In Adam Smith: Systematic Philosopher and Public Thinker, Eric Schliesser demonstrates absolute mastery of Smith's written corpus. Schliesser pays careful attention not only to the Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) and the Wealth of Nations, but also to Smith's currently less-read essays on perception, aesthetics, language, the history of natural science, and the history of philosophy. In addition, Schliesser brings Smith's thought into conversation with that of a wide variety of Western intellectual figures, both canonical (e.g., David Hume) and not (e.g., Sophie de Grouchy), and he incorporates and responds to a truly vast amount of scholarship on Smith and Smith-related issues from a broad range of disciplines. Thus, Schliesser has produced a major scholarly work that should be read by all those interested in Smith.
The main theme of the book is reflected in its subtitle. Schliesser reads Smith as a philosopher who both studies and produces “systems of thought” unified by “coherent and connected explanatory principles” (5). Schliesser also reads Smith as a thinker who cares deeply about the impact that intellectual systems have on the public; the moral and political consequences of a system, Schliesser argues, matter as much to Smith as its more inherent justificatory status does. Thus, Schliesser concludes that while Smith is a proponent for social change, he is not a “revolutionary”; rather, he is a “reformist,” whose commitment to “gradualism [is] an instance of responsible … public speech by the theorist” (374–75).
I used the word “theme” in the previous paragraph to convey that the book does not (to me) read as a sustained argument for a specific thesis (pace the claims of its jacket). Schliesser is clear that he “tried to make the book as modular as possible” so as to maximize its usefulness for readers with particular interests (20). These modular parts are certainly interconnected and well organized. The text contains many explicit callbacks to previously made points and previews of points yet to be made; it also begins every one of its chapters and sections with a straightforward roadmap for the subsequent stretch of text. But while the “systemic philosopher, public thinker” idea certainly lends shape to Schliesser's “sympathetic exposition of Smith's views,” it would be incorrect to state that the book is about establishing this reading of Smith (20). It seems better to state that the book is about the many things Schliesser has to say about virtually every aspect of Smith's thought.
Although the book contains much material worthy of comment, I engage in what follows only with three particular points. First, admirably cautious to avoid treating Smith as an uncritical Humean, Schliesser argues that Smith is not really an empiricist. He calls our attention to several passages from the essay “Of the External Senses,” in which Smith argues that certain natural desires intrinsically involve directives towards the means for their satisfaction. For example, the desire for food in newborn infants pre-experientially prompts both movement towards the mother's breast and the activity of suckling. Schliesser takes Smith's use of terms such as “preconception,” “idea,” and “notion” to characterize the infant's instinctual grasp of distance, externality, and causal connection and to signal his commitment to at least a thin form of un-Humean innatism (57–58).
But how un-Humean is this view? Hume's empiricism can surely recognize certain innate tendencies and dispositions. The Humean just thinks that all factual beliefs and knowledge must be rooted in experience. Schliesser recognizes this; thus, he distinguishes Smith's view from “the very minimal claim that prior to experience these proto-passions [or preconceptions] exist as kind of very vague drives or content neutral mechanisms (e.g., Humean principles of association)” (57). However, Schliesser must make a stronger case that the—in Smith's language—“vague” preconceptions, ideas, and notions possessed by the infant fall into the category of factual beliefs or knowledge that Hume thinks can only come from experience (58). To this end, Schliesser cites a long footnote from Smith's essay “The History of Ancient Logics and Metaphysics” that identifies an “idea” with “a thought or conception of any kind” (61). But for Schliesser to complete his case, this passage needs much more unpacking and comparison with Smith's hesitantly cognitive language in the infant passage. (Furthermore, Schliesser's argument should consider Hume's own reference to a “kind of presensation; which tells us what will operate in others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves”: A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Norton and Norton [Clarendon, 2007], 216.)
Schliesser goes on to apply this innatist reading to Smith's reference to the “idea of exact propriety and perfection,” which “exists in the mind of every man” (59). Schliesser argues that the best way to explain how we all “cultivate” this idea is by appealing to something a priori about it. My first concern about this move is that it overlooks the rhetorical context of the passage in question. Since the passage occurs in the most moralistic, practically oriented parts of Smith's TMS, “every man” could refer to every one of his readers, that is, every normally developed human being, not every human being per se; obviously, the former reference is consistent with the view that the idea comes from experience that all normally developed people happen to have. I am also puzzled by this move because it takes a rather circuitous path towards a potentially deep feature of Smith's moral theory. Smith very well might have problems accounting for how we get the “idea of exact propriety and perfection” without appealing to something built into human nature. But it seems to me more fruitful to pursue this question via appeal to, for example, his general account of how conscience develops or his often normative appeals to “nature” than by trying to attribute to him generic epistemic innatism.
Second, Schliesser also believes that it is a mistake to read Smith as holding Hume's passive conception of reason. Schliesser's main piece of evidence is a TMS passage in which Smith argues that the only way to explain certain altruistic practical dispositions is by recognizing that reason is an “active principle” (68–70). While I cannot go into details here, I am in agreement with much of what Schliesser has to say (elsewhere, I have also provided a close reading of this passage). However, Schliesser does not give enough attention to another TMS passage in which Smith appears to agree with Hume (and Hutcheson) that reason simply cannot motivate action (The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Raphael and Macfie [Liberty, 1982], 320). Any attempt to make sense of the passage on which Schliesser focuses must bring it into conversation with this one.
Third, one of the most exciting features of Schliesser's study is its attempt to reconstruct Smith's theory of the passions in terms of some basic conceptual distinctions to which Smith alludes but never really “works out” (47). The most basic of these distinctions is between “natural” or “original” passions and “derived” or “cultivated” passions. The hallmark feature of the latter is that they are constituted in some sense by a “sense of ourselves moving up or down in the estimation of an (internally) selected group of observers” (78). These “derived” or “cultivated” passions become “properly moral” when membership in the “group of observers” to which they refer is constrained by morally essential characteristics like impartiality (137). Schliesser must be right here; Smith clearly thinks that our moral sentiments develop out of social interaction, and he certainly seems to think that sentimental evaluations become specifically moral when felt from the right kind of perspective. However, while Schliesser's account makes sense of self-directed Smithian moral sentiment, it is not clear how it works for other-directed Smithian moral sentiment. How does my sense of an impartial spectator's evaluation of me relate to my moral evaluations of other people? I think a plausible, Smith-friendly story can be told here, but Schliesser leaves it to future Smith interpreters to tell it.
