Just after the turn of the twentieth century, young Muhammad Sulong went on a pilgrimage. Sulong's pilgrimage was not simply a matter of going to Mecca for the Haj; it followed a form in use as a rite of passage for a small, select group of young men from Pattani. Muhammad Sulong was bound for Mecca to study Islam, learning from the teachers at the spiritual centre of his religion, in the original – sacred – Arabic language. There he would study, as did other young Muslim men from Southeast Asia and other parts of the Muslim world. After suitable learning and preparation he would also perform the Haj. Then a decision would be made: to stay on as a member of the Jawi community at Mecca, or return to Pattani as a respected teacher, to share his experience and the accumulated wisdom with others from his community. So his pilgrimage began.

In his Imagined Communities (1991), Benedict Anderson argued that pilgrimages were crucial to the development of shared identities for both the older religious communities and for the younger national communities:

The educated played a crucial role in this process:

Thus the small group of pilgrims, especially the literate ones, were able to influence the identity of the larger community around them.

Nationalist pilgrimages, argued Anderson,Footnote ⁴ were initially the province of bureaucratic functionaries. Their pilgrimages were lifelong, realised in their progress through the colonial bureaucracies as they wended their way around the colony, from municipality to province, gradually working their way upward to the higher positions at the capital, the ‘spiritual’ centre of the pilgrimage. Along the way, they met fellow functionaries with whom they shared little except this grand lifelong progression. These bureaucratic pilgrimages became nationalist in the colonies because of the different centres imposed on functionaries due to their place of birth. While those born in the metropole had the opportunity to rotate through a variety of colonies and even advance to positions in the capital city of the metropole, those born in the colonies found their pilgrimages circumscribed to the colony of their birthplace, their upward movement centred on the colonial capital city. Consequently, they came to identify with those following a similar path to the same centre, identifying with fellow ‘nationals’ in their new ‘nation’.

In later years in places such as Southeast Asia these nationalist pilgrimages extended downward, into the educational system:

Because of their ability to communicate in both local and colonial languages, again this bilingual literati played a key role in mediating between the colonisers and their community.Footnote ⁶

While Anderson took some care to illustrate similarities between older religious communities and the newer national communities, he left the relationship between the two unexplored.Footnote ⁷ And yet many of the anti-colonial nationalist movements began as part nationalist, part religious movements, such as Sarekat Islam in Indonesia or the Young Men's Buddhist Association in Burma, or the less organised Kaum Muda of Malaysia. Furthermore, Anderson focused on the communities that might be created by various types of pilgrimages, but without examining the deeply personal nature of individual pilgrimages. Understanding the life of Muhammad Sulong allows, perhaps requires, an exploration of the impact of pilgrimages on individuals, and of the relationship between religious and national pilgrimages. Sulong's pilgrimage included not only the spiritual identity-defining experience of the Haj, but also included intensive training designed to provide him with the knowledge necessary for a respected imam. He embarked on a form of educational pilgrimage that would determine his life prospects and his social status, as well as his identity and sense of community. These are precisely the characteristics of the educational pilgrimages of the indigenous bureaucrats in colonial Southeast Asia that Anderson thought shaped national identities. Exploring the nature of Sulong's pilgrimages, seemingly both nationalist and religious, provides a better understanding of his life, and perhaps of the relationship between national and religious identities within individuals and communities.

Although Anderson has left the relationship between religious and national identities and communities unexplored, other work has not. According to Ernest Gellner, in the Muslim world the modernisation process broke down the old isolated local communities, as it had in Europe. In forming a new community, a shared ‘culture’ was necessary; a choice had to be made between Westernisation and some form of local culture. In the Muslim world, elites turned neither to Westernisation nor to folk culture, but to scholarly tradition, to the written works of Islam. Wrote Gellner:

Gellner thought that this process took place at the turn of the twentieth century, approximately at the time that young Muhammad Sulong set off for Mecca, as reformists sought to purify Islam by turning to scripture and scholarship, then to marry it to modernism in order to overcome backwardness. Indeed, Sulong was one of those engaged in this process. Where Anderson implied that religious identities eventually gave way, however, Gellner believed that, for Islam only, religious identities overcame national identities, as Islamic identity and the ummah won out over national identity and the national community.Footnote ⁹ For Gellner, then, both nationalism and fundamentalism emerged together out of the same processes that created nationalisms elsewhere. Islam uniquely defied secularisation, allowing fundamentalism to emerge victorious.Footnote ¹⁰

Gellner's argument has been widely critiqued, on several grounds, two of them of particular importance here.Footnote ¹¹ First, the vast majority of the Islamic world has accepted the nation-state system, and the nationalism that goes with it. Fundamentalism has not overcome nationalism in Islamic societies. The two have found a way to coexist, and the relationship between them deserves much more careful study than Gellner gave it. Second, Gellner rightly emphasised the importance of the local community in pre-nationalist societies, especially in Islamic societies. His contention that modernisation broke up their isolation is more questionable. The local Islamic communities were never as isolated in the past, nor were they as dramatically changed, as Gellner would have it. The pilgrimage ensured that they were never isolated. At the same time, the local-level focus of Islam, both organisationally and ideologically, ensured that the local community remained important to identity long after colonialism opened communities up. The Arabic word ummah highlights this dual nature of identity and organisation. It best translates as community, and refers to both the local community and the religious community as a whole. In many ways, the ummah has always been conceptualised and felt most keenly at the level of the local community, despite the more recent attempts to depict it as an alternative to the nation.Footnote ¹²

In examining pilgrimages and identity, I will begin by looking at the nature of pilgrimages for the Jawi community. I will then examine Sulong's experience in the context of the Jawi community at Mecca, and its relations with both the larger Muslim community and with the Jawi community in Southeast Asia. Then I will examine the experience of Sulong after he returned to Siam, seeking to understand the effects of his pilgrimage on his life. Along the way, I explore the ways that the currents of modernism, nationalism and Islam shaped his identity.

Jawi pilgrimages

Young Muhammad Sulong's Siam

Muhammad Sulong was born in the village of Lukson, in Pattani, in the year 1895.Footnote ⁴¹ It was a time when the experiences of the different parts of the Jawi community were increasingly distinct, and in ways that affected the development of nationalisms. Those in Java and the Straits Settlements had been under colonial rule for generations. The Dutch, on the advice of Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, were seeking to reduce the influence of pilgrims, and to promote modern education as an alternative. By 1902, the ethical policies would have a large focus on promoting education, leading to nationalist sentiments.Footnote ⁴² The British took a more liberal attitude towards the pilgrims, and Singapore was flourishing as a centre for Islamic scholarship. In Mindanao, the United States was about to take over from the Spanish, and fight a long and bloody war. Aceh was at war with the Dutch. And the British were gradually taking power in the Malay sultanates, in most places beginning in the guise of advisors, then slowly expanding influence until they held control. In Siam, the court at Bangkok was working to take greater control of its periphery, including the lower south.

Sulong's birthplace of Pattani had a long history as an independent kingdom, and a long history of resistance to central Thai rule. In 1808 King Rama II separated the Kingdom of Pattani into seven small sultanates, each ruled by a hereditary sultan or Tunku. This provoked considerable discontent for some time, and apparently inspired those writings of the famous Pattani scholar Daud ibn Abd Allah al-Fatani that deal with the concept of jihad.Footnote ⁴³ The hereditary sultanates were eliminated at the turn of the twentieth century when the reforms of King Chulalongkorn brought the south gradually into the same system of government as the rest of Siam. After 1901, the sultanates were placed under the control of the governor of Monthon Nakhon Sithamarat, and the tributary system was replaced with a taxation system. When the sultans resisted the change, the government applied pressure. The sultan of Pattani, Tunku Abdulqadir Kamarruddin, continued to resist the changes, and he was imprisoned first in Songkhla, and later in Phitsanulok. Under duress, and in return for an annual retirement annuity and other privileges, most of the other sultans were ‘convinced’ to accept the new monthon system.Footnote ⁴⁴

Passive resistance of various sorts continued throughout the seven sultanates, and especially in Pattani. When the former sultan of Pattani was released after two years in prison in Phitsanulok, in return for a promise to give up political activity, he returned to a hero's welcome.Footnote ⁴⁵ He later fled to Kelantan, where his descendants continued the resistance. Many religious scholars and others also fled to Kelantan. Meanwhile, under the treaty of 1902 Kelantan got a British advisor, although it remained under Siamese control until 1909, when it was ceded to the British. In 1906, the sultanates were reorganised into provinces, amphoes and a monthon, bringing them into line with other regions in Siam.

Sulong's ancestors were religious teachers in Pattani, an occupation that was influential and often hereditary in the sultanates. For several generations, the family had been wealthy enough to send members to Mecca for the Haj,Footnote ⁴⁶ so that the family had both long experience with the identity-shaping experience of the pilgrimage, and with the influence the title ‘Haji’ could bestow. Sulong's grandfather, Syeikh Zainal Abidin bin Ahmad al-Fatani, was one of the best-known Jawi scholars of his generation.Footnote ⁴⁷ Sulong's father, Haji Abdulqadir, son of Muhammad, was wealthy enough not only to go on the Haj, but was also able to support three wives, and to send his eldest son to the best schools. Muhammad Sulong was born to Haji Abdulqadir's first wife, Sarifah in 1895. Thus when the sultan of Pattani, his sultan, was arrested, charged with rebellion, and imprisoned, Muhammad Sulong was just seven years old. Sulong went to school at a Muslim pondok school at Kruze, the old capital of Pattani, run by Tokhru Waemuso.Footnote ⁴⁸ There, in what is thought to be the hometown of the best-known Pattani scholar, Daud ibn Abd Allah al-Fatani,Footnote ⁴⁹ Sulong studied Malay, basic Arabic and Islam. He must have done well because in 1907, at 12 years old, his father decided to send him to Mecca for further studies.

Muhammad Sulong's Mecca, and beyond

Most of the travel to Mecca at the time of Sulong's departure was on British steamships, out of Padang, Singapore and Acheh; the ocean voyage took about 22 days. On arrival, there were two different periods of quarantine, then customs and immigration to clear before the two-day camel trip across the desert to Mecca. While the trip was much easier than it had been a few decades earlier, it was still arduous, especially for a 12-year-old boy.

In Mecca, most young students stayed at a wakaf, a sort of boarding house for students, which would have been founded by one of the rich pilgrims from the Jawi community as a type of charitable duty. A few, including Sulong for at least part of his time at Mecca, stayed with relatives.Footnote ⁵⁰ When he arrived at Mecca, Sulong had the opportunity to meet Syeikh Wan Ahmad bin Muhammad Zain al-Fatani, the leading scholar from Pattani and a prominent modernist.Footnote ⁵¹ Sulong began his education at Mecca by studying Arabic and Islam at a primary school run by the Jawi community near al-Haram mosque.Footnote ⁵² During this early period, he met and studied with Tok Kenali, a scholar from Kelantan who was a disciple of Syeikh Wan Ahmad.Footnote ⁵³ His course of study later involved visiting the many mosques in Mecca, listening to the teachers there, and studying with those who had the most knowledge or the best reputation. In this way, he learned from religious teachers from throughout the Muslim world.Footnote ⁵⁴ Sulong gradually earned a reputation as a scholar himself, especially among the Jawi community, and he was encouraged to teach, becoming ‘a junior lecturer on Islamic law of the Shafi'ite school in 1927’Footnote ⁵⁵ at al-Haram Mosque.

Haji Sulong studied, and later taught, at a time of considerable political ferment in Mecca. The Ottoman Empire still controlled the Hijaz, but both local rulers and the British also held influence. Since about 1880, the British had had designs on Ottoman territory, due in part to a desire to increase trade, in part to concerns over the radicalisation of Indian pilgrims to Mecca, in part to concerns over control of the Suez. In 1882, the British had invaded Egypt. There they established a protectorate, with a British ‘advisor’ effectively exercising control over an Egypt that was still technically part of the Ottoman Empire. This exertion of power through an advisor held similarities to the experience of the Malay community back in Southeast Asia, where the same technique had been used in several sultanates, including Kelantan, Pattani's neighbour. During this period, the British also unsuccessfully sought to take control of Afghanistan, increased their influence in Oman and, in 1904, gained control over what is now South Yemen through a treaty with the Ottoman Empire. Elsewhere, the Russians were encroaching on Ottoman territory. The Ottoman emperor also was resisting the political change promoted by the secular nationalist Young Turks, who would come to power in 1908, then depose the sultan in 1909, just four years after Sulong arrived in Mecca. The weakening of the Ottoman Empire, and the secularisation under the Young Turks, called into question its ability to serve as the protector of Islam and of the Hijaz. At the same time, there was no other powerful political entity able to step in and defend Islam and its holy centre. Sulong thus found himself at the centre of political uncertainty, of anxiety over the future political status of the region, and of concern over what it would mean for Islam.

Increasing division in the politics of the Ottoman Empire was matched by increasing intellectual pluralism. While Mecca remained the spiritual centre of Islam, Cairo and, to a much lesser degree, the Hadhramaut were expanding their intellectual influence. The revival of religious education in the Hadhramaut followed a long period of decline, due, at least in part, to unstable political conditions. The revival began in the late 1870s when Ali bin Muhammad al-Hibshi, whose father was the Mufti of the Shafi'i school at Mecca, established a ribat (college) to teach more formally. This was followed a few years later by the establishment of a college at Tarim, financed by rich merchants from Java and Singapore as a place to send their children. A third college was established in Ghayl Ba Wazir, a coastal city, in 1902, by Shaykh Muhammad bin Salim, who studied in Egypt. These and other smaller colleges all led to at least a short-term revival of scholarship in the Hadhramaut. Teaching methods and content remained mostly conservative, and the impact of this revival was rather limited, except among some families in Java and Singapore.Footnote ⁵⁶

In Egypt, the reformation was more substantial. During this period, al-Azhar, the best of the religious schools, and the centre of Sunni scholarship, underwent reforms that would make it much more progressive. In the second half of the 1890s, shortly after appointing Muhammad Abduh to its board, al-Azhar introduced more secular subjects to its curriculum. During this era, despite resistance, attempts were made to improve the qualifications of the faculty, examinations and coursework were standardised, and the library was consolidated, mostly through the efforts of Abduh.Footnote ⁵⁷ As both a modern university and the centre of Sunni learning, al-Azhar became the leading institution of higher education in the Islamic world. Finally, in 1908, the even more progressive Cairo University was organised, giving Egypt a modern secular university alongside al-Azhar. Egypt and al-Azhar became known for political activism over the next two decades. Despite the prestige of Mecca, an increasing number of students from the Jawi community chose to study at al-Azhar, especially during the 1920s, as numbers rose from an estimated 80 at the beginning of the decade to about 200 by 1925, with at least some of these from southern Thailand.Footnote ⁵⁸ This plurality of religious centres, while not entirely new, matched the increasing political pluralism as the Ottoman Empire weakened.

Intellectually, two powerful ideologies, nationalism and Islamic revivalism, both central to the identities being developed through pilgrimages at the time, were expanding within the region, with Mecca, Istanbul and Cairo as the main focal points. Nationalism came in two primary variants, the secular constitutional nation-state nationalism of the Turks, exemplified in the Young Turk revolution of 1908 – which was not well received in Mecca – and the integrationist Arab nationalism of Cairo, Mecca and Damascus. Constitutional nationalism had also its champions in other parts of the Islamic world, particularly at Cairo where, especially after the First World War, attempts were made to fuse it with Islam, to create a kind of Islamic constitutional nationalism. In this later style, Islam and nationalism were to be fused to create movements demanding independent nation-states in Islamic countries and colonies such as Egypt or Malaysia. Such nationalism was closely related to modernist Islamic reformism, and propagated through al-Manar, a journal founded by Muhammad Rashid Rida, a student of Muhammad Abduh. Al-Manar had a powerful impact on the Jawi community, with many of its ideas making their way back to Malaysia and Indonesia during the first part of the twentieth century.Footnote ⁵⁹ There was also contact between this group and the Jawi community at Mecca, at about the time when Sulong was rising to prominence there.

A second form of nationalism, integrationist nationalism, sought to join the many tribal communities together into a larger nation, one that could take a place on the international stage. Initially, it took the form of Pan-Islamic nationalism, due, in part, to the changes in social and educational structures, due in part to shared dangers of Islamic nations facing colonialism, and due in part to the attempts of both the Ottoman sultans and the British, through the local rulers of Mecca, to reinforce legitimacy and extend influence.Footnote ⁶⁰ During and after the First World War, integrationist nationalism increasingly took the form of Arab nationalism. It had a political champion in the local ruler of Mecca, Sharif Husayn, and in his son Faisal, who was close to the Damascus-based nationalists.

As for revivalism, it was, of course, not new. It had swept across the region many times before. It also had many variants; nearly all Southeast Asian Muslims who visited Mecca can be said to have promoted it to some degree, returning with tales of the way that Islam was practised in the heartland. Haji Sulong's version of revivalism, like that of many in the Jawi community, was most influenced by the teaching of Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905).Footnote ⁶¹ AbduhFootnote ⁶² was born in a small village in 1849, in the Nile delta. By the time he was 12 years old, he had memorised the Quran; he then went to the prestigious Ahmadi mosque at Tanta for further study, before moving on to al-Azar. Abduh graduated from al-Azhar in 1877, and stayed on as a teacher. Abduh's only foray into political activism came when the British invaded in 1882. At that time he was involved with a group of army officers who rebelled against the British, and consequently was exiled for three years.

In 1888, Abduh returned to Egypt, and was appointed a judge. In 1895, he was appointed to the administrative council of al-Azhar, where he worked to implement some of the educational reforms he had long advocated. Then in 1899, he was appointed Grand Mufti of Egypt, and given charge of the judicial system. He was also named to the Legislative Council. Politically, he believed that the government had a right to obedience. This had to be balanced against the right of the people to justice. The people had to provide counsel to the ruler to ensure justice and prevent the government from errors and passions, necessitating popular participation in politics.Footnote ⁶³ As for his reformist teachings, Abduh believed that Islam should strip away the accretions of tradition and return to its foundations. Science and reason would then have greater scope to build on those foundations, so that religion and science could be compatible, since both sought fundamental truths.Footnote ⁶⁴ For Abduh, then, religious and educational reform went together. He also chose to work within the existing political system, despite his disagreements with it, rather than seek to overturn it. Abduh's teachings and his life would provide inspiration for Sulong upon his return to Siam.

Modernist revivalism had competition from an older retrogressive revivalism that was popular among some Bedouin. This retrogressive revivalism held little attraction for either Sulong or the Jawi community in general. Where modernists were forward-looking, Wahhabism found its ideal society by looking back to the time of the prophet Muhammad, and envisioning the return to such a state. It was also more forceful in its attempts to reform Islam, as a political movement under the leadership of Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, who began his conquests in 1902. This was just before Sulong arrived, and while then distant, the conquests would draw ever nearer. Eventually, in 1924–25 the House of Saud and the Wahhabis took over Mecca, Medina and eventually the entire Hijaz.

Through all this ferment, Sulong studied, and with a variety of teachers from around the region. As he matured, he began to teach others. When he was 27 years old, Haji Sulong married Sabiya, daughter of one of the teachers at Mecca. Along with his status as a teacher came increased wealth and, since his wife was a local, a house for his new family.Footnote ⁶⁵ Haji Sulong thus came to occupy a privileged position, and planned to spend his life among the Jawi community in Mecca. His marriage to a local gave him a certain status in relations with those from Mecca, and with those from other communities. He was in a position to broker deals, to ease social relations, and consequently to gain considerable respect. Snouck Hurgronje described this status as partial assimilation, and noted that children of such marriages, or at least grandchildren, would have been entirely assimilated.Footnote ⁶⁶ Sulong's future opportunities at Mecca seemed unlimited. A year later, Sabiya passed away.

During his time at Mecca, Sulong had the opportunity of meeting many members of the ruling classes of Jawi society, who came from throughout Southeast Asia to study or to perform the Hajj. At 29 years old, after the death of his first wife, he married Khadijah, who came from this elite. Khadijah was the daughter of Haji Ibrahim and sister of Haji Mohammad Nor, who would later become Mufti of Kelantan. This second marriage must have helped to tighten Sulong's links with the Jawi community back in Southeast Asia. These relationships with leading Malaysian Muslims enhanced Sulong's influence both at Mecca and, later, back in Southeast Asia.

Haji Sulong was in Mecca throughout the First World War, through its intrigue, alliances and betrayal. He saw the British, particularly the charismatic T.E. Lawrence, encourage the Arab rebellion of Sharif Husayn against the Turks, promising an Arab state when the war ended. He would have seen both the First World War and smaller tribal wars, including those between the proponents of Arab nationalism and revivalism, sweep through the area. He was at Mecca when the war ended, and when the British government made the Balfour declaration, outlining a Jewish homeland in Palestine. He experienced the British betrayal of Arab nationalism and the breaking of promises to Sharif Husayn as the British took control and divided the Middle East with France. He thus had little reason to trust in British promises. He saw the abdication of Sharif Husayn and the abandonment of Mecca to the Wahabbi forces in 1924, and witnessed, from a short distance, the fall of Medina a year later to the same forces.

The Wahabbi takeover led to some hardship for the Jawi community, particularly for teachers, as all teachings, except Wahabbi teachings, were banned, and restrictions were placed on the publications of religious materials. Many from the Jawi community left for Jeddah and for Southeast Asia, and the Straits Settlements government issued safety warnings for pilgrims intending to go on the pilgrimage in 1925.Footnote ⁶⁷ Some from the Jawi community were killed in the fighting.Footnote ⁶⁸ However, a shared reformist agenda allowed enough common ground for some from the Jawi community to coexist, even thrive under the new regime. The famous Pattani scholar Muhammad Nur Fatani would become the new leader of the Jawi community. Sulong must have seen a way to coexist with the new government, as it was during this time that he was appointed a junior lecturer at al-Haram.Footnote ⁶⁹ Then in 1927, Sulong's one-year-old son Mahmud died, and, to escape the grief, he and his wife returned to Pattani for a planned two-year visit.Footnote ⁷⁰ It would mark their permanent departure from Mecca.Footnote ⁷¹

Young Sulong during his time at Mecca became Haji Sulong. He grew to maturity, had, and lost, a wife and then a child. He became prominent in his own community and a teacher of some renown. He was at Mecca at a time when not only he, but the entire region experienced tremendous change: the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, a world war, the rise of colonialism, the rise of nationalism and the rise of perhaps the strongest and most diverse revivalist movement to date. While we can only begin to appreciate the change his pilgrimage had on his identity by exploring his later life, we can briefly summarise some of the most important influences. Sulong's maturation took place during a time of expanding pluralism: pluralism of thought, pluralism of politics and pluralism of identities. Such pluralism is not unproblematic for Islam, where some argue that the Quran mandates that the ummah must be one. However, for Abduh, for Sulong, and other modernists, the unity was in religion only, not in government and society, and only in issues clearly settled in the Quran itself.Footnote ⁷² Otherwise, pluralism held its virtues, in the competition of ideas, and perhaps in ensuring the preservation of Islam by associating it with a variety of polities, some of which were bound to survive, rather than tying it to a single empire. Pluralism of identity at the time was prevalent not only in Mecca, where Pattani, Siamese, Jawi, Shafi'i, Islamic, reformist, fundamentalist, Arabic and Ottoman identities were all available to Sulong, but also back in Southeast Asia, where colonialism was creating a variety of experiences for different groups, organised around new boundaries. Also noteworthy was Sulong's intellectual attachment to modernism, and to Muhammad Abduh and his teachings. Sulong, we should note, returned to Pattani as a visitor, not as a resident. He thought of himself as a Meccan by that time, and left his home and possessions behind, intending to return. That would soon change, as Sulong found that his identity was perhaps more complex than he had thought.

Haji Sulong's Siam

When Haji Sulong returned to Pattani, he soon decided that the rest of his life should be spent in Siam, not Mecca. He appears to have discovered his purpose in life: a need, and an opportunity, to put Abduh's Islamic modernisation programme into action. He would subsequently follow the path advocated by Muhammad Abduh quite closely, first seeking to revive Islamic teachings, then seeking to reform Islamic education, then seeking to implement modern political and legal systems within an Islamic context. Upon his return, it seemed to Haji Sulong that Islam in Thailand was fraught with superstition, and believers were apathetic.Footnote ⁷³ He felt a responsibility to teach Islam according to the teachings of the Quran, as he had learned, practised, and taught it in Mecca. So for two years Haji Sulong travelled around southern Thailand, promoting a revival of interest and a purification of local Islam. He also taught in the main mosque at Pattani. His teachings, described as ‘progressive and bold’,Footnote ⁷⁴ so upset local Muslim teachers – since they were responsible for the teachings that Sulong wanted purified – that a government investigation was requested and conducted to determine whether he was fomenting rebellion. The government wisely chose to stay out of such religious conflicts, and no charges were laid.Footnote ⁷⁵

After two years of travelling through Monthon Pattani promoting Islamic revivalism, Sulong decided that the next step was to build a school. Perhaps due to the influence of the teachings of Abduh, he did not wish to establish another pondok school, teaching only religion. He wanted to build a school that would also lead to higher standards of education in the area, and to higher levels of development. It would be Thailand's first Islamic school. In this way, Haji Sulong combined his revivalism and his goal of modernisation through Islamic-based education and development. So he set out to raise the money to build the school through donations. However, at the time, the great depression was just beginning to affect Thailand, making fund-raising difficult. Haji Sulong went to the former sultan of Yaring, Phrayaphiphitsenamat, and convinced him to match the donations of the villagers, so that he would meet half of the cost. In return, the school would bear his name. After construction began, Haji Sulong had a sign bearing the name of Phrayaphiphitsenamat made for the school. However, Phrayaphiphitsenamat passed away shortly thereafter. After his death, his son, Phraphiphitphakdi, then district officer of Mayo, objected to the use of his father's name and appealed to the provincial governor to have it removed. In the end, the name of the school was changed, the donation was not made, and construction had to be halted for a time.Footnote ⁷⁶

As the school slowly approached completion, political circumstances changed in Sulong's Siam with the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932. The change in government opened up new pathways to power through election to both local and national government. It also put in place a new national leadership that needed to forge links to local leaders. Among those to take advantage of these new opportunities was Haji Sulong. The new government wanted to rapidly increase educational levels, but, in the midst of the depression, had only limited resources to do so. So they encouraged approved individuals to build schools, which would then be recognised by the government. In 1933, Haji Sulong travelled to Bangkok to request funds to finish the school. He also invited Prime Minister Phahon to the opening. Phahon provided the necessary funds, and agreed to come and officially open the school. Pridi Phanomyong, while he was Minister of the Interior (1934–35), also visited the school. Thus through the school, Haji Sulong became known to those in Bangkok as a local leader of the Malay–Muslim provinces. After the school opened, Haji Sulong became headmaster, and built up influence among students, former students and parents. The school also came to serve as a mosque for those who lived nearby and accepted Haji Sulong's modernist Islam.Footnote ⁷⁷ Sulong frequently met with those in the area to discuss his plans for the school, according to Numan Hayimasae, and in 1935, the government ordered the school closed, because it feared that the school was becoming a centre of political activity. Sulong then went back to travelling around the region, teaching in different towns and villages.Footnote ⁷⁸

The political reforms implemented after the overthrow of the absolute monarchy opened up new opportunities. Tengku Mahmud Mahayiddin, the son of the last sultan of Pattani and the most important separatist leader, returned from exile in northern Malaya, expressing a desire to work within the new system.Footnote ⁷⁹ He took up residence not in the south, but in Bangkok, close to the centre of political power, but far from his southern constituency. Sulong was also drawn into politics during this period.

In 1937, the first direct election to the Thai parliament was held. The two leading candidates were Phraphiphitphakdi (Kamukda Abdunlabut), the son of the last sultan of Yaring, and Khunjaroenworawet (Jaroen Suebsaeng), who resigned his position as a government medical officer to run for parliament. Another hopeful, the former governor of Pattani, Phrayaratanaphakdi, who had been removed by the new government after the overthrow of the absolute monarchy, asked Sulong for his support in the election. Sulong was a prominent citizen, and knew the former governor well; however, he felt loyal to his old friend Jaroen and chose to support him instead. Phraphiphitphakdi was the only Muslim contesting the election in Pattani and he sought to capitalise on that status.Footnote ⁸⁰ He emphasised the role of his father and his ancestors as sultans, able to mediate with the Thai government. And in a campaign leaflet, he cryptically quoted a verse from the Quran, which stated that Muslims should respectfully support that which was good, while withholding their support for the evil works of their enemies.Footnote ⁸¹ With Haji Sulong supporting a Buddhist, this amounted to an attack not only on Charoen, but also on Haji Sulong himself. This cryptic suggestion that Muslims had to vote for good Muslims led to formal complaints and an investigation, which was ultimately dropped. While government officials considered this argument dangerous, they decided to handle the matter informally. Phraphiphitphakdi was able to win election over Jaroen, the candidate of Haji Sulong.

It is important to note that Haji Sulong was sufficiently integrated into the political system that he would support a Buddhist with a similar political ideology rather than a Muslim with a different ideology. In other words, the politics of a candidate was more important to him than ethnicity. Both Charoen and Haji Sulong were ‘new thinkers’, modernists who shared a belief in the rhetoric of democracy and equality promoted by Pridi Phanomyong and some other leaders in Bangkok at the time. With Haji Sulong's support, Charoen would later be elected mayor of the municipality of Pattani. After the Second World War, he would be elected to the parliament.

In 1938, Field Marshall Phibun Songkhram became prime minister and pursued a policy of forced assimilation nationwide. Forced assimilation and the reshaping of culture hit particularly hard in Malay–Muslim areas, where provisions came into conflict, not only with local culture, but also with religious practices. School curricula were revised to include more Thai culture, and all lessons were to be conducted in Thai. Traditional hats, headscarves and sarongs were all prohibited. The Muslim courts previously used for civil cases were eliminated. Objections to these measures were raised by the Muslim members of parliament (MPs) in parliament and through other means, but to no avail.Footnote ⁸² Effectively, Muslims were forced to choose either a Phibun style Thai (Buddhist) identity, or a local identity, which was really no choice at all. Passive resistance to the government became widespread. When there was a dispute between Muslims, it would be arbitrated informally. If it could not be settled, those living in the border provinces would appeal it to courts in Malaysia. In Pattani, where the border was distant and inconvenient, the imams in the province elected Sulong to serve as the arbitrator of those conflicts that could not be solved locally.Footnote ⁸³ Sulong was also influential in creating an informal organisation to promote co-operation among local ulama and the continued use of Islamic law.Footnote ⁸⁴ Sulong thus became the leader of the informal Islamic legal system in Pattani, a position indicating that he was held in high regard for his knowledge of Islam, and a position indicating his own choice of identity.

Heavy promotion of the policies of forced assimilation coincided with the outbreak of the Pacific War. Although Thailand quickly capitulated to the Japanese, a resistance movement was established both overseas and in Thailand, spreading to all parts of the country, including the Malay–Muslim provinces. In the lower south, the British decided to support the resistance movement under the leadership of separatist leader Tengku Mahayiddin, offering him, he believed, support for his cause after the war. Some, including Tengku Mahayiddin himself, saw independence as a desirable alternative to the harsh policies of the Phibun regime.Footnote ⁸⁵ For others, support for the resistance to Phibun and the Japanese allowed a reconciliation of Malay and Thai identities, albeit uneasily. The mobilisation and militarisation of provincial society, mostly in urban (Thai Buddhist) areas, the difficult wartime economy, and British covert support for separatist leaders in Malaysia who promised to fight Phibun all further undermined Bangkok's relations with the lower south, and support for separatism grew. However, after the war, Mahayiddin and his movement received very limited support from the British. They were left to seek other means to win their goals.Footnote ⁸⁶

At the close of the war, a new government was put into place. It found itself facing a complex situation in the south. During the war, the northern and eastern Malay states had been ‘returned’ to Thailand by the Japanese, so that southern Thailand and northern Malaya were reunited after their earlier separation in 1909. Then after the war, while the United States wanted to treat Thailand as an ally because of the co-operation of the Free Thai resistance movement during the war, the British wanted to treat Thailand as a defeated enemy. With British policy uncertain, the separation of the lower south must have seemed a distinct possibility. During this period, Sulong developed channels of communication to both the British and to Mahayiddin.Footnote ⁸⁷ This provided insurance for Sulong, should Mahayiddin succeed. It also was probably an attempt to ensure, and increase, his influence in the region. As for the government, under the circumstances, it had little choice but to try to win back support. Pridi, with the guidance of his Muslim friend and advisor Chaem Phromyong,Footnote ⁸⁸ returned to the policies of accommodation and integration pursued after the 1932 overthrow of the absolute monarchy. The highest profile move to improve relations with the leaders from the lower south came when Sulong and others were invited to Bangkok to meet King Ananda. The King donated 20,000 baht to promote religion, education and welfare in the region.Footnote ⁸⁹ Pridi even indicated a willingness to allow autonomy, within a Siamese state, providing a means to reconcile plural identities to those who remained loyal to both Siamese and Malay identities.Footnote ⁹⁰

As part of its reconciliation policy, the government approved the Patronage of Islam Act, which recognised the role of religious leaders in the lower south, and provided a structure of authority for them. In addition to the Jularachamontri, the national leader, there would be a central Islamic committee, provincial committees and mosque-level committees. At the provincial level, all the imams from the province would choose the committee. In this way, the government could learn who comprised the recognised leaders in Malay–Muslim communities. At the same time, government recognition of what had been informal leadership both reinforced the influence of those leaders, and gave them formal control over mosque committees and their imams, increasing their power considerably. In Pattani, Haji Sulong was elected president of the provincial Islamic committee. With Sulong's support, his old friend Jaroen Suepsaeng, the mayor of Pattani during the war and a Pridi supporter, won election to the parliament in 1946. As president of the Pattani Provincial Islamic Committee, Sulong had a formal platform for expressing his views, and through his long-time relationship with Jaroen, and indirectly with Pridi, he had taken a clear political stand. He was firmly positioned in both local and Thai (Siamese) national politics.

Sulong also took an interest in the government's initiative to restore first the system of Islamic judges, and then a revamped system of Islamic courts in Thailand's Malay–Muslim provinces.Footnote ⁹¹ Sulong again can be seen following the path set out by Abduh, who had during his career become involved in the judicial system in Egypt. Sulong was unhappy with both government proposals, so that his position became not only deeply political but oppositional. The government wanted to select the judges itself, and to require that they be able to speak and write Thai. This would have advantaged the former judges, removed by the Phibun government, in filling the positions. Sulong, who had filled the position informally since the justices were suspended, wanted the local imams to vote on the new judges, which, given his level of support, would have allowed his preferred candidates to win. The government later proposed an examination for those who wished the position, but Sulong held firm, on the grounds that the judges had to be chosen by the imams, not the secular government.Footnote ⁹² The government indicated some willingness to compromise on the appointment of the judges. However, Sulong was also dissatisfied with the government blueprint for the new justice system in the south, which left the Islamic courts under the jurisdiction of the central government courts, requiring a judge from the Ministry of Justice to sit alongside the Muslim judge, and co-sign the decision. Sulong found this unacceptable, as it placed the courts under secular authority. Despite the efforts of the government to negotiate, no resolution was reached in this dispute, and government officials began to see Sulong as intransigent.Footnote ⁹³

The policies of reconciliation continued, as pondok schools were allowed to teach without regard to the curriculum restrictions put in place by Phibun. Then in response to numerous complaints about government officials, in March of 1947, Pridi ally Prime Minister Luang Thawin Thamrongnawasawat established a committee composed of four government officials and the Jularachamontri to go to the south to investigate. This seeming opportunity would set in motion events that would lead to Sulong's imprisonment. When religious leaders in Pattani learned that the committee would soon visit, they organised a meeting to discuss what problems should be raised. About 100 people attended the meeting, which chose Haji Sulong as representative to make seven specific requests of the government:Footnote ⁹⁴

1. 1. That the four southern provinces be governed as a unit, with a Muslim governor.

2. 2. That for the first seven years of the school curriculum, Malay be allowed as the language of instruction.

3. 3. That all taxes collected in the four southern provinces be expended there.

4. 4. That 85 percent of the government officials be local Malays.

5. 5. That Malay and Thai be used together as the languages of government.

6. 6. That the provincial Islamic committees have authority over the practice of Islam.

7. 7. That the Islamic judicial system be separated from the provincial court system.

It is unclear whether Luang Thamrong ever intended to act on the recommendations of the committee, or whether he merely intended to use it to gauge, or to manipulate public opinion. However, people in the south took the committee seriously, and Sulong and other religious leaders coordinated a response. Having sought public opinion, Sulong must have felt a responsibility to follow up on the issues raised to the committee, as he subsequently established a ‘Seven Requests’ movement for this purpose.

The separation of the court systems, perhaps the matter of greatest concern to Sulong, had already been rejected. Of the other requests, the first was the most difficult, as it would grant administrative autonomy to the four Malay–Muslim provinces.Footnote ⁹⁵ The committee met Haji Sulong and held extensive discussions over the requests, but had no authority to make decisions. It also listened to similar requests from Narathiwat, with additional requests for radio broadcasts in Malay, for Friday holidays, and for a campaign to convince Thais not to use the derogatory word ‘khaek’ to refer to Malays. And it heard complaints about local officials, according to its original purpose. Whatever Luang Thamrong intended, the bureaucrats were not willing to take seriously these complaints against their own. Another committee made up of representatives of the ministries concerned investigated 20 of the complaints. Twelve of the complaints they considered were against government officials, and in every case they decided that due to lack of evidence, the complaint should be dismissed.Footnote ⁹⁶ As for the seven requests themselves, a government response was slow in coming. After an interpellation in parliament by his friend Jaroen received an unsatisfactory response, Haji Sulong began to organise his movement to pressure the government into considering the requests more quickly, and, he hoped, more successfully.

Sulong's continued efforts to force the government to separate the court systems, even after it had compromised in the selection process for justices, seems to have convinced the government that he was stubborn, and would not listen to reason. Sulong further alarmed the government when, in following up on the Seven Requests/Demands, he developed an organisational structure, a plan of action, and a mission statement, based around the twin goals of preserving Malay ethnicity and creating an autonomous unit for the Malay–Muslim provinces, under Thai rule. For Sulong, such a solution would have reconciled Thai and Malay identities; for the government, it amounted to separatism. Sulong then began to raise funds and to travel around the region speaking in mosques about his movement and its goals. He also announced that, in accordance with the wishes of the people expressed in the seven requests/demands meeting, he would invite Haji Mahayiddin, a son of the last sultan of Pattani and leader of the separatist movement, to return and govern the four southern provinces.Footnote ⁹⁷ None of this was considered secret, and when the governor of Pattani was notified, he chose only to continue to collect information.

During this same period, the separatist movement, based in Kelantan and led by Haji Mahayiddin, spurred by rising sentiments of nationalism and independence in Malaysia, increased its agitation. There was a rise in robberies, especially of Buddhists, some schools were burned, and violent incidents in general increased about the middle of the year 1947. A British reporter from the Straits Times was invited; she wrote a story about the Sultanate of Pattani and the way its people were being repressed by Thai authorities. Haji Sulong was the host of the reporter when she visited Thailand, so that some officials saw this as evidence that he was involved in a separatist conspiracy with Haji Mahayiddin and with foreigners. About the same time, a large meeting was held in Kelantan, with leaders invited from both sides of the border, where the liberation of Pattani was discussed. With such activities coming while Sulong was promoting autonomy and the return of Haji Mahayiddin, some Thai officials inevitably saw the two movements as one. They claimed that Haji Sulong was the leader of the Pattani branch of Haji Mahayiddin's movement.Footnote ⁹⁸ However, as Surin Pitusuwan argued, Haji Sulong's machinations were much more complex.Footnote ⁹⁹ Bangkok politicians were in contact with Mahayiddin, at least intermittently, throughout this period.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ Sulong would not have wanted to be left out of any arrangement made between Bangkok and Mahayiddin. He also may have hoped to use the threat of an alliance with Mahayiddin to improve his leverage with the government. In a time of political tension, it was a risky approach, one that ultimately proved too provocative, as Haji Sulong and his movement came under intense scrutiny.

Gradually, the government response to the Seven Requests/Demands became clear. Only the request to separate the courts was refused outright. The other requests were either referred to the ministries concerned (an indirect refusal), accepted in principle, but considered possible only in the long term (such as an increase in Malay Muslim officials), or, in a few cases, limited concessions were granted (such as radio broadcasts of news in Malay, five hours a week of teaching Malay in elementary schools where qualified teachers were available, and agreement in principle that government offices would close on Friday). In addition, more development money was promised, including money for provincial mosques, when it became available.

In November of 1947, a military coup overthrew the Pridi-allied regime and placed a conservative pro-royalist Democrat party government in nominal power. The following month, as a part of a policy to crack down on the southern separatist movement, the Ministry of the Interior decided to transfer the governor of Pattani. The proposed new governor, Phrayarattanaphakdi, had left the civil service many years earlier, and before agreeing to return, exacted a promise of support. Sulong believed that Phrayarattanaphakdi still held a grudge against him, since Sulong had not supported him when he wished to run for election.Footnote ¹⁰¹ At about the same time, there were reports that Bangkok would open a dialogue with Haji Mahayiddin, and through the auspices of a Muslim senator, had invited him to Bangkok.Footnote ¹⁰² Haji Sulong travelled to Kelantan to find out if this report was true, and when he was told that it was accurate, he promised to draw up a petition in support of autonomy for Haji Mahayiddin to use in his negotiations. Upon his return, Haji Sulong met with the new governor, and reported his plans. However, when his supporters circulated the petition, they were arrested, and on 16 January 1948 the police came and arrested Haji Sulong at his home on charges of conspiracy in a separatist movement.Footnote ¹⁰³

The trial began in March in Nakhon Sithammarat and lasted for nearly a year during which time the accused were held without bail. On 28 February 1949, Haji Sulong and three others were convicted and sentenced to three years in jail. When the prosecutor appealed, the sentence was increased to four years and eight months. Haji Sulong's appeal was rejected. He served most of his sentence at Bangkhwang Prison in Bangkok, and was released three months early in the hope that it would appease his followers in the south. Some 1,000 people were there to meet him at the train station on his return home in March of 1952.Footnote ¹⁰⁴

While in prison, Sulong wrote about the events that had led to his conviction. He claimed that the government had pressured witnesses to affect the outcome. Of his own actions, he wrote:

After Haji Sulong's release, provincial authorities continued to keep a close watch on him. He was required to check in at regular intervals, even though he had limited his activities. At the end of 1953, the district officer called him in and asked him to stop teaching. He did so, but, unable to work, he struggled to support his family, and wrote a letter of protest to the Ministry of the Interior, stating that he was not a separatist, that he would not engage in such activities, and that if he were to be under restriction permanently, he might have to leave the country.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ Denying his right to teach in his school was effectively taking away what had been the great purpose of his life, the purpose that had led him to stay in Thailand. By April of 1954, meetings between separatists in Kelantan and supporters in the Malay–Muslim provinces were again increasing. Banditry was on the rise. The Pattani MP, Phraphiphitphakdi, reported to the government that the root cause of the rise in crime and discontent in the south was the decline in rubber prices. This, he claimed, had upset plantation owners and had led to widespread unemployment, especially among young male rubber tappers who were angry and had too much free time.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ However, the government was not convinced that rubber prices were to blame. At about the same time, Haji Sulong's good friend, Jaroen Suebsaeng, former MP from Pattani, came under investigation for involvement in the Peace Rebellion (Kabot Santiphap). Jaroen was arrested and imprisoned. This may have further deepened government suspicion of Haji Sulong, and, a few months afterwards, he and some of his close associates were told to report to police at Songkhla. Haji Sulong took along his eldest son, Ahmat, to interpret and to provide a contact in case of need. On 13 August 1954, they reported to the police as ordered. They were last spotted at noon prayers in a mosque in Hat Yai, guarded by armed police officers. No bodies were ever found.Footnote ¹⁰⁹

Pilgrimages, identity and Sulong

Sulong's educational pilgrimage to Mecca reshaped his life in many ways. It is not surprising that it had such a profound impact when we consider that he was there during his formative period, from the age of 12 years, when he was just beginning his education, to the age of 32 years, when he had grown to maturity, found an occupation, married, had a child, and grieved for the loss of his first wife and his young son. What is rather striking is that his ‘vacation’ to Siam would so completely move him from his former path, that, rather than spend the rest of his life in Mecca, he would never return there, even when he found his life in danger in Thailand. Despite his time in Mecca, despite his strong identification with the Arab and Jawi communities there, Sulong still retained a strong local identity that would become his primary identity upon his return.

The strength of this identity, and its relationship to Sulong's other identities, can be explained, in large part, through an exploration of his pilgrimages. We have noted that Jawi pilgrimages tended to promote three types of identity: a universal Islamic identity, a local identity, and a Jawi identity, with the latter generally the weakest of the three. We can observe aspects of all these identities in Sulong's life. Sulong's marriage to his second wife, Sabiya, gave him a close connection to at least part of a Jawi-wide community, and he was, for many other Jawi, a respected (though still young) teacher. His local identity, while he remained at Mecca, was seemingly weak, since he never had any intention to return. It is only in the pattern of his later life that we can see how strongly he retained it. Upon his return to Thailand, it would take on new prominence, as he found a way to align it with his Islamic identity, and his identity as a scholar. Sulong found his personal link between the local and the universal in the teachings of an Egyptian scholar and leader respected by many in the Jawi community, Muhammad Abduh. Upon his return to Thailand, Sulong saw a need to put into practice the teachings of Abduh, which had become the focus of his scholarship. We cannot know exactly when his ‘vacation’ to Siam became instead his life's work. What we can tell is that upon his return, he made a deeply personal pilgrimage through the Malay–Muslim Siamese provinces teaching the Islamic reformism of Abduh. After two years of peregrinations, his life's work in Siam was clear to him. The school he subsequently established was not the typical pondok of other returning scholars. Rather it was a modern and progressive school. Where initially he had taken his message to the people of the Malay–Muslim provinces, now they would come to him, in a sort of reverse pilgrimage, with him at the centre.

Sulong soon became involved in Siamese politics, supporting the modernist faction, as he would have seen it. As we noted, he attached more importance to his ideology, and his relationship with the Sino-Thai Jaroen Suebsaeng, than he did to his ethnicity, actively supporting Jaroen rather than fellow Malay–Muslim Phraphiphitphakdi, son of the last sultan of Yaring. When the Phibun government later came to power, Sulong resisted assimilation, but in a relatively passive fashion, as he became a judge in an informal system of Islamic jurisprudence, designed to allow Malay–Muslims to seek justice within their own legal system, rather than through the secular courts. This provided the basis for one of his later political battles with the state.

There are many ways to interpret Sulong's political activities after the war. The separatist movements in the south have sought to claim his legacy, emphasising his grievances against the government. The government has also sought to paint him as a separatist. Sulong himself, and his son after him, tell a different story. They describe a man who was concerned with social justice, who sought to protect his people through the political means available to him at the time. In some instances he sought help from the state. He also communicated, and to some degree co-operated with other potential sources of assistance, including the British and the leader of the separatist movement. This kept Sulong's options open, of course. As Surin noted,Footnote ¹¹⁰ this was probably a means of applying pressure to a government that was also courting the separatist leader, seeking arrangements of its own.

In trying to understand Sulong and his life, it is essential to keep in mind that most of the time, people do not have to choose between plural identities; indeed, even seemingly contradictory identities can be simultaneously embraced under most circumstances. There is nothing about Haji Sulong Abdulkadir al Fatani, his pilgrimage, or his identity that is singular. Rather, his pilgrimage, like his life, and his identity, can only be understood as plural. Sulong's pilgrimage to Mecca came at a time of great pluralism in the Middle East: pluralism of educational centres, pluralism of ideas, pluralism of politics. This pluralism may have contributed to his complex identities. The religious and nationalist nature of his pilgrimage also contributed. Indeed, the key characteristic of a religio-nationalist pilgrimage seems to be to enhance the multiple identities that all hold, making choices among them all the more difficult. For Sulong, one identity is clearly visible throughout: his commitment to Islamic modernism. It is rather striking that it was this commitment that allowed him to effectively bridge his universal and local identities. At the same time, it drew him into Siamese politics on what would ultimately be the losing side. Ironically, it was his involvement in Thai politics, rather than any attempt to separate from it, that would lead to his untimely death.

In writing of pilgrimages and the creation of nationalism, Anderson wrote of the impact of large numbers of people all undertaking new types of pilgrimages, which led to the birth of nationalism. And yet older forms of pilgrimage did not disappear, remaining to produce alternative forms of identity. Gellner, writing of nationalism at the same time, argued that Islam was uniquely resistant to nationalism, and that fundamentalism would preclude national identities for those of that faith. Missing from both these analyses is the deeply personal nature of identity, and of a pilgrimage. While it may be true that the combining of large numbers of new bureaucratic and educational pilgrimages created the then new national identity, it is only when we closely examine individual pilgrimages that the complexity of the experience and the consequent complexity of identity appear. Exploring the different types of pilgrimages, ziarah, the Haj and educational pilgrimages, also highlights the linking of the universal to the local, in ways that these analyses have overlooked. Even today, as the Haj has become much easier and cheaper, allowing many more people to undertake this central religious pilgrimage, the local aspect has perhaps been strengthened. Pilgrims attend the Haj under national quotas, generally with a tour group from their own local area, so that the experience is shared primarily with a local community. And while superficial impressions of the pilgrimage may be widely shared, the deeply personal ones are often shared only with close friends and family.

Religious identity, ethnic identity, local identity, one or perhaps two different national identities, and a sense of personal mission all crystallised in the pilgrimage of Haji Sulong. His Muslim identity did not preclude his national identity, or his local identity, as we see a complex interweaving of all his many identities helping to shape his decisions. Sulong's experience, writ large, helps to explain the plurality of identities among both individuals and groups in places such as the lower south of Thailand. It also suggests some of the ways that individuals struggle to reconcile their own diverse identities in difficult political circumstances, a challenge many face in the Kingdom of Patani/Thailand today.