The closed nature of the Soviet system meant that little was known about the republics on the periphery, particularly those of Central Asia. Most scholars viewed the region as a cotton colony of the Soviet Union dominated by a largely traditional, feudal society impervious to Western understanding. Despite greater access to the region and its peoples in the wake of the collapse of communism, the perception that the region remained under Moscow's shadow continued to suppress interest among nonspecialists. More recently, however, renewed interest in the Muslim world brought on by the war on terror has changed all of that. Specialists in international relations, security studies, and comparative politics, in particular, are intrigued by any number of questions, not the least of which are the persistence of authoritarianism and the inability of radical Islam to gain traction in Central Asia.

In an attempt to further lift the shroud, Pauline Jones Luong has assembled 10 chapters addressing state–society relations in postcommunist Central Asia. Her espoused purpose is to add to both our theoretical and empirical knowledge of the region. While she is more successful in achieving the latter goal, readers will find that the introductory and concluding chapters make a decent effort to address the theoretical implications of the volume's eight chapters. This is particularly so for the concluding chapter in which Luong addresses debates in the literature on the developing world that revolve around the unitary state versus the pluralist state, strong societies and weak states, and the role of the international community in developing states. The discussion is enlightening, but this reader was left wondering why she did not engage the literature on state and society in the Islamic world more directly and explicitly. Comparisons would be of particular interest to those concerned with the rise of radical Islam. Insofar as Central Asia appears to have substantially avoided the problem, what comparative differences in the region's state–society relations might have contributed to its having done so?

The introductory chapter engages in a careful critique of the dominant views of Central Asia during the Soviet era. The discussion is important to the volume's thesis. Eschewing a behavioralist/culturalist position, The Transformation of Central Asia essentially contends from a historical legacy perspective that the Soviet state transformed the region more fundamentally than previously thought, as a consequence of which the Soviet legacy is a much stronger causal factor than Islam in explaining most transformation processes in the postcommunist era. In so doing, it gave new meanings to existing symbols and imbued the population with secularist values. These values inform the relationship between state and society in postcommunist Central Asia.

Subsequent chapters address particular aspects of this thesis. While most focus on the effect of Soviet-era institutions, some highlight the effect of Soviet-era values on state–society relations. The general argument is that despite the new states' use of Islam to form a national identity centered on traditional values, the region remains largely secular and deeply suspicious of radical Islam. In this vein, Chapter 1 argues that women continue to look to the state for maternal support; and Chapter 2 argues that such traditional practices as bride kidnapping, which appear to be reemerging, in actuality persisted during the Soviet era as well. However, rather than being an expression of religious belief or traditions, both then and now, the practice has been adapted to social and economic realities.

The contributions focusing on institutional effects generally argue that Central Asia's elites have adapted Soviet institutions and practices in an effort to legitimate their rule. These efforts have not been terribly successful. The reasons offered do not point to a single cause. Some contributors argue that state capacity is too weak (Erika Weinthal's thesis in Chapter 8 in discussing problems associated with grappling with environmental protection). Others contend that elites are too divided to effectively use the state's capacity, as has been evidenced in the debate over language policy in Kazakhstan (Chapter 4). Most of the volume's contributors, however, point to the very design of the institutions themselves, arguing that they induce conflict. Laura Adams (Chapter 3) argues that cultural workers' attempts to serve central elite interests by producing works intended to legitimate the newly emerging state have been impeded by the inter- and intrainstitutional competition for resources that marked these same institutions during the Soviet era. Chapters 5 and 6 argue in a similar manner that republican elites attempting to centralize have been met with the resistance of local and regional elites using their institutional bases of power.

The issue of authoritarianism is touched upon in virtually every chapter. Indeed, those studying state–society relations generally do so operating from the premise that democracies require strong societies capable of holding ruling elites accountable. Kelly McMann's contribution (Chapter 7) does not suggest that such societies are likely to emerge in Central Asia anytime in the near future. She argues that civic organizations continue to look to the state for support. Such dependency on the state is rooted in both the relationship of society to the state during the Soviet era and the fact that the state has retained much of the wealth and resource base of the former Soviet state. Under conditions of economic underdevelopment, this makes it virtually the only source of funding within the country. The implications for democracy of a weak society are spelled out most clearly in the volume's opening chapter. Decentralization, whether it has occurred as a consequence of elite competition of the type addressed in Chapters 5 and 6 or as the intended result of state policy, such as the devolution of social responsibilities to local councils (mahalla), has not led to either greater public accountability or more efficient government. The elite struggle for power has taken place within the context of a weak society. This has meant a lack of competitive elections and inadequate information flows to assure transparency. The result has been the institutionalization of authoritarianism at the local and national levels.