This collection of short essays not only sparks the lay reader's interest but also delivers sufficient depth to engage the specialist. The analysis of different aspects of World War I is divided into three sections, each corresponding to the phrase used in the title: change, upheaval, collapse. The distribution is not chronological; each part instead addresses a separate theme.

In the first section, the authors analyze the level of global integration and subsequent disintegration before and during the July Crisis of 1914. Stefan Rinke's opening essay addresses the Latin American response to the outbreak of war and highlights the global shock about the events that had ultimately led to the war. Boris Barth then demonstrates that new wartime fault lines served to shift the centers of economic power to the periphery, de-Europeanizing rather than de-globalizing trade. Segesser's article discusses efforts to develop and implement a set of rules of war based in law. Debates centered in particular on the question of who qualified as a combatant, and on the methods civilized states are permitted to use to pursue violent conflict. The interpretations of these norms failed to take hold, not just among “uncivilized” states but also, as the Great War demonstrated, on the part of the leading and “civilized” states of the day. In his contribution, Florian Kerschbaumer argues that the war destroyed existing networks and organizations, making the case that artists and scientists were as complicit in the jingoism of the age as politicians and journalists were.

The second section consists of a variety of regional case studies related to the theme of upheaval. Volker Prott's article on local conditions in Alsace-Lorraine argues that Francophile or pan-German antagonisms were not the reasons for discontent in the region, but rather mistrust of Berlin, German military repression, as well as the divide-and-conquer strategy being pursued in Paris. Agnieszka Kudelka's essay on Galicia addresses a similarly significant region to the east of Germany, examining how its inhabitants viewed relations with Austria-Hungary and Russia. Because of the heterogeneous composition of the province, authorities in Vienna wanted to win the support of Poles and Ukrainians in order to isolate Russophiles. With the conquest of large portions of the Galician crownland by Russia, it is surprising that the position of Russophiles was not consequently strengthened. Christoph Brüll and Christophe Bechet, for their part, show that, although Belgian strategy consistently aimed at defending the country's eastern border, this did not automatically imply that an invasion by Germany meant an alliance with France. Had Marshal Joseph Joffre crossed Belgian territory first, as he had been prepared to do, German diplomats might very well have received approval for traversing Belgium. Gabriele Clemens's essay then analyzes Italy's reasons for joining the Allies in 1915. Although irredentism, the issue of Albania, and other territorial considerations played a role, Italian leaders made the “irresponsible decision” (135), despite significant internal divisions on the matter, in the hope of maintaining Italy's status as a Great Power and of achieving the same goals desired by other Great Powers, namely, prestige, military honor, and geostrategic advantage. Lothar Höbelt's chapter expands on the topic of neutrals’ entry into the war by looking at the various late entrants and their decisions for joining the war. He shows that one previous framework for understanding their actions—the idea that domestic considerations dictated the direction of the neutrals, but that external considerations determined the timing of their actions—applied only in some instances, e.g., for Italy, Montenegro, and the United States. Other neutral states, such as Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, Romania, were able to play the opposing sides against one another and then take the best offer on the table.

The third section of the book addresses so-called imagined perspectives, opening with an interesting sociological analysis of sexual morality in Germany and France. Guntram Schulze-Wegener argues that elites in both countries were distraught about the “radical overthrow of all values” (153) in the wake of the war, and disappointed as well about the war's failure to play the “purifying” role they had expected. He addresses the important question of why there were no great naval battles, despite the earlier importance of the naval arms race, but rather mere “chance events and independent acts” (165) on the seas—especially given the growth of a small, German coastal defense navy and a High Seas Fleet vigorously promoted by the emperor, who developed “an almost erotic relationship to his fleet and its men” (170). Wilhelm's desire for Weltgeltung (not to be confused with Weltherrschaft) could only be achieved, he believed, through the creation of a large fleet that would rival that of Britain. Lauritz Wichmann's essay describes the development of anti-German stereotypes among Entente powers, showing how the positive view of Germany prior to unification had gradually eroded in Britain, worsening around 1900 with the naval arms race playing out in the media. Favorable views about Germany in France and Russia also gave way to more critical ones, culminating in the labeling of “Prussians” as “hordes,” “vandals,” and “wildermen” who pursued a “moral double standard” (186). In the section's final essay, Ralph Sowart investigates a highly structured theoretical question: whether, in the decision-making processes that had led to the war, leaders in Berlin and Vienna were guided by practical considerations or their emotions. He shows that Austro-Hungarian officials reacted emotionally rather than rationally, arguing about the matter from the outset as an existential question and using charged terms such as dastardly, impertinent, and revenge. The German case proved somewhat more ambivalent: though the emperor reacted very emotionally in the marginal comments of his correspondence, he initially gave uncharacteristically diplomatic responses to the Austro-Hungarian diplomat Alexander, Count of Hoyos. But even in Berlin there was little discussion and the risks of war were trivialized, giving the Germans only a binary choice. The July Crisis was therefore about rationalizing emotional decisions, Sowart argues, rather than about making rational decisions.

The source base for these articles is as varied as their topics. Whereas some rely mainly on secondary literature to explore lesser known topics, others delve more deeply into the primary sources. The authors sometimes lose themselves in the narrative or try to establish a theoretical framework rather than making a historical argument.