In light of the long tradition of cuneiform texts (from the end of the fourth millennium bc onwards) and the influences they have had on many cultures, the volume under review has been provocatively entitled ‘Philosophy before the Greeks’. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was known for his Eurocentric approach to philosophy, to the extent of rejecting non-Western means of reaching the truth. Although much time has since passed, there are certain features of Eastern philosophy that have not been entirely digested today.Footnote ¹

V.d.M. sets himself in opposition to this trend and, after examining a range of texts, identifies an alternative method of philosophical reasoning. This is a speculative method that is fully worthy of what the Western tradition calls ‘philosophy’. While there is no native word for philosophy within cuneiform languages, this does not imply that the concept was absent from the ancient Near East. This issue is not the terminology, as no single standard definition of philosophy exists, either in the West or in the Far East, but rather being able to grasp the universal applicability of the concept. (Concerning the idea of an insurmountable difference between East and West, and how they can be integrated and enriched with each other, see R. Guénon, Orient et Occident [1924]. See also ‘Orient et Occident’, Le Radeau, January 1925, republished in Vers la Tradition 120 [2010], and ‘Terrains d’entente entre l’Orient et l’Occident’, La Revue Hebdomadaire, June 1927.)

On the basis of this line of thought, the book opens with an introductory essay on Babylonian epistemology, which lays the foundations for an analysis of the corpora's argumentative purpose within the following chapters. In Part 2, ‘The Order of Things (Les Mots et les Choses)’, V.d.M. analyses the written word, as a basic principle of rationality. In Part 3, ‘Writings of the Gods’, he interprets the interactions between divine and human beings. In Part 4, ‘The Word of the Law’, he argues that royal justice was based on truth. In Part 5, ‘A Babylonian Epistemology’, he resumes the various argumentative threads and draws some conclusions.

All the texts considered are lists of various types. At first glance this might seem uninspiring, but for V.d.M. it is precisely in these corpora that we find answers to the epistemological questions of ancient near Eastern philosophical thought.

The principle of lists is at the heart of the three corpora selected by V.d.M. To word lists, he adds omens and laws, in the format of syntagm and paradigm. For omens, the syntagm consists of the protasis and the apodosis, while the paradigm format is formed by a generative counsel to expand the series (pp. 114–25). For laws, it presents the syntagm ‘if …, then …’, while the paradigm organises entries by following a similarly ‘pointillist’ approach (pp. 158–70).

Through word lists the Babylonians structured the reality that surrounded them and acquired information about it. Thus, these lists can be interpreted as systematic descriptions of reality. Through lists of omens the Babylonians attempted to make sense of the divine. They believed that the gods themselves were as keen on careful reading and writing as they were and that, writing within the universe itself, the gods communicated their will to humankind. The lists of omens were, therefore, meant to add significance to a variety of events, which were interpreted in turn as messages from the supreme judges. Through lists of laws, such as the Hammurabi stele, the rules (which were mandatory to observe) were put into written form. This is a source of certainty and reassurance for the truthfulness of justice. The drafting of codes of laws thus marked a seminal change in society, since they provided an independent source of certainty.

The central thesis of the volume revolves around ‘reading the written’ (pp. 223–4). Not by chance, the subtitle of the first chapter is ‘I read, therefore I am’ (p. 3). By writing, or through the written word, it was possible for the Babylonians to determine the true significance of reading in its bilingual or multilingual context. The science of reading – namely a sign that has many meanings and many pronunciations, which results in a great deal of interpretative freedom for the reader – was the basis for the entirety of this understanding. Through the Babylonian hermeneutic tradition of reading we may thus appreciate the Babylonian exercise of philosophy.

A key example for understanding the Babylonian hermeneutic tradition is the last 200 lines of the Enuma eliš, which features a long list of titles attributed to Marduk. These are not merely divine exaltations, but proclamations that the divine plan has been fulfilled; a plan that is not explicitly stated, but one that offers glimpses of sense when reading between the lines, if one wishes to understand the universe. Enuma eliš, which appears to be cosmogony, is also imbued with cosmology. Through a hermeneutic reading of the signs of the different titles of Marduk, one can understand the divine plan. For example, the five signs of the number 36 reveal its true meaning, which is ‘the king (LUGAL) the thwarted (BUR₃) the weapons (DU₁₀) of Tiamat (AB₂) uprooted (BUR₃) her weapons (DU₁₀), whose (LUGAL) support (DU₁₀.BUR₃) was firm (DU₁₀?) in front (^d) and rear’ (p. 9).

V.d.M. has undoubtedly paved the way for a topic that will attract more interest in the coming years. From this perspective, what follows should be seen as seeking further methods of investigation rather than as detracting from what has been achieved by V.d.M., with the aim of stimulating further research.

It would be fruitful to see if the principles that V.d.M. derives from the corpora considered here can be applied to other texts. This would allow us to see whether the conclusion he has reached, based on these sources, is the same with respect to other examples, what is different and why. It is well known that Greek philosophy is a continuation of the sapiential, cabalistic and orphic thought of the Near East, just think of the Seven Sages, Hesiod’s Theogony, Zoroaster etc. It would be interesting to see to what extent Babylonian philosophy influenced neighbouring cultures, such as the ancient Greek and Israeli philosophical traditions. At the same time, to what extent should we see other ancient cultures as being autonomous from their Babylonian counterpart?

From this point of view, a point of patency would undoubtedly be to explore how Babylonian philosophical thought corresponds to the ten foundational philosophical questions, then subsequently compare these answers to those from other cultures. As a reminder, the foundational questions are: (1) What is the Meaning of Life? (2) Who am I? (3) Could I be living in a Matrix? (4) What is Right / Wrong? (5) What is Time? (6) What happens after death? (7) Are human beings just machines? (8) Does God Exist? (9) Destiny? Free Will? (10) What is beauty? By finding (or not finding) the answers to these for each culture that one wishes to consider, one can sketch philosophical thought across the world, thus comparing their differences. This list of the foundational questions of philosophical reasoning (from which all sub-questions can be derived) is key to philosophical thought, and it was consequently a little confusing not to see it mentioned within the volume. These ten foundational questions, even if they are formulated differently, encompass the spheres of ethics, theology, gnoseology, psychology as well as ontology.

I hope that future publications will consider the aforementioned research ideas and survey cues, and if V.d.M.’s proposal is valid and correct, it will be observable across the broad range of cuneiform texts.

V.d.M.’s pioneering study will certainly stimulate future reflection on philosophy, both inside and outside the context of the ancient Near East. The book is written with such clarity that it is accessible to both specialists and the most varied public. Everyone – detractors and supporters alike – will have to confront its contents, thus defining it as a milestone in the history of studies on the subject.