This small wave of new books about Tanzania offers both new insights into the country’s political and economic history and an opportunity to think about some bigger questions. Thus, Ronald Aminzade and James Brennan write quite differently about “race” and “nation,” respectively offering a political history told through the lens of these terms and a social and intellectual history of the evolving meanings and practices of race and nation in Tanzania. Michael Lofchie’s account of the last five decades of economic policy and history, on the other hand, raises broader questions about practices of explanation in political economy work.
In Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Post-Colonial Africa, Aminzade provides a wide-ranging three-part overview of Tanzanian political developments leading into independence in 1961, the socialist period of the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, and the two-and-a-half most recent decades of evolving multiparty democracy and neoliberalism. Because similarly broad accounts are only available for the first two periods, this is a welcome contribution. The thematic focus of the book is the external and internal “others” of Tanzanian nationalism. Aminzade does Herculean labor in assembling, in one place, discussions of the wide range of debates and policies that have touched on and affected “foreigners” and “internal others,” the latter of which he treats as coterminous with the “racial” other represented by “Asians,” that is, Tanzanians of South Asian descent. Among the pertinent history covered are struggles over citizenship and “Africanization” around independence, the socialist era’s nationalization of real estate overwhelmingly owned by Asians, and contemporary debates over the role of foreign capital.
Four decades of British colonial rule built on categorizing people as European, Asian, or African are the foundation of this story. Racial boundary making between Africans and Asians during that period is Brennan’s central focus. Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania will likely stand as the definitive history of the ways in which categorical discourses of race, shaped by their diverse practitioners, situated these two populations vis-à-vis each other under colonialism (Chapters 1 through 4) and into the first decade after independence (Chapter 5). It offers an analytically sophisticated and empirically rich account of categorical framings from both “above” and “below,” economic regulation and relations, processes of material accumulation, and policies and practices of social and spatial segregation and how they shaped one another in the cauldron of Tanzania’s preeminent city, Dar es Salaam. Brennan’s masterful command of a plethora of English and Swahili sources positions him to achieve the rare feat of effectively moving beyond arguing that race and nation are contingently “constructed” to show the complex evolution of these categories and the practices of identification that drew on them. Chapter 4 on the 1930s and 1940s is especially impressive. It closely traces Tanzanians’ intellectual labor that went into focusing questions of belonging more and more squarely on “race.” But taifa, the Swahili term denoting that notion, also connoted the idea of common descent cum destiny that is typically referenced by “nation.” Race and nation were thus effectively bound together.
How this enmeshment was to be negotiated became an ever more urgent and high-stakes question with the coming of independence. Remarkably, in its official institutions, the newly independent Tanzanian state disentangled taifa’s amalgamation to produce, Aminzade notes, a “victory of nonracial nationalism” (Race, Nation, p. 125). His book’s central argument, however, is that this victory was and remains contested. He presents this as a necessary corrective vis-à-vis a literature that he sees as having “marginalized racial divisions and silenced the voices of those nationalists who unsuccessfully espoused a racial vision of the nation” (p. 104). Although this summary indictment is—as Aminzade’s at times heavy reliance on existing accounts shows—too broad-stroke, the general point is well taken, and both his and Brennan’s book definitively put to rest any notion of a uniformly civic and inclusive Tanzanian nationalism.
Especially when his account moves beyond the constitutive moment of independence, however, Aminzade tends to overcompensate for this perceived blind spot, leaving the reader with an at times exaggerated sense that the question of racial and foreign others was all-pervasive, ever salient, and deeply consequential. He insists, for instance, that Tanzanian politicians have been compelled to appeal to “racial hatreds” (ibid., p. 14) in order to secure popular legitimacy. But this argument sits very uneasily with the fact, amply documented in the book, that key leaders, longtime President Julius Nyerere first among them, vehemently, consistently, and publically condemned racialism. Evidently, there were strategies other than race-baiting that kept Nyerere in power and high popular esteem for a quarter of a century. Seeking to underline the prospective potential of a racialist government, Aminzade likewise notes, without evaluative comment, that “many claimed” that the opposition Chadema Party’s candidate would have won the 2010 presidential elections had they been free and fair (p. 366). However, neither were election irregularities sufficient to tip the vote, which went 27% to 63% to the incumbent, nor, more crucially, did racialism play a significant role in the opposition’s campaign. It was animated instead, as Lofchie’s argues in The Political Economy of Tanzania (pp. 219–20), by an anticorruption message directed against a political-economic oligarchy. Unsurprisingly, given their prominence in business, this oligarchy included Asians, but it was neither racially constituted nor, for the most part, so framed (see also—summary statements to the contrary notwithstanding—Aminzade’s own rich evidence [Race, Nation, pp. 337–49]).
Such questionable lines of argument, combined with poor editing that leaves in place a grating number of misspellings of names and Swahili terms as well as factual errors, yield an impression that the account is sometimes less than sure-footed (Luo-Kikuyu ethnic tensions are attributed to Uganda [ibid, p. 125; sic Kenya]; a GDP growth rate of 6.9% from 1966 to 1975 [p. 205] is far too high—Angus Maddison’s go-to series puts it at 1.9%). This diminishes the book’s otherwise considerable appeal as a synthetic overview of Tanzanian political history.
What about its broader theoretical purpose as a contribution to the study of nationalism and its “others”? Aminzade does show that foreign and racial others figured in Tanzanian nationalism. But his concern with making that point tends to leave too little space for nuance and analysis. Thus, he often documents nonracial and even antiracialist framings of policies, but only to almost formulaically discount them—they are “code” or have a hidden racial “subtext” (e.g., ibid, pp. 133, 337, 359). Likewise, racially differentiated impacts of policies are routinely conflated with the idea that such policies were “racial” also in the senses of being racially framed, motivated, and “targeted” (a term that is sometimes applied very loosely: e.g., pp. 229, 238, 360). The reifying and psychologizing tone of the repeated assertion that various debates and policies evinced “racial hatred” (e.g., pp. 110, 165, 359) similarly forestalls a more analytical and nuanced inquiry that would ask to what extent, in what ways, and to what effect race figured in Tanzanian political history.
Attention to the complex texture and context of practices of categorization and identification along the lines of Brennan’s book would have helped to foreground such questions. It may also have broadened Aminzade’s discussion of the nation and its others by making it take nonracial framings of such others more seriously. Even the most “racial” act of the Tanzanian government, the nationalization of overwhelmingly Asian-owned real estate in 1971, for instance, had clear parallels in an important policy a few years prior that forced predominantly black political leaders to give up their sources of rental income and their business interests (Taifa, p. 225). Both actions were very similarly framed as moves against economic privilege and exploitation. True, at least in Dar es Salaam’s urban context, Brennan notes, Asians were taken to be “the most fitting example of the new nation’s purge category, ‘exploiter’” (p. 19). But, as Brennan’s excursion into 1960s Tanzania’s rich popular discourse on exploitation shows (pp. 160–76), even there they certainly were not the only exemplar of this category. Beyond the city limits, the many black peasants and “kulak” farmers who did not readily embrace Tanzania’s policy of socialist villages were similarly branded “saboteurs” of the national project and treated accordingly. Race, this suggests, was neither an unrivaled nor an all-underlying master category that sorted the nation’s others in all permutations of Tanzanian nationalism.
It is apropos that Lofchie can cover much of same terrain of economic policymaking as Aminzade, but with only the occasional reference to the nation’s racial others. While this is of course in part a function of Lofchie’s different focus, there is also plainly a different assessment of the importance of racial (and other categorical) others. “Parties seeking to exploit racial, religious, or ethnic feelings have great difficulty generating electoral support” (Political Economy, p. 214), Lofchie notes, and he cites a telling explanation offered by an informant: “it isn’t Tanzanian” (p. 215).
Lofchie’s primary concern, however, is an analysis of the rise and near collapse of the state-controlled economy of the 1960s and 1970s and the protracted process of liberalization from the mid-1980s. Chapters 2 and 3 on the preliberalization era argue that the initial adoption of a state-controlled economic regime was a matter of Tanzania following the reigning consensus of development economics. The persistence of this system in the face of its poor performance, however, calls for a very different explanation, argues Lofchie. It was the result of the state “creating bureaucratic controls and regulations as a means of providing rent-seeking opportunities” (ibid., p. 64).
This mere restatement, often by way of “just-so” narration, of the received wisdom about interventionism in sub-Saharan Africa, which Lofchie’s own work of circa 1990 helped to shape, amounts to a lost opportunity, however. The Tanzanian case especially warrants a more thorough reexamination of both evidence and argument. Lofchie states, for instance, that the economic malaise brought by interventionism was the product of resource transfers out of agriculture and into the urban sector and the hands of bureaucratic rent seekers. As a central piece of evidence of such transfers, he invokes poor prices received by agricultural producers under state-controlled marketing (ibid., p. 71). However, there are several reasons for such low prices that have little to do with any such transfers. While Lofchie notes some of them (pp. 76–77), he ultimately does not take them into account when he questionably presented resource transfers as not just the effect but indeed the “real” purpose behind the official marketing system and the prices it generated (p. 78). Similarly, in terms of the broader logic of the argument, the fact that many Tanzanians found jobs and opportunities for graft in the state-dominated economy is, by way of a functionalist post hoc ergo propter hoc explanation, taken to be the “principal reason” (p. 21) why this economic regime was kept in place. He again offers the reader glimpses of possible alternative explanations—officials’ notion that “the remedy for the failure of … economic controls was to heighten the level of economic control” (p. 80), for instance, and the fact that “the political elite continued to be enthralled by the Nyerere ethos of socialism” and was “trapped” by a “fear of punishment for dissenting views” (p. 34). But summary statements of the argument again shunt such points aside and squeeze Tanzania’s preliberalization political economy into a functionalist, reductionist argument.
The suggestion that the coming of economic liberalization can be explained by a “tipping moment” (ibid., p. 42) generated by the shifting weight of economic interests, carries similar hints of economic reductionism. However, by and large, the rich and insightful empirical narrative of Chapters 4 through 6 steers clear of this trap by treating the material interests of various groups as creating complex and shifting constituencies for liberalization and not as its straightforward cause. Ideational changes, donor pressure, and Nyerere’s waning influence are all given their fair due as well. Lofchie also convincingly argues that the great eagerness with which liberalization was pushed forward by the National Assembly in the early 1990s owed much to the fact that reform promised “an economic free-for-all” (p. 121), especially for the politically well connected. However, in an effective counterpoint to a common portrayal of liberalization as a deeply unpopular imposition, Lofchie also argues that it had much broader popular appeal. His conclusion nonetheless shows that liberalization’s primary beneficiary was a political-economic oligarchy. This point finally is a useful reminder that between material interests and political outcomes stands the complex game of politics that defies attempts to explain it by way of taking interests served for history’s cause.
None of these books derives its insights from case comparisons. Yet, especially when one reads them as competing narratives, they generate much productive thinking about how to look at the world of politics. Their disagreements, moreover, are a question not only of different theoretical precepts but also of differences in terms of the evidence considered and how it is interpreted. This suggests that such work in a theoretically informed area and single-case-study mode is a long way from having run out of empirical and theoretical terrain to productively explore.
