These two books begin with a similar and similarly disheartening assessment of the citizenship experience in contemporary democracy: this experience is deeply disappointing and frustrating, especially if citizens have expectations that their participation might make a difference or that they will be treated as free and equal. These are “false expectations” (3) according to Green and, when disappointed, lead to “devitalized agency,” says Aslam. Both authors also lay the blame for the sorry state of citizenship on unjust and unequal economic forces that set up what appear to be insurmountable barriers to equal participation and what might be called the fair value of citizenship. Thus both books are keenly aware of social injustice and inequality and both books take issue with contemporary theories of democracy for failing to see the true nature of the malaise experienced by contemporary democratic citizens. Despite these similarities these two books have nothing in common. It borders on the bizarre that two books written in the field of political theory about citizenship and contemporary democratic theory should be in such completely different universes. Between the two of them they list approximately (and conservatively) 650 separate works in their respective bibliographies, yet Green and Aslam share only six references (Connolly, Locke, Rancière, Tocqueville, Weber, Wolin). (Both also cite Foucault, Josiah Ober, and Plutarch, but not the same texts.) Perhaps this is a reflection of the state of the field of democratic theory, both that there is too much to read and that we do not read across or outside our bailiwicks. But the lack of connection is startling and leads me to abandon a comparative analysis for separate sequential discussions of these two books.
The Shadow of Unfairness: A Plebeian Theory of Liberal Democracy is a wonderful book with which I found much to disagree. Let me begin with the wonderful parts. Green's analysis of the failings of liberal democratic orders is spot on. We are told by philosophers and pundits alike that the cornerstone of liberal democracy is the free and equal status of citizens. But everywhere we look this ideal is belied by reality. Rather than freedom and equality, citizens experience unfairness: “ordinary citizenship is second class citizenship” (9). This is due to three factors. First, only a few will ever exercise real political power (remove). Second, citizens for the most part can have an impact on politics only by joining (and therefore diluting) their individual agency to a group (manyness). These two limits to the fair value of citizenship might be overcome if it were not for the third feature and the most important: plutocracy. Money is power and the power of money has a deep, unavoidable, and devastating impact on the possibility of equal citizenship. The standard response to these pathologies is to seek ways to overcome, mitigate, and reduce these barriers to the fair value of citizenship. Green resists this move and instead embraces what he calls a new democratic realism. Remove, manyness, and plutocracy are permanent and insurmountable obstacles to instantiating freedom and equality in the public sphere of real working democracies. And here is the very interesting twist to the argument. Green fully embraces the ideals of liberal democracy, including the ideal that all citizens are free and equal. Furthermore, we should have these ideals in mind when designing many of our institutions (constitutional essentials, for example). But we must acknowledge that mass democracy will never come close to this ideal, and this acknowledgment opens up a completely different view of democracy: plebeian democracy is what Green calls democracy in which citizens see that the deck is permanently stacked against them, and the acknowledgment of the unfairness of it all loosens many conventional constraints on good democratic behavior.
Green develops the idea of plebeian democracy on two tracks. On the one hand, the contemporary story is paralleled by an erudite and compelling story of ancient Rome and the forces at work in the republic. Dubbed “analogous reasoning,” the continuous recourse to this original form of plebeian politics brings a richness and depth to the contemporary claims. At the heart of the twenty-first-century version is the endorsement and expansion of the Rawlsian idea of “reasonable envy.” When distributive inequalities are so out of whack with basic ideas of fairness, it is reasonable, as the old definition of envy goes, to want your (super rich) neighbor's cow to die. (It is of no direct benefit to you, but it does level the playing field.) Plebeian politics, then, are focused on curbing, limiting, and chastising the few at the top. This in turn frees plebeian politics from certain ideals of civility: no longer are citizens constrained by public reason or deliberation to appeal to shared principles, have an open mind, or promote civic friendship. In place of these ideals, Green speaks about unruly rancorous speech, policies that target the rich, heckling and shouting down, and other forms of vulgar political action at the disposal of plebeians.
My main disagreement with Green is that I think he mistakes the problem for the solution. Resentment, rancor, and a growing sense of unfairness overshadow our democracies and debase the value of citizenship. But I cannot see embracing this resentment, rancor, and envy as leading anywhere but to, well, where it led Rome: to demands for stability at any cost. History seems to suggest that plebeian politics almost always come to a bad end. Be that as it may, this is still a wonderful book, full of insight and erudition that most significantly reminds us that plutocracy is the real enemy.
Ordinary Democracy: Sovereignty and Citizenship beyond the Neoliberal Impasse begins with a grim assessment of the “sense of powerlessness, distrust, and even betrayal that citizens feel” in contemporary liberal democracies. This malaise has been brought on by a neoliberal politics of emergency: the threat of terrorism and financial crisis are continually invoked to justify “necessary” state action that overrides and suspends citizen sovereignty and leads to a loss of agency. Neoliberalism thrives on instilling the feeling that there is nothing much individual citizens can do in the face of these forces and so the citizenry sinks into a state “without vitality, lacking energy and confidence in its own powers” (2). This state of affairs has led some democratic theorists to abandon ideas of sovereignty altogether. Aslam, however, wants to retain sovereignty in the face of the neoliberal impasse in the form of energizing and revitalizing micro-practices within social movements. These micro-practices democratize sovereignty both in the sense that they are components of social movements, intent on making the state responsive to citizens’ real needs, and also because participating in these practices can reignite and revitalize a sense of efficacious agency at the level of the individual citizen.
Taking a cue from James Tully's idea of public philosophy as enacted normativity, Aslam introduces five case studies of democratized sovereignty, each one of which is a form of public philosophy. In each case, he focuses on a particular micro-practice within the movement and reconstructs it in terms of empowerment and sovereignty. Along the way Aslam offers insightful discussions of the work of William Connolly, Bonnie Honig, Judith Butler, Wendy Brown, Jodi Dean, and Elisabeth Ankler. This list offers a good picture of the theoretical universe in which the argument moves and from which it rarely strays.
The first and most compelling case of the five is a discussion of the Canadian First Nations political movement known as Idle No More. Focused on protesting legislation, judicial decisions, and administrative regulation that have adverse effects on indigenous sovereignty, land claims, and especially environmental concerns (pipelines, for example), Idle No More developed (and continues to develop) innovative citizen actions. The micro-practice that interests Aslam is the Round Dance, where activists and ordinary citizens gather, often in commercial malls, to drum, dance, and sing. The Round Dances have the dual effect of instilling a sense of energy and agency in the citizens who participate at the same time as making demands on the state as well as neoliberalism more broadly. It is no accident that they take place in malls and disrupt the everyday commercial activity of capitalism. This public philosophy is asking us to assess and reassess our priorities. Idle No More continues to be an active and increasingly effective player in the Canadian public sphere.
The four other cases include the documentary practices of Occupy Wall Street, the interfaith Friday prayer sessions in Tahrir Square, the DIY ethos of the movement to rebuild after hurricane Sandy (Occupy Sandy), and solidarity gatherings sponsored by the Strike Debt movement. The cases are interesting, and Aslam does a wonderful job integrating descriptive narrative with discussion of theoretic literatures. Unlike the Idle No More example, however, Aslam is unable to move beyond the subjective feeling of doing something significant, important, and meaningful that accompanies these practices. Participants are “walking the talk,” to use a phrase from Tully, by exercising agency in the face of or perhaps despite the neoliberal impasse. But it is not clear that they are exercising sovereignty in the more conventional sense also appealed to by Aslam: “democratizing sovereignty involves transformations of juridical institutions so that they are responsive to the claims made by citizens” (10). Occupy Wall Street and Tahrir Square are particularly problematic in regard to claims about efficacy and consequential political agency. Nevertheless this is a book full of hope for radical democracy. All the cases offer inspiring narratives of grassroots activism at its best. They are testimony that civil society is not sapped of democratic energy and neoliberalism's emergency politics has not succeeded in fully privatizing and depoliticizing the sovereignty of citizens.
