78
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
[23 February 1858]Footnote 1
As I am anxious both from friendship & gratitude to be as useful to you as possible at the F.O. I remind you how indispensible [sic] it is that you shd give me a good working U[nder]. Sec[retary]. who can both write & speak & above all that he shd be in the H[ouse] of C[ommons].Footnote 2 — If the Premier is there as Palmerston was, he knows all the business of the F.O. as well as the Sec[retary] of State because it all passes under his eye, but it is impossible to cram a Chancellor of the Exchequer with ready answers or even with the bearing, of a case wh may have gone thro’ a dozen phases — Stanley was perfection & of course I cannot expect to get so clever a fellow, but it is very important that he shd be what & where I point out.
I think we shall have to move Cowley & certainly must send a good man to Petersburgh [sic] — [. . .]
79
Malmesbury's unpublished diary, MP 9M73/79
23 February 1858
[. . .] Clarendon* writes to beg me to see Persigny who is just come over[.] Excitement of French ag[ain]st us very great & the same on this side ag[ain]st the Emperor.Footnote 3
25 February 1858
Went by Clarendon's invitation to see Persigny – Found him in good humour – suggested to him that after an answer to Walewski[’]s despatchFootnote 4 we shd proceed with Palmerston[’]s Bill.Footnote 5
28 February 1858
Saw Persigny at my House – Very violent when I told him we could not proceed with the Refugee BillFootnote 6 wh indeed we found impossible. Agreed to write a despatch to be submitted to him sub rosâFootnote 7 & his answer d[itt]o [. . .]
80
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
1 March [1858]
[. . .] I shall see P[almerston] at 12. He wishes you not to state positively yr intentions on the Bill but to announce only yr answer to W[alewski]'s despatch & give 10 days to cool down — I don't think this a bad idea – Time is everything – & you may say that you will wait the result of the trialFootnote 8 before you renew the subject before the House, without saying how — At the same time you must express y'self ready to act &c &c[.] I wrote to Walewski last night a letter shewing our amicus & for the Emperor to see — [. . .]
81
Malmesbury's unpublished diary, MP 9M73/79
1 March 1858
The same hopeless conversation with Persigny – submitted a despatch wh he altered. Parl[iamen]t met & Derby made his statement in wh he pledged himself to nothing on the Bill but spoke well in the French sense — Our army and militia 103000 men in Gt Britain – want of seamen.
2 March 1858
Persigny again pleased at the speech but a reaction in the evening when I met him at his own house — conversation with ClaremontFootnote 9 — Both say they don't know how to appease the French people who will not understand the abandonment of the Bill —Footnote 10 [. . .]
6 March 1858
Persigny at 12Footnote 11 – Said I might send the despatch to his Govt —Footnote 12
82
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/61
‘Tuesday’ [9 March 1858]Footnote 13
St James's Square
I return your box, and wish you joy — Look at the leading article in the Morning Post.Footnote 14 If the despatch from Walewski is as conciliatory as his language reported by Cowley all will be well, and I think it will be. Telegraph your satisfaction – but I think it would be well to telegraph also to Cowley, who is confidentially to see it, that we hope it will contain an explicit disclaimer of the meaning attached here to the despatch of Jan[uar]y. 20 that the ‘law’ and ‘legislation’ of England designedly ‘favoured’ such offences, and ‘sheltered’ such criminals.Footnote 15 That is the real sore point with the public[.]
83
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/58
‘Tuesday night’ [9 March 1858] ‘11.30 PM’Footnote 16
There is the d[evi]l to pay – I went to congratulate Persigny,Footnote 17 and found him profoundly ignorant of all that had taken place! My congratulations were received with a face like a thunder cloud – and my explanations were not better accepted. Enfin, he sends his démissionFootnote 18 by telegraph tomorrow – he has been insulted – passed over – God knows what — I told him the Emperor knew too well the value of his services &c &c[.] Non, non, l'affaire est finî. Whether you can do any thing or not, I know not – but imagine having an ambassador ignorant for 24 hours of such an arrangement as Cowley announces!
84
Malmesbury's unpublished diary, MP 9M73/79
9 March 1858
Cabinet on France – HodgesFootnote 19 [sic] – CagliariFootnote 20 – Isthmus of Suez — Derby went to Persigny in evening – found him ignorant of Walewski[’]s receipt of my despatch – Declares he will send in his resignation —
10 March 1858
Persigny still in London — Party at Ld Derby – all late Govt there but Pam[.]Footnote 21 Saw Bernstorff*Footnote 22 on the Naples quarrel — [. . .]
12 March 1858
Gale kept back steamers – French answer to my despatch was only remitted to me at 3 o clock by Persigny who was ill & sulky. — House of C[ommons]. hostile – Case of Cagliari put forward factiouslyFootnote 23 – We gave the papers —
13 March 1858
Cabinet – Disraeli as usual alarmedFootnote 24 – agree to refer the Cagliari case again to the Law Officers tho the last gave 3 decisions in favour of Naples.Footnote 25 — Saw Bernstorff who promised to use his offices at Naples for the release of the English engineers,Footnote 26 but after the decision of the Cabinet I thought it right to write to him & allow him to retract if he chose — Dined at SalisburysFootnote 27 – Society ag[ains]t us – Cambridge* family very hostile and mischievous.—
16 March 1858
Cabinet on a mem[orandum] by Prince Albert on the state of the navy. [. . .]
17 March 1858
Levee – Persigny in good humour but determined to resign.
20 March 1858
[. . .] At 6 with the Queen. [. . .] Deprecated the increasing wish of the H[ouse] of Commons to meddle with for[eign] affairs [. . .]
85
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
4 April 1858
Heron Court
[. . .] Bad appointments were so fatal to the last Govt. & wd be so much more so to ours that I have taken great pains about them, & if you get the list you will see that I have observed seniority throughout excepting where there were cases like Walter[,]Footnote 28 EdgecombeFootnote 29 & BarronFootnote 30 — The Queen too is very officious & knowing about the Dipl[omatic]. Corps — [. . .]
86
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
8 April [1858]
[. . .] Also a letter from KellyFootnote 31 who says & I hear Cairns* agrees with him that the King [of Naples]Footnote 32 has not a leg to stand upon — I will ask them to attend the Cabinet tomorrow. I am not sorry if we have the law on our side to recover our fiasco on IndiaFootnote 33 by a popular piece on Naples[.]
87
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/4
12 April 1858
St James's Square
On my return from the House this evening, I found your box with the opinions of the Law Officers on the cases of the two engineers.Footnote 34 Although they all concur in saying that we are entitled to ask for compensation, yet I must confess that the opinion, as a whole, is by no means satisfactory to me. You will have to use great caution in making it the basis of a demand on Naples. What strikes me most forcibly is that throughout the opinion the Law Officers never attempt to raise the question, which after all would be our best ground, that the offence with which they are charged, was not, according to international law, triable in Naples. In my judgement you must refuse to lay this opinion before Parliament; and while you follow the precise language of the opinion with reference to the ground on which you demand reparation, (which will be a sufficient parliamentary ground, as admitted by John Russell, for not producing the opinion itself) you must be careful not to narrow your ground as much as that opinion would do. If I might suggest to you the substance of a despatch,Footnote 35 I would begin by recognising the feelings of amity towards this country, and of humanity towards the prisoners, which, on the representations of Mr Lyons* as to the state of health, first of Watt, and next of Park,Footnote 36 had induced the King of the Two Sicilies to interpose his authority (if such authority was avowedly interposed) for their liberation, and for waiving further criminal proceedings which H.M. deemed justifiable according to Neapolitan and international law. But, you should say, the recognition of such motives on the part of the King, did not exempt us from the duty of examining, on the part of our countrymen, what plea of justification could be alleged, for their capture, detention, and subsequent trial. As to the result of that trial, I should express myself in terms which implied the impossibility, under any system of justice, of arriving at any conclusion, other than that of entire acquittal. But I should hold it necessary to discuss the merits of the whole case, in order to arrive at any conclusion. I would admit, that according to international law, after all that had occurred, the Neapolitan frigates were justified in boarding, and overhauling a vessel, which, under whatever circumstances, had notoriously been engaged in a piratical attack on Neapolitian territory; and although the gravest doubts might be raised, whether it was competent to the Neapolitan vessels to do more than ascertain the nationality of the vessel, and then to hand over the crew & passengers to be dealt with according to the law, and before the tribunals, of the country to which she belonged, yet that we should not, under the very peculiar circumstances of the case, have raised any objection on the score of a violation of the strictest principles of international law, in taking the vessel and her crew to Naples, more especially as by the written testimony of the captain, it was his intention, had he not met the frigates, to have proceeded to Naples, with the consent of his crew. But, after waiving every point on which the slightest doubt can be raised, and admitting them all in favour of the Neapolitan Government – not contesting that is, for the sake of argument, the validity of the capture, however doubtful; not insisting on the utter illegality of any judicial proceedings in the courts of Naples, we are compelled to urge upon the Neapolitan Government the claims of our countrymen for compensation on the following grounds. Then I would set forth the view taken by the Law Officers; and in this way, while you avoid committing yourself to going all lengths with the Sardinian Government in demanding the restitution of the Cagliari, with which, properly speaking, we have nothing to do, and which our Law Advisers, as well as those of the late Government[,] consider at least a doubtful claim, you do not abandon a position which may be a matter of European interest, and by not insisting on what is in the least degree doubtful, strengthen your case for that which can hardly be disputed. Mental malady in one case, and broken health in the other, arising indisputably from long confinement on charges which could not be supported on even prima facie evidence, form a ground of claim for compensation which hardly could be, and which in the state of our relations with Naples hardly will be, resisted. I would not, in my despatch, intimate any amount of compensation; but I would say to Lyons (privately) that £1000 for each of the prisoners would be accepted as a reasonable and very moderate reparation. I think I would authorise him to intimate that the return of the Sardinian vessel, as an act of courtesy, waiving the question of the legality of the seizure, would be agreeable to H.M.'s Government, who would use their endeavours to have such a restitution accepted in the same spirit by the Sardinian Government, without, of course, abandoning their opinion as to the rights of the case.
The sooner we can get France to join us, on any plausible pretext, in renewing diplomatic relations with Naples, the better.Footnote 37 The truth is, that, in theory, our ground of rupture was absolutely indefensible; and, in practice, we never should have had these difficulties to contend with, had we had a resident minister at Naples.
88
Malmesbury's unpublished diary, MP 9M73/79
14 April 1858
Cabinet. Read my despatchFootnote 38 to CarafaFootnote 39 asking for compensation for Watt and Park —
89
Malmesbury to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 99/2, fo. 5
15 April [1858]
Fitzgerald* is very much hurt at yr not letting him answer any questions & he says GrahamFootnote 40 & others have chaffed him about it — If you take the Cagliari you can safely give him the others —
90
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
17 April [1858]
Here is an important letterFootnote 41 wh ought I suppose to be read to the Cabinet or else it will be impossible to make them understand the position — With the great majority or the aggregate of legal opinions in favour of the captain of the Cagliari & the opinion at the same time given that her condemnation was illegal we cd easily join France in urging the Neapolitans to surrender the ship & the Sardinians to accept it as enough. The Emperor wd then get out of his mess —
[P.S.] Pray keep the letter for the Cabinet.
91
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/5
‘Monday’ [?19 April 1858]Footnote 42
Downing Street
We may, and I think should, support Sardinia, at all events by the expression of our strong opinion, so far as the restoration of the vessel,Footnote 43 illegally confiscated – but I doubt whether France will join us. I wish she may.
92
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/450/2
[24 April 1858]Footnote 44
St James's Square
I have just received from Cowley Walewski's letter to you, of which I heard from you a couple of hours ago.Footnote 45 It is overbearing in its tone; but being a strictly private letter, is less offensive than I had apprehended from your letter — In any event, it can not be made the basis of any public discussion: and, I hope, it may rather be considered as an attempt at bullying, on Walewski's part, than as the interpretation of the real intentions of the Emperor. Still I do not like it – It coincides, too nearly to be pleasant, with the account sent us by ChelseaFootnote 46 of Espinasse'sFootnote 47 most unguarded language; and we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by Cowley's (possibly misplaced) confidence. The publication of Walewski's letter (or allowing its contents to be made known) would neutralise any and every other policy in this country; and though the language of France with respect to Sardinia (and the conduct of Sardinia, which I now attribute to French influence) is very suspicious, I cannot believe they would choose to break with us on such a ground. If they take up the Sardinian case with a view to embarrass us, they deprive themselves of all the advantage which they would have from the refugee question with the absolutist powers; and on the other hand Sardinian interests in the popular sense will be greatly injured by being connected with an insolent demand for an ‘overt act’ in support of the pretensions of France on the refugee question. The position is a critical one, but I do not think hopeless. I am glad that we have a Cabinet tomorrow, and that Cowley will be able to attend.
Meantime I send you not a pleasant letter from H.M. who objects to BathFootnote 48 for the complimentary mission to LisbonFootnote 49 – and on no ground alleged. I think we must make a stand on this – of the list she sends, I hardly know one who would accept unless it were old Westmoreland [sic] – and we cannot afford (nor can She) to give Bath such a slap in the face[.]Footnote 50
93
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
27 April [1858]
Ought not Lord LyonsFootnote 51 have secret orders to go to Tangiers if the French made a descent upon Morocco either by land or sea[?]Footnote 52
If this is likely to happen we ought to send an additional reg[imen]t. to Gibraltar to send over to Tangier – with some artillery — Lord Clarendon told me that Louis Nap[oleon]. had offered to let us have Egypt if we wd let him have Morocco,Footnote 53 but it is evident that if we agreed he would keep the gates at Tangier.
94
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
23 April [1858]Footnote 54
The inclosures especially that from Hudson are important.Footnote 55 You will get in an hour my despatch to Hudson the pith of wh has been telegraphed to him already, & wh is the substance of a statement I intend (with yr approval) to make tonightFootnote 56 in reply to Airlie'sFootnote 57 questions – a similar one to be made in the Commons — When you have read the despatch pray send it back to me that Disraeli may read it before it goes to Aldershot where the Queen is at present —
I have a pleasant day before me – Pelissier[,]* Cowley[,] Bernstorff & Azzeglio!*
95
Malmesbury's unpublished diary, MP 9M73/79
29 April 1858
[. . .] I make a speech on Cagliari – whole house concurs – many mistakes in H[ouse] of Commons —
96
Malmesbury's unpublished diary, MP 9M73/79
2 May 1858
[. . .] Cancelled the despatch I had written to Cowley — Cabinet alarmed at Emperor's conversation with himFootnote 58 — [. . .]
97
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
19 May [1858]
I am much obliged to you for having charmed Ld. S[tratford].Footnote 59 who has actually written me a civil letter in consequence.Footnote 60 This looks as if he thought your Govt wd stand —
Pray send me the phrase you wish me to employ to the King of Naples as regards our renouncing a cause of immediate reprisal, & adopting the line of arbitration,Footnote 61 as you sketched it in our conversation of yesterday. The wording is important & should be severe.
98
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/6
20 May 1858
Downing Street
I have had such a mass of work thrown upon me all at once this morning, that I have hardly been able till now to look at the question in your letter of yesterday.
The language which I think you should use would be that the case appears so clear that we should be fully justified, as reparation is refused us, in taking matters into our own hands, and enforcing compliance with our just demands; but that desirous of giving to Europe a practical proof of moderation, and of our adherence to the principle recorded at our insistence in the Protocol of the Paris conference,Footnote 62 we are willing to submit the question in dispute to the mediations of a friendly Power; and we take this course the more readily, because the disproportion between the relative means of the two states is such as to preclude the possibility of any misconstruction as to our motives. We must make it a condition that the question of the Cagliari, in which we support the claims of Sardinia[,] shall be submitted to the same mediator, with the consent, of course, of Sardinia.Footnote 63
99
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/7
20 May 1858
The accompanying lettersFootnote 64 from Ld. Lyons are important and unpleasant, not to say alarming. I think you should send them to the War Office – and extracts at least from that of the 15th. to Cowley. Matters are very serious if a reinforced fleet is coming from Toulon to Cherbourgh – Should these letters be sent to H.M.? They will create great excitement, and bring on us heavy demands for increased expenditure.
100
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
24 May [1858]
Heron Court
I send you a disagreable [sic] letter from Cowley – but what he says of the Emperor[’]s views of this country I look upon as much tainted by the disgust he feels at Pam's fiascoFootnote 65 on Friday night.— He (Cowley) is a most honest & able servant but has his political bias wh is ag[ain]st us. —
The Montenegro part of Cowley's letter is settled since by telegraph & the limitation will take place without touching on Turkish seigneurial rights.Footnote 66 We have succeeded in preventing the French & Russians from making Montenegro independent, & Brunnow is very sulky with me. — [. . .]
101
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/22/60
24 May 1858
Bernstorff has been with me, in your absence, and read to me, but could not leave with me, a telegraphic dispatch from Berlin to say that Naples would accept arbitration, providing it was that of a great power, but not mediation. I told him I was sorry to hear it – for that we were willing to accept mediation in the sense of the Protocol of Paris,Footnote 67 but not arbitration on the part of any power. He seemed surprised, and said that in conversation you had told him we were ready to accept ‘médiation ou arbitrage’ and that he had so written to his Government. I told him he must have mistaken you, for I had had a conversation with you in the Cabinet on Saturday on this very subject. I asked him whether he referred to our claim for compensation, or to that of Sardinia for restitution of the Cagliari – as I could not undertake to say whether as to the latter Sardinia might be willing to accept arbitration. He said no, he referred to our claim for compensation. I then said I was sorry to find there was any misunderstanding, but that I would write to you immediately. To save time, I do so by messenger. If Naples refuses to accept mediation, we shall have to take stronger measures.
102
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
24 May [1858]
Heron Court
I have just got yr note about Naples. There is no mistake & we must stick first to mediation – Bernstorff has no authority whatever to act in the matter — The longer we drag out the question the better – It ought not to be settled till Parlt. gives way to grouse – & I hope to keep it open till then. — [. . .]
103
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
25 May 1858
Heron Court
I wrote you a hasty note last night [. . .]
What I told Bernstorff was that I had given Sardinia (with whom we were bound to a certain degree,) the choice of mediation or arbitration – & Bernstorff himself has nothing to do with the business unless he comes from the King of Naples — I prefer acting at once thro’ Lyons — Sardinia has chosen mediation & to that we must now adhere — My draft is written offering Naples to take Sweden for mediator but is waiting for the legal answer to the ‘argumentative reply’ wh must be embodied in it. —
The next step will be the reply of Naples whether she accepts a mediator, & what mediator – It won't do to have one of the Congress Powers, as there is controversy enough among them already. — If Naples refuses mediation or compensation we must take reprisals — If she accepts the next step will be to lay down the terms of mediation — Then comes the mediation itself & it will be strange if the Cagliari affair does not last till August.Footnote 68 — [. . .]
104
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
26 May [1858]
I hope you will not think this despatchFootnote 69 to Carafa too rough – It is written for the H[ouse] of Commons — The three lawyers go on plaguing me about mediation being unpopular, but I am sure it is the right line & that I have kept up an unbroken link between the injury, the demand, the refusal, the reference to mediation, & the ultima ratio.—Footnote 70
105
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/8
15 June 1858
St James's Square
I quite approve of your proposed answer to Stratford.Footnote 71 It would never do to have him interfering with Bulwer in political matters. If he goes, and goes in good humour, he may be useful to us. [. . .]
106
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/450/5
[?30 July 1858]Footnote 72
I see Pakington* is gone down to Osborne, so the Queen will probably give him her own orders as to her event.Footnote 73 Old Sir C. NapierFootnote 74 called on me yesterday in a great state of mind as to our ships, none of which, he said, except the Royal Albert, were fit to put to sea; and our lubberly crews would only get laughed at by the French, whose ships & crews are in admirable order. If he is in any measure right, the smaller the event, the better.
107
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
3 August 1858
I think we must try to get out of Sir B[aldwin]. WalkerFootnote 75 whether any other work could safely be suspended if we appropriate 2 or 300 000 £ to converting sailing ships into screws until Par[liamen]t. meets again. I cannot help fearing that the Emperor remembers the humiliation of this past spring when he was not ready to go to war, & that he is determined never to be so placed again as regards England.
Another attempt at assassination or rebellion emanating from our refugees wd certainly try his peaceful resolve very hard, & this may happen any day. —
It appears to me that you should insist on your Naval Lord having all the year round a complete squadron of 6 sail of the line with frigates &c in proportion in or near the Channel, & that they shd be considered as much a matter of course & necessity as are the Guards in London & Windsor. — This wd be a nucleus of well trained ships wh would prevent a surprise & which could be increased at need – We have now nothing, & our money is spent without producing what one may call our ordinary means of self defence — [. . .]
On 4 August 1858, Malmesbury accompanied the Queen and Prince Albert on their visit to Napoleon III at Cherbourg. He then travelled with them to Prussia. For the remainder of August, Derby took day-to-day charge of the Foreign Office.
108
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
13 August [1858]
I send you a letter from a man who has friends in the French Admiralty & we have generally found his information correct – Pray send it to Pakington and Disraeli[.]
109
Derby to Edmund Hammond,* MP 9M73/20/11
13 August 1858
Chevening
I forward an unsealed letter to Lord Cowley, which I will thank you to send on, having first sent a copy of it, and of the enclosure, to Lord Malmesbury.Footnote 76 I think his attention ought to be called to a matter, which may have no peculiar meaning, but which, together with many minor symptoms, exhibits a somewhat urgent anxiety on the part of the French Government to be in a state of more immediate readiness for military operations than is consistent with an entire determination to maintain friendly relations generally.
110
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
15 August 1858
Potsdam
[. . .] I find the Prince of Prussia*Footnote 77 reasonable on the Danish question.Footnote 78 — I have put in a good word for Bernstorff & altho’ the Princess of PrussiaFootnote 79 hates him I do not think he will be removed.Footnote 80 — I believe Manteuffel* will go as soon as the King dies & a moderate liberal gov[ernmen]t succeed to his —Footnote 81
111
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/15
16 August 1858
Osterley Park
[. . .] The large purchase of timber which your correspondent notices coincides rather ominously with the intelligence I sent you (and Cowley) as to orders for saltpetre and sulphur; and though I do not believe our trusty ally has any hostile feelings or intentions at this moment, it is clear that he means to place himself in a position to make his power be felt, whenever it suits him that we should feel it. One of the papers had rather a good simile for him the other day when it said that he kept the gates of the Temple of JanusFootnote 82 neither open nor shut, but creaking day & night on rusty hinges, so that nobody could get a wink of sleep. Nevertheless, we were wonderfully amiable and cordial at Pelissier's dinner yesterday. He was in great force, and told all his after-dinner stories, with which you are familiar. He had the TurkFootnote 83 on his right at dinner, and on his left the Duke of WellingtonFootnote 84 – not Brunnow – who sat next but one to Musurus,* with De La WarrFootnote 85 for a buffer. I was directly opposite to him, with Van de Weyer on one side and De Cetto on the other. The latter had taken a panic that the Conference at Paris had been occupying itself lately with the succession to the Throne of Greece. I thought I might venture to assure him such was not the case, and that Cowley, I knew, had strict orders as to the subjects which he was to entertain. [. . .] Neither Apponyi* nor Bernstorff present, but represented by their Chargés d'Affaires. The Turk was prodigal of his assurances of reparation for Djiddah,Footnote 86 and of the innocence of the Turks as to any of the late contests with the Montenegrins.Footnote 87 He expressed himself well satisfied with the result of the conferences,Footnote 88 and grateful for the assistance which Turkey had received from Cowley. [. . .]
112
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/22
19 August 1858
Downing Street
I send you a letter from Cowley, which you would have had a day earlier if I had come up to Town yesterday. I add one from him to me, with Claremont's explanation of the large French order for saltpetre. It seems at least plausible, and it is corroborated by the large estimate for blasting powder. But what a store of powder they have in hand! Enough for six Crimean wars! If they are equally well prepared with other warlike stores, we are sadly behind, especially if we have many such actions as Roebuck's and Lindsay's.Footnote 89 [. . .]
113
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/23
19 August 1858
10 Downing Street
Since I wrote to you an hour ago, Musurus has been with me in a great state of mind in consequence of Capt[ain]. Pullen,Footnote 90 in virtue of his first orders, having proceeded to bombard Djidda, before the arrival of the Turkish Troops.Footnote 91 It was unlucky that he should have done so, though of course no blame can be attached to him for acting on his orders; but it does not seem that the bombardment produced the desired effect, till the Sultan's orders were received. Musurus wished me to authorise him to write to his Government that we regretted what had taken place. I begged him however to write nothing till he heard from you. I admitted to him that after hearing of the massacre the Porte had spontaneously done all it could; and I said it was unfortunate that Captain Pullen had sailed before receiving his second instructions: I need not say that his communication was strictly confidential and unofficial. He went so far as to tell me that he looked on this bombardment, in the face of all that the Porte was doing at the same time, with alarm chiefly on account of the precedent; for that France would be only too apt to profit by the example, and take a similar course whenever one of her agents should choose to fancy himself insulted. I ventured to hint to him that the massacre of a consul and a considerable number of Christians was not an every day [sic] proceeding, and to say the least, was an exceptional case – but in truth he has some foundation for his apprehension that bombardment is a weapon to which our friends across the water will be only too ready to have recourse, particularly if they can appeal to a precedent set by us. It would therefore I think be well, as the Turk has really behaved very well in the matter, that you should write something, not in the nature of an apology, but of regret that the second instructions had not reached Capt[ain]. Pullen in time to prevent him acting on his first.
114
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/24
20 August 1858
Osterley Park
[. . .] I return Cowley's letter — Our friendFootnote 92 is rather a bold man – and if he does not take care, he is likely, from your account, after the capture of the fort, to find allies willing to assist him in the occupation.Footnote 93 [. . .]
115
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
21 August 1858
Potsdam
I had anticipated your wishes respecting the bombardment of Jeddah by telegraphing to Bulwer – ‘That we must support Capt[ain] Pullen but that he might express our regret that he had not waited rather longer or that Ismail Pasha had not made more haste’ — Musurus is a comedian[,] has no weight with his Govt. & is never instructed till long after his instructions are of any use.—
He has been getting up the steam ag[ain]st Stratford's missionFootnote 94 but I told him that was not the line he ought to take when the Queen meant to pay the Sultan a compl[iment].
116
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
21 August 1858
Potsdam
[. . .] The Prince (ours I mean)Footnote 95 is up to his neck in German intrigue to get rid of this Govt.Footnote 96 A Nassau princess has been brought here to be looked at for the P. of Wales, but she is a very seedy article & will not do. — I have confined my eloquence with both Manteuffel & the Prince of Prussia to urging them to be one with Austria & the other German states as against the possibility of a war with France & I have held the same language to KollerFootnote 97 the Austrian minister — [. . .] As to France we must be in a better state to meet her in case of need – We are very deficient in materials of war & have not 100 000 muskets in the whole country so that our population is defenceless — The Whigs have ruined our navy by mismanagement & miscalculations – I fear the Commission for manning it is not a good one – My brother,Footnote 98 who while he was in Parl[iamen]t, took a great interest & trouble about the question says it is composed of tartars well known & disliked by the sailors as such, & who know nothing & care less for the altered feelings & circumstances of modern ‘Jacks’ who like all of us have progressed, perhaps without being better than our predecessors – that there ought to be younger officers on the Commission who have been employed in the manning of ships lately — This is the most important subject of all. [. . .]
117
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/26
23 August 1858
St James's Square
KarolyiFootnote 99 has just been with me to communicate a despatch from his Government to the effect that by the confession of the Montenegrins themselves they were the aggressors in the last affair of Kolashin,Footnote 100 and it is added that they have committed all sorts of atrocities, and carried off above 100 women. The Porte intends to demand reparation, and Austria is anxious to support the demand, and wishes us to do the same, and to induce France! to do so likewise. I told him that I had not seen our reports of this last affair, and that I could therefore express no opinion; but that the papers were probably gone to you, and that I was on the point of writing to you, and would report the communication he had made to me. We owe the Turk a good turn for our bombardment; but whether we or any one can persuade the Emperor that the Montenegrins can be in the wrong, or the Porte in the right, is more than I can undertake to say.
Cowley wrote to me on Saturday,Footnote 101 very uneasy at the state of feeling in France.Footnote 102 Roebuck & Lindsay have done no end of mischief.Footnote 103
118
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
23 August 1858
Potsdam
I send you a proof of our friend Brunnow's treachery — I have met him as well as I could by writing to Bulwer & Crampton* from here but the latter has I find retarded his departure from London unknown to me for 3 weeks & is not expected in Russia till the 27th when he promised to be there the first week of this month. — The French I believe will not be humbugged by this misrepresentation of Brunnow's. [. . .]
I had a very satisfactory interview with the Neapolitan minister here (officieusement.) & I expect to receive fair overtures – & practical offers.Footnote 104 [. . .]
119
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
25 August 1858
Potsdam
[. . .] If Fitzgerald has not sent you some copies of despatches upon Montenegro written by Buol to his chargé d'affaires here, & my replies as described to Bulwer, pray ask for them. — To demand compensation from Montenegro for its raids, is asking for an impossibility, & wd only produce an envenomed correspondence.Footnote 105 The commiss[ione]rs. are just going to Constantinople to explain & settle the boundariesFootnote 106 but that country must long resemble the old Scottish border. — All European politicians believe that if Napoleon breaks out it will be against the East — Ld Stratford has been with Fitzgerald to say he would not be Bulwer[’]s guest, & that he does not like his mission to be strictly complimentary – I cannot consent to any other arrangement. This was the one he accepted, & if not followed there would be two Kings of Brentford at Constantinople. I think he won't go after all. [. . .]
120
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/27
25 August 1858
Downing Street
Lord Stratford has just been with me, and has shown me a letter which he has received from you, and also his answer. You know how touchy he is, and how difficult it is to talk over business with him, particularly of a personal character; and I was more than once tempted to tell him that it was to me a matter of perfect indifference whether he went to Constantinople or not. We have parted however very good friends. He wished to know, in consequence of some expressions in your letter, whether there were any change in the views of the Government, or whether he was to look on his former instructions as still in force in letter and in spirit. I told him I knew of no change – that his mission was of a purely complimentary character; but that before leaving Turkey it was desirable that he should take the opportunity of once more urging on the Sultan his old advice as to the policy towards his Christian subjects, and especially as to the Hatti Humayoun.Footnote 107 He talked about his stay in Constantinople, and wished to know if there was any desire to hurry him away – that he proposed to remain about a month, which would be required for the settlement of his affairs; but that he did not contemplate more than one (if one) private conversation with the Sultan, besides his audience of leave, in which latter he would officially (or semi-officially[)] urge on H.M. the views of his Govt. I said the only inconvenience attending so long a stay would be the way in which he would be watched by all foreign diplomatists, and the awkwardness of his position vis-à-vis Bulwer, whose guest, by the way, he positively refuses to be – and said he would prefer remaining on board, or going to the Inn! As I understand, he will occupy one of the Embassy houses, on his own account. He assured me however that he fully understood that he was to enter on no political question whatever – to give no opinion on passing events, on appointments, and in no respect interfere with Bulwer, farther than to give him any support in his power. I think I have given you the substance of what he said – the upshot of which was that if on account of the jealousy of other parties he was to be hurried away, he would rather not go at all – and a month is the time he names for his stay. I think you must let him have his way, but the time is rather unfavourable for urging the claims of the Christians. I have had Musurus with me again, to deliver a despatch which Fitzgerald will have sent you by this messenger. I told him that before receiving it we had instructed Cowley to represent to the French Govt. our horror and indignation at the atrocities which had been committed,Footnote 108 and to invite them to join with us in reprobating them, and to use their influence with Prince Danilo* for their suppression.
121
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
27 August [1858]
Potsdam
You could not have spoken more to the purpose to Ld Stratford who had before been to Fitzgerald whose letter I inclose — My reply to F. was that I could not alter any thing that had been settled, that I understood him to be satisfied to be Bulwer's guest, Bulwer having written him a very handsome letter on the subject & that it wd be very offensive to him to alter the arrangements now — It is much better he should not go at all under the present circumstances of the Porte, & if he refuses on the score of a personal quarrel with Bulwer it is his fault — Fitzgerald will send you my answer wh he was to shew to Ld. S[tratford].
If you still think he ought to have a separate palace assigned to him I will tell him so. [. . .] I shall not answer Musurus’ circular till I know what the French mean to say but I think the Porte right in all but the pecuniary indemnity, & I have told Cowley to speak in that sense — The Prince of Prussia has promised not to act on Oriental questions without coming first to an understanding with us — I believe he is to be trusted wh Manteuffel is not – & his asking me to write to him instead of Manteuffel shews that he will get rid of him as soon as he is regent —Footnote 109
122
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/29
30 August 1858
Knowsley
[. . .] Knowing what sort of man Stratford is, I think rather than give him an excuse for throwing up his mission, I should give way upon the question of his separate residence. Indeed I understand from him that he had given orders for some furniture to be placed in one of the palaces attached to the embassy. In his present frame of mind, and with his feelings towards Bulwer, I cannot conceive a more agreeable ‘guest’ to have for a month! Besides which, he takes his whole family, and I believe some friends, so that on the whole, separate maintenance will be the better plan. But if you think it not desirable that he should go at all, you have only to stand out on this point, and I think after all he will not go. It would however have the appearance of yielding to the jealousy which has been expressed by foreign courts. I am glad you have had an opportunity of seeing and conversing with the Prince of Prussia – I believe him to be thoroughly honest, and I should think he has character enough to be his own master, whenever he gets free from his present embarrassing position. [. . .]
123
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
1 September 1858
London
[. . .] Yesterday I saw Ld. Stratford — He shewed me a letter from Bulwer offering to place either palace at his disposal so I settled with him that he was to go to Pera & he solemnly promised to stay less than a month & to see the Sultan not oftener than twice. — He had lowered his tone very much wh I attribute to his conversation with you [. . .] I send you a report from our spy of the information possessed by France of our navy – & also a letter from Cowley respecting the Emperor's conversation with Palmerston. [. . .]
124
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/30
2 September 1858
Knowsley
Cowley's report of Palmerston's conversation with the Emperor is more satisfactory than any thing we have heard lately, as to the state of H.M's disposition not only towards this country, but as to Russia, with regard to whose views I hope he is beginning to open his eyes. She has however, aided by the effect produced on his vanity by the flatteries of that demi-savage Danilo, completely made a catspaw of him in the Montenegrin affair: while his jealousy of Austria prejudices his views on Turkish questions. Palmerston's report confirms our view that his great military preparations have primary reference to Italy. I do not quite understand the second paper you have sent me and which I return.Footnote 110 How much of it is the report to the Emperor, and how much a report on that report, made to you? Our navy looks more formidable on paper than I am afraid it is in reality. [. . .]
125
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
17 September 1858
Achnacarry
[. . .] I have written to the Queen to explain why she [has] not & will not get as many despatches as formerly – 1st Because there is complete tranquillity & no vexatious correspondence with any Power – 2nd Because for the next month almost all the principal ministers abroad & their representations here are absent on their holydays [sic], wh is also the case with HM. ministers abroad – 3rd because I have reduced the messengers of wh Clarendon had got a useless army costing above £30 000 a year. [. . .]
126
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
18 September 1858
Achnacarry
[. . .] Palmerston has written me a letter wh I send you. [. . .]
[P.S.] In answering Palmerston I have rejected the Emperor[’]s assertion that we ever promised to pass his Conspiracy Bill – This was Persigny's lie —
127
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
4 October [1858]
Achnacarry
[. . .] Elliott* [sic] at Copenhagen is very uneasy & tho his personal tendencies are German he says the Danes can do no more & deserve to be permitted to negotiate on the basis they offer.Footnote 111 He says the violent German party have spread a report that the Queen[’]s visit to Prussia has made them safe & that in my conversations with PlatenFootnote 112 at Hanover & the Prince of Prussia I promised not to interfere at all – They also say the Prince Consort did so – I believe this to be as untrue as the first — My language to all of them was this – that we recognised the jurisdiction of the Diet over the King of Denmark as regards Holstein & Lauenberg but not as regards Shleswig [sic] – If the latter point was unfortunately stirred that the Powers who signed the treaties must alone consider & settle any breach or infringement of the treaties to wh they had been parties – That it was a fixed principle of British policy to maintain the integrity of the Danish monarchy & we shd insist on the succession as arranged by the Convention of 1852 — The Queen will send you my draft to Elliott [sic] & I shd not wonder if the Prince tried to alter it but altho’ the Holstein question is a German one it may in five minutes become European if German troops enter Holstein, & I think we ought to tell them, what I believe to be just, namely that this last proposal of the Danes ought to be received with respect as a basis of negotiation — [. . .]
128
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/35
6 October 1858
Knowsley
[. . .] I do not at all like the aspect of affairs between France and Portugal.Footnote 113 The former refuses all reference to arbitration, and sends two ships of war to enforce her demands. The quarrel is a very awkward one, and I believe Portugal is in the right. She will undoubtedly have the sympathies of England with her. There is no denying the fact, that the transaction was essentially a slaving one, even beyond the wide limits of free emigration claimed by France; and the fact of a French Government agent having been on board so implicates the Government itself, that they are compelled to brazen it out. [. . .]
129
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
8 October 1858
Achnacarry
[. . .] I think that the informalities that took place at the beginning of the French & Portuguese transaction will get us out of that difficulty – but I have asked Pakington to send a couple of ships to the Tagus for the protection of British subjects & to watch proceedingsFootnote 114 — [. . .]
130
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/36
11 October 1858
Knowsley
[. . .] I do not like the turn things are taking about the Charles et Georges.Footnote 115 France will listen to nothing, and is determined, as you will see by Cowley's last telegram, to have the ship released by fair means or foul, and not in any way to menager the ‘susceptibilité’ of Portugal.Footnote 116 I suppose she will have to give way; but certainly Walewski is not making it very easy for her to do so. [. . .]
131
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/37
16 October 1858
[. . .] I do not at all like the aspect of the Charles et Georges affair.Footnote 117 Walewski's tone is so haughty and unaccommodating, as hardly to leave a loop-hole; and a quarrel with Portugal, and on such a subject, will not be favourably looked on here. We shall have plenty of people urging on us our treaty engagements;Footnote 118 and I should not wonder to see Palmerston take up this question to make political capital out of, if we can not get some fair settlement. However, we have been in worse difficulties; [. . .]
132
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
17 October 1858
Achnacarry
I have got two private telegrams from Bulwer to say that Stratford has been interfering, & advised the Sultan not to confirm the Montenegro boundary proposed by the C.C.Footnote 119 & R.R.Footnote 120 & that Ali PashaFootnote 121 who had pledged the Porte to the agreement will resign. Thouvenel thinking it a trick of Bulwer writes to complain of him but I hope the telegraph by this time has set things right.— I have telegraphed to Stratford that the CuracoaFootnote 122 cannot be spared any longer & that I hope he will release her as soon as possible — [. . .]
133
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/38
25 October 1858
Knowsley
I have had a long conversation with Bernstorff today, at his request, on the subject of Naples, on which he says he had also spoken to you. I hope our language has been the same. He laid great stress on the concessions which the King of Naples had made to us in the matter of the Cagliari, and said that you had given him to understand that when that affair was settled, diplomatic relations would be renewed. I corrected him by saying that the language we had held was that while that affair remained unsettled, it was idle to talk about renewed relations; that the settlement of that question removed an additional obstacle, and replaced us where we were. I said we were still willing to consider any proposition which the K[ing]. of Naples might make, analogous to the previous proposal, which Clarendon had rejected, of a convention with the Argentine Republic. That convention had fallen to the ground, but some overt act upon the part of the King was necessary. I admitted to him that had I been in office, I should not have advised the demonstration which was made, nor the recall of the ministers; but it was a very different case sending them back again without having obtained any satisfaction on the subject on which we & France had made a joint demand. He then said we were not on the same line with France; that France required nothing but ‘des phrases’ – a mere explanation of the terms in which the demands of France, conjoinably with us, were answered – but without any intimation of any concession to her and our wishes. I said I did not know how that might be, though I thought he overrated the facility with which France would receive mere explanations of the tone of a reply; but that on the part of England I thought there would be great difficulty in renewing friendly relations, as long as no step whatever was taken by Naples towards improving the condition of the political prisoners. He then read me letters from Carafa, and from the Prussian minister at Naples to Manteuffel, the substance of which was that the King of Naples was willing to take the initiative in sending back a minister, if assured that he would be well received, he could enter on no discussion as to the fate of the political prisoners; and that any attempt to introduce the subject would only eloignerFootnote 123 the chances of an accommodation. That he considered all offers on his part to have been set aside by Clarendon's rejection; and that although he had been ready to send them to the Argentine Republic, where the government would make due provision for their health, their morals, and their religion, he would not be justified in sending them to the United States, where they would have no one to attend to them, and where perhaps they would die of hunger! It was difficult to listen to this with a grave face – so I merely suggested that the prisoners themselves might be offered the choice of risking these formidable dangers, or remaining where they were! I then said that on the statement he made, it seemed to me that it would be worse than useless to continue the negotiation; that to us it was very immaterial whether we had a minister at Naples and they one here, or not; but that we should be very happy to renew our relations whenever the King would give us a reasonable ground for doing so, that we should of course cease to press for any modification of his system of government, or of his treatment of his own subjects; but that the most likely mode of reconciling the public mind in England to a renewal of diplomatic intercourse would be some signal act of grace and mercy taken spontaneously by himself – after which an explanation of any thing which might have been offensive in his language would have every chance of being favourably received by France and ourselves. In reply to an observation of Bernstorff's that the public mind was so prejudiced by exaggerated statements (and he referred particularly to Gladstone)* that any such act as I spoke of would have no effect, I said that I thought he was mistaken; that the people of England certainly thought the Government of Naples a detestable one; but that the best mode of mitigating such feelings would be to take some overt act which should place it in a more favourable light. At present I could only recommend that the subject should be dropped, as in the King's present temper I did not think further discussion could serve any useful purpose. I believe this is a very correct account of our conversation, which I hope was in accordance with your views.
134
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
26 October [1858]
Foreign Office
If I had been yr parrot I cd not have spoken to & answered Bernstorff about Naples with verbatim identity more completely the same as yr conversation with him — I have sent the Queen some very interesting reports from ‘our friend’Footnote 124 containing Ad[mira]l La Graviere's plan for invasion drawn up in 1857!Footnote 125 Among them is a statement that Louis Napoleon is unwilling to renew with Naples & I certainly have found no help from him to do so, & illwill in the Cagliari case. His game is to give hopes to the Italian liberals — [. . .]
135
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/39
27 October 1858
Knowsley
I am very glad to find that we have been so exactly on the same tack with Bernstorff in re Naples. He is evidently very sick of his vicarious duties;Footnote 126 and is the more anxious for a renewal of diplomatic relations which would have the effect of relieving him from them. I shall be glad to see the papers from ‘our friend’Footnote 127 which you have sent to the Queen as soon as H.M. returns them. [. . .] I must say I am not quite easy about your friend the Emperor's preparations; and the plan of an invasion, drawn up in 1857, has an ugly look about it, when coupled with the particular description of armaments which he is strengthening. We must, at all hazards, keep up our naval strength. I only hope we may be able to effect such reductions in parts of the naval expenditure, where I am sure there is much waste, as may keep the estimates within reasonable compass.
136
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
27 October 1858
London
This Portuguese businessFootnote 128 cannot I think be passed over in silence & I propose writing a despatch to Cowley expressing the regret of HMG that the French shd not have adopted the principle of the Paris ProtocolFootnote 129 shewing the disquietude such summary proceedings occasion in Europe & the risk of the most fatal consequencesFootnote 130 — If France had fired a shot at Lisbon we must have gone to war with her or broken our treaties with Portugal – & France ought to know this from our Govt. She was quite in the wrong as to the acts of her vessel the Charles & Georges, but Portugal when she found a French delegate on board ought not to have seized her but made a diplomatic complaint to the F[rench].G[overnment]. wh by the presence of that official became the responsible party — It is requisite distinctly to know what France expects in regard to these emigration ships.
The moral of all this is that with such a neighbour & that neighbour so reckless, if we are to hold our own we must have more ships at our command in the Channel —
Every body [sic] is for strengthening our Navy & I am sure you may do what you like in that way — Had the casualty taken place at Lisbon to wh I have alluded, France would have been mistress of the Channel at once.
137
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/41
28 October 1858
Knowsley
I concur with you that it will hardly be possible to avoid writing something to Cowley for communication to Walewski on the subject of the Charles et GeorgesFootnote 131 –but the despatch will require the most careful consideration, and I should like to see your proposed draft before you send it. I apprehend that our parliamentary line of defence for having allowed Portugal to be coerced must be that she made no application to us for protection – that had she done so, it would have been our duty to have examined into [sic] the merits of the case, and, if she proved to be in the right, to have afforded her our aid. But as she did not, we were exempted from the necessity of examining into the case, or pronouncing any opinion as between the conflicting statements. In writing therefore to Cowley I think you had better abstain from any discussion of the case, but only instruct him to point out to Walewski the serious complications which might result from such hasty and violent measures as France had resorted to, not to mention the perpetual risks attending the so-called free! emigration. It would also be better, I think, only to instruct Cowley to make verbal representations, and not to read, still less give a copy of your despatch.Footnote 132 In the Emperor's present temper we cannot answer for the character of his reply to a written communication, and it might be such as to lead to serious consequences. Much as I desire to maintain the French alliance, in which I am sure you agree with me, I confess, I am less sanguine about it than I was; and I am entirely of your opinion that we ought to lose no time in placing our navy on such a footing that a rupture, at all times possible, should not find us as ill prepared as I am afraid we are at this moment. For this reason we ought for the present to be doubly cautious to give no excuse for a premature quarrel.
138
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
17 December 1858
WimpoleFootnote 133
[. . .] Disraeli[’]s complaint as to the distribution of the patronage by some of our colleagues is just & well founded.Footnote 134
[. . .] I can conscientiously say I have not yet named an attaché[,] a consul or a clerk whose belongings & godfathers are not of the right colour. In the upper grades of the diplomatic service I had no choice – they are all ‘not of us.’ — [. . .]
139
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
28 December 1858
Heron Court
I am afraid we shall have a great deal of trouble with the PrincipalitiesFootnote 135 — I have telegraphed to our different ministers to say that if Servia shows a determined wish to have Prince MiloshFootnote 136 instead [of] Prince AlexanderFootnote 137 we should probably advise the Porte to put a good face on the matter & take him — If the Austrians meddle they will make a civil war. The Porte has proposed to put off the elections in Moldavia & Wallachia on the score of illegality for 22 days but it has no right by the constitution to do so — I think the interpretations of the treatyFootnote 138 required on several points had much better be given by a meeting of the PPFootnote 139 at Paris who made it, than second hand at Constantinople – The conference wd have more prestige with the Principalities than the RRFootnote 140 in Turkey – but Buol & the Porte are against it & if the latter is so I do not believe we cd call it legally.
Apponyi is here & very anxious about Italy – I told him that HubnerFootnote 141 at Paris was so disliked that he was useless to his Govt. & Apponyi agreed & said every body [sic] wished a change but Buol's temper will not let him do it.
P.S.
Apponyi asked me what we should do if France[,] Russia & Sardinia made war on Austria — I said that in a purely Italian war the object of wh was carried out by Italians he must never look for help from an English Govt although we should not assist the Italians to break the Treaties of 1815. but [sic] that our attitude & subsequent action in the event of a war of aggression upon Austria by France & Russia must depend upon the circumstances of the case & whether provocation had been given to justify it – That public opinion in England wd be strongly for Italian independence, but that it would be equally strong against any wanton aggression of France or Russia, so Austria must take care to be forbearing & always in the right.
140
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/46
30 December 1858
Knowsley
I am glad to see by a telegram from Loftus* of the 28th that Austria is better inclined, and is giving better advice to the Porte than we expected – that she gives up Alexander, and advises the Porte not to quarrel with the Milosch family; and if the Porte has the good sense to swallow the leek without making wry faces, all may go well; but if she takes the high line, asserts her right of independent action, and does not accept Milosch, the consequent complications may be very serious.Footnote 142 I see Russia is ready to acquiesce in Milosch. Has she been doing more?
You gave quite the right answer to Apponyi about Italy; but I do not much like his language as you report it to me. I should have thought that the state of Austrian finance would have been a sufficient reason for taking every step to avoid rupture with France; but they seem at best as anxious to take offence as France seems careless of giving it. Still I do not think we shall have an Italian war, and I feel very confident that Russia will not be over anxious to engage in new hostilities, especially when she can hope for no advantage. [. . .]
141
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
1 January 1859
The Queen has just told me of the marriage between Prince NapoleonFootnote 143 & the eldest daughter of the King of Sardinia,Footnote 144 announced by the Emperor — It proves a complete alliance between France[,] Russia & Sardinia —Footnote 145
142
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
2 January 1859
Windsor
[. . .] I hope you will approve of my reply to the French note respecting the Austrian interference at BelgradeFootnote 146 — My time is passed in smoothing down the quarrels between Buol & Walewski[.]
143
Malmesbury to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 99/2, fos 43–44
Monday [3 January 1859]Footnote 147
I found yr note in passing thro’ from Windsor to Heron Court —
The Servian news is very good – things taking a legal course — The eventuality feared of Austrian intervention at Belgrade will not occur —
I do not see & have never seen the slightest danger of anything but a war of notes & this has disappeared —
There is a difference as to whether the Conference at Paris or the Ambassadors in Turkey shd settle disputed points in the constitution of the PrincipalitiesFootnote 148 – I am for the former —
I go at 2 PM. & you will find me here but it is not worth a walkFootnote 149 – I return Monday — [. . .]
144
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/47
4 January 1859
Knowsley
I quite approve of your despatch in reference to Buol's unnecessary announcement of what Austria would do in the event of a demand being made from Belgrade for succourFootnote 150 – but France and Austria both seem so much inclined to fly at each other's throats, that it will not be very easy to keep matters quiet. Russia fortunately, does not seem inclined to brouiller les affaires.Footnote 151 I do not like the marriage you announce.Footnote 152 It looks very anxious for Austria; and Lombardy seems very unquiet. [. . .]
145
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
4 January 1859
Heron Court
The despatch from Bloomfield wh I send you is of such importance that I cannot answer it until I have your opinion & the Queen[’]sFootnote 153 — I do not believe the crisis so near as most people who are frightened by foolish speeches of Napoleon[’]s, whose hatred of Buol & his envoy Hubner is unbounded.Footnote 154 But the danger is that should disturbances take place in the Legations Austria will interfere & Napoleon will make this a casus belli. Cavour* is ready to join him, & until now Russia had agreed not to take an active part in the war but to keep so strong a corps of observation on her Austrian frontier as to paralyse one third of the Austrian army. On the other hand the secret telegram from Loftus stating that Alexander* has invited the Austrian Emperor to meet him looks as if he wished to prevent a smash in Italy — Subservient to yr judgement my opinion is that we should reply to Prussia what I did to Apponyi, & to keep ourselves perfectly at liberty to act or remain neuter[,] stating that France & Austria could, if they chose to work together, improve the condition of central Italy & that they ought to be urged to do so, we England & Prussia being Protestant nations not taking any active part, wh wd do more harm than good, but supporting any plan which would give the Roman states a better Govt even if a remodelling of the territorial arrangements of the Papal dominions were desirable. So far, being the contracting Powers of the treaties of 1815 we would approve of an infringement of those treaties, but no farther, & should not be prepared to sanction any change of the present territorial distribution of Europe.— Then to press Prussia to urge upon Buol the extreme importance of keeping in the right —Footnote 155 This last piece of useless folly about Belgrade is incredible, tho I hope nothing will come of it but his having been snubbed by France —
I send you a letter I got yesterday when I was in London from Disraeli by wh you will judge of his nervous systemFootnote 156 — He wanted to send for you but he went away more tranquil.
146
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/48
5 January 1859
Knowsley
I cannot but entertain the hope that Schlienitz'sFootnote 157 inexperience has led him to exaggerate the magnitude and imminence of the danger. The language used by the Emperor to Hübner was quite enough to put the alarmists on the qui vive, and lead to all sorts of unfounded reports.Footnote 158 Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny that there has been something ominous of late in the proceedings of our ‘August Ally’, and the contemplated alliance (matrimonial) with Piedmont looks threatening. If Sardinia is fool enough to throw herself bodily into the arms of France, it will be the old fable of the Horse, the Stag, and the Man:Footnote 159 but there is no saying what ambition, and hatred of Austria may lead her to do. Meantime, affairs in Lombardy look critical; and though the despatch which you send me today from Consul JamesFootnote 160 expresses no apprehension of an immediate rising, he speaks very strongly not only of an uneasy feeling, but of its being fomented by French, Sardinian, and Russian emissaries. The worst is that with France longing to pick a quarrel, and Sardinia too much inclined to be made a catspaw of, Austria, or rather Buol, is only too likely to give them a fair pretext, and he is too dogged, and too little adroit, to get well out of a difficulty when he has made one. I think your proposed answer and advice to Prussia quite the right one. I would add that the best check upon France is the cordiality of feeling, and unity of purpose, between Prussia and Austria. She will not like to risk a quarrel on light grounds with united Germany. If Austria, by any imprudence, leads to war in Italy, our position would be a very embarrassing one – for public sympathy in this country would be on the side of France, or rather of Italy, and this country would never raise a finger in support of Austrian rule over Lombardy. Of course you have put Cowley in possession of Bloomfield's secret despatch, and begged him to keep his eyes and ears open.Footnote 161
I am sorry for the state of Disraeli's nerves. I do not exactly see what influence, for good or for evil, my being in Town three days sooner or later could have upon the affairs of Servia – you know however how soon he is up and down again. I have been able to give his friend Lucas,Footnote 162 (who boasts that he put us into office) a distributorship of stamps; with which both he and D[israeli]. are well pleased.
[. . .] I shall be in Town on Monday.
147
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
6 January [1859]
Heron Court
[. . .] I think everything is quieting [sic] down again – ThiersFootnote 163 had assured PeelFootnote 164 that the want of horses in the French army was a sure proof that Napoleon did not meditate a campaign this year – & you will see that Claremont confirms his opinion but he is preparing material on a vast scale — [. . .]
P.S.
You will see by these letters that Cowley is altogether French & that like all men he imbibes the complexion of the Court at wh he resides. Walewski has written a despatch to Pelissier wh he has sent me to read regretting that we do not go the whole hog with him, & he ends very absurdly by saying that Austria's intention to interfere at Belgrade is of itself a breach of the treaty – I wonder whether he takes the same view as regards his own Emperor & his own wife! I have replied merely to acknowledge the perusal permitted & saying I wd keep my remarks on the contents till I had the pleasure of seeing Pelissier next week —
148
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/49
6 January 1859
Knowsley
Disraeli writes to me in such excessive agitation,Footnote 165 that I have told him that if I can possibly make my arrangements, I will anticipate my return to Town, and will go up on Saturday evening, in which case I would see him after Church on Sunday. I do not urge upon you, if you think it unnecessary, that you should be there as soon; though if you are it would be convenient that I should see you, either with him, or as soon after as possible. I hope however that you will not delay your return beyond Monday, and that you will let me see you on that day. Even if I only come up on Monday, I shall be in St. James's Square by 5PM, or soon after. Matters abroad are critical, there is no doubt; and we have plenty to occupy our attention at home. I do not know from what reason, but it is evident to me that Disraeli greatly mistrusts Cowley, and that he has some secret informant in Paris, on whom he places far greater reliance.Footnote 166 Do you know who this is?
149
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
7 January [1859]Footnote 167
Heron Court
My house will not be ready & the cleaners out of it till tomorrow night & the servants want one day to clean the dirt of the cleaners — This wd not prevent my coming up to an hotel if I could do any good or desirable harm, but I cannot see any cause for agitation wh only breeds more alarm. There is actually so little at the F.O today that Hammond writes to say he will not send the daily messenger, a thing wh has never happened to me in the two years of our official connexion! Disraeli never reads a word of my papers wh go round, & knows nothing but what the Jews at Paris & London tell him — Undoubtedly any moment may bring forth a revolution in the Papal States wh Buol might try in his bad humour to repress without concert with France, but I do not believe the Emperor is ready for such a business as a double campaign with Austria. Both Claremont & Thiers tell us he has no horses to move his troops — If however he does mean war I can do nothing more than what I have done, wh is to urge Buol to be prudent, to tell Napoleon that he risks his crown, & Sardinia that she is humbugged by him. To press on Prussia to be neutral if the war does break out, & to support the above advice & warnings to the various parties — I will call on you at 5 P.M. on Monday.
150
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/450/6
8 January 1859
Knowsley
I send you an extract, a tolerably long one, from a letter which I have received this morning from Disraeli,Footnote 168 and one which the same post has brought me from Sir C. Wood.* I think you ought to see both of them, but I will thank you to let me have them back. Disraeli's viewing of the working of the Emperor's mind is, I believe, substantially correct. I doubt if he is equally right in supposing the state of the French army to be such that he could not, at a very short notice, enter upon a campaign in Italy; and especially on account of the defective condition of his artillery. In cavalry, he is doubtless short-handed, but an Italian campaign, in aid of a popular insurrection, would go far to supply this description of matériel. D. may be right in supposing that he will not risk a war which he believes to be in contravention of public opinion in England. But who shall say that if Lombardy should rise, and Piedmont support her, such a war, even if France took part in it, would not meet with much popular sympathy here? I think you have, as Disraeli allows, fully impressed upon Apponyi that in such a case Austria must not look for assistance from us. I am sure we should not be supported by the country in offering it. The cause would be most unpopular, and there would be always found some more or less valid pretext on the part of France for an interference, even in direct opposition to the treaties of 1815. I can hardly think D. is correct in his belief that Austria is encouraged, in high places,Footnote 169 to expect a different result; and I am sure he greatly underrates the stubbornness of Buol's nature, if he expects that any apprehension whatever will induce him to initiate a ‘conciliatory’ proposition for a revival of the conferences of Paris, to take into consideration the state of central and southern Italy. I am convinced he and his Emperor would prefer being dispossessed by force of their Milanese possessions, to making (I believe even to accepting) such a proposition. Disraeli leaves me in doubt as to the ‘second’ point which he considers as urgent in point of time;Footnote 170 but I agree with him, and I think you will do so also, that it is high time we were all assembled, and I hope to see you in town on Monday afternoon. You will judge better than I can what reliance is to be placed on the information furnished by Wood. He seems to have no doubt that it comes from MazziniFootnote 171 himself; but I own I find it difficult to reconcile the nature of the scheme said to be agreed upon with his apparent approval; for it tends directly to augment the influence and power, not only of Sardinia, but, personally, of Victor Emmanuel, whom he hates, and believes to be the greatest obstacle to the regeneration of Italy. Perhaps he calculates that the result of such an attempt would be to subvert the constitutional government of Sardinia, and substitute a north Italian republic. But he must greatly misjudge L. Napoleon, if he thinks that such a project would find favour in his eyes – unless it were such a ‘republic’ as we have had in the Ionian Islands – under the ‘protection’ of France.
151
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
15 January 1859
The PrinceFootnote 172 has just sent me this box & inclosure –Footnote 173 It confirms Cowley[’]s reportFootnote 174 wh crossed it on its way to Windsor, & looks like business – but by the date (the 11th) I am still in hopes that the damper the Emperor got at the Bourse on the 3 following days & is still feeling, may choke him — I only wish he may command in Italy & Pelissier on the Rhine – I fear McMahon* will be the man, a very accomplished & gallant Irishman — ‘Our Uncle’Footnote 175 is a sad burden upon us – If attacked we must defend him & his cowardly army, but from what I understand of the P. of Chimay'sFootnote 176 despatch it is not impossible that in a row he may go over to the French – However it wd not suit us to see them in the Scheldt & in Antwerp — A greater public iniquity never was committed than that of the Whigs who left our Navy in the state shewn by the papers we discussed today. — [. . .]
152
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/450/7
[17 January 1859]Footnote 177
[. . .] I am more than ever glad that you sent Cowley's letter to the Prince.Footnote 178 It is well that he should see that when Crowned Heads (or quasi-Crowned ones) take upon themselves to meddle in la haute politique,Footnote 179 they cannot do so with impunity, and that they may create complications which they cannot easily resolve. ‘Our Uncle’ is beat in playing too fine a pawn; and he must be made to feel that he is not the dependant of France but that he is the occupier of a petty throne, whose neutrality is guaranteed only so long as it is real and actual; and that while he may depend on us (and I hope you will urge this language on Prussia also) for the support we are bound to give him in the event of his being attacked, he must not expect to run at the same time with the hare and the hound. If he thinks fit to put himself under the protection of France, he must take all the consequences of that protection; on the other hand, if by such intrigues he gives just cause of offence to France, he must not expect us to drag him out of the mire. What you have said to Austria, you must say to Belgium, ‘keep in the right, and appeal to treaties’.Footnote 180 I think the events of the last few days have given the Emperor a lesson he will not forget; and notwithstanding the telegram today of the movements (slow from want of money) of that madman the King of Sardinia, I have better hopes than I had a few days ago of the preservation of peace. But I think the neutrality of Belgium is a point on which it would be well to come to an understanding with Prussia, Austria, and Russia; and that we should not conceal from France our determination to abide by the terms of treaties. But for this, Belgium must go honestly with us, or must be left to her fate.
153
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
27 January [1859]
The precis of Buol[’]s wishes is here inclosed as sent me by Apponyi – It appears to me that we have said to France & Sardinia exactly what he recommends.
He mistakes our suggestion as to the Pope's territory – What we said was that if France & Austria thought fit to entertain that question after a concert in [sic] the affairs of central Italy, we as parties to the Treaty of Vienna wd consider it, but not take the initiation. —
You will see in the PostFootnote 181 a categorical statement every word of wh in reference to present & past is a lie – & the phrase in my letter to Cowley is quoted, thereby entirely verifying the truth of my information respecting the Emperor[’]s orders to write me down when he saw Mr. BorthwickFootnote 182 — It may do us much harm if not contradicted.
I wish you joy of our Cabinet yesterday.
154
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/50
27 January [1859]
I return Buol's and Apponyi's letters. We have said in substance what B[uol]. wishes; but as usual, he wishes us to put it in the least conciliatory form – and I do not think L. N. would like to be told, after his assurances that if Austria confines herself to her own territories, he will not interfere (though I don't believe him) that ‘we should not see him enter on an aggressive war[’], with an ‘avis indifférent’.Footnote 183 Such an expression would commit us far more than is prudent or safe. [. . .]
155
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/450/8
6 February [1859]
St James's Square
These are subjects on which it would be very much better that princes, at all events in constitutional countries, should leave to the responsible advisers of the Crown, and not make them matters of private irresponsible correspondence.Footnote 184 The question you have marked is one for Prussia alone – and which we are not called upon to answer. It is a mere question of her losing ‘carte’ in Germany by apparent indifference, in a case in which Austria should be successful without her aid – What have we to do with that? I hope however there will after all be no war – at least not now — Cowley's telegram is most satisfactoryFootnote 185 – but we must not abate our naval preparations.
156
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
21 February [1859]
I return you Disraeli[’]s letterFootnote 186 & when I have seen Cowley will send you back the other papers — Disraeli, as usual, has neglected to read a word of what has passed between the F.O.[,] Germany & France or he wd know that we & Prussia understand each other perfectly on the Italian questions but without any binding agreement. Any thing like the ‘demonstration[’] he speaks of is in my opinion to be positively avoided – It wd drive Napoleon mad & bring us at once into the row —
[P.S.] I feel as sure as one has a right to feel on such subjects that the Emperor of Russia has no intention of going to war now or hereafter if he can help it – that it is entirely against his nature & that his whole mind is bent on internal improvements – His armies are reduced to the lowest scale —
157
Malmesbury to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 99/2, fos 100–101Footnote 187
[Undated]Footnote 188
The policy of insisting & threatening is Palmerstonian & wd commit us to one side or the other — From the moment we show a bias to one side our influence is gone – because they are now bidding for our friendship — We never can I hope be induced to join a protectorate of Italy — We have enough of the protectorate of Belgium who will probably be invaded by one of its protectors, & now of the PrincipalitiesFootnote 189 whose protectors are all pulling different ways — England always acts de bonne foiFootnote 190 in these cases & therefore has the disadvantage of being like a respectable clergyman cotrustee with 5 horsedealers.
158
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
23 February [1859]Footnote 191
Cowley will be much obliged to you to lend him the draft of the paper you meant to send to the Queen. – He says it will be of great use to him as a memorandum on the subjects on wh he will have to treat.Footnote 192 He lives at 3 Upper Belgrave St. & goes to Vienna tomorrow morning.
159
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
3 March [1859]
This account leaves little hope of preventing the fixed resolve of the unprincipled men who threaten Europe with war, but with this knowledge we must be awkward if we do not put them completely in the wrong—Footnote 193
160
Malmesbury's unpublished diary, MP 9M73/79
18 March 1859
Telegram from Cowley proposing from Emperor Congress – Emperor apparently wishing to retreat — Pelissier called later making official demand to this effect — Russian proposal originally – Prussia agrees — Saw Apponyi about it & telegraphed to Loftus —
161
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
19 March [1859]
I will come to you in ½ an hour when you have read these important papers —
Can we consent to excluding Sardinia from any share in the discussion? There are reasons to justify it —
Should I make Austria pledge herself by a Note not to attack Sardinia if we ask her to disarm – & agree to Cowley's proposal?
Is not a Congress too solemn a proceeding & wd not a Conference at some neutral capital be better to consider how the Italian question cd be settled.
162
Note in Derby's handwriting, MP 9M73/20/62
19 March 1859
Will Austria consent to Congress or Conference (the latter preferably) on Italian questions, including substitute for Treaties of 1847, conditionally upon France calling on Sardinia to disarm, under guarantee for five years by England & France against invasion of Sardinia by Austria, so long as Sardinia confines herself to her own territory?Footnote 194
163
Note in Derby's handwriting, MP 9M73/20/63
19 March 1859
Will France consent to call on Sardinia to disarm, she being guaranteed for five years by England and France, against invasion by Austria, so long as Sardinia confines herself to her own territory – conditionally upon Austria consenting to Congress or Conference (the latter preferably) on other Italian questions, including substitute for Treaties of 1847?
164
Malmesbury's unpublished diary, MP 9M73/79
20 March 1859
Saw Brunnow who knew nothing but agreed in our view of restricting Congress to Italian subjects & not touching treaties of 1815. — Saw Apponyi who agreed that it wd be better to leave out all Italian states & refer our plans of reform &c to them rather than admit Sardinia — Wrote to Cowley to urge his obtaining disarmament of Austria & Sardinia on condition that France & England guaranteed Sardinia for 5 years — [. . .]
21 March 1859
[. . .] France hesitates about guarantee to Sardinia[.]
24 March 1859
[. . .] Berlin & Petersburgh [sic] accede to my proposal to admit the Italian states to be heard but not sit by their table at Congress — [. . .]
165
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
25 March [1859]
[. . .] If the Emperors, either Austrian or French[,] refuse my proposal of admitting the Italian states by delegates in the same manner as Belgium & Holland at the Congress of London, it will be evident that neither of them want a compromise.
What Cowley says of the attendance of Cabinet Ministers is true in the abstract, but if I go to the Conference it will be because the Queen must be represented in the same manner as the other Courts, & I shd not decide any doubtful or new points without reference to you, but if Cowley does not go, (as he hints) & I do not go, I really do not know what two men to send —Footnote 195 I am in hopes that as Russia accepts all our 4 pointsFootnote 196 & all our conditions, she will prevent an abandonment of the Congress — It is now evident that the French Emperor is no longer the same man in mind or body that he was formerly —Footnote 197
166
Malmesbury's unpublished diary, MP 9M73/79
27 March 1859
Brunnow came – Invited him to join in inducing Sardinia & Austria to disarm we & France giving guarantee to former — Austria very recalcitrant — [. . .]
1 April 1859
[. . .] Cabinet at 12 – Resolved not to resign but dissolve as soon as parliamentary business permitted – Only EstcourtFootnote 198 & Stanley for immediate resignation — Ld. Derby went to the Queen who was very anxious we should go on & at once gave him leave to dissolve Parl[iamen].t [. . .]
14 April 1859
Fresh proofs of the insincerity of France — [. . .]Footnote 199
16 April 1859
New French proposal to invite Sardinia to disarm on condition all the Italians were admitted as principals to the Congress — Apponyi came with a despatch stating that Austria meant to submit ultimatum to Sardinia to disarm — He thought it meant war – I gave him my opinion that it must be made with a declaration that Austria was ready to disarm also — [. . .]
17 April 1859
Agreed with Bernstorff to demand Sardinia to [sic] agree to principle of general disarmament — [. . .]
167
Malmesbury to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 99/2, fo. 66
[18 April 1859]Footnote 200
The present state of things is this[:]
———————
Austria & France have agreed to the principle of a general disarmament —
They have not agreed as to whether it shall be effected before the Congress or shall be arranged at it —
HMG. prefer the Austrian view wh is the former – Sardinia has not answered but is considering the subject & the Chevalier d'AzeglioFootnote 201 is come on a special mission in reference to it —
168
Malmesbury to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 99/2, fos 68–69
[18 April 1859]Footnote 202
The Sardinian answer has arrived vide Fitzgerald[’]s telegram.Footnote 203 We must say therefore that Sardinia has not consented to the disarmament in consequence of not being admitted to Congress & this makes it the more necessary that you should make it clear before that she was excluded by opinion of all the 5 Powers both France and Russia maintaining it & that we urged her admittance & that of other states as in Congress of London on Belgium in 1832 —
169
Malmesbury to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 99/2, fos 86–87
[20 April 1859]Footnote 204
The summons was made at 5-30 yesterday at TurinFootnote 205 – No answer given yet — The demand included disarmament of volunteers. I cannot help thinking that Austria will profess to be satisfied with Sardinia[’]s answer if it is what we advised & that she will fall back upon a mediation of England between her and France to wh I have agreed provided ‘all three disarm previously or all three remain in exact status quo as regards military movements.’
I do not think a Cabinet can be of any use whatever happens – the Congress is at an end — We have nothing to do but either to mediate as above or be spectators of the battle —
170
Malmesbury's unpublished diary, MP 9M73/79
21 April 1859Footnote 206
News arrives that Austria rejects our proposal and summons Sardinia to disarm in 3 days. [. . .] Protest strongly ag[ain]st Austria [. . .]
171
Malmesbury to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 99/2, fo. 98
[22 April 1859]Footnote 207
The French & we have advised Cavour to reply ‘that he has already agreed to a general disarmament to be arranged by Comm[issione]rs in London.’ Buol had not heard of this when he sent the summons. Hudson goes back tonight — The French cannot be in line under 6 weeks — I think it may still be stopped.
[PS] A strong protest is gone to Vienna[.]
172
Derby to Malmesbury, MP 9M73/20/51
26 April 1859
St James's Square
Hammond has been here with a letter from the Admiralty to the effect that FanshaweFootnote 208 is very unwilling to detach a Line of Battle ship for Genoa, and wishes to substitute Terrible for Orion. As the former is a very large vessel, and as her only object is protection of British life and property, I have authorised this substitution. I have also written to Pakington on the state of our naval preparations, and as to the amount of force which we could raise in two or three months, and how long it would take us to have the means of competing (le cas échéant)Footnote 209 with a French & Russian fleet combined. Such a necessity I hope is not imminent; but in the present state of affairs, and notwithstanding Gortchakoff's* assurances to Crampton,Footnote 210 we ought to be prepared for all emergencies.
The refusal of France to hear of our renewed mediation puts an end to all chance of arresting the progress of war. [. . .]
I was very well received last nightFootnote 211 – the country is all for peace – almost à tout prix – and Austria's intolerable stupidity has completely turned the scale against her.
173
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
27 April 1859
Both France & Austria were offered our mediation on the 25th – Austria having in fact originated the idea on the 23rd. So far then she is in the right – & France is now using arrogant language & hints at a Congress on wider bases than our 4 points. Those 4 points however comprise all desirable reforms political & social in Italy, & if the base is to be wider it can only be [?interpreted]Footnote 212 by a breach of the treaties of 1815 —
I have therefore said we will have nothing more to do with a Congress – at wh France wd be unbearable & wh wd lead us into a quarrel with her —
The people of England will end by seeing that there is not a pin to choose between the merits of the antagonists —
Gortchakoff[’]s assertion respecting the Treaty is so solemn as far as regards us that I really believe it only concerns Germany. It may however have something to do with Turkey.— Your speech will be very popular & was excellent – Apponyi did not like your word ‘criminal’ but I told him that according to Talleyrand a political crime is less bad than a fault.Footnote 213
174
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
28 April [1859]
This telegram has just arrived [. . .]Footnote 214
I am against accepting the suggestion because with Russia it will end in nothing but a gain of time for the French who MalaretFootnote 215 owned were not nearly ready — Besides this, Russia has taken such a decidedly French line that she is not a neutral Power. — On the other hand it may be said hereafter that we have not tried every chance if we decline — [. . .]
175
Malmesbury's unpublished diary, MP 9M73/79
28 April 1859
Return to London – Great panic at belief of Russian & French treaties offensive & defensive [. . .]
3 May 1859
[. . .] Cabinet on Proclamation of NeutralityFootnote 216 and increasing navy —
6 May 1859
[. . .] Cabinet on Proclamation of Neutrality, and building 18 gun vessels – Disraeli said there was a deficit of 6 000 000£ [. . .]
176
Derby to Disraeli, DP 186/2/108–109
8 May 1859
Your secret communication, just received, is too important to be answered hastily. I will ponder it well over before tomorrow. ElginFootnote 217 had occurred to me; but the difficulty, supposing him willing to accept, would be his being in the H[ouse] of Lords, while you want strength in the Commons – otherwise the Col[onial]. Office would have suited him better than the For[eign]. Office.Footnote 218 I should, I confess, be very sorry to see any change made in that Department at the present moment. It is of great importance to have a man there who has at his fingers’ ends the whole thread of the complicated negotiations in which we have been engaged – & whatever may be Elgin's ability, he has been for nearly two years wholly out of the way of European politics. I should much deprecate such a change, though he would be useful in the Government, & his accession would facilitate that of Gladstone, if he is a desirable acquisition. Recollect however his extreme opinions on Italian affairs, which would be very embarrassing just now.
177
Malmesbury's unpublished diary, MP 9M73/79
9 May 1859
[. . .] Malaret called to apologise for Persigny's app[ointmen]t.Footnote 219 — I was very cold to him —
178
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2
11 May [1859]
I send you an important letter from Mr CravenFootnote 220 tho not requiring immediate action — I begin to think that the course events will take is a retreat of the Austrians on their old line of the Mincio & that we shd be ready when that happens to stop the war if possible by inducing them to take some large measure as to Italy – wh Napoleon wd be either obliged to consent to, or declare himself for their total expulsion — The danger is from Germany wh I fear will break upon France before that moment arrives, & produce an inextinguishable conflagration — If they do not, we might press both upon France & Austria with a high tone when the critical phase wh I foresee should arrive. —
The young king of Naples’Footnote 221 game is to restore the suspended constitution when he succeeds to the throne, & perhaps to send an army to assist his countrymen – but that is the last move — It wd certainly stave off the French domination & the MuratistsFootnote 222 —
179
Malmesbury's unpublished diary, MP 9M73/79
12 May 1859
Ld Clarendon called – long conversation about Parties – said Ld J Russell and Palmerston menFootnote 223 wd join – agreed cordially that it wd be a great benefit if moderate Whigs and Derbyites wd join – there was little difference, if any, between them – abused Palmerston[’]s speech at TivertonFootnote 224 — [. . .]
18 May 1859
[. . .] Persigny very low – declaring before God the Emperor never meant war — [. . .]
20 May 1859
[. . .] Queen very jealous of asking Russia to assist to avert the war.Footnote 225 She & Prince evidently anxious not to stop the war but to let Germany go at the French — [. . .]
28 May 1859
[. . .] Dined at Palace – Princess RoyalFootnote 226 there very anxious for the help of England – Queen touched the second string — [. . .]
29 May 1859
Bernstorff called – asked & I assured him we shd be ready to act with Prussia to stop the war if we saw a chance. [. . .]
180
Derby to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 57/2, fo. 11
2 June 1859
St James's Square
I send you the Queen's letter respecting the speech.Footnote 227 I should be obliged to you to return it to me as soon as you can, with any remarks you may have to make – as I ought to write to H.M. in the course of the morning. My own impression is to accept her amendment on the subject of the navy, but strongly to urge upon her the reconsideration of the other paragraph. We must avoid any thing which throws a doubt upon our neutrality.
181
Malmesbury to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 99/2, fo. 78
2 June 1859
The papersFootnote 228 will not be printed till Saturday night as our printer has been ill & he must be a confidential man. They have gone thro’ 3 careful weedings by Fitzgerald and me & I do not think you will find any delendaFootnote 229 but you shall have a copy as soon as possible.
182
Malmesbury's unpublished diary, MP 9M73/79
6 June 1859
[. . .] Queen very anxious about Austrian defeat at Magenta.Footnote 230
183
Malmesbury to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 99/2, fo. 80
7 June [1859]
In the event of an adverse division how are the Italian papers to be presented at all? We cannot do so after we have tendered our resignation – My successor will then publish the originals unrevised & very likely our intended proofs side by side —
184
Malmesbury to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden 99/2, fo. 102
[?8/9 June 1859]Footnote 231
Can you not present the papers before you adjourn after the division? You are however the best judge – I will send you a dummy down to the House & distribute when you tell me.
185
Malmesbury's unpublished diary, MP 9M73/79
18 June 1859
Went with my colleagues to Windsor to give up the sealsFootnote 232 — Queen said ‘I am very sorry to part with you’ – she spoke of the state of Europe &c with great anxiety. She doubted evidently the power of the new Govt to hold – Hoped we wd support the navy – lamented loss of Clarendon – who refused to join.— Saw Ld J. Russell in the evening to explain foreign affairs. Gathered from him that strict neutrality wd be kept – but that Gladstone the new Ch[ancellor]. of the Ex[cheque]r. meant to reduce the navy wh he did not approve.
