This edited volume by Robert Falkner and Barry Buzan brings together International Relations (IR) theories on great powers and scholarship on global environmental politics (GEP) to examine the role major powers do and could play regarding global environmental problems, especially climate change. This collection of conceptual, and to a more limited extent empirical, insights regarding major powers’ international political behavior in the realm of the environment is an important step toward raising the profile of the field of GEP within IR and advancing our understanding of great-power politics in general.

The central theoretical contributions of the book (presented in Chapter 2 by Robert Falkner and Barry Buzan) consist of a proposed definition of a great environmental or climate power, and a framework for studying the attribution of great-power status and the corresponding special rights and responsibilities. The various contributing chapters apply this framework to a set of cases (the United States, the European Union, Russia, China, India, and Brazil) in Part II, and a mixed bag of issue areas (e.g., security and coal) in Part III. Particular attention is given to issues of securitization throughout the volume. Further, Falkner and Buzan make a case for deep pluralism as an emerging feature of world politics today, characterized by the diffusion of governance capabilities and the disappearance of distinct issue-neutral power centers or great-power rivalry.

Distinguishing between material and social power, and leaning heavily on the English School’s notion of international society, Falkner and Buzan define a great environmental power along two dimensions: states that, on the one hand, control ecosystems and natural resources that enable them to inflict significant transboundary environmental harm (i.e., wielding negative environmental power) and, on the other hand, command social power in the sense that they can shape international agendas, meanings, bargaining outcomes, and governance instruments (i.e., wielding positive environmental power). Negative power often translates directly into bargaining power, imbuing the country with destructive potential (e.g., major GHG emitters) with veto power in the negotiation of multilateral agreements. Emphasizing that power is a neutral concept, that is, it includes both the ability to inflict harm and to address problems, Falkner and Buzan suggest that a state’s great-power status depends on a somewhat vague balance between these two dimensions. This negative–positive environmental power distinction is applied and sometimes expanded upon in the various contributing chapters, creating a consistent red line throughout the book—a rare strength for an edited volume.

However, this definition in terms of the kinds of environmental power a state can wield also has several weaknesses that become clear throughout the book. The first and maybe most important one is a missing focus on the domestic dimensions of great environmental power status. In her chapter on Brazil, Kathryn Hochstetler begins to close this conceptual gap and offers excellent insights regarding the positive environmental power a country can exercise with domestic policy making rather than international diplomacy in a specific issue area like deforestation. The outstanding chapter on coal powers by Stacy VanDeveer and Tim Boersma also applies this understanding of power, analyzing not only whether the foreign policies of three major powers (their “energy diplomacy”) are conducted in accordance with their special international responsibilities but also their domestic actions related to the mining, transportation, and burning of coal.

The great-power definition of Falkner and Buzan has a second blind spot regarding the potential use of social (“positive”) power to obstruct the development of environmental governance solutions: It assumes that material power is always destructive and social power is always constructive. Finally, the definition’s treatment of positive power does not grapple with the difficult distinction between shaping environmental treaties, institutions, and policies and having a positive effect on the environment. The latter has been a long-standing concern and challenge in the literature on international regime effectiveness.

While Falkner and Buzan as well as other contributing authors pay attention to the English School’s definition of a great power, which requires the allocation and acceptance of special responsibilities by the leaders and people of a country, they leave open whether this requirement applies in the context of environmental politics. They make a more general claim that “The general premises of the great power concept, and great power theory, do not translate to GEP in a straightforward manner” (p. 23). Most authors throughout the book argue for a great environmental power status of their cases absent any evidence of such an acceptance (e.g., Brazil, Russia) or even despite the explicit rejection of special responsibilities (e.g., the United States, India). Hence, all “conventional” great powers are considered great environmental powers, while Germany, France, and the United Kingdom are treated as one EU case—also considered a great environmental power. Many authors deal with their mixed findings by labeling a country a partial great power (China), a boundary case (Brazil), or “a less than clear case” (India). It might have been useful to include a borderline case and falsify the great-power status of the country under scrutiny to offer a clearer answer to the ultimately unresolved question of what defines a great environmental power.

The concept of (special) responsibility is key not only when attempting to define great powers but also in the context of most international environmental regimes as well, especially the climate change regime. The United National Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is all about the distribution of responsibility. Historically, the central frame for responsibility discussions has been the distinction between developed and developing countries (or the Global North and South) rather than the distinction between great powers and others. While some of the book’s contributions briefly comment on this context and the general resistance to a great-power club approach, no chapter looks specifically into the discourses on responsibility in the UNFCCC negotiations. The principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” would have deserved its own chapter in a volume on climate change and global environmental responsibilities.

Further, I was hoping for a stronger empirical focus—and possibly a framework for studying—the allocation and acceptance of responsibility; tracing these in texts, speeches, policies, and negotiation behaviors; and ultimately enabling a comparison between countries. Only Miriam Prys-Hansen (on India) and Stacy VanDeveer and Tim Boersma (on coal) do this systematically and well.

Finally, the book leaves a topical gap with regard to geoengineering and the possible role great powers can, should, and might take on in future large-scale efforts to intentionally change the global climate, especially with solar radiation management.

In sum, this fascinating and rich volume brings together a group of outstanding scholars to address an important set of questions for both IR and GEP scholarship. It opens up space to broaden and sharpen analyses of great green powers in the future, using the conceptual toolkit provided. Unsurprisingly, the volume’s core empirical finding is that great environmental powers do not assume or act on their special responsibilities. Circling back to the definitional question that motivated the volume, strict followers of the English School would have to deny great environmental power status to all countries assessed when it comes to climate change, including the United States. However, the authors collectively accept that the ability to inflict significant (not necessarily global-scale) environmental harm is sufficient for being a great environmental power, ideally combined with the exercise of social power in international environmental treaty making. Maybe these findings simply confirm why great-power theories have so far not been connected to GEP: The great-power concept does not easily apply in the context of global problems. Due to the specific problem structure prevalent in this sphere of politics, major powers do not receive special benefits or rights to balance (i.e., make it worth taking on) their special responsibilities. Hence, most countries prefer not to be a great environmental power.