A near death?

Realism could have perhaps withstood its own failure in predicting the end of the Cold War and the rhetoric of the ‘world’s policeman’ used by George Bush in the 1991 Gulf War, but the age of humanitarian intervention, from Somalia to Kosovo, seemed to prove too much of a burden. Realism was challenged on its preferred field and military issues, and realist scholars were at odds with the activist American approach to domestic conflicts, often dissenting with the positioning of the Clinton Administration in the Balkans. Realism seemed often unable to explain major foreign and defense policy decisions of the period, such as the expansion of NATO, the Iraq War of 2003, and the transformation of armed forces and military doctrines in Western countries (Monten, Reference Monten2005; Coticchia and Moro, Reference Coticchia and Moro2014).

The debate on globalization has also contributed to a shift in attention from how states interact (the fighting ground of realism) to how state boundaries were actually beginning to blur because of the eroding power of the economic forces that were making the world ‘flat’. Academics and influential columnists joined forces in declaring the obsolescence of major wars (Mueller, Reference Mueller1989; Friedman, Reference Friedman2005). Paradigms that recognized pluralism in IR were better able to grasp the impact of economic interdependence among major powers and the significant role of vast transnational interests of big private companies in securing a ‘capitalist peace’ (Schneider and Gleditsch, Reference Schneider and Gleditsch2010).

More broadly, non-state actors traditionally are not subject of much scrutiny by realism. The emergence of al-Qaeda and relevance of insurgent groups in intra-state conflicts created incentives for security studies to move from the analysis of conventional and nuclear issues (that fitted realism very well) to the onset and dynamics of violence in civil wars. If realist scholars made important contributions (Posen, Reference Posen1993), the literature in the rest of the field burgeoned and assumed its own features, very different from those of the traditional IR debate. In addition, debates on ‘identity’ left realism off-balance. Books that sparked debates, such as The Clash of Civilizations focused on a world where states were less important and religious identity was a prime driver of action and the best explanation of cooperation and conflict in global politics.

Realism lives. Is China its savior?

Nonetheless, realism showed a persistent vitality. Realist scholars were involved in public debate and were critical of several aspects of US policies, particularly in advocating abstention from the intervention in Iraq (Art et al., Reference Art2002). Often, realism was able to play a role in challenging conventional wisdom, unveiling the risks and unintended consequences of action, and deflating the rhetorical exaggerations of policy makers and pundits. It also continued to shape academic debate and was responsible with refined views on key topics in IR, such as alliances and the origins of major wars (Copeland, Reference Copeland2000; Cesa, Reference Cesa2010).

In the new century, at least two attempts to renew realism deserve specific attention. The first is John Mearsheimer’s (Reference Mearsheimer2001) forceful revision of the neorealist paradigm, culminating with the publication of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. According to Mearsheimer, great powers not only aim to maximize their own security by adopting mostly defensive postures but also attempt to concentrate as much power as possible in order to try to prevent the emergence of global and regional challengers. Only the reach of hegemony would then guarantee great powers. Insurmountable collective action problems and mistrust hinder cooperation (and alliances as well) and shape the world of ‘offensive neorealism’, with war always in the background as a tool to solve controversies on who the hegemon is and how it shapes its regional arena and its global positioning.

Further, the theory of neoclassical realism emerged; first, as a result of the heterogeneous work of a group of scholars and then as a more coherent attempt to provide a revised realist approach (Lobell et al., Reference Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro2009). Neoclassical realist scholars investigate more thoroughly the way in which national interests are defined and foreign policy decisions take place by focusing on domestic sources and processes. States, in other words, can differ greatly in terms of their preferences and strategies according to different configurations of domestic politics. Neoclassical theories then aim to offer insights on foreign policy formation – relegated to second-order analysis in Waltzian Neorealism – showing when and how different strategies (such as internal vs. external balancing or bandwagoning vs. balancing) can emerge (Schweller, Reference Schweller2009).

Realism’s return to centrality in the debate was also owing to ongoing developments in international politics. The first mention is China’s emergence as a potential challenger to US primacy, initially at least in the Pacific region. Irrespective of the outcome, this is a classic issue for realist analysis, as it involves considerations related to regional security, the determinants of military strategy, and the dynamics of ascent and decline of powers. The second mention is the ‘fatigue’ accompanying US participation in military adventures, particularly in complex wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These developments led policy makers – particularly in the United States – to adopt a more prudent stance on military interventions that risk involving ‘boots on the ground’ with no vital interests at stake. The terrorist threat is still perceived as an enduring one, but American strategy is also refocusing on conventional (Russia’s regional ambitions) or nuclear-related (Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programs) issues that fit into the realist horizon more easily than prolonged military campaigns for the stabilization of countries.

Current challenges to realism

Notwithstanding these vital signs, realism still faces relevant challenges. The first challenge is epistemological: can realism withstand the challenge of increasingly fragmented knowledge in the social sciences and maintain unity? Several scholars have pointed out the indeterminacy of realism: this is both a problem for this paradigm as a guide toward formulating foreign policy and for making it ‘often possible for realism to avoid falsification by coming up with a variety of explanations none of which is more apt to fit the evidence than another’ (Vasquez, Reference Vasquez1999: 380). Guzzini (Reference Guzzini2004) argues that realism has to come to terms with irreconcilable changes in the practice of diplomacy that make its timeless assumptions on how the work of international politics is actually outdated. Nonetheless, it pretends that no justification for these assumptions (centering on realpolitik) is needed, thus, avoiding the thorough confrontations that are typical of scientific debates.

More broadly, the fragmentation of knowledge has deeply affected realism, and one might wonder how much is left of old realism; for instance, once the assumption of states being unitary actors is relaxed by scholars. In addition, some of the most interesting attempts to offer a realist view of the process of European integration have accepted that such a phenomenon is outside the (traditional) realist perspective. For instance, Grieco’s (Reference Grieco1995) take on European monetary integration provides useful insights on power dynamics in international integration, but nonetheless recognizes that very deep integration has actually taken place. Although this pertains to most, if not all, schools or paradigms in IR, it is not a challenge to be underestimated. To a large extent, instead of one concept of realism, there are several realisms.

Other tenets of realism have been challenged as well. The rational choice paradigm that often (though only in certain aspects) characterized this tradition of thought has increasingly been coming under fire in recent decades. For instance, sociological neo-institutionalism has deeply shaped recent debates in Political Science and IR. Organizational interests and organizational myopias have been recognized to play an important role in shaping foreign and defense policy decisions, such as the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons, and notably complicate the calculations in the offensive/defensive balance, a trademark of realist strategic analysis. Moreover, cultural approaches have been gaining ground: concepts such as that of ‘security culture’ are not necessarily antithetic to realist views (Johnston, Reference Johnston1998) but require realism to further expand its reach outside its traditional borders.

Finally, modernization processes pose possibly the most enduring empirical challenges. According to Gat, the technological–industrial revolution ‘[…] made all the countries that experienced the revolution […] far less belligerent in comparison with pre-industrial times, with the interdemocratic peace representing only the most striking manifestation of that development’ (Gat, Reference Gat2005: 73). Coming to terms with the decline or absence of major wars, linked to the emergence of more open societies populated by (much) wealthier citizens than ever before, is the main challenge that realist scholars have to face to avoid being relegated to being doomsayers in the academic and policy debate.

The strength of pluralism

Probably ranking top among liberalism’s strengths in describing and understanding contemporary international politics is its pluralism. The world is less characterized by the sole significant presence of states and instead by the increasing affirmation of non-state actors. The number of intergovernmental organizations has multiplied by a factor of 25 between 1977 and 2009; the influence of multinationals has been increasing constantly since the 1970s, and the number of non-governmental organizations has also been rising; transnational civil society has become more lively and the number of ‘global protest events’ (social fora and international civil society manifestations) increased by almost seven times between 1990 and 2005 (Istituto per l’Enciplopedia Italiana, 2012: 219). Megacities produce 60% of the world’s GDP (McKinsey Global Institute, 2011) and some of them have much larger populations than the majority of countries in the world. Liberalism, precisely because of its attention to a plurality of actors, seems to be particularly well equipped to study an ever more plural world.

Moreover, the intrinsically normative dimension of liberalism makes it suitable for dealing in a non-ideological manner with a topic such as that of the legitimacy of (and responsibility in) global governance (from the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine to the debate on the legitimacy foundations of global financial institutions, to mention only two examples) (cf. Keohane, Reference Keohane2006).

The challenges

Alongside these strengths, nevertheless, liberalism has to face some undisputable challenges.

Pluralism and security: The first challenge concerns pluralism itself: liberalism’s attention to non-state actors risks being highly biased (by its very conformation) toward those actors creating greater cooperation and lowly biased toward those non-state actors that might make international politics more conflict prone (terrorist groups, failed states, private security agencies, etc.). The risk of adopting a selectively pluralistic perspective combines a second risk that concerns the study of security: traditionally less inclined than other traditions of thought toward analyzing security issues other than those regarding the institutional construction of long-term security, liberalism risks an inability to provide instruments to understand a reality that is ever more dense with perceived threats to security. Therefore, the challenge facing liberalism is to give a less sectorial and less presumptively cooperative reading of international reality, whereas seeking tools to create areas of peace that can take greater account of the complexity of the actors and security dynamics at play.

The crisis of democracy: For the liberals, ever since Kant’s treatise Perpetual Peace, internal democracy has been a guarantee of peaceful conduct toward other democracies. Yet, today, democracy is experiencing significant transformations that may reduce its irenic capacity. The following two transformations will be mentioned here: the transformation of citizen participation and the illiberal drift. Decreasing citizen participation in public life and a corresponding reduction in the legitimacy that they attribute to institutions might have important repercussions to their ability to provide an obstacle to war, which they are assumed to have provided in the liberal tradition of thought. Moreover, the separation in democracy between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘procedural’ components (visible in particular in newly democratized countries) is another concern. Even consolidated democracies, particularly since 11 September 2001, have tended to reduce individual guarantees in the name of the fight of terrorism. This has severe implications as only if there exists a liberal ideology alongside democratically elected institutions can there be democratic peace.

Finally, if democratic peace theory is being challenged by the transformation of democracy at a state level, the topic of democratization is appearing ever more emphatically at a global level. The issue is subject to intense debate; nevertheless, to date the proposals put forward by liberal theorists are not very satisfying.

The transformation of multilateralism: Another pillar of liberal thought, multilateralism, is also undergoing significant transformations. The multilateralism characterized by international organizations and codified regimes is leaving extensive room for ad hoc agreements. Furthermore, the inefficiencies of traditional multilateral institutions pose problems of legitimacy and credibility that contribute to their difficulties. Finally, emerging powers are challenging the old multilateral settings, advocating for their transformation, and new non-governmental actors are aspiring to play an increasingly important role, sometimes undermining the traditional multilateral framework. This new global governance has had such an impact on multilateralism that some authors have envisaged a new era of multilateralism, labeling it ‘multilateralism 2.0’ (Van Langhenhove, Reference Van Langhenhove2010): a system in which non-state actors have gained importance, there is an enhanced link between policy domains, and there has been a diversification of multilateral organizations. Hence, the following question can be asked: Is multilateralism 2.0 still capable of creating peace, as the more formal multilateralism did in the 20th century? If it is true that it is the presence of generalized principles of conduct (stable principle beyond the contingency) that produces peaceful effects (Ruggie, Reference Ruggie1992), the new multilateralism might not have irenic consequences: neither the mere coordination of a group of ‘willing states’, nor an informal multilateralism made of relations between different actors are based on generalized principles of conduct. The challenge put before the liberal paradigm, therefore, is a conceptual one that combines – as is typically the case in this tradition – with substantive problems relating to building a more peaceful international order.

Methodology and ontology: A further challenge is a methodological one. Liberalism has remained largely linked to a positivistic mindset. Yet, the greatest methodological challenge comes precisely from an approach, constructivism, which has created a research program centered around concepts dear to liberalism (values, norms) in a subjectivist ontological key, revising liberal concepts, such as that of security communities, democratic peace, and norms diffusion (see section on constructivism below). Now the capacity to develop a line of research that assumes a constructivist methodology and ontology to deal with topics dear to liberalism will be a litmus test of the paradigm’s continuing vitality and its ability to maintain a constructive relationship with the discipline as it evolves.

Epistemology: The most radical epistemological challenge that liberalism has to face, nevertheless, is of a more profound nature and can be summed up in the following question: Can liberalism continue to provide key aspects in understanding an ‘ever less modern’ international politics, it being a tradition imbued with Enlightenment and modernity? Modernity is, above all, trust in progress, in the possibility of control (in addition, social control through institutions such as the state); it is trust in instrumental rationality, in science, and technology. The modern man is the citizen-individual, who may be controlled by an oppressive and totalitarian system (such as in the case of Bentham’s Panopticon or George Orwell’s 1984), but who can also aspire to his own emancipation. Many elements continue to remain of this modernity; however, many others are experiencing a crisis, upto an extent that some authors speak of ‘postmodernity’ (Jean-François Lyotard) and others of a significant transformation of modernity (Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens). As far as liberalism is concerned, what is under pressure is the trust, intrinsically of the Enlightenment and modern mold, in the possibility of progress governed by man and the trust in the capacity of analysis and rational collective response to the challenges.

Beyond Western IR: Moreover, in the world of late modernity, the non-Western component is emerging in its complexity. We might wonder what a highly oriented Western (centric) discipline such as IR has to offer to this world in heuristic and normative terms. A growing literature is addressing this issue (Tickner and Wæver, Reference Tickner and Wæver2009); however, there still remains a significant amount of work to be done to make the discipline truly more global. Liberalism is no exception to this.

Constructivist insights on contemporary world politics

Major constructivist contributions to the study of current global politics include the analysis of socialization dynamics, the concept of the security community, and the role of identity factors as triggers of change in the global distribution of power.

Studies on socialization processes have shed light on the deep impact of international institutions, defined as formal and informal sets of rules, in the shaping of states’ interests and identities. For instance, they have contributed to understanding of the emergence and consolidation of neoliberal ideas within international organizations and accounted for mechanisms that make those ideas resilient over time.

Moreover, a significant contribution by constructivism can be found in the field of security studies, as remarked by Lucarelli and Monteleone in this issue. The assumption that security threats are constructed has enabled constructivists to trace the processes of securitization of foreign policy issues that have taken place since the 1990s in multiple fields, such as development cooperation, migrations, climate change, and energy (Guzzini, Reference Guzzini2011). Studies on security communities have provided insights for the interpretation of emerging regional security organizations in Africa, Asia, and South America. The reading of changes in the material distribution of power as a constructed concept has also laid the foundations for understanding the ideational factors shaping the global role currently played by emerging powers. From this perspective, these changes matter insofar as great powers either advocate or oppose the development of new international norms (Drezner, Reference Drezner2007; Zürn and Stephen, Reference Zürn and Stephen2010).

On these bases, constructivism has had a significant impact on the current theoretical and methodological debate about international politics. Major achievements by this approach include bringing ideational variables back to the attention of all mainstream theories of IR and contributing to progress in discourse analysis research.

Theoretical and empirical challenges

Middle-ground position and internal fragmentation: The position of constructivism in the middle ground between rationalism and postmodernism raises questions concerning its boundaries, triggers criticisms by both camps, and has also created the conditions for broad internal diversification and fragmentation.

Positivists point to the weak explanatory and predictive potential of constructivist assumptions. They claim that because constructivists assume that the social structure constitutes the nation states and the international system, they are vague about what contributes toward building these structures, where state identities come from, and how they are expected to evolve (Kaufman, Reference Kaufman2013). Post-positivist scholars, in turn, criticize the very explanatory ambition of these scholars. From this point of view, Zehfuss (Reference Zehfuss2001: 338) highlights the dangerous liaison between constructivism and identity, stressing the limits of identity-based explanations of IR proposed by constructivists.

A multitude of constructivisms have originated from attempts to contribute to this debate. However, over the past decade, rather than engaging in meta-theoretical debates and addressing criticisms of internal fragmentation, constructivist scholars have mainly focused on empirical research (Adler, Reference Adler2012). One might even argue that these recent studies have further increased the internal differentiation of this approach to IR. Indeed, hybrid approaches merging constructivist assumptions with rationalist, postmodernist, and critical theory insights have proliferated in the past decade. Pragmatist scholars have welcomed the merging of constructivism with other schools (Friedrick and Kratochwil, Reference Friedrichs and Kratochwil2009), whereas others have concluded that attempts at building bridges between opposing theoretical schools end up watering down the original contribution of the constructivist agenda (Wiener, Reference Wiener2003).

Regression of established norms and diffusion of non-liberal ideas: Recent developments in contemporary world politics seem to reinforce criticisms of the explanatory and predictive potential of constructivist research and challenge its optimistic view in regard to international cooperation.

Constructivists share with liberal theorists the assumption that ‘international institutions can transform state identities and interests’ (Wendt, Reference Wendt1992: 394), a value commitment toward international cooperation, and an optimistic attitude toward change (Reus-Smit and Snidal, Reference Reus-Smit and Snidal2008). More specifically, studies on norm diffusion assume that this process occurs through gradual steps from norm emergence to norm spread and interiorization (Finnemore and Sikkink, Reference Finnemore and Sikkink1998; K. Stiles, 2008). In this regard, recent cases of the degeneration of established liberal norms and the diffusion of non-liberal ideas represent challenges for constructivist studies of norm diffusion.

An example of norm regression is the weak definition of torture provided by the United States after 11 September 2001, concerning the interrogation methods used against alleged al-Qaeda members. This definition appears to contrast with the UN Convention on Torture and with established domestic norms concerning the ban on torture. Similarly, the proliferation of agreements between EU member states on the forced repatriation of migrants, despite the principle of non-refoulement established by the UNHCR, which has become a consuetudinary norm within international law, raises questions about factors explaining norm erosion. On the bases of these cases, questions remain open for further research: Why do embedded norms sometimes lose their prescriptive potential and disappear? What factors are needed to erode dominant global norms and create the conditions for acceptance of alternative ones (McKeown, Reference McKeown2009; Panke and Petersohn, Reference Panke and Petersohn2012)? Can constructivism address these questions without giving explanatory potential to the interests of powerful actors and greater attention to domestic politics?

Moreover, constructivism generally suffers from a ‘nice norm’ bias (McKeown, Reference McKeown2009). Constructivist studies on the influence of epistemic communities, social movements, and international organizations on world politics have proliferated (Snow, Reference Snow2004; Goodman and Jinks, Reference Goodman and Jinks2013), but there is a gap in this literature concerning issues, such as the spread of political Islam or the use of violence by ideologically motivated actors in IR (Adamson, Reference Adamson2005). These actors challenge the optimistic orientation of many constructivists toward norm diffusion as a driver of international cooperation.

Questions also arise with respect to the ability of constructivist studies to predict change. There is a gap in the constructivist literature concerning the conditions necessary to reach the ultimate stage of the socialization process, which is that of norm internalization. An emblematic case in this regard is the approach of the Chinese government to human rights. The government has recently ratified core international treaties and engaged in gradual ‘discursive enmeshment’ in the global human rights regime (Foot, Reference Foot2000). Nevertheless, one might wonder whether these developments represent one of the early stages of the country’s socialization into international human rights law or merely a cosmetic change made by the central government in order to improve its international image while domestically preserving the status quo. Most constructivist empirical research seems to avoid this question and focuses on international norm creation rather than implementation.

Finally, till date, constructivism has overestimated the role of international norms and downplayed the agency of local actors (Acharya, Reference Acharya2011). The emergence of non-Western powers sharing a common developmental discourse and political culture in opposition to the discourse dominating international organizations, and the role of regional leaders in shaping security communities in Asia and Africa provide new challenges to the interpretative schemes used by constructivists (Haacke, Reference Haacke2013; Dembinski and Schott, Reference Dembinsky and Schott2014).

These emerging trends and power dynamics call into question some of the generalizations provided by constructivist research. At the same time, they confirm the importance of ideas and norms in IR, thereby furnishing opportunities to further test and develop the constructivist research agenda.

Challenges to security studies

Contemporary armed conflicts: Changes in the nature, characteristics, and goals of contemporary armed conflicts are among the biggest challenges to security studies. State-centric and employing military power as the most important independent variable, traditionalist approaches have focused on interstate wars and dynamics between states (mostly in terms of balance of power and deterrence). Interstate wars, however, have become rare, whereas intra-state wars have increased in number and relevance, and have strongly been associated with state failure or weakness. Contemporary armed conflicts reveal how irrelevant deterrence can be when conflicts are fought to obtain non-territorial gains, by actors (both rebels and governmental forces) adopting criminal methods to finance their war activities. This deeply affects the duration and intensity of war and underlines the importance of intervening not just militarily – as traditionalists would suggest – nor with development instruments that risk injecting new resources into the cycle of war financing, as proposed by scholars closer to human security, peace studies, or post-Marxist approaches.

Security studies scholars have had difficulty agreeing on the factors explaining change in one of their core research interests and suggesting effective solutions. The described changes have highlighted that institutional, technological, and normative modifications deserving further exploration have altered the perceived costs and benefits of armed conflicts. They also reveal that it is no longer useful to look at states as monolithic entities: looking inside states may be more important.

Democratization: The relationship between democratization and security has been only partially explored. Democratic peace theory has highlighted some regularity in the way democracies manage their conflicts in dyadic relations, and has influenced the adoption of democracy promotion as a security policy. Nevertheless, certain types of democratic transitions markedly increase the risk of military disputes (Mansfield and Snyder, Reference Mansfield and Snyder2005). The democratization processes beginning from the so-called third wave have introduced a high number of new democracies and hybrid regimes whose behavior and performance affect regional stability. However, while democracy promotion has increasingly been used as a security policy, the implications of democratization processes and democratic state building have not been fully explored by security studies (among the exceptions, Miller, Reference Miller2012).

Democratization can be a challenge for security studies also in another respect. The growth of multilateralism since the second half of the 19th century reflects the diffusion of democratic practices (Attinà, Reference Attinà2011). As the number of democratic countries has reached a critical mass, a normative change has taken place, leading to expectations of an organizational change of existing security institutions. Expectations are that the decision-making process of an institution like the Security Council should be democratic, and issues are framed as if it were democratic already. However, opportunities to influence this decision-making process are still limited. This is problematic because multilateral security and peace operations in particular have become more and more intrusive. The adoption of the so-called third-generation peace operations and of the concept of responsibility to protect has signaled a willingness to go beyond national sovereignty. However, scanty results (Libya) and inconsistent application (Syria) are challenging existing forms of multilateralism, now under the control neither of the only remaining superpower nor a fully democratic body. This means that more attention should be devoted to how decisions on security issues are made within security institutions and, more importantly, by whom. It also means that, if unsolved, the contradiction between input and output legitimacy in multilateral security risks bringing military alliances and pacts to new life.

Risk management: Risk management is increasingly important in contemporary security policies and agendas. Although this trend challenges traditionalist approaches and confirms the relevance of constructivist and critical approaches, in that they promote an enquiry into how security threats emerge, it ultimately challenges them too. The discovery of risk as a source of insecurity represents a move away from an existential threat and a state of exception, traditionally managed by states, toward a ‘routinization’ of the exception that transforms a public good into a private one, which can be produced by private companies as long as they possess the right technical solutions. It is also a shift from an objectively existing immediate known threat, finite, and intentional, to a subjectively existing long-term unknown one, infinite, and unintentional, whose consequences, although serious, need not be existential (Kessler, Reference Kessler2010).

Faced with less and less-controllable global risks, states adopt a preventive and proactive stance. The role of those who contribute to defining risk and how to manage it (the risk communities) becomes particularly important, because they define who and what deserves to be included and protected by the political community or not, as well as what goals the political community should achieve. Current efforts at analyzing the (in)securitization process have provided valuable methodological insights. However, so far, they have failed to identify in a systematic way: securitizing actors and practices, the conditions allowing the same securitizing actor to be successful or not under different circumstances, whether the actors and practices identified by the different schools are compatible or not, and what instruments can be used for security purposes.

Theoretical challenges: The many approaches that have sprung up over time have revealed a field capable of moving beyond its limits to inquire into new phenomena, and of borrowing from other fields to increase its heuristic capacities. Nevertheless, the many approaches have had a hard time creating a fruitful dialogue with one another. Moreover, the emergence of non-Western powers and security cultures and the concentration of conflicts and security-relevant phenomena in non-Western areas highlight new limits to existing approaches. So far, security studies has very much been a Western discipline, focused mostly on the European and American experience. This makes its results applicable to specific contexts only, or in need of testing in other contexts.

Adapting to ongoing changes rather than just reacting to specific events may require a redefinition of its focus, attitude, and identity and a greater willingness to engage in a real dialogue among its schools. It is also a crucial effort for the relevance of security studies in the 21st century.

Varieties of rationalism and systemic crises: highlights and lowlights

Insights from both comparative politics and political economy of endogenous decisions have shed light on the role played by specific domestic political processes in exacerbating global crises such as in the case of widespread protectionism in the 1930s (Gourevitch, Reference Gourevitch1986), or in influencing the ‘global’ regulation of international financial markets, through the interactions among national systems of regulation (Farrell and Newman, Reference Farrell and Newman2010). Market dynamics are thus connected with policy decisions at different governance levels. Studying crises through a prism combining multiple lenses, however, increases complexity to levels that are difficult to manage analytically, with the result that ‘white noise’ impairs both methodological and empirical clarity. Then, again, an exclusive emphasis on inside–out causation and the narrow focus of some quantitative analyses, have at times spelled an extremely high level of sectoralization, particularly in American IPE, biasing focus away from the theorization of broad changes in the global political economy (Wade, Reference Wade2009: 117).

A further risk, inherent in treating systemic crises as springboards for ‘foundational’ re-definitions of the discipline, is the prominence of ‘here and now’ arguments in many studies of critical international turns. ‘This time is different’ has not been an uncommon interpretation of the complexity of systemic crises. Both political and economic analyses have provided a guard against the perils of ‘exceptionalizing’ exceptionality, as proven by Reinhart and Rogoff (Reference Reinhart and Rogoff2014), in the vein of seminal research in the institutionalist tradition (North and Weingast, Reference North and Weingast1989). Although relevant for its focus on the role of institutional reforms in facilitating political responses to global crises, Rogoff and Reinhart’s subsequent elaboration has been significantly debated, owing to the disputable accuracy of some key findings, and regressive policy implications (Herndon et al., Reference Herndon, Ash and Pollin2014).

The constructivist counterpoint: new and old ideas

Furthermore, institutional innovation, and institutional change at large, has at times depended on extra-institutional factors. As substantiated by constructivist IPE, its dynamics do not systematically follow a logic of consequentiality (Blyth, Reference Blyth2002). Provocatively asserting that ‘economics are too important to leave it to economists’ (Widmaier, Reference Widmaier2009), constructivist IPE has somewhat tended to downplay previous economic analyses on the role of non-material factors in systemic crises (Kindleberger, Reference Kindleberger1978; Akerlof and Shiller, Reference Akerlof and Shiller2009).

Yet, IPE constructivists have innovatively studied the sociological dynamics through which ideas originate and diffuse across governance levels, contributing to systemic shocks, as argued by Hobson and Seabrooke (Reference Hobson and Seabrooke2007) about the outburst of the subprime bubble. Partially contradicting the rationalist camp, sociologically oriented IPE has investigated how bottom-up dynamics influence mid-level outcomes, including US consumerism, through the role of unprivileged consensus-seeking groups (Jacobs, Reference Jacobs2005). These studies further prove the importance of two-way frameworks (top-down and bottom-up) in the understanding of systemic (exceptional) change. Reflectivist analyses have significantly contributed to the IPE literature on the crisis, exploring the often-unacknowledged ‘everyday and emotional’ influences (Widmaier, Reference Widmaier2009) that shape state interests and market trends, to highlight a key process through which material and ideational factors interact via non-rational logics.

IPE and systemic crises: learning from the past and challenges ahead

Apart from their significant merits, rationalist and constructivist IPE studies have displayed unambiguous limitations in the analysis of global changes. Rationalist (American) IPE – in its strongest and predictive vein – failed to anticipate the crisis of 2008 (Cohen, Reference Cohen2009; Helleiner and Pagliari, Reference Helleiner and Pagliari2011). In fact, on the eastern shore of the Atlantic, British IPE had questioned the premises on which risk creation and propagation were conceptualized in contemporary financial models, policies, and practices (Langley, Reference Langley2002; Watson, Reference Watson2007). Yet, such warnings fell on deaf ears, before the subprime mortgage bubble burst. A major change has occurred since then, and critical voices have even cautioned against the collapse of a still poorly reformed – status quo – system (Helleiner, Reference Helleiner2014). Although the question whether social sciences should be in the business of prediction at all may not be a misplaced one (Mosley and Singer, Reference Mosley and Singer2009), there is little doubt that IPE scholarship has learnt its lesson the hard way.

Relative to other areas in the social sciences, the inter-disciplinary nature of IPE offers several benefits. Relaxing some of the assumptions of Open Economy Politics paradigm and expanding its tools to model outside–in dynamics seems a promising way to make sense of crises without losing analytical rigor and lowering explanatory ambitions too much (Lake, Reference Lake2009; Oatley, Reference Oatley2011). Openness to accepting that both rationally altruistic and non-rational dynamics may be at play has become a necessity, even in the rationalist camp (Keohane, Reference Keohane2009: 38; Leblang and Pandya, Reference Leblang and Pandya2009). Unlike IR, IPE has an ontological vocation to look beyond high (security) politics. Unlike economics, it carries a foundational interest in the analysis of the political origins of economic decisions, and an equally constitutive drive to look at the political consequences of economic shocks. Such disposition appears crucial to derive meaningful insights into the dynamics of global financial regulation, capital rules, and macroeconomic policy making that are on top of leaders’ and citizens’ priorities these days.

On the empirical front, looking at past interactions in monetary and financial relations has been one natural path to beat. A major topic of interest has been the (likely) requirements for international cooperation to be effective in solving the problems of the current system. The analytical challenge would be – no less – an effort in singling out the specificities of cooperation before crisis, from those relative to cooperation during and after a crisis. Studies in the political economy of monetary relations that have explored the long-run record of international cooperation under critical turns have found that, compared with the past, a few elements in the current system concur in indicating a positive prognosis (Eichengreen, Reference Eichengreen2011). Differently from the inter-war period, countries are not divided along rooted ideological divides. The increased technicality of financial matters may diminish the politicization of negotiations. Moreover, the greater institutionalization of monetary and financial cooperation at the international level, through the reform of the IMF governance and the Basel III agreement on banking supervision, reduces uncertainty and ensures the reiteration of negotiations, which in turn increases the likelihood of cooperation. On the other hand, however, a higher number of systemically important actors have heightened transaction costs associated with cooperation. The absence of a Bretton Woods-like institutional compact to coordinate global liquidity and exchange rate fluctuations has encouraged instability and propelled uncertainty. In addition, the fragmentation of epistemic communities, each lobbying for its own technical agenda, has more than compensated the lower politicization of the current system. Finally, the general comity among G-20 members cannot be equated to the security ties that existed in the transatlantic compact during the Bretton Woods era.

More particularly, and relative to the evolution of the sovereign debt crises in Europe, liberal institutionalists have exposed the failure of the EU institutional anchoring in preventing the deterioration of the Greek and Spanish economies, questioning whether – and how – the euro area will be able to effectively lead the adjustment of its members out of the crisis (Carlin, Reference Carlin2011). According to some, the solutions will depend, inter alia, on which narratives of the Eurocrisis prevail in policy circles. Yet, the intra-European divide between Ordoliberals and neo-Keynesians interacts with the cleavage between leaderships in mature systems, on the one hand, and elites in emerging market countries, on the other, over the effects of unconventional monetary policies. An ineludible step of IPE analyses of the crisis is thus to factor in the relations among the United States, China, and other key emerging market economies, to explore how European dynamics are being played out in global processes and fora. Diverging geo-political priorities and an intellectual disagreement on how to restore growth make the task of cooperating even more daunting. IPE approaches in both the reflectivist and rationalist traditions should become engaged in deriving testable implications on the consequences of normative dissent and heterogeneous interests across different governance levels in uncertain times.

Although accounting for mixes of rational and non-rational logics makes it even more complicated to investigate the type and likelihood of the upcoming evolutions in the global financial system, this is not a reason that is valid enough for international studies to do away with such complexity. Born in dire times and grown up in the midst of a systemic crisis, IPE research has been strengthened by criticisms from economists and political scientists alike. There is evidence to argue that such training has started to bear some fruits.