Michael Gillespie's Theological Origins of Modernity provides a historically grounded and philosophically ambitious, at times even provocative, account of the deep unity of the modern tradition.Footnote 1 The book is more historical than most works of political theory, and exhibits a healthy freedom from received wisdom about who the important thinkers are and about what they might have to say. Yet it would be quite wrong to read this book as a simple history: it is also—perhaps even primarily—a philosophical diagnosis of the present. Gillespie's thesis, stated far too crudely, is that the familiar Enlightenment story of an age of reason preceded by an age of darkness, superstition, and religion is far too simplistic. We late moderns, too, have thoughts about first things and divinity; but we hide the enduring presence of those thoughts and questions from ourselves by the pride we take in having overcome the atavisms of theology. Gillespie argues that, so far from being wholly novel, those thoughts are in fact the descendants of the theology of late medieval nominalism. Where others speak of the secularization of Christianity, Gillespie prefers to speak of the transference of divine attributes from God to man or nature.
In his earlier book, Nihilism before Nietzsche, Gillespie focused on the trajectory of the will as it moved from the frightening God of Ockham to become the defining trait of humanity as such in Descartes, the German Idealists, and Nietzsche. Here Gillespie does not revise this claim so much as suggest that the historical inheritance is more complex: in addition to the Cartesian emphasis on will, we also inherit a sense of God's irresistible power, which turns out to be the source of the deterministic accounts of nature put forth by modern science. Modernity as whole contains both elements; the two understandings of nature or being conflict but also turn out to require or imply the other. Gillespie's most striking theoretical claim is that our late modern metaphysical situation is most clearly expressed in Kant's Third Antinomy of freedom and necessity; his most striking historical claim is that the Third Antinomy repeats the paradoxes of late medieval nominalism, although without full clarity on modernity's basically derivative character. If we have not really gotten past the Third Antinomy, and the Third Antinomy is but a reiteration of the basic tension in nominalist theology between divine and human will, then self-knowledge requires genealogical efforts to recover the original of which our own thought is a distant reflection. Nominalist theology lives on in our thought about first things and being, albeit in a concealed, unselfconscious way: Gillespie's primary purpose in The Theological Origins of Modernity is to undo that concealment as a first step toward philosophic clarity about our fundamental situation.
In this brief comment, I can hardly do justice either to the book's historical breadth and erudition or to its more directly philosophical claims about our own situation. Suffice it to say that The Theological Origins of Modernity will give us much to chew on—on both fronts—for some time to come. Here I focus mainly on a terminological question, albeit one that raises some central philosophical issues: What exactly does “theology” as used here mean? Does it have any necessary relationship to revelation or to a God that speaks to human beings, is a person, and so on, or is it really just a synonym for “thoughts about the highest being or beings, the character of Being or the whole, or the like, regardless of whether it has anything to do with revelation”? While Gillespie sometimes speaks of “theology” (as in the title of the book), he more often uses the term “metaphysics/theology.” I wonder whether we would lose anything essential if we described the thought of most of these thinkers as simply metaphysical. In what follows I try to show how this question arises from Gillespie's argument in at least three different ways.
First, Gillespie's stated contribution to our understanding of modernity is to contest the Enlightenment account of modernity as fundamentally atheistic and antireligious—an account, Gillespie recognizes, still influential. In its place Gillespie suggests that “from the very beginning modernity sought not to eliminate religion and its place in human life, and … it did so not out of hostility to religion but in order to sustain certain religious beliefs” (xii). At various points Gillespie suggests that Descartes, Hobbes, even Machiavelli were moved not by religious skepticism or a proto-Enlightenment atheism but by some form of genuine religious belief (170, 228, 90, 318 n. 74). Yet religious belief certainly need not mean anything like orthodoxy, however defined; Gillespie is an articulate advocate of the view that these thinkers and others were likely heterodox in any number of ways (and thus not above several kinds of prudent dissimulation) but not atheistic in the sense we mean it today, by which Gillespie presumably means thinkers like Bertrand Russell or Daniel Dennett. Past thinkers may well have used a variety of devices to avoid trouble with the authorities even while quietly communicating their true views; it would nonetheless be a gross error to think that what is hidden is in all cases the same, much less that it necessarily coincides with what we think of as atheism. “Esotericism” may be practiced by Rosicrucians, or horoscope believers, or whatever, just as well as “atheists.” Gillespie gives us a salutary reminder that the underworld that opens up once you leave public, conventional religion contains all manner of belief and unbelief.
That said, there is no question that Gillespie's claims on this front—Hobbes is a good Calvinist; Machiavelli is not an atheist, is perhaps even a Christian humanist—will earn him much controversy. Here I leave aside the hermeneutic work of arguing over the specific belief of this or that thinker and ask a more political question. What happens to specifically biblical religion in the course of this narrative? Does it remain an open possibility, or has it been subsumed in the trajectory of modern metaphysics? Gillespie suggests that modern metaphysics/theology has its roots in the late medieval theology of divine omnipotence and thus presumably in some form of biblicalreligion. In this story, however, modern metaphysics quickly leaves behind or conceals religious belief in the everyday sense of the term. One could get the sense from this book that biblicalreligion exhausts itself in the thought of Luther, who articulates most rigorously the tension between divine omnipotence and any sense of divine justice we can understand, and who argues most uncompromisingly that omnipotence is the more fundamental fact. In Gillespie's telling, this event provokes the reactions of Descartes and Hobbes, who respond by transferring various divine attributes to other aspects of reality. After that, the Bible becomes more and more relegated to the sidelines (and this quite regardless of whether Hobbes was a believer). One might think, then, that biblicalreligion has impaled itself on the contradiction between divine omnipotence and divine goodness. This seems to have been the conclusion of Hans Blumenberg's similar account of the role of nominalism in early modernity, as it was of many Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thinkers. But biblical religion continues to exist, although it is separated from the trajectory of thinkers with whom Gillespie is concerned, and even to serve as a source of resistance to the malign political consequences of modern metaphysics. One thinks, for example, of the political conflicts of the twentieth century, in which the United States—if not a strictly biblicalcountry, at least one sympathetic to, and in important respects informed by, biblicalreligion—confronted fascism and communism, surely examples of the exaltation of the will and historical necessity, respectively.
To be sure, Gillespie is not Blumenberg. He regards the question of the correctness of the atheistic “secularization” thesis (which sees the Enlightenment triumphing over superstition) as opposed to a theological interpretation that holds that God has, for his own reasons, turned away from human history, as philosophically undecidable. The possibility of biblicalreligion, even a “philosophically astute” belief, remains open (272). He also suggests that we will need to consider again the question of reason and revelation (18). Yet how exactly our consideration of that question is to proceed is not quite clear, although it is apparently not Strauss's way of approaching the question, which is said to be based on a too radical divide between reason and revelation (350 n. 137). I myself suspect that Strauss might have been more sympathetic to Gillespie's criticism than it would seem at first. Be that as it may, do we not need a representative of revelation in its own name as part of this conversation? And if that is a legitimate player in the debate, do not the terms “theology” or “religion” obscure rather than illuminate crucial differences between biblicalor other religions that claim revelation and the thinkers Gillespie studies?
However that may be, even if Gillespie is right to describe his various moderns as religious, the views they hold are hardly what we normally think of as religion, if by that term we mean something to do with reverence or conventional morality, piety, or the like. Gillespie knows well that these modern theologies are in many respects positively opposed to traditional religion, both in their time and ours. That fact does not rule out, of course, the possibility that these thinkers are moved by beliefs in divinity or first things, unconventional though they may be. But consider Gillespie's Descartes. (Gillespie's Hobbes seems to me to present a different set of issues entirely.) A previous generation of commentators took science to be the core of Descartes' thought; as a consequence they dismissed or downplayed his metaphysics and took Descartes' appeals to theology as largely prudential. According to Gillespie, this reading is superficial: Descartes is concerned throughout with theological considerations, above all the threat—both practical and theoretical—to science posed by the possibility of divine omnipotence. Descartes is haunted, it seems, by the terrifying and possibly capricious God of late medieval nominalism and of the Reformation. Gillespie offers a novel interpretation not of the details of the Cartesian project so much as of the fundamental motive behind it: Descartes is attempting to construct a citadel of reason, founded on the indubitable cogito ergo sum, that will tame divine omnipotence. But note well that this interpretation does not really deny the atheistic character of Descartes' mature thought. The God whose existence is demonstrated by Descartes is infinite but incapable of self-consciousness; he cannot, it would seem, have anything to do with moral matters or the Bible or piety in the everyday sense of the word. As Gillespie remarks, the God Descartes ends up with is very close to Spinoza's God (339 n. 144). That God is infinite, unthinking, beyond good and evil. We can quibble about the sense in which this is “theological,” but by our everyday use of the word, it is well nigh indistinguishable from “atheism.”
The real difference between Gillespie's interpretation and earlier interpretations is that the latter took Descartes to be what we might call a “dry” or soulless atheist, someone who believes that the world might really be matter in motion and nothing more, whereas on Gillespie's interpretation he is very much the “wet” atheist, almost an existentialist, someone who is enough of a believer in the nominalist God to feel the need to attempt to conquer him. For Descartes as seen by the older interpretation, God as meant in everyday talk is a sop to “weak souls” (Discourse 5, end); for Descartes as interpreted by Gillespie, we must become God. It is safe to say, I think, that Gillespie's Descartes is far more hubristic than the soulless atheist he was previously believed to be. To think, then, that Gillespie's revision of our conventional understandings of early modernity is somehow more pious or more conciliatory to conventional religion would do the book a serious disservice—and this despite the impression Gillespie sometimes gives.
Second, Gillespie's more radical interpretation of Descartes' aspiration to become a God is not without its own puzzles. The claim is that Descartes is confronted with the threat of an omnipotent God who is no man's debtor and who is not bound by justice as we know it, or necessity, or anything else. In order to escape from the fear and uncertainty produced by such a God, Descartes is compelled to engage in a contest with the frightening nominalist God: the scientific project of mastering and possessing nature is merely the practical expression of that deeper confrontation.Footnote 2 Note, however, some strange aspects to this sequence. Consider the God against whom Descartes reacts. That God stands in an ambiguous relationship to the God known in the Bible. He is thought to be omnipotent—an opinion whose origins seem to be biblical—but he is not known to be good nor do we have any certainty that he will keep his promises. God can, it would seem, flood the earth again but the rainbow is not evidence of the reliability of his promises. That God shares a fearsome, utterly mysterious power with the God we meet in the Bible, but lacks any knowable or intelligible concern with morality or law or justice as we humans understand it. In fact, the chapter on Luther might be said to show how the idea of omnipotence ends up being indistinguishable from mere arbitrariness (157–58). One of the ironies of Gillespie's story is that while those we normally think of as atheists turn out to be religious (Descartes, Hobbes, Machiavelli), those we normally think of as religious, like Luther, lead to a practical atheism or fanaticism, since God's chosen cannot afford to be bound by any merely human morality.
Humanly speaking, it is perfectly understandable why a person might be tempted to rebel against such a tyrant. It is harder to understand why you might think it possible to succeed. Is it possible, if Descartes really thought that God was omnipotent, to think that the cogito could withstand such a God? Neither the mysterious God of the Bible who is concerned with justice nor Luther's terrifying and transmoral God, taken literally, provides very good grounds for the Cartesian project. So the question arises, How seriously does Descartes take Luther's frightening nominalist God, really? In fact, Gillespie is somewhat ambiguous on this score. Sometimes he speaks of Descartes rebelling against or taking the place of the nominalist God: “[Descartes' cogito] is able to resist and ultimately challenge (or even replace) God himself. Man for Descartes becomes master and possessor of nature by dispossessing its current owner, that is, by taking it away from God” (40). At other times he suggests that Descartes needs only to exorcise the possibility or idea of an omnipotent God: “the challenge to the certainty of his science … does not require the actual existence of an omnipotent God but only his mere possibility. Descartes thus does not have to believe in such a God or even in any god at all to entertain such doubts” (194). But the two are not the same; and which one is correct makes a big difference in how we understand the roots of Descartes' thought. After all, one cannot replace a mere possibility.
None of this is to deny the fertility of Gillespie's interpretations, or the centrality of the nominalist challenge to modern thought. But let me propose an alternative hypothesis for what happens at the key juncture in the narrative. As presented here, the nominalist revolution has in fact two distinct moments: one is the thought of divine omnipotence and will—the mysterious and completely unpredictable God of Ockham, Luther, and Calvin; the other is the thought that the world is made up of radically individual particulars—there are no Platonic Ideas, Aristotelian species, or the like. The two moments are linked but not identical; a key question is how they are linked. It often seems as though the concept of will is the more fundamental moment; certainly it has a more prominent place in the presentation of the narrative. But for the reasons just mentioned, it is hard to see a clear path from divine omnipotence to human will, taken on their own terms. It may therefore be better to see the account of nature as the key element, moving part, or source of motion in the unfolding of modernity. Such an account would go like this: late medieval nominalism brought to light a new way of seeing nature as composed of radical individuals. If that is the way the world is, the only plausible response is the assertion of will, some will. The disparate positions of Luther and Descartes could then be seen as reactions to the same underlying phenomenon, the radical individuality of things. The changing candidates for who exactly possesses that will would be less important than the view that some will is necessary. Or as Gillespie puts it, the ontic differences between Luther, Descartes, and Hobbes rest on (and partially obscure) their underlying ontological agreement (15–18).
On this interpretation, Gillespie's narrative would be more Heideggerean than theological in any biblicalsense: at a certain point in history Being began to appear differently than it had previously. The story would not be a moral drama in which something has been stolen from its rightful owner which ought to be restored. The assertion of will in Descartes and others would not be the fundamental reality; it occurs against a backdrop of a new dispensation of the world. To borrow a distinction from Heidegger, the ontotheological question about the highest being or god (for Luther, the mysterious nominalist God who spoke in the Bible; for Descartes, human beings who are on the way to becoming gods via the mastery and possession of nature) is less fundamental than the ontological question about the character of Being as such. The migration of the notion of the will from the divine to the human is the foreground of Gillespie's drama; but it may well be only the foreground. Perhaps we should even see the notion of divine omnipotence as a Trojan horse, meant to soften us up to accept the radically individualist modern metaphysics.Footnote 3
I do not know if this is what Gillespie has in mind. But it brings me to my third and final question. Gillespie argues eloquently for our need for self-knowledge: his project is not history for history's sake, still less historicism, but history in the service of a philosophical diagnosis of the present. Still, one wonders about the bearing of his historical claims on the properly philosophical question at hand. Could not a thoughtful partisan of modernity accept the results of Gillespie's historical researches and still think that modernity is more right than not? It is not always clear whether the demonstration of the historical rootedness of this or that aspect of modernity is meant to invalidate that aspect. But if it were, would that move not be rightly accused of committing the genetic fallacy? Even if our nominalism is historically indebted to Ockham, Luther, and company, it might still be the correct account of the world as it presents itself to us. It might be a historical accident that the truth about the world first presented itself to human beings in the guise of or under the shelter of nominalist theology. Must not the historical studies, however necessary, be propaedeutic to, or accompanied by, a more properly philosophical inquiry?
Gillespie provides a twofold response to concerns of this sort. First, it is not at all clear that our contemporary belief in the truth of nominalist metaphysics is anything more than our own, late modern prejudice. The concealment of theology has meant that we tend to take the nominalist view as though it were known to be simply true, the result of our science. But the nominalist view may well be a premise of our science rather than a result of it. As Gillespie remarks, “The truth of natural causality [in the context of Kant's Third Antinomy] is not taken as a matter of faith to be believed or not but as a self-evident truth of reason. In this way, the theological foundations of the two sides in the debate are concealed and thus cease to be open to debate. The contradiction at the heart of the antinomy is thus solidified and made insoluble by the forgetfulness of its theological origin” (276). The irony of Gillespie's narrative is that modern science and metaphysics, ostensibly the enemy of all faith, rest on an unarticulated faith, and a faith that we are unable to see for ourselves as faith. So long as partisans of modernity claim that the radically individualist metaphysics is known rather than just believed, Gillespie's historical studies will have some bite.
Second, and more substantively, Gillespie makes the (Platonic) suggestion that we cannot help seeing things as both one and many, and that this situation is both contradictory and unavoidable. The question of the one and the many, he remarks, is “primordial because it cannot be answered, and it cannot be answered because it is itself the presupposition of all thinking and therefore of all questioning and answering” (43). Nominalism in its various guises sees manyness, plurality, or chaos as the ontological truth of the world, unified only by an exercise of the will, variously understood as divine or human. Yet nominalism cannot provide us with an “unequivocal answer to the question,” for there is “no final theoretical vision of the whole that can serve as the absolute, fundamental, and unshakeable truth” (43). (It also follows that nominalism cannot be all wrong: Gillespie cannot promise us any simple liberation from modernity.) Indeed, Gillespie goes so far as to assert that “Temporality … becomes meaningful for us against the background of eternity” (18). Apparently the one or the eternal remains a kind of root or presupposition of our thinking, lurking unarticulated behind our own, late modern, nominalism. The deepest theoretical theme of this philosophic diagnosis of the present is thus the Platonic/Parmenidean aporia of the one and the many. Although Gillespie is certainly not a conventional Straussian, he remains a thinker of fundamental and—as far as we know—insoluble problems.
The ultimate burden of Gillespie's narrative would thus not be the unavoidability of theology, if we mean by that term something specifically biblicalor otherwise divinely revealed. It is rather our persisting need to think the whole, to see the many as in some sense one, and one in a more than merely factitious sense. The Kantian antinomies, so far from being a calamity, are in fact the truest thing about modernity, apparently because they are the closest approximation within modernity to the Platonic aporiae. And this is true in spite of (or perhaps even because of) the terrible practical consequences of the late modern consciousness of the basic contradictions of our world. If I understand Gillespie correctly, the political pathologies of modernity are finally intelligible only in terms of the metaphysical problems they both reflect and distort. Gillespie implies that we cannot live without thoughts about first things, nor can we finally seal those opinions off from our practical lives, and thus that coming to terms with the tensions inherent in practical life might require seeing them in the light of our contradictory metaphysical inheritance.
In the final pages of the book, Gillespie suggests that without a clearer understanding of the roots of our own tradition, we will be less able to handle the challenge of Islamic fundamentalism, itself a variety of nominalism. On some level, this must be true, since lacking self-knowledge is hardly a good thing. But I wonder how much further the practical guidance we might expect from this inquiry will go. Will replacing our late modern nominalist metaphysics of will and necessity with the aporia of the one and the many allow us to navigate better the practical manifestations of those tensions? Or is its utility primarily negative, liberating us from misguided or fanatical attempts to absolutize some partial claim? Put differently, it may well be that practice rightly understood points us to theory; it does not follow that theory rightly understood will necessarily provide us much help, if any, with practice. However that may be, Gillespie has surely done us a service by reminding us that modernity did not and cannot settle the questions that originally set it in motion.
