Robert A. Larmer, Professor and Head of the Philosophy Department at the University of New Brunswick, has published many pieces criticizing Hume’s “Of Miracles” (1748).Footnote 1The Legitimacy of Miracle, his most recent contribution to this project, brings together several core ideas from these earlier pieces into a single whole. For philosophers working on recent responses to Hume’s “Of Miracles,” Larmer’s book is essential reading.
A marked feature of several recent critiques of Hume’s “Of Miracles” is their almost complete lack of respect for Hume. Thus David Johnson, in Hume, Holism, and Miracles (1999), maintains that there is nothing “even superficially good” in Hume’s essay.Footnote 2 In Hume’s Abject Failure (2000), David Earman is equally blunt: Hume’s essay, Earman says, “represents the kind of overreaching that gives philosophy a bad name.”Footnote 3 Fortunately Larmer’s book has a different tone: although disagreeing sharply with Hume, it displays real respect.
In this review, I shall confine myself to what Larmer says is the “basic contention” of his book, namely the claim that “a priori in-principle dismissals of the possibility or probability of justified belief in miracles fail” (187). Larmer takes Hume’s “Of Miracles” to urge an a priori dismissal of precisely this sort.
Larmer summarizes his understanding of Hume’s argument against rational belief in the testimony of miracles as follows:
1. A miracle must be defined as violating the laws of nature.
2. Any evidence in favour of a miracle inevitably conflicts with the evidence in favour of the laws of nature.
3. The evidence in favour of a miracle cannot exceed, even in principle, the evidence in favour of the laws of nature.
4. Therefore belief in the occurrence of a miracle can never be justified. (38)
“[A]t first glance,” says Larmer, this argument is “simple, elegant and compelling” (53), and the standard response of Hume’s critics, which consists in seeking to undermine the third premise, is deemed “not an easy task” (38).
Nevertheless, Larmer thinks the above Humean argument is “severely flawed” (4), and the reason for this is said to lie not in the third but in the first premise, i.e., in the claim that miracles must be defined as violations of the laws of nature. We can see that this premise is incorrect, says Larmer, by “reflecting on the fact that the laws of nature do not themselves allow the predication or explanation of any event” (38).
Larmer provides us with two instances of such reflection:
It is, for example, impossible to predict what will happen on a billiard table by making reference solely to Newton’s laws of motion. One must also make reference to the number of balls on the table, their initial position, the condition of the felt, the angle the cue stick is held at, and so on. (39)
One can know, for example, that masses attract one another, but knowledge of the law of gravity tells us nothing of the amount of gravitational attraction the earth and moon will exert on one another. Only if one knows the mass of the moon and the earth and their distance apart will one be able to calculate that value. (50 n. 47)
Larmer takes these reflections to validate a “basic distinction” between “the laws of nature” and “the stuff of nature,” the latter being “the material conditions to which the laws of nature apply” (39). This distinction enables Larmer to say that God can perform miracles by changing material conditions in the world, e.g., by creating or annihilating units of mass/energy or by causing such units to occupy different positions. For example:
if God were to create ex nihilo a spermatozoon which fertilized an egg in the body of a virgin no laws of nature would be broken, yet the usual course of nature would have been overridden in such a way as to bring about an event nature would not otherwise have produced. (39)
If this approach makes sense, the first premise of Hume’s above argument turns out to be false, and so the argument is unsound.
There are two obvious objections to this approach, which Larmer nevertheless believes can be overcome. A first objection is that, in taking God to have intervened in the world by creating, annihilating or changing the material conditions of mass/energy, one is ipso facto taking God to have violated a law of nature, namely the Principle of Conservation of Energy. Larmer takes this objection to blur the distinction between a ‘scientific’ and a ‘metaphysical’ reading of the relevant law, however. On a scientific reading, the law makes a claim only about the behaviour of energy in isolated systems, whereas on a metaphysical reading it makes a claim about reality in its totality (41). On the scientific reading, the law can’t properly be taken to be violated by divine intervention in the world, for such intervention entails that the world is no longer viewed, in its totality, as an isolated system (41-46).
A second objection is that the expressions ‘law of nature’ and ‘miracle’ in the first premise of Hume’s argument, should be understood more colloquially; a law of nature might be understood as a well-established regularity of nature, and a miracle as a dramatic exception to such a regularity (40). Larmer’s response is that evidence that a given regularity of nature lacks exceptions can only be obtained on the condition that “all other things … [are] equal”; but “the believer in a miracle … contends that all other things were not equal [in the case of a miracle],” so the needed evidence against miracles is unobtainable (41).
I doubt that Humeans would find this last point entirely persuasive. Humeans take their experience of the constancy of the regularities of nature and the variability of the credibility of human testimony to provide a sufficient reason for the rational rejection of miracle reports,Footnote 4 and the believer’s contention that all things weren’t equal in cases of alleged miracles would seem to amount to precisely such a report, and so might well seem to beg the very point at issue.
