In 2007, Rosa Díez—a former leader of Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) in the European parliament—decided to leave the Spanish socialists and create Unión Progreso y Democracia (UPyD). One year later, this new leftist party obtained a seat in the Spanish parliament, and 4 more in 2011. However, last December the party lost all its seats putting it almost at the verge of collapse. Why is it that after such a quick national breakthrough, the party electorally collapsed? Moreover, why will it most probably disappear?
These are the two questions that any reader of Nicole Bolleyer’s excellent book will be able to respond to straight away. Building on the shoulders of giants (e.g., Maurice Duverger, Mogens Pedersen, Angelo Panebianco, etc.), Bolleyer explains why some new parties manage to organizationally survive (i.e. persistence), while others are not able to maintain their parliamentary status (i.e. sustainability), disappearing—more often than not—from the political panorama soon afterwards. In this context, the book constitutes a perfect complement to those studies looking at the determinants of party emergence and success—two certainly related, although very different, phenomena.
Showing an outstanding acquaintance with the history of party politics in 17 Western democracies, Bolleyer—like a modern Darwin—proceeds to destroy one myth after another. First of all, she challenges the common belief that government participation is prejudicial for new parties alike. On the contrary, access to office might help (mainly entrepreneurial) parties to keep up with their organizational costs. Secondly, she also defies the idea that a party’s death derives from its lack of institutionalization. In fact, she explains how institutionalized parties might decide to merge with other (generally bigger) parties in order to achieve higher aims. More importantly, she also shows how all parties—not just charismatic—face a similar dilemma: namely, should individual short-term interests of the leadership be given preference over the collective long-term interests of the membership, or the other way round? In other words, should the leaders of newly created parties prioritize the consolidation of their power or the construction of a strong organization?
For Bolleyer the answer to this vital question cannot be found at the country-, but at the party/organizational-level. In particular, she maintains that how parties get established in the medium (i.e. sustainability) and long (i.e. persistence) term will be influenced by the combination of two different factors: the origins of a party (i.e. structure), and the choices made by its elites (i.e. agency). In this context, Bolleyer recovers and complements Panebianco’s (1988) almost forgotten “genetic model,” even if she also departs from it in two important aspects, destroying two more myths on the way: neither a top-down formation nor the construction of an extra-parliamentary organization are necessarily better for institutionalization.
Following a mixed-methods approach, and after finding that a party’s origin is the only factor explaining both persistence and (short- and long-term) sustainability-two related, although different, phenomena-the book makes use of four different methods (i.e. triangulation, MSSD, MDSD, and historical narratives) in order to understand how those different structural conditions might influence, and also be mediated by, the choices adopted by founding leaders. Choices that, in turn, will also model the way parties institutionalize and thereby help to secure (or not) a party’s electoral sustainability and organizational survival.
What she finds, in what can be considered one of the most important contributions to the literature, is a (non-deterministic) link between a party’s origins and its modes of party formation, intra-organizational dynamics, programmatic distinctiveness, elites choices, and patterns of institutionalization which, nonetheless, cut across ideological differences. Taking into consideration that new rightist parties can be both rooted (either bottom-up or top-down) and entrepreneurial, she discovers that while rooted outsider parties (mostly Green and religious) tend to be formed bottom-up, adopting a de-centralized structure, entrepreneurial insiders (mostly leftist and liberal) are usually created in a centralized top-down fashion. And this is important because different structural conditions strengthen different dimensions of institutionalization, conditioning the behavior of party leaders.
Thus, in rooted parties (which count with the “natural” advantage of an incipient extra-parliamentary organization infusing the party with value) leaders should focus on the routinization of recruitment strategies and conflict resolution; in entrepreneurial parties (usually favored by an incipient routinization of coordination procedures in public office) the emphasis should be on building an extra-parliamentary organization that would allow the party to navigate through the storm of electoral decline and leadership succession. When that is not the case (e.g. rooted parties with entrepreneurial leaders), parties will ultimately decline and perish. This is not to say that partially institutionalized parties will not be able to become sustainable or persistent (at least temporarily). However, while routinization helps the former, value infusion is better for the latter.
All in all—and making perfect use of what Kim Sass Mikkelsen (“Negative Case Selection,” Sociological Methods and Research, 2015 Online First) calls “negative cases” —the book shows that neither rootedness nor party building are per se necessarily sufficient to assure long-term success and survival. The achievement of these two phenomena will mostly depend on the willingness of party leaders, more often than not on the basis of past experiences, to build an extra-parliamentary membership organization not exclusively directed to consolidate their power or that of the party in public office.
Exceptionally well written, the book combines a sound conceptualization, operationalization, and case selection with a rigorous methodological approach, complementing a large-N (140) quantitative analysis with a considerable number (37) of in-depth qualitative case studies. Conceptually, however, the book should not assume that routinization and value infusion are the most important (and only) dimensions of party institutionalization (see Harmel, R., Svåsand, L. and Mjelde, H. Forthcoming. Institutionalization (and De-Institutionalization) of Right-wing Protest Parties. forthcoming). Operationally, the book would have certainly benefited from the quantification of variables like “agency” and, especially, “institutionalization.” The use of proxies (“leader succession” is implicitly proposed in page 184) would have helped not only to incorporate these factors to the quantitative analysis, increasing the robustness of the findings, but also to understand which dimensions of party institutionalization are more important. Methodologically, the adoption of process tracing à la Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen (Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines, 2012) would have been desirable in order to better understand the “causal chain” linking the various variables at play: namely, party origins, agency, institutionalization, sustainability, and persistence. In terms of case selection, it would have been interesting to add a chapter on (conservative) rooted insiders parties, complementing the author’s (holistic) approach.
Notwithstanding the abovementioned criticism, the book is clearly destined to become a classic, not just among academics but also practitioners. For the latter, and particularly among new parties’ (e.g. Podemos, ANEL, M5S, etc.) leaders, the book here reviewed should be a mandatory reading, as it constitutes a perfect “survival guide.” For the former, Bolleyer’s book constitutes a perfect “research-design guide.” Finally, and echoing Margit Tavits’ (Post-communist Democracies and Party Organization, 2013) similar findings in post-communist Europe, New Parties in Old Party Systems constitutes the most visible proof that while in general the “mass party era” might be already over, the mass party as an organizational model is far from obsolete.
