Gregg Mortenson built his first school in Korphe, Pakistan, in 2004. Today, two best-sellers, a hit record, Nobel prize nomination, and a criminal investigation later, his organization Pennies for Peace claims to have built more than three hundred schools. Its Website hails him as a hero, admired by American commanders and Taliban warlords alike. Schools, he says, strike directly at the poverty, ignorance, and hatred that “cause war, terrorism, everything.”
Mortenson hit on a parable as fresh and seductive today as it was when Booker T. Washington built his cotton school in Togo in 1906. It has the shape—if a story can be said to have a shape—of an hourglass. Large aspirations are funneled into a single object, in this case a school. The device is small and simple but capable of releasing a cascade of idealized outcomes: material abundance, reconciliation, and peaceful change. We call this process development.
It may seem a poor way of understanding the world, but this kind of reductionism has enormous political value. Developmental fables are a defense against the stark complexity of social evolution. They fill a yawning gap in comprehension separating the United States and fellow “donor nations” from the realities of the Panjshir Valley, Darfur, or the thousands of other struggling communities they wish to transform. We can gauge their value by their durability. Despite the vicissitudes of nation building, the rise and fall of economic theories, and repeated declarations over the last century that aid is dead, the parables still hold their allure.
The three books under review treat different decades and continents, but they share an approach. Rather than try to rate development projects against a post facto standard, or judge them by quantities of aid or their fidelity to a theory of growth, they recapture the narratives that practitioners once used to explain their purposes and ultimate aims. The Mortensons of the twentieth century—the engineers, economists, and peace corps volunteers who dug latrines and staffed planning commissions—had pictures in mind of the ideal Korea or the future Mozambique they were trying to build, and those pictures had consequences.
When officials in Germany's colonial office envisioned the future of Africa, for instance, they saw the postbellum American South, the South of sharecropping and Scottsboro. In Alabama in Africa, Andrew Zimmerman explains that as Germany emancipated its serfs and struggled to reorganize agricultural production using free, foreign (mainly Polish) labor, reformers at the German Verein für Sozialpolitik began to admire the racial order of the former Confederate states. This model of “internal colonization” (p. 81) became the basis of what might be called Africa's first green revolution, an attempt to transfer an entire political economy into the colonial setting. The developmental device—the neck of the hourglass—was long-staple “upland” cotton, a variety essential to industrial textile manufacture that until the turn of the twentieth century grew nowhere outside of the American South. In the reformers' view, successful cotton cultivation required economic, legal, and social underpinnings like what they saw in Alabama. It needed free black labor, smallholder farming, and patriarchal families, all of which limited worker mobility and incentivized production. These were not only requirements but also concomitants; if upland cotton could be transplanted, they believed, the Negro Volkskultur would grow along with it.
The Tuskegee Institute joined forces with German colonialism to reshape Africa's culture and society. Zimmerman reveals how developmental narratives alter self-perception and knowledge production in the “donor' countries just as much as in the target societies. Washington founded Tuskegee in 1881 to transform Southern agriculture and professionalize the first generation born into freedom. George Washington Carver's breakthroughs at Tuskegee opened the way for the peanut to displace cotton as a cash crop. In the first two decades, Washington worked with W. E. B. DuBois on a social-scientific critique of the “Negro problem,” but when the Germans offered a chance for African Americans to escape the confines of the South and form an expert colonial labor force, Tuskegee's mission changed. The arrival of four Tuskegee agricultural specialists in Togo in January 1901, Zimmerman explains, shifted the institute from the pursuit of emancipatory science to a program of “colonial Pan-Africanism.”
On lands burned over by recent colonial wars, the Tuskegee expedition built model farms and schooled the Togolese in the use of modern implements. They successfully crossbred upland cotton with local varieties, producing a strain with the long sturdy fibers needed by Bremen millers. As belts of cotton cultivation began to spread along the rail line inland from the port of Lomé, colonial governors introduced systems of coercion modeled on the latest American methods. Agronomist overseers limited the amount of cassava, cattle, and food crops that could be raised, forcing farmers into a monocrop cash system. The controlled market for raw export-grade cotton displaced other markets and other industries, such as weaving and pottery, which once provided women with the means to live independently from men. German-trained police cracked down on nomadism, and the Togolese slowly and reluctantly began to fall into the sedentary, paternal, smallholding patterns of the idealized South. German mastery of biology, Zimmerman insists, provided the ways and means of social control: “The state insinuated itself into African farming practices … distributing its own authority along with these new hybrids” (p. 151).
Although Germany's experiment lasted less than two decades, its French and British successors recognized it as a model for progressive colonialism and a breakthrough in the globalization of cotton production. After World War I, the French took over Togo and expanded the system into their West African colonies, while the British laid out cotton tracts along the banks of Lake Victoria. But its more important legacy, Zimmerman shows, was a sociology of race and labor propagated by Max Weber (an early advocate of “internal colonialism”) and Robert E. Park of the Chicago School, both of whom had connections to Tuskegee and the Verein für Sozialpolitik. Their conceptual framework discounted biological racial difference while demarcating cultural distinctions that functioned “just as effectively as race to underwrite political and economic inequalities” (p. 203). The Chicago School's catalog of the cultural habits of the sedentary, paternal, village-oriented “Negro peasant” (p. 224) would define underdevelopment for a later generation of modernizers, who would come to Africa and see this imported social order as intrinsically traditional, African, and in need of reform.
In The Great American Mission, David Ekbladh tells a more familiar story more comprehensively than anyone has before. In the mid-twentieth century, the United States used development as an all-purpose tool for neutralizing threats, propping up allies, and diluting the appeal of communist ideology. Wealth and technological superiority endowed the United States with power to regulate the pace of other countries, to create a world—in the words of Walt Whitman Rostow, chief salesman of development as theory and policy—where “societies which directly or indirectly menace ours will not evolve” (p. 174). The New Deal showed the way and formed the basis of a developmental consensus, bipartisan and international, lasting from Harry Truman's Point IV address in 1949 until the Tet Offensive in 1968. Those who joined the bargain, which included private aid groups, the United Nations, and the governments of India, Pakistan, Iran, South Korea, and Tanzania (to take a few of the countries covered in detail), “accepted that development be broadly conceived, embracing whole countries and regions if need be, and based on large-scale planning. It held great affection for technology—particularly grand industrial edifices—as both a means and an end” (p. 4). Ekbladh points out that in these pre–Bernard Lewis decades, Islam was presumed to be a member of the coalition, too. In Iran and other parts of the Middle East, aid workers quoted the Koran and sought to enlist imams as modernizers (p. 176).
The iconic edifice of this era was the hydroelectric dam. The Aswan High Dam, Ghana's Volta Redonda, and India's Bhakra Nangal were hailed as schools of modernism. Ekbladh casts David Lilienthal, who globalized the model of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), as the voice of a mythic vision of “the great dam as an inspiration” producing “a change in spirit, a release of energies and self confidence” (p. 161). Critics would later dismiss this species of gigantism as statist vanity, but it captured the imagination of donors, governments, and thousands of people who made pilgrimages to the sites. The dreams were built on an even grander scale. When the World Bank negotiated a bargain for the damming of the Indus River in 1961, it was seen as cementing a technological peace between India and Pakistan; and Lyndon Johnson offered Ho Chi Minh a choice between war and a TVA on the Mekong.
With these kinds of ambition in play, to evaluate the success or failure of development schemes on a scale of GNP is to miss the point. Development was not growth; it was, in the National Security Council's words, “a struggle to capture symbols … that express man's aspirations and thereby influence political behavior” (p. 183). Failure came when the symbols lost their magic. Ekbladh blames the collapse of the consensus on a disillusionment with technology, a growing environmental consciousness, and a creeping recognition that the presumed concomitants—stability, health, and the reconciliation of enemies—did not always follow. It was easy to claim that poverty and stagnation caused conflict, but when electricity did not bring peace, the “development community” fractured into growthist, environmental, and dependentista factions. Development was dormant for the better part of the 1980s and 1990s but, Ekbladh points out, its absence left a void. The return to the politics of nation building occasioned by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq did not produce a new consensus or interpretive framework, but instead revived many of the assumptions and symbols of the 1960s.
No region of the world has been as captive to developmental politics as sub-Saharan Africa. Larry Grubbs begins by explaining that Secular Missionaries offers no critique of past mistakes or a program for addressing Africa's woes. Instead, he shows how the U.S.-African encounter has been shaped by the “ideas, images, values, hopes, and fears” that comprise “the cultural and epistemological context of development” (p. 4). Foremost was the American portrait of Africa itself, which went from Paul Gauguin to Salvador Dali without a realist phase in between. In the early 1960s, Africa enticed experts as a purportedly pristine setting for development, with no entrenched aristocracy, no peasant guerrillas, and no remnants (forgetting the cotton scheme) of previous failed development ventures. Lacking the obstacles that held back Asia and Latin America, it was ripe for a quick “renaissance” (p. 192) with relatively little outside assistance. Americans convinced themselves that Africa did not need planning commissions or steel mills but only guidance, and so the instrument of development was people. People-to-people exchanges, Peace Corps volunteers, and educational tours would instill a receptive psychology, while a major demonstration in a single country—John Kennedy chose Nigeria—would show what could be done.
Grubbs recounts the emergence of the African Studies Association (ASA), with help from the CIA, as the principal source of knowledge for scholarly and policy audiences. Encouraged not to break colonial trade patterns in the way that the Asians and Latin Americans had done, African governments continued to rely on dwindling export markets for palm oil, coffee, and raw materials. ASA observers explained the resulting stagnation in Weberian terms, as a product of African tribalism and irrationality. Even before the Biafra war, American officials had written off Africans as incapable of the cultural discipline required by modernity. The total volume of aid going to the region in the 1960s, the peak decade of international assistance, was minuscule. Africa was shortchanged by optimists and pessimists in turn.
Development is difficult to evaluate retrospectively. At the heart of the problem is an implied counterfactual: Would things have turned out differently if the interventions had not occurred? Analysts have tended to focus on bureaucratic processes in governments and multilateral agencies, as well as on model cases and the theories of growth they embody. These studies remind us that the actual achievements of development may shape policy less than the imagineers—the Mortensons, Lilienthals, and Washingtons—whose stories give it meaning.
