Based on the texts of the five works under review here and what we know about the pace of academic publishing, it is clear that the bulk of the analysis provided in each was written prior to the waves of demonstrations and protests that swept the Arab region beginning in December 2010. One can only imagine how many scholars of Arab politics with books in process were faced with the dilemma of whether a chance to revisit the text was worth delaying publication or mourning the passing of the opportunity to make that decision. The authors of three of the works under review were able to incorporate some analysis of events that were only unfolding as the texts went to press, in prefaces, introductions, conclusions, and codas. The two authors who did not have or take the opportunity to reference the uprisings are no poorer as a result. For the most part, each of these books contributes something important to our understanding of the recent political upheavals and changes that continue to unfold.

Since Islamists have posted some remarkable victories in the first elections after the overthrow of longstanding rulers, the tenacious question of the compatibility of political Islam and democracy has again resurfaced. The books by Nathan Brown and Eva Wegner have thankfully moved forward that question beyond its theoretical positioning by presenting a crucial but often overlooked fact: Islamists do not operate in democracies, for the most part, but under conditions of more or less authoritarian rule, and if we wish to understand their behavior, we need to understand the impact of these political conditions on them. As a result, these authors offer compelling accounts of the character of some of the most important contemporary Islamist movements in the Arab region—as well as important insights into the authoritarian conditions in which they have developed and changed over time.

Though the title of Brown’s book, When Victory Is Not an Option, identifies the pre-uprising period as the setting for his study of Islamist movements—a setting that shifted after Islamist achieved considerable electoral success in 2011 and 2012—his study convincingly analyzes the effects of semi-authoritarianism on the development of contemporary Islamist movements and anticipates some of the shortcomings of the political learning (or maldevelopment) encouraged by such limited political environments. This can go some way toward explaining the poor showing of those Islamists who have seen victory since. Focusing on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, with comparative analysis of Brotherhood-related organizations in three other Arab countries (Jordan, Kuwait, and Palestine), Brown documents the various ways in which these movements have adjusted their behavior, organizations, and ideologies in coping with conditions where they are allowed some space to organize politically and participate in elections, but were never allowed to unseat or form a government, and where the rules of the political game constantly shifted and changed under the ruling regime. In Brown’s analysis, Islamist movements have managed to develop supple yet disciplined and, in some cases, sophisticated political machines, but were unable to commit to democratic politics in such conditions. The question now may well be how a movement that has spent so much time devising ways of navigating semi-authoritarianism might adapt to and operate in the new political environment—and how those changed conditions might further change this organization. As Brown notes: “the model that seems so well designed for semi-authoritarianism may not make the transition to democracy easily” (p. 235), and as a result “our findings about Islamist behavior under semi-authoritarian regimes might actually outlast those regimes” (p. 3).

Much of political science research on Islamist movements over the past decade or so has centered on the question of whether including Islamists in formal political processes can contribute to their moderation. Brown attempts to improve upon—or perhaps bypass—the inadequacies of this inclusion-moderation debate. Rather than moderation, Brown’s analysis gauges “politicization,” which he defines as “the decision to devote resources to elections” (p. 5) and “a political strategy that works through existing institutional and constitutional arrangements” (p. 55). The intent of this shift seems to be to avoid the messy normative judgments involved in characterizing any particular Islamist ideology as “moderate,” since groups with political agendas that include items one could deem illiberal or even radical may choose to engage in electoral politics. If so, one might ask whether he could have merely clarified that his assessment centers on behavior rather than ideas, since it is unclear that Brown succeeds in avoiding the normative problems he associates with the appellation of “moderation.” This is because what Brown deems “politicization” carries a positive connotation throughout most of the book. In other words, the understanding of politicization as increased political participation seems to assume moderation in the sense of a willingness to play by the rules of the political game. His notion of politicization almost always points to behavior that involves, as he puts it, a “climb in from the edge” (p. 55)—that is, behavior that is quite the opposite of radical: accommodationist, self-limiting, and participatory. One might ask further whether the use of one or more of these terms might have been helped by shifting attention to behavior and, thus, been preferable to the seemingly more ideologically-loaded adjective: “moderate.” It is only on rare occasions that Brown’s analysis seems to allow for the possibility of immoderate or radical politicization. And nowhere does he seem to allow for the possibility that politicization might involve increased participation in efforts aimed at the violent overthrow of the regime. “Greater politicization,” for Brown, may at times prove “more confrontational,” but it “always stops far short of violence” (p. 94).

Regarding the question of why Islamist groups might choose to play a game that is stacked against them, Brown argues that the most realistic groups invest some, but not too much (lest they “unnerve rulers and provoke a repressive response”), of their efforts and resources in elections as a means of “building a movement, articulating an agenda, and using the limited openings that elections can offer” (p. 25).

The study by Wegner more explicitly and comprehensively broaches the question of the circumstances under which Islamist parties are willing to do so and the costs and benefits that weigh upon their decision-making. Although the title of Wegner’s book delineates her topic as Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes, the main focus is found in the book’s subtitle. Wegner’s study is less an account of Islamist opposition in general than a rich, detailed and—for such a concise book—comprehensive study of a single Islamist party. Morocco’s Party of Justice and Development (PJD has tended to play by the established rules and only rarely adopts a more confrontational stance. Based on extensive field research and interviews, and employing a wide literature on social movements, party politics, and elections under authoritarian regimes, Wegner analyzes the ways in which the PDJ navigated the difficult choice between playing the “regime game” and playing the “electoral game” between 1992 and 2007. Her study is a compelling account of what is at stake in negotiating these choices. Challenging the regime through boycotts and demonstrations in order to change the rules of the game allows the organization to preserve its credibility and identity but risks marginalization and exclusion from the political process and the loss of an opportunity to build electoral support. Contesting flawed elections poses risks to one’s credibility and ideological coherence in exchange for visibility and a tenuous seat at the political table.

The introduction outlines Wegner’s “heuristic model,” which is aimed not at predicting behavior, but at identifying “the forces shaping the strategies of an Islamist opposition party toward the regime and in the electoral arena: organizational development, the party’s relationship with an ISMO [Islamist social movement organization; specifically, the party’s founding movement], and institutional constraints” (p. 123). Chapters one and two offer rich and well-articulated introductions to the Moroccan political system and to the origins and evolution of the PJD, respectively. Chapter three offers concise analyses of the PJD’s engagement with the regime game, while chapter four analyzes the party’s electoral and parliamentary strategies, and together the two chapters offer a vivid account of the impact of balancing these two strategies on the character and development of the party.

The PJD’s win of a plurality of seats in the parliamentary elections held at the end of 2011 and the party leader’s appointment as prime minister seems to have moved the party out of the opposition for the moment, though the monarchy remains firmly in power. Although the period studied in the book ends in 2009, Wegner’s analysis of the PJD and its relationship to the monarchy goes a long way toward explaining how this is possible. Wegner notes that the Moroccan regime’s strategy of alternance, adopted beginning in 1998, has been “marked by the king’s explicit goal to integrate the former opposition into government” (p. 5). Wegner notes how the PJD has struggled since that time to maintain their credibility as an opposition force. The party’s poor showing in the 2007 parliamentary elections revealed how damaging cooperation with an authoritarian regime could be among their constituency.

Wegner’s final chapter offers a brief comparison of PJD decisions with those made by Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, in order to demonstrate the saliency of her heuristic model, since it is the three sets of factors the model identifies that, she argues, best account for the different electoral decisions made by each party. One question she asks seems particularly relevant in light of the PJD’s 2011 electoral success: “Why did the PJD try so hard to win new voters while being outright docile toward the regime, whereas the IAF chose the opposite approach in both respects?” (p. 129). Her analysis demonstrates how the PJD entered elections from a position of relative weakness in a system that permitted alternance, even if from above, and where electoral strength could be translated into governance. In contrast, the IAF is the only strong and organized political party in Jordan and could make a strong electoral showing, if allowed. However, in the past, Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood had achieved influence not through elected office but through government appointments.

Katerina Dalacoura’s book, Islamist Terrorism and Democracy and the Middle East, fundamentally challenges simplistic accounts of the relation between regime type and oppositional behavior. As the title indicates, the author focuses specifically on the question of whether democracy or its absence impacts the willingness of groups to employ terrorism as a means to achieve their political objectives. Dalacoura argues persuasively that authoritarianism can no more be said to cause Islamist use of terrorism than democracy can be said to diminish Islamist willingness to employ it. Dalacoura discusses a wide variety of Islamist groups: al-Qa'ida, Hizb al-Tahrir, Palestinian Hamas, Lebanon’s Hizbullah, Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group and Islamic Salvation Front, the Egyptian Gama‘a Islamiyya and Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, Tunisia’s Nahda, as well as groups outside the Arab region such Turkey’s Welfare Party and Justice and Development Party, and even the Islamic Republic of Iran. One by one, she refutes commonly-held and scholarly-defended notions that political participation, the amount of freedom citizens enjoy, or the lack of engagement or relation with established institutions (what she calls “rootlessness”) alone in any country can account for the prevalence of terrorism. She also rejects ideational explanations as a singular or even primary cause, arguing that focus on ideology and ideas explains how grievances are translated into terrorist practices without addressing why. That is, focusing on ideology does not explain why one group provides a radical interpretation of religious texts whereas another adopts a nonviolent or even apolitical interpretation of religious texts. Dalacoura seeks to take issue with the policy of the George W. Bush administration, which put forth “democracy promotion” as a component of the “War on Terror,” and her analysis occasionally overstates the singularity of standard explanations of terrorism. At the same time, her study is an important temper to the unbridled optimism that emerged the wake of the Arab uprisings. The fall of authoritarian rulers and the holding of elections will not alone begin a period of peace and justice in the region. Dalacoura is not arguing against democracy promotion per se, but rather suggesting that analysts take a multi-faceted approach that interrogates the social, political, and economic grievances that impact the decision making processes of Islamist actors. Her analysis offers the nuance and specificity that Tibi’s lacks, as she calls upon policy makers to analyze Islamist groups case by case, grasping them as “rational actors, and understanding and responding to the utilitarian way they use terrorist tactics” (p. 186).

Both Brown and Wegner make clear that under conditions of semi-authoritarianism, Islamists may adopt pragmatic and accommodationist political strategies. While one might be tempted to conclude that it is the narrow and limited democratic openings in an authoritarian environment that contribute to this response, rather than the authoritarian constraints, neither author suggests as much. One of the shortcomings of Dalacoura’s analysis is that she does not offer much in the way of clarifying what causes or hinders the use of terrorist tactics by Islamists. Her aim is more critical than constructive in this sense. She does gesture toward “tentative answers” to this question by suggesting the importance of socio-economic reasons. But, ultimately, Dalacoura puts forth what she terms a “strategic/instrumental explanation”—that Islamist movements “used terrorist methods when their leaderships concluded that they delivered the results they sought” (p. 181)—which seems to beg the question of what conditions might be changed so that Islamist leaders might reach different conclusions.

Where Brown and Wegner analyze the ways in which Islamists trade and manage accommodating and oppositional strategies in semi-authoritarian contexts, the volume on Islamism by Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn focuses on Islamist movements that engaged in more active, “militant” resistance to various local contexts informed by regional and international forces and employing a wider range of methods (violent and nonviolent) than the terrorism studied by Dalacoura. Strindberg and Wärn’s aim is to uncover “the features of Islamism that makes it a generically human expression of grievances and aspirations, thereby disentangling it from the web of received wisdoms based on threat assessments and cultural exoticism” (p. 7). Their first two chapters wade through the often acrimonious debates over definitions and representations involved in a study of Islamism, clearing the way for their rather novel reading in chapter three of Frantz Fanon’s analysis of colonialism in conjunction with social identity theory. In that, their central chapter, they argue that Islamism has emerged as an ideology of resistance not to transcendent narratives about civilizational others or to an abstract modernity or “the West,” but as the product of local exigencies, developments and interactions that are situated within a global system. In other words, Islamism emerges in resistance to both domestic conditions, which its advocates view as autocratic, oppressive, corrupt and humiliating, and “a regional system,” which they view as “molded and maintained by an international community paying lip service to the cause of democracy and human rights while safeguarding neo-colonial interests with an iron fist” (p. 9). Strindberg and Wärn’s understanding of Islamist movements as “socioculturally grounded expressions of the Fanonian impulse” (p. 65) bears an interesting parallel to Brown’s account of potential maldevelopment that can emerge from conditions where the game is rigged. Due to the “hopelessly asymmetrical nature of most conflicts in which Islamists are currently engaged across the globe,” Islamists struggle neither because they have some realistic chance of success nor because they are inherently violent “but because the ability to inflect damage on the enemy reifies a sense of Self, which then translates into political capital in the ongoing struggle to define the nature and trajectory of Islam” (p. 58). Some readers might question the use of Fanonian psychology to explain violence on the part of the colonized, and others might mistake the authors’ explanation of Islamist discourse and behavior for justification; far too many analyses of Islamism that fail to carry prefatory declarations of alarm at the evil scourge of Islamism are similarly accused. But what Strindberg and Wärn provide is simply a nuanced analysis that eschews moralism. In chapter four they thus insist that understanding Hamas and it ability to resonate with its constituency has to go beyond the references to the Qur’an and Sayyid Qutb in its founding documents, to an analysis of the social and political aspects of the group’s conflict with Israel and its competition with the global Islamist movement al-Qa‘ida. Chapters five, six, and seven offer similar analyses of al-Qa‘ida, Lebanon’s Hizbullah, and Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front, respectively. Chapter eight departs from the others in many respects, focusing less on Islamist groups and movements and more on marginalized and radicalized Muslim individuals who take up various forms of militant activism, losing some coherency as a result. A concluding chapter reiterates the association of contemporary militant Islamist movements with “the Fanonian impulse.”

Through extensive field research and interviews across a number of contexts, Strindberg and Wärn explain why and how Islamism emerges by disaggregating the various extant manifestations of Islamism, with different concerns, aims, and choices. The same conditions that led to the emergence of Islamism contributed to the Arab uprisings that began in 2010, according to the authors. So too, Strindberg and Wärn note that the responses of Islamists to these recent events, which they were a part of but did not lead, were similarly varied and have revealed numerous internal divisions (p. 9).

While Strindberg and Wärn’s study contextualizes and pluralizes Islamist movements, Bassam Tibi’s Islamism and Islam treats “the Islamist movement” in the singular and explains its behavior by reference to the anti-Westernism of Islamic thinkers like Sayyid Qutb. Tibi identifies two core “messages.” The first is worth reiterating, but hardly novel to most scholars: that “there is a distinction between the faith of Islam and the religionized politics of Islamism” (p. vii). In fact, Tibi devotes considerably less time to defending this first, less-contestable message compared to his second: that “Islamism is a totalitarian ideology in Hannah Arendt’s understanding of this term.” He further clarifies that Islamist totalitarianism is “deeply linked” to anti-semitism, and the latter is further described, according to Tibi (again, via a purported “Arendtian analysis”) as a “genocidal ideology” (p. viii). In Tibi’s world view, the differences between Turkey’s Freedom and Justice Party and al-Qa‘ida, between Sayyid Qutb and Tariq Ramadan, between “moderate” or “institutional Islamism” and “radical” or “jihadist Islamism,” between “the peaceful and violent branches of Islam,” are generally meaningless differences over means, not over aims (pp. 2, 51, 121). While Tibi’s attempt to draw attention to liberal and secular Islamic thought is welcomed and important, I would have liked to see more of Tibi’s articulation of that alternative (his own and perhaps a sustained engagement with similar efforts to articulate an alternative within the region) and less conflation of importantly different things into a “fictitious monolith” of Islamism, a view that, as Strindberg and Wärn argue, unfortunately dominates too much policy oriented analysis of Islamism (Strindberg and Wärn, p. 42). While critical accounts of Islamist movements are particularly needed now that Islamist political figures and parties have gained a hold on political power in a number of Arab countries, the usefulness of this work for scholars and policy analysis of political Islam is diminished by the author’s lack of attention to variation and nuance, as well as the dearth of direct engagement with primary texts and actors from contemporary Islamist movements.

Tibi’s book would have us believe that the shortcomings of the political outcomes of the Arab uprisings lie simply in the fact that it is Islamist movements that have seen the most success in the elections that followed. The other books reviewed here offer a more complex picture of both the challenges faced by oppositional actors in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian contexts, and the significant and varying impact of those systems on some of the largest Islamist opposition movements in several contexts. While the five books reviewed here are just a small selection of the many recent books on the topic of authoritarianism and democracy in the Arab region, an unfortunate dearth of studies consider the impact of authoritarianism on non-Islamist actors and movements in the region. One can only hope that the frustration of many analysts and activists with the course of the “democratic transitions” in the region will spur a study of a larger range of political actors. One may very well find a similar dynamic among secular, leftist, nationalist, and liberal “opposition” actors to that found among Islamist movements and parties. This is not to suggest that the election of one of the non-Islamist candidates running for president of Egypt would have led to a different outcome than the one that befell the presidency of Muhammad Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, only that the problems and challenges of Egyptian politics exceed the ideology of the person or party that wins even a democratic election. The ongoing political struggles in the Middle East and Northern Africa will undoubtedly continue to display a thorny complexity that only political science at its very best is well suited to analyzing.