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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 April 2005
Mohammed Hafez's Why Muslims Rebel is a theoretically informed and persuasive study of Islamist movements' turn to violence. Using social movements theory, this welcome addition to scholarship on political Islam sets out to debunk “deprivation theories” of the rise of violent Islamist movements. In direct contradiction to Ted Gurr's classic Why Men Rebel (1970), Hafez argues that violent Islamist insurgencies “are not primarily an aggressive response to economic deprivation or psychological alienation produced by severe impoverishment or failed modernization.” Rather, they are “defensive reaction[s] to predatory state repression that threatens the organizational resources and lives of political Islamists” (p. xvi). Hafez uses Islamist pamphlets, reports from human-rights organizations and newspapers, and a range of secondary sources in Arabic and English to investigate violent Islamist insurgency in Algeria and Egypt in the 1990s. He bolsters his case by providing more schematic comparisons with other countries where Islamist violence has not occurred on a similar scale, as well as with states where it has.
In this carefully comparative work, Hafez examines the role of political processes, mobilizing structures, and ideological frames in promoting violent insurgencies. In chapter 2, he analyzes the nature of political exclusion in Algeria (where the electoral victory of Front Islamique du Salut [FIS] was annulled by a military coup in 1992) and Egypt (where a series of illiberal electoral laws and pre-election crackdowns excluded the Muslim Brotherhood from participation in the elections). Drawing comparisons with Jordan, Pakistan, and Tunisia, Hafez shows that political exclusion by the state is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of insurgency. In chapter 3, Hafez delineates those characteristics of state repression that more definitively result in the Islamist organizations' turn to violence. He shows that only when state repression is deployed indiscriminately (rather than selectively) and reactively (rather than pre-emptively) Islamist organizations resort to violence. He argues that reactive state repression after a period of mass mobilization and organizing allows the movements to gauge their own strength, command enough resources, and have enough at stake to fight back. He tests his hypothesis by sketching insurgencies in Tajikistan, the Philippines, Chechnya, and Kashmir. The two chapters analyzing political processes that lead to insurgencies are the book's most successful chapters. Although violence in Pakistan, where exclusion has been only partial, is not definitively explained, these chapters are clear, coherent, and convincing.
In chapter 4, Hafez examines mobilizing structures and argues that political exclusion and indiscriminate and reactive repression lead the insurgents to transform their organizations into exclusive structures. Exclusive movement organizations have the benefits of greater protection against counterinsurgency measures and greater internal cohesion, but their very exclusivity intensifies intramovement competition, institutionalizes underground mobilization, and consequently prolongs violent insurgency. Although this chapter offers a fascinating study of the fragmentation of violent Islamist organizations in both Egypt and Algeria, it leaves an important question unanswered: why did the leaders of Egyptian Jama

a Islamiyya issue a unilateral cease-fire in 1997 if, in fact, that year saw more intraorganizational competition, which, as Hafez's theory tells us, should lead to further bloodshed and the protraction of insurgency?
Chapter 5, where Hafez attempts to explain the relationship between ideological frames and anticivilian violence, is the book's weakest chapter. Hafez points to three mechanisms of “moral disengagement” that legitimate attacks on civilians: ethical justifications (“we have a righteous cause”), advantageous comparisons (“we have suffered more”), and displacement of responsibility onto the victims (“they brought it on themselves”). Problematically, Hafez categorizes these mechanisms as antisystemic. One can argue that states (the United States foremost among them) readily use these same justifications to explain their killing of civilians. In addition, one is not entirely convinced that post hoc justifications for violence would necessarily encourage anticivilian violence itself. There are more complex social and institutional–organizational mechanisms at work that are not explored here.
Overall, the book is accessible, sound, and effectively presented. Arabic names are clearly transliterated, and I found only one typographical error (Ann Swidler's last name is rendered in the text and in the bibliography as Swindler). However, a few quibbles remain. First, the Palestinian struggle against Israel (pp. 158–59) is an instance not of Islamist insurgence but, rather, of nationalist struggle against foreign occupation, and the Lebanese Hizbullah (p. 159) has not conducted a domestic insurgency as in Algeria or Egypt. Instead, it has fought a war against a foreign state. Similarly, the Chechnyan and Kashmiri rebellions are nationalist/secessionist and different from those of Algeria and Egypt. Second, in at least two places Hafez explains the state's use of repression by claiming that Islamist “violence begets repression” (pp. 78, 83). This brief allusion to the circularity of violence and repression only occludes Hafez's clear argument and brings up more questions than it can answer. Another persistent question that Hafez leaves unanswered is the reason behind Islamist organizations' attacks on soft targets before state repression. Admittedly, the number of such attacks increases dramatically after state repression, but nevertheless the reader wants to know more. Fourth, although Hafez wants to shift the focus away from the socioeconomic background of the Islamists, some explanation of how and whom the organizations recruited would have been helpful. Finally, it is perhaps a credit to the clarity of Hafez's rendering of his cases studies that I was left wondering why so many of the Islamist movements' turns to violence seemed to happen in 1992. Further research may be needed to show whether global reasons (such as the end of the Cold War and the United States' shift of focus to Islamism) could have encouraged further state repression of Islamist movements at that time.
Despite these questions and critiques, Hafez's book is a very welcome addition not only to Middle East studies, but also to sociology and politics curricula. Chapters can be profitably assigned to undergraduate students, and all can benefit from Hafez's careful argument about political processes, useful deployment of cross-case comparisons, and successful framing of his argument within the larger theoretical literature.