Everyone recalls Protagoras’ story in Plato's eponymous dialogue: it relates Epimetheus’ failed repartition of features to each animal species, followed by Prometheus’ attempt to correct his brother's negligent design. This story, albeit relating an absence of thoughtful design, as human beings are notably left without any attributes, lays out some central features of the ancient notion of providence. As the story tells, the planned repartition of powers to different animal species aims at ensuring their survival. The idea is thus of an intelligent force which, by dint of its ability to plan in advance, ensures (or at least should ensure) the survival of the world and of the species it contains. If we were to rewrite the story according to C.'s reading of the Stoic contribution to this vast topic, the gift of the planning-ahead intelligence to human beings would have been that of an impulse towards themselves (oikeiôsis), in addition to the special status granted by their sharing in reason. The stress on the linkage between providence and oikeiôsis, i.e. appropriation or familiarisation, constitutes C.'s most original contribution in this study that aims at retracing the development of the Stoics’ notion of providence from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius. Oikeiôsis not only constitutes the necessary condition for the preservation of life, as it accounts for human beings’ and other animals’ tendency towards their own preservation, but it also applies to God and, as such, accounts for the way in which providence extends down to the world and to each individual human being. Eight chapters (from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius) lead to the discussion of this twin thesis concerning the relationship between providence and oikeiôsis. C. first identifies in Hierocles an argument to the effect that self-preservation in all animals, including the most repulsive ones, is the product of providence, which endows them with adaptation towards themselves. This argument, he claims, is an attack launched against the Epicurean account of life preservation. As providence delegates its own power to human beings in the form of a daimôn, the individual care of the self ultimately goes back to the providential governance of the world. Next, C. shows that cosmic oikeiôsis applies not only to the world but also to individual human beings. Since individual human souls are perceived as detached parts of the world, god not only perceives what happens in the soul of individual human beings, but he also has a natural impulse and concern towards each of them.

C. starts the history of Stoic providence with Zeno's identification of Plato's demiurge with nature and his refusal of conceiving god separated from the world, which resulted in a biological model of creation. Next, C. presents Cleanthes as departing from Zeno in holding that god is not the only causal factor in the cosmos. With a view to shielding god from the responsibility of evil doings, Cleanthes restricted god's providence. Chapter 3 discusses the extant fragments of Chrysippus’ On providence. According to C.'s reconstruction, the first book defended the idea that conflagration does not imply that god is the cause of destruction, as it consists in a withdrawing of Zeus into providence and Book 4 focused on the problem of evil, maintaining the inseparability of good and evil and viewing non-moral disadvantages as necessary consequences of a well-planned order. The next two chapters embark on Middle Stoicism. C. accounts for Panaetius’ denial of the destructibility of the world, for his view on divination and his rejection of astrology. He also argues for a strong opposition between sense-perception and reason and a deep connection between a reason-based study of the cosmos and political knowledge. Like Panaetius, Posidonius emphasised the importance of reason as a tool for cosmological studies, which guarantee, in turn, ethical and social good living, and gave emphasis to the providential role of philosophy. The next chapter presents Seneca's providence as what guarantees the unhindered unfolding of nature. While Seneca is optimistic concerning human progress, ignorance is pointed out as what impedes, in the case of human beings, this providential unfolding. C. pays a lot of attention to the issue of the political implication of the wise person and finally argues that with Seneca the governing features of divine providence are transferred to the king. In order to approach Epictetus’ providence, C. raises the question of what accounts for human beings’ failure to recognise it. This leads him to embark on an examination of the causes of human corruption. He then shows that parental love, which lies at the heart of the formation of human societies, constitutes a providential gift ensuring the preservation of human life. Finally, according to Marcus Aurelius, one should emulate gods’ benevolence towards bad people in showing them kindness. Providence is thereby connected to politics; for it is the good leader's task to foster free and voluntary obedience through kindness.

In devoting a monograph to the topic of providence, C. indisputably contributes to the relatively recent renewal of the field of Stoic cosmology and theology and follows in the footsteps of other studies chiefly concerned with Stoic theology and providence, such as that of M. Dragona-Monachou, The Stoic Arguments for the Existence and the Providence of the Gods (1976); G. Reydams-Schils, Demiurge and Providence (1999); P.A. Meijer, Stoic Theology (2007), and many important papers that cannot be all listed here. While Dragona-Monachou's and Meijer's studies focus on the formal proofs for the existence of the gods, and that of Reydams-Schils on the tradition that conflates Platonic and Stoic readings of the Timaeus, C.'s book has the merit of offering a large overview of the topic of providence and of the network of related issues. Despite its merits, the book and its methodology raise some questions. I will focus on two primary concerns. Broadly speaking, two main approaches are available for handling the fragmentary state of our evidence. Either one attempts to use the sources synoptically in order to reconstruct the ‘Stoic doctrine’, or one pays heed to its evolution and development. While the historically oriented approach has many advantages, including avoiding the pitfall of essentialisation, the selection and manipulation of the fragments need to take into account the dialectical settings of the sources in which they are embedded with careful philological scrutiny. Despite his historical approach, C. does not lay forth his methodological assumptions and rarely addresses the original motive of the sources. This sometimes results in attributing tenets to Stoic individuals or in suggesting a dialectical context on unstable grounds. For instance, C. argues that Books 1 and 4 of Chrysippus’ On Providence are a reply to an Epicurean line of criticism on account of the fact that the issues they address match Velleius’ comments against the Stoics in Cicero's On the Nature of the Gods (1.20 and 23). To back up this claim, one needs to show that it is plausible that Velleius’ remarks reflect a third-century bce Epicurean attack on Stoicism and needs to address therefore the complex question of Cicero's working method in ND (and especially the parallels with Philodemus’ De pietate) as well as the fact that 1.20–3 conflates Stoic pronoia with Plato's demiurge. Furthermore, one wonders whether Velleius’ pointing to a contradiction between the idea that most human beings are fools, and therefore unhappy, and that of a world made for the sake of human beings (see also Plut. SR 31 and Cic. ND 3.70) is a valid parallel to the extant fragments of On providence 4, which address the necessary existences of vices, diseases and the topic of free will (Gell. 7.1–2). The second problem relates to the uneven discussions of some philosophical issues. While it is obviously impossible to offer a detailed analysis of every point, some arguments would have benefited from more careful discussions. This especially applies to C.'s treatment of Stoic epistemology: one wonders what C. means when he says that Cleanthes made reason rather than sense-perception a criterion of truth (without mentioning katalêptic impressions) or why there is a conflation between self-perception and knowledge. Furthermore, the discussion of fate would have benefited from a sustained engagement with S. Bobzien's fundamental contribution (Determinism and Freedom [1998]), and the interesting chapters on oikeiôsis could have taken into account K. Vogt's discussion of citizen-gods (Law, Reason [2008]). Finally, readers would have enjoyed a conclusion connecting together the various discussions.