Aristotle deliberately builded upon a few deliberately chosen concepts—such as matter, form, act and power—outlines vague and rough, but solid, unshakeable, and not easily undermined; and thence it has come to pass that Aristotelianism is babbled in every nursery, that “English Common Sense,” for example, is thoroughly peripatetic, and that ordinary men live so completely within the house of the Stagyrite that whatever they see out of the window appears to them incomprehensible and metaphysical. Charles Sanders Peirce, A Guess At the Riddle. Footnote 1
The debate between 3- and 4-dimensionalists is one of the most lively and pervasive in current metaphysics. At stake is a glittering prize: the correct metaphysical analysis of material things and other objects commonly thought to persist in time by enduring. Since we count ourselves among such objects the outcome of the debate is of more than merely academic interest to us. Obviously the ramifications of the debate, even of the points raised by Kit Fine, go far beyond what I can discuss here, so I shall simply select some salient issues and comment on them from my own somewhat heterodox point of view.Footnote 2
In his paper Fine defends the view that material things are 3D continuants, without temporal extension; that at any time at which they exist, they do so completely and not in part, by contrast with occurrents (processes, events and states), which have temporal parts corresponding to the different times over which they occur. As his examples from the language of location and mereology demonstrate, the distinction between 3D and 4D objects is deeply entrenched in our everyday conceptual scheme. He finds it shallow to characterize the debate purely in terms of whether material things do or do not have temporal parts—as if we could discover or postulate that material things have temporal parts in the same way we discover or postulate that they are composed of quarks and electrons. Rather than see the difference between continuants and occurrents in terms of different kinds of presence in space and time, he proposes that the difference between existing and being extended in a dimension be considered ultimate. On this basis he carries the fight to proponents of the 4D ontology and argues that they are unable adequately to explain the linguistic and conceptual facts he sets out.
As regards the entrenched nature of the distinction, I am in complete agreement. But I do not find all the linguistic evidence equally compelling. Fine says it is acceptable to ask or state when a wedding was and where it was, it is acceptable to ask or state where the bride was (at a certain time), but not when she was. Conversely, we can only ask or state of a continuant when it existed. I am not sure we should place too much emphasis on the usage of ‘exist’. The verb is a relatively recent coinage (in English ‘existence’ first occurs in Chaucer but ‘exist’ does not appear until the 17th century) and apart from its tensed use with continuants, it is used in the timeless sense of the existential quantifier, so it is not exactly unsophisticated grass-roots chat. The verb ‘be’ which he also mentions, and which appropriately gives this volume its title, is of much older provenance. One of the English verb's four Proto-Indo-European roots is *wes–, from which we get ‘was’, and German gets ‘gewesen’, as well as ‘Wesen’, ‘essence’. It originally meant ‘live’, ‘remain’, ‘abide’, ‘continue’, and in “archaic” poetic German wesen still does: Der Eremit west im Walde. Now we can very well ask where as well as when Plato lived, and I think it is acceptable also to ask where as well as when the woolly mammoth existed. The facts of ordinary usage are then to be treated with caution.
I am largely in accord with Fine's rejection of a supposedly unproblematic primitive or undifferentiated notion of presence underlying the 4D account, and agree that there are different modes of occupying, or extending over, regions of space and/or time.
My main worry about Fine's proposal to treat ‘exist’ as ultimate is that it leaves us in a difficult position when asking in virtue of what a continuant continues to exist from one moment to another. Descartes notoriously claimed that material and spiritual substances could only continue to exist by being continuously recreated by God. Assuming we don't want to accept that solution, we seem to be forced to the conclusion that they simply passively survive from one moment to another by a sort of brute existential inertia, unless and until something occurs which destroys them. This is the position of Roman Ingarden, for instance,Footnote 3 and I find it unsatisfying. Occurrents on the other hand persist by generating or at any rate continuously acquiring new temporal parts, and it is in virtue of the succession—typically causal—of such parts that the occurrent continues to occur. So I am not wholly statisfied with the exist/extend distinction as Fine outlines it, though with many of the ontological and linguistic facts he adduces I am in complete agreement.
I agree with Fine that we cannot simply throw the 3D language away. It is so deeply entrenched and has such pervasive linguistic and conceptual ramifications that an honest 4Dist to be wholly convincing would need to produce a totally new language of comparable cognitive power to ours without words for 3D objects, a task which would make crafting Esperanto or inventing Hopi from scratch look childishly simple. I do not claim that such a task is impossible, merely that no one has even begun to do the serious work required to show that it is not impossible. I know and applaud that modern analytic metaphysicians are no longer beholden to language in the way their less resolute analytic ancestors were; but it is one thing to say that a given ontology is possible: it is another to show how such an ontology sits with our actual linguistic practice.
Fine contends that the 4Dist has no way to account adequately for the exist/extend distinction that fits the facts. For eliminativist 4Dism, which denies that there are any continuants at all, I agree, but I think there is a way for moderate 4Dists, who do not deny the existence of 3D objects, to have their cake and eat it. Of course one way to be moderately 4D is simply to accept that there are both 3D and 4D objects, that they are fundamentally different, and that's it. This appears to be Fine's view. But I think we can unify the ontology of 3D and 4D objects in a more satisfactory way. We can accept that the metaphysically ultimate entities in the physical cosmos are 4-dimensional, extended in time and space, but this can be reconciled with the acceptance of continuants provided we can find a way to account for the strict identity of continuants over time, by comparison with the accretion of temporal parts of occurrents. We need to make sense of this identity-in-diversity.
However, we can already make sense of one form of identity-in-diversity in the case of universals. We do this by the cognitive procedure known as abstraction. Whenever we have an equivalence relation among things—such as similarity in a certain respect—we can abstract under the equivalence and consider the abstractum. Whether this is created or discovered by the abstraction process is a delicate issue which we leave aside here. The abstractum's properties are related to those of its concreta through considering which predicates are invariant under the equivalence. For example weight (in any gravitational field of fixed strength) but not shape is invariant under the equivalence of being as massive as or equimassivity: a person's birth (natal) zodiacal sign but not their gender is invariant under the equivalence of being born on the same day of the year as or equinatality. Whereas similarity's abstracta are universals, equimassivity's abstracta are masses, and those of equinatality are birthdays, the identity-in-diversity (in this case identity-despite-change) of continuants is accounted for by considering certain occurrents under an equivalence relation which Kurt Lewin dubbed genidentity.Footnote 4 Temporal phases of the occurrents which on this metaphysical picture sustain or constitute a continuant are genidentical: the abstractum under genidentity is the continuant itself. Abstracting under equivalences is pervasive in human thought, and perhaps necessary to it. An Aristotelian or Strawsonian conceptual priority of continuant-talk over occurrent-talk is perfectly compatible with a Whiteheadian metaphysical priority of occurrents (processes) over continuants (things). The abstractive steps in this case might be pre-linguistic, instinctive or innate or—as Peirce archly suggested—instilled into us in the nursery. Piagetian psychology suggests the attainment of the concept of the same through time is an observable developmental stage. The entrenchment of the distinction which Fine so rightly stresses is no absolute barrier to a revisionary fundamental metaphysics in which the 4D is more basic than the 3D.
On this basis we can predict the relativity of part–whole for continuants that Fine points out. If a process constituting a continuant is a less extensive subprocess of a process constituting another continuant and furthermore begins, or starts to be a subprocess, later than the whole, and/or ends, or stops being a subprocess, earlier than the whole, then the continuant constituted by the one is a temporary part of the continuant constituted by the other. Also, since genidentity is a relation between temporal slices or segments of a process, it follows straightforwardly that no continuant can have a temporal part, since the temporal differences are part of what is abstracted away from. Genidentity is a solely transtemporal equivalence (occurrents at the same time but different places are not genidentical) and so the abstractum is wholly and identically present at each time but not at each place.
What an abstractum is and what it is like depends on what its concrete basis is and what the equivalence relation is. The relation being exactly similar to, which gives us (determinate) universals, is bound or restricted by neither space nor time, so universals are wholly present in their instances wherever and whenever these are. If we have an equivalence relation such as smelling like and having the same causal origins as we can get something which has neither temporal nor spatial parts, but is spatiotemporally restricted, like Fine's localized aroma. We could get something with temporal but no spatial parts, such as a Zeitgeist, like the Enlightenment. We can have other spatiotemporally restricted abstracta: the Woolly Mammoth, for instance; and each part of each of us at every time we exist is host to our own personal universal: Socraticity exists as a whole wherever and whenever Socrates is, Fineness in Kit's case, mere Simony in mine, and there are other universals in our constitutive processes: Socratizing, Finery, and Simonizing. A finely polished ontology indeed.
I applaud Fine's conjunctive/disjunctive presence distinction, but again I think that there is an underlying reason for it. Say an object is extensive in a dimension when it is where one or other of its parts is (continuants in space, occurrents in time and space), and intensive in a dimension when it is where all its parts are together (the milk example, the smells example, but also sounds, fields, and composite universals such as redness-and-roundness). If an equivalence relation can obtain between objects at different locations in a given dimension, it seems reasonable that the only way in which abstracta under the equivalence can be present at locations in that dimension is intensively.
Abstraction as a cognitive tool has been associated predominantly with the metaphysics of universals and of mathematical objects such as numbers, proportions, directions and the like. But it is more widely applicable beyond this standard range. I commend its judicious use to dimensionalists of any cardinality.
