Anthropogenic climate change poses a conundrum for moral philosophy. It is expected to result in very bad outcomes for large numbers of victims, with harm that is causally linked to the avoidable action of perpetrators, but scholars have struggled to provide a compelling account of the wrongfulness of climate-related harm. Climate ethicists have produced a number of work-arounds to the supposed theoretical difficulties that are often held to be intractable up to the point at which each author introduces his or her approach to solving them. Some have linked individual agency to collectively caused harm by disaggregating shares of culpability to persons, despite the absence of direct causal links between them. Others have sought to ground responsibility for redressing climate-related harm in unjust enrichment, invoking a beneficiary-pays principle that avoids the causality problems associated with the consequentialist polluter-pays principle. Still others have turned to virtue ethics, condemning persons for failing to avoid what is cast as a form of moral corruption in their contributions to climate change, thus avoiding disputed links between specific actions and bad outcomes, or to arguments from fairness against defecting from cooperative schemes by which the anthropogenic drivers of climate change might be lessened, thus avoiding problems surrounding collective agency as well as causal links to climate outcomes.
While each of these approaches may be vulnerable to objections, as all ethical arguments are, the general impotence of ethical theory in condemning the sort of harm involved in climate change is frequently exaggerated. A common trope in climate ethics involves bemoaning the theoretical canon for its failure, claiming climate change as a litmus test for the applicability of conventional ethical theories to this putatively new and more complex example of harm, then hyperbolically claiming that one has transformed and redeemed conventional forms of ethical theorizing. Moral philosophy and the institutions charged with global environmental protection may both be struggling to address this new challenge, but the fate of neither can depend upon a solitary rescuer, however heroic. Scholarly contributions to climate ethics can be valuable and important without this heroic rescue narrative, and scholars should not be burdened with such unrealistic expectations or assessed on the basis of such spurious and unfair standards.
In her important book, Elizabeth Cripps wades into this conundrum, offering not one but four normative analyses through which persons may be assigned responsibility for their greenhouse-polluting actions and/or their failure to take adequate remedial action. Cripps takes an ecumenical and pragmatic approach to ethical theorizing, drawing upon a range of traditions and approaches in assessing the strengths and limitations of each. She also invokes the heroic rescue narrative, defending her focus upon climate change by noting the urgency of its threat, implying that sound ethical arguments might dislodge entrenched social and political obstacles to agreement, and calling upon readers to “find ways of acting together, by influencing, amending, supplementing, or if necessary bypassing those [state] institutions” (p. 202). It cannot help to mobilize support for cooperative remedial action on climate change when theoretical resources for impugning greenhouse-polluting actions or behaviors elude scholars, but this narrative errs insofar as it posits that a theoretically sound analysis provides either a necessary or sufficient condition for effective social or political action. Fortunately, her work needs no such narrative to be compelling, as its innovative and pluralistic ethical framework stands on its own merits.
According to Cripps, persons have a weakly collective duty to organize for action against climate-related harm insofar as they belong to one of three potential groups. The Young ought to take mitigation actions from a moralized form of self-interest, given expected impacts upon their cohort within their lifetimes. The Able should support mitigation as well as adaptation actions on the basis of their capacity to do so, and Polluters should support mitigation, adaptation, and compensation on the basis of their moral responsibility for the harm in question. By invoking multiple and now-familiar grounds for remedial action, Cripps aims to “reinforce the case for correlative individual duties with complementary but largely independent foundations” (p. 197). One might be tempted to view her identification of multiple collective agents and grounds for remedial duties as undermining the cogency of any one such duty, as if based in a lack of confidence in any one of them. But the multiple agents and remedial principles constitute an innovative alternative to prior work in climate ethics that has unhelpfully and erroneously insisted upon singular collective agents and remedial principles. Methodologically, Cripps coordinates what had previously been regarded as incompatible principles, linking them through overlapping obligations that none of the three collective agents could tenably address on its own, and deriving various individual duties from these collective obligations.
More ambitiously, Cripps also seeks to ground remedial action on climate change in obligations to nonhumans, which rehearses familiar objections to the drawing of boundaries in a manner that accords protection to humans but not to nonhumans. But perhaps her most novel and ambitious claim concerns the moral taint that affects those unable to fully resolve tensions among three aspects of their lives. Here, she relies upon a form of virtue ethics, which is often accused of underdetermining action but which can powerfully capture dilemmas involved in the human predicament surrounding climate change. While ambitious, these analyses also stray further from analytically robust forms of normative theory, generating imperatives that are simultaneously vague in their prescriptions and thin in their foundations, but are nonetheless provocative in mining heretofore underexplored normative resources for a climate ethics critique.
As with many other works in climate ethics, in Climate Change and the Moral Agent, politics for Cripps plays a relatively minor role in diagnosing the moral failure of inadequate remedial efforts, with links between ethical analysis and social or political change underexplored. To her credit, she offers a fresh and compelling account of the ways in which individual remedial duties might be discharged when collective action is unlikely to occur, distinguishing between the promotional duties that reduce obstacles to collective action and the direct and mimicking duties through which persons can act even when cooperation is not likely to be forthcoming. In doing so, she avoids the perils of entirely futile prescriptions for collective action, as some make in theorizing collective responsibilities, as well as atomizing apolitical assumptions common to climate ethics work that assumes away political life altogether. Different persons have different skill sets and live in different contexts, Cripps aptly notes, and accordingly have different ways of discharging duties to others as a result. By considering the relative efficacy of alternative courses of action, we might determine optimal or appropriate remedial actions, gaining purchase on flexibility and mobilizing the range of diverse remedies that might together be effective in reducing threats of climate-related harm, if at the cost of some prescriptive precision for those wondering what they should do.
Overall, Cripps commendably reconciles the competing constructs of individual and collective agency, self-interest and altruism, and direct and indirect duties, and in the process develops an account of remedial responsibility that should be of interest to ethical theorists as well as those working in more applied fields of normative analysis. By plausibly connecting competing principles and levels of analysis, her argument makes a compelling case for a form of normative pluralism, with specific duties rooted in varying contexts that others have erroneously sought to eliminate. Even if it fails to dislodge the impasse within contemporary climate politics, her analysis yields insight into what persons should do about climate change, in a world that is neither implausibly idealized nor inaccurately devoid of either politics or moral failure.
