Susan Meld Shell's Kant and the Limits of Autonomy is less about the limits of autonomy than its emergence: its emergence in the minds of men and women through education and enlightenment, its emergence from the “hard shell” (Ak. 8:41) of absolute monarchy and ecclesiastical faith, and its emergence as a concept within the corpus of Immanuel Kant's works. Part 1 of Shell's book examines its slow surfacing in Kant's earlier writings, especially his Remarks in “Observations Concerning the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime” and his Lectures on Anthropology. Her discussions of Rousseau's influence on Kant and her meticulous exegesis of Kant's Groundwork in chapter 4 are insightful.
Shell really hits her stride in part 2, which turns to Kant's later writings. Chapters 5 and 6, which examine Kant's Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Toward Perpetual Peace, and The Metaphysics of Morals, are nothing short of masterful. Her thoughtful critique of strongly communitarian readings of Kant's religious and historical thought (208–10) and her account of the differences between Perpetual Peace and Metaphysics with regard to the permissibility of preemptive war and interference in the internal affairs of other states (243–46) are both timely and highly persuasive. I am hard pressed to think of another book with better coverage of these texts, and I will certainly recommend these two chapters to my graduate students. (I should also add that her discussion of the relationship between legality and morality on pages 296–98 is a superb supplement to a famous footnote in Perpetual Peace [Ak. 8:375–76n].)
This book, strong as it is, is not without flaws, though these usually consist of strange oversights rather than mistakes in argumentation or misjudgments in interpretation. For example, chapter 7, which focuses on moral education, entirely ignores Kant's most explicit discussions of it, viz., in Part Two of the Critique of Practical Reason (Ak. 5:151–61) and in the Doctrine of the Methods of Ethics of The Metaphysics of Morals (Ak. 6:475–85), with its unintentionally (?) hilarious “moral catechism” (“1. Teacher: What is your greatest, in fact your whole, desire in life? Pupil: [is silent]. Teacher: That everything should always go the way you would like it to. 2. Teacher: What is such a condition called? Pupil: [is silent]” [Ak. 6:480–82]). Also in this chapter, Shell writes of “Kant's preference for an established church (along liberal lines) over the separation of church and state” (266) but neglects to mention divergent sentiments in The Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant maintains that “a state … does not have the right to legislate the internal constitutions of churches or to organize them in accordance with its own views, in ways it deems advantageous to itself, that is, to prescribe to the people or command beliefs and forms of divine worship (ritus) (for this must be left entirely to the teachers and directors the people itself has chosen)” (Ak. 6:327).
In the introduction to her book (3, 5–8, 14) and at various other points throughout (e.g., 184, 256, 335–36), Shell either explicitly or implicitly criticizes Rawls and other contemporary Kantians for their “deviations from the strict letter of Kant's argument,” as she says with respect to Rawls: “both in [his] ‘political philosophy’ and in the ‘Kantian’ moral ideal that he seems personally to prefer, Rawls systematically excludes Kant's emphasis on desert as a primary moral phenomenon and his related insistence on the moral necessity of religion of some kind” (6). Though Shell's points here are not without merit, I think she exaggerates these gaps between Rawls and Kant. First, as the title of his magnum opus indicates, Rawls was first and foremost a theorist of justice (or right), not morality more broadly. His deemphasis of motivation is wholly consistent with Kant's own doctrine of right: Kant says that with right “no account at all is taken of the matter of choice, that is, of the end each has in mind with the object he wants”; rather, right attends to the external relations of choice in order to make the freedom of each consistent with the freedom of all (Ak. 6:230). Moreover, Kant reminds us that “birth is not a deed of the one who is born” (Ak. 8:293), suggesting that it is not profoundly un-Kantian to worry (as Rawls does) that social and natural contingencies might have undue influence on the opportunities and income available to our fellow citizens. As for religion, Kant's own views on state regulation of it—which is all that is relevant to the doctrine of right offered by Rawls—may be more complex and conflicted than Shell suggests, as I noted above. Rawls's political thought may also be more religiously inflected than Shell seems to think: see, for example, David Reidy, “Rawls's Religion and Justice as Fairness,” History of Political Thought 31, no. 2 (2010): 309–44.
This being said, I am highly sympathetic to Shell's worries about modern academic liberalism, which as she rightly argues is “rarely willing to defend the core principles of liberalism as simply true” (14). The idea of universal, objective moral truths is indeed out of fashion, and the later, “political” Rawls played a large role in this unfortunate development, as he jettisoned many of the Kantian elements of his earlier theory and abandoned any pretense of comprehensive moral theorizing. Political liberalism's thin gruel of reasonableness, overlapping consensus, and public reason (6, 14, 256) looks even thinner when compared with the muscular, ambitious, practical philosophy developed by Kant and so ably and artfully interpreted by Shell. In order to speak truth to power, as Kant himself habitually did, liberalism must have something to say about the former as well as the latter.
