This interesting study analyzes the story of Britain's involvement in southwest Arabia from 1955 until its withdrawal in 1967. Using documents available in the British official archives and the Aden Secretariat, the author provides a thorough analysis of the stormy relations between Britain and the region's political entities, namely Aden and the Protectorates. Mawby argues that successive British governments, whether Conservative or Labour, pursued with only slight variations a policy of expansion and domination in the region with a view to secure Britain's imperial interests.
Against the background of a clash between Arab nationalism and British imperialism, the author exposes the opinion of the main figures, both in Britain and in southwest Arabia, who had impact on Britain's policy toward the region. The background chapter traces Britain's policy in southwest Arabia to its origin in 1839 and analyzes the impact of the rise of the Yemeni imamate as a rival to Britain. The author's emphasis then turns to Britain's aggressive policy in the 1950s. He analyzes the twists and turns of Britain's policy against the background of a confrontation between British and Egyptian nationalist goals. The author's analysis demonstrates the impact of Pan-Arabism and Nasser's ideology in the region during the late 1950s and early 1960s. He argues convincingly that Britain's attempts to halt the expansion of Nasserite ideology accelerated rather than slowed the process. Numerous cases in which the British attempted to exert control in the region are discussed by the author. These include political manipulations, search for collaborators, and the use of ground and air forces to pacify the region. The author's organization and the use of sources, both primary and secondary, are effective in proving his points and illustrating his arguments.
The author provides a thorough analysis of the impact of the rise of the nationalist movement in Yemen on Britain's involvement in the region and the intensification of the conflict in the early 1960s. These developments are explained against the background of British apprehension regarding Egyptian aims in the region. With overwhelming evidence, the author argues that despite the erosion of its power in the aftermath of World War II, the intensification of the decolonization process, and the diminishing role Britain played in world affairs, successive British governments, whether Conservative or Labour, were reluctant to abandon the region; the notion that southwest Arabia was essential to Britain's security interests prevailed in Whitehall. However, the role southwest Arabia played in bipartisan British politics is not analyzed thoroughly. Likewise, the role of domestic pressures and the impact of economic constraints remain largely unexplored.
One of the major contributions of this study is the thorough analysis of the opinions of the various British officials in London who dealt with the problem. The differences in their approach are presented in detail and enhance our understanding of the issues involved. Moreover, the author does not neglect the opinions of British officials who operated in the region and argues that their opinion had significant weight on policymakers in Whitehall. The author demonstrates that there was little difference in the approach of British governments, whether Labour or Conservative, toward southwest Arabia. Containing Nasser's influence in the region remained an article of faith by both governments, and despite the Labour government's commitment to social reform, there was a consensus that Britain should continue to exert influence in the region.
What makes this study particularly valuable for this historian is the analysis of British methods of control. Mawby's analysis provides an insight into Britain's tactics of manipulating the local elites into collaboration with its efforts to establish a regime sympathetic to its aims and interests in the region. With overwhelming evidence, the author demonstrates how the British encouraged local elements hostile to Nasser and attempted to suppress all those who sympathized with Nasser's aims in the region.
The author's presentation is sound, accurate, balanced, and supported by appropriate documentation. Its strength lies in its clear and detailed analysis rather than in its originality. Much of its content is already familiar and has been provided by other historians. For example, the argument that Britain persisted in its occupation tenaciously and that both Labour and Conservative governments regarded southwest Arabia as essential to Britain's imperial defense is by no means new. What makes the book valuable is the detailed manner in which the author explains the problems that confronted British policymakers and the exposition of the views of the personalities involved. Other issues that are raised by Mawby, such as the U.S. position in the Yemeni conflict and the reference to Cold War diplomacy, are important and contribute to the value of this study. However, the author's discussion of these important variables remains scanty and superficial. Moreover, the exclusive use of British sources somehow limits the value of the study, and it is difficult to gain an accurate insight into the attitudes and opinions of the indigenous actors.
Despite these shortcomings, the book is an important addition to the literature on the subject for the mere fact that it provides an analysis more complete than any other study dealing with this topic. The book includes notes and an extensive bibliography in the appropriate places. Students at all levels as well as the general public can benefit from it.
