then can specifically religious arguments make any contribution at all to the domain of politics and public policy?
