Over the past couple of decades, an ever-growing body of scholarship has emerged to scrutinize the consequences of Western democracy promotion efforts, particularly in the context of the Middle East, which has been a target of regime change and democratization in the post–9/11 moment. Manal A. Jamal's book, which seeks to understand why democracy promotion succeeds in some countries but fails in others is a welcome addition to this body of literature. The book is based on original fieldwork conducted in El Salvador and the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT), comprising a rich data set of interviews with political leaders and civil society activists as well as foreign donors, in addition to analyses of reports on donor assistance to the respective countries or territories.
In an innovative departure from most other assessments of foreign democracy promotion efforts, Jamal focuses on the context in which democracy assistance is given as the factor determining democratic outcomes. In particular, she dismisses the argument that the failure of democratic development in Palestine was due to the demobilization of what were previously vibrant, mass-based, grassroots organizations because of NGO-ization and professionalization caused by the inpouring of foreign aid in the wake of the Oslo Accords. Her research finds that El Salvador experienced a similar trend of professionalization of civil society organizations but without the effect of demobilizing wider grassroots constituencies. This leads her to argue that the type of political settlement governing post-conflict transitions is the key factor determining the success or failure of democracy promotion efforts. In this respect, she elaborates:
Even in the absence of the massive influx of Western donor assistance and requirements for institutional professionalization, Palestinian civil society and democratic developments would have remained constrained because, ultimately, the Oslo Accords were not meant to deliver and promote democracy. The massive influx of foreign aid that followed, including assistance to develop civil society and democracy, was intended to buttress the Oslo Accords and to promote those groups and constituencies that did not oppose the Oslo Accords. (7)
This argument is carefully substantiated over seven chapters. Chapter 1 lays out the rationale for paying attention to political settlements in understanding democratic developments in post-conflict societies. Specifically, Jamal categorizes post-conflict settlements as either inclusive or non-inclusive. Inclusive political settlements are those that include all major political groups and are widely supported across society. Non-inclusive political settlements are those that exclude key political constituencies and have limited societal support. She classifies El Salvador as an example of an inclusive political settlement, whereas Israel-Palestine is an example of a non-inclusive political settlement. The type of political settlement shapes the consequences of donor funding for civil society and democratization in three ways: 1) who receives funding and who does not; 2) the amount of funding and types of programs; 3) the design of political institutions at local and national levels and electoral design, which, in turn, shapes citizen participation and civil society interactions.
Choosing to compare El Salvador and Palestine was based on similarities in their experiences of protracted conflict, and specifically the parallels between what became the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), as elaborated in Chapter 2. The FMNL was founded in 1980 and, like the PLO, was an umbrella group of leftist guerrilla groups. Whereas the PLO fought to dismantle a settler colonial regime, the FMNL fought to end government repression and long-standing socioeconomic inequalities, manifested in the unequal distribution of land. Both the FMLN and PLO were political-military organizations that actively mobilized popular support among key sectors (workers, students, women, and peasants) through the establishment of mass-based grassroots organizations.
Chapter 3 provides an informative discussion of how the nature of the political settlement in the respective cases shaped the inclusivity of emerging political institutions and the relationship of civil society to those institutions as well as to the general population. Both groups signed peace agreements in the early 1990s. Jamal demonstrates how the more inclusive political settlement in El Salvador led to more inclusive political institutions and more competitive elections, whereas the non-inclusive political settlement in Israel-Palestine led to the demobilization of mass organizations and the political domination of Fatah, at the expense of groups who opposed the peace accords. Chapter 4 then proceeds to outline how the political settlement shaped the amounts and types of Western donor funding and the programs that donors prioritized. Aid to the OPT was singularly aimed at supporting the Oslo Accords and liberal peace-building efforts, at the same time marginalizing opponents to the accords. Aid was mainly channeled toward professionalized NGOs and budget support for the Palestinian Authority. Meanwhile, sectors that could possibly provide indirect support to the opposition, such as local government, were underfunded. By contrast, donor aid to El Salvador was less coordinated, with each donor funding different actors. This fragmentation reduced donor leverage over political outcomes while ensuring that a more inclusive range of civil society and political actors received funding. Similarly, a range of sectors was funded, with a much larger portion of funds going to develop local government, strengthening democratic development.
Chapter 5 drills down to examine how one sector of civil society was impacted by foreign donor aid following the respective peace accords, namely, women's organizations. Both the PLO and FMNL had affiliated women's organizations that historically were vital in mobilizing large numbers of women in rural and urban areas to participate in the struggle. This chapter provides a fascinating discussion of how donors approached women's organizations in Palestine and El Salvador. The focus of Western donors on buttressing the Oslo Accords led to the exclusion of women's organizations associated with the opposition and a preference for professionalized NGOs that lacked any mass base. This, in turn, led to the creation of vertical hierarchies and political polarization within the women's sector, weakening civil society and failing to provide the sorts of programs that would address women's priorities in the context of an ongoing military occupation. By contrast, Western donors in El Salvador did not differentiate between civil society organizations with regard to political affiliations. As a result, a range of women's organizations had access to funding, which they used to professionalize, but without losing their mass-based constituencies. Indeed, donors preferred to fund NGOs with popular constituencies to reach impoverished communities across the country. Consequently, despite the many challenges facing women's organizations in El Salvador, Jamal argues that civil society there is stronger than in the OPT.
Chapter 6 highlights the longer-term impacts of donor aid on the Palestinian political landscape through a focus on the aftermath of Hamas's 2006 election victory. The author provides a thorough and sobering discussion of how Western reactions to Hamas's electoral victory exacerbated political polarization between Fatah and Hamas, ultimately undermining democracy and weakening civil society. More than fifteen years later, Palestinians continue to live with this damaging status quo, with no end in sight, as highlighted by the indefinite postponement of Palestinian legislative and presidential elections in spring 2021. An increasingly authoritarian Fatah, its Western backers, and the Israeli government continue to prevent elections out of fear of a Hamas victory. Chapter 7 concludes by considering the author's findings related to two other conflict-to-peace transitions, in Iraq (post-2003) and post-apartheid South Africa, reaffirming her argument that the nature of political settlements shaped the respective outcomes of democracy promotion in these two contrasting cases.
This book is likely to become an important reference point for other scholars researching democracy promotion and democratization in post-conflict contexts in the Middle East and beyond. The comparison of cases from different geographical regions has a particular strength in revealing relevant factors not considered previously in the literature on democracy promotion. However, there exist two tensions within the book, which are not so much the fault of the author but rather the consequence of the deficiencies of mainstream comparative politics as an academic field.
The first tension concerns the role of geopolitics and, in particular, the geostrategic interests of Western governments in ultimately shaping the nature of political settlements. The author does discuss these factors throughout the book. For example, Chapter 3 is attentive to how the post–Cold War geopolitical context in the Middle East weakened the PLO and its bargaining position vis-à-vis Israel. Chapter 4 highlights the significance of Western interests in determining the amounts of aid disbursed in each case. Per capita, the OPT received over three times more aid than El Salvador, even though the OPT is a middle-income country. This gave donors to the OPT more leverage over political outcomes than in the El Salvador case. Nonetheless, the geopolitical context is not incorporated into the book's explanatory framework.
The second tension lies with the book's normative commitment to the idea of Western democracy promotion despite its limitations and failures in practice. The author does hint toward this in places. As Benjamin Shuetze discusses in his contribution to Jadaliyya's Middle East Studies Pedagogy Initiative, this is a weakness shared by most of the literature on Western democracy promotion.Footnote 1 In both El Salvador and Palestine, democracy promotion has not only failed to address the fundamental issues that generated conflict and violence in the first place—that is, social inequalities of land distribution in El Salvador and national dispossession in Israel-Palestine—but has been key to enabling the continuation of these injustices. Ultimately, the fact that almost thirty years after the signing of the Oslo Accords Palestinians have neither peace nor democracy is a stark indictment of Western democracy promotion.
I believe that an exploration of these tensions could be productive in revealing future avenues of research into democracy promotion and post-conflict transitions in the Middle East and beyond, as well as pushing comparative political scientists to think more critically about how some of the assumptions underpinning their field are entangled with imperialism.
