In his magisterial work, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor argues that Western societies have experienced a shift to secularity in which belief in God becomes only one amongst many other options of belief; similarly, explanations of reality that focus on the “outer life” of the cosmos are pushed aside in favor of explanations that emphasize scientific, immediate, this-worldly causes. Taylor refers to this condition of secularity as the “immanent frame,” and he contrasts it with, for example, the milieu in Muslim-majority societies.
Whereas Taylor restricts much of his attention to the immanent frame in Western societies, Damien Howard, a Jesuit priest, focuses on the implications of the immanent frame for Muslim thought. Howard develops Taylor's premise to argue that because evolutionary theory provides an account of how human beings have emerged from matter and developed in their physical environment, it seems to connect closely with the immanent frame; hence, Howard contrasts evolutionary theory and the immanent frame with a framework for understanding the human condition that emphasizes transcendence, metaphysical inaccessibility, or the “outer life” of the cosmos. Howard avers that, taken together, evolutionary theory and the culture of immanence fundamentally challenge religious ideas not only about the origins of humanity but also about the dignity and special properties of human life by pointing out that the human animal is not at the center of the universe.
By connecting evolutionary theory with the culture of immanence, Howard's study raises such salient questions as: How do theories of evolution impinge on Muslims’ deeply entrenched ideas about what it means to be human? Have Muslim intellectuals reworked their understanding of Islam in order to make it fit with evolutionary theory and the culture of immanence, and if so, how?
To address these questions, Howard largely analyzes the work of two groups of Muslim intellectuals: the first group includes early 20th-century thinkers such as Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad ʿAziz Lahbabi, who attempted to synthesize the work of Henri Bergson. The second group comprises thinkers such as Rene Guenon, Frithjof Schuon, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, who belong to the Traditionalist School, an intellectual movement positing that a perennial wisdom recurs through each of the World Religions, especially in their esoteric, Gnostic, or sapiential currents. According to the Traditionalist School, the perennial wisdom of the World Religions always points to a Sacred Source as the ultimate basis of reality. Although Howard gives some attention to the writings of Guenon and Schuon, he is particularly interested in the work of Nasr.
Howard examines to a lesser extent the debate on the reconstruction of secular knowledge amongst a third group of Muslim intellectuals in the latter part of the 20th century. This third group includes the Malaysian Sufi scholar Syed Naquib al-Attas; the late Palestinian-American scholar of religions Ismail al-Faruqi, who championed the idea of the Islamization of knowledge; and the Ijmali anthropologist Merryl Wyn Davies. Howard has a very sound grasp of philosophical and religious themes, and his analysis is thorough, sometimes overwhelmingly so, in its sheer coverage of ideas and thinkers. It is clear we are in the company of a scholar of wide and deep learning who gives his subject serious study.
Howard carefully points out that although evolutionary ideas have now come to be embraced keenly by a culture of immanence, the early 20th-century thought of Henri Bergson illustrated that evolutionary theory could also have been taken in a direction amenable to religion and spirituality. It was precisely this hope that led Iqbal and Lahbabi to attempt to synthesize Bergsonian thought with an Islamic ethos, because they saw in Bergson's ideas the possibility of the limitless potential of human spiritual and material evolution. In contrast, the anti-Bergsonian Traditionalist School rejects evolutionary theory outright and insists on the impossibility of synthesizing evolutionary theory with religion because the latter posits the divine origins of man, that is, man's descent from heaven rather than ascent from matter. In between these two camps, Howard situates al-Faruqi, al-Attas, and Davies.
In fact, much of the book can be read as an implicit, if not explicit, analysis and comparison of Iqbal's and Nasr's respective views, which Howard describes as Bergsonian and anti-Bergsonian for heuristic purposes. It is perhaps not surprising that, given his own religious and theoretical commitments, Howard's most positive appraisal of all the efforts examined in the book is of Iqbal's Bergsonian attempt to appropriate the immanent frame within a Muslim perspective. In some ways, Iqbal's ideas on the evolutionary spiritual development of human beings accords with Taylor's reading of modernity as an open-ended project that potentially allows for the development of newer, authentic forms of religiosity.
Howard's critique of Nasr's work rehearses familiar criticisms about the idiosyncratic use of the concept of “tradition” and of Traditionalism as a syncretistic modern phenomenon. What is different about Howard's critique is that he also accuses Traditionalism of nihilism, claiming that it undermines the validity of human perceptions and reason.
Yet this critique is slightly amiss. While it is true that Traditionalists give much more weight to an intuitive apperception of the inward elements of reality, they do not entirely dismiss the validity of human reason or perception to capture the outward aspect of reality. A similar misunderstanding occurs when Howard sets up his heuristic continuum of Bergsonians and anti-Bergsonians to describe Iqbal's and Nasr's respective positions. While it may be true that Nasr's Traditionalism leans much further toward transcendence than does Iqbal's synthesis of Bergson, Howard mistakenly aligns Traditionalism completely with transcendence, without giving due recognition to the modulating role of immanence in the Traditionalist approach. Just as Traditionalism espouses both God's transcendence and His immanence (referred to as tashbīh and tanzīh in Islamic terminology), as well as the necessary interplay between them, so it espouses both man's ability to know the nature of reality and his tendency to be deceived by material reality. This double movement between transcendence and immanence, between knowledge of reality and man's forgetfulness of eternal truths, is not given enough play in Howard's presentation.
Howard's reading of the Qurʾanic commentary on the nature of man is heavily indebted to Fazlur Rahman's hermeneutics. This again poses a bit of a problem, because Rahman's modernist oeuvre is very much rooted in a strong immanent approach. We see here Howard's a priori commitment to an overriding immanence and hence his misreading of, for example, the Traditionalist School as antithetical to immanence.
Rounding out the book is a discussion of various Christian attempts to wrestle with the same questions and the ways in which such attempts could assist Muslims in developing more nuanced responses to modernity. One senses that Howard, like Taylor, adopts a Western voice, broadly speaking, in reply to Muslim entanglements with modernity. On this point, Howard adopts a more critical tone when he concludes that, because evolutionary theory has come to the Muslim world framed by the traumatic intercultural encounters of colonialism, most, if not all, Muslim intellectual attempts to deal with modernity have been fed by feelings of ressentiment toward the West and its sciences and that such attempts caricature the authentic spiritual values that continue to exist in modernity. Of course, ressentiment has been part of the dialogue. But to suggest that there has been no meaningful dialogue beyond such feelings is to discount the Muslim contribution to the ongoing dialogue on modernity.
The book is highly recommended for readers interested in philosophy, religion, evolutionary theory, and the intellectual transformations wrought by, or should one say sought by, modernity.
