Descartes's Proofs of God and the Crisis of Thomas Aquinas's Five Ways in Early Modern Thomism: Scholastic and Cartesian Debates*

Igor Agostini

doi:10.1017/S0017816015000152

Descartes's Proofs of God and the Crisis of Thomas Aquinas's Five Ways in Early Modern Thomism: Scholastic and Cartesian Debates*

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 April 2015

Igor Agostini

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Igor Agostini*: Affiliation:
University of Salento

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I
II
III
IV
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It is well known that the demonstration of God's existence is a crucial problem in early modern theology and philosophy. In contrast to the medieval period, in the seventeenth century atheism became not only an individual standpoint, but a true philosophical and epistemological position. Accordingly, any attempt to prove the existence of God had to address both atheist and libertine attacks against the classical proofs of his existence. In this sense, it is not possible to understand fully Descartes's metaphysical project, including his proposal of new proofs for the existence of God, without reading it as a reaction to this intellectual context. In spite of the charge of atheism brought against him in the Admiranda methodus novæ philosophiæ Renati Des Cartes (Utrecht, 1643) by the Utrecht Theologian Gijsbert Voetius (1589–1676) and his follower Maarten Schoock (1614–1669) (who accused Descartes of replacing the traditional arguments for God's existence with new proofs intentionally made susceptible to the criticism of atheists), Descartes consistently claimed that the demonstrations proposed in the Meditationes de prima philosophia (Paris, 1641) aimed to establish the existence of God against the atheists.

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Type: Articles
Information: Harvard Theological Review , Volume 108 , Issue 2 , April 2015 , pp. 235 - 262

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0017816015000152 [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 2015

I

It is well known that the demonstration of God's existence is a crucial problem in early modern theology and philosophy. In contrast to the medieval period, in the seventeenth century atheism became not only an individual standpoint, but a true philosophical and epistemological position. Accordingly, any attempt to prove the existence of God had to address both atheist and libertine attacks against the classical proofs of his existence. In this sense, it is not possible to understand fully Descartes's metaphysical project, including his proposal of new proofs for the existence of God, without reading it as a reaction to this intellectual context.Footnote ¹ In spite of the charge of atheism brought against him in the Admiranda methodus novæ philosophiæ Renati Des Cartes (Utrecht, 1643) by the Utrecht Theologian Gijsbert Voetius (1589–1676) and his follower Maarten Schoock (1614–1669) (who accused Descartes of replacing the traditional arguments for God's existence with new proofs intentionally made susceptible to the criticism of atheists), Descartes consistently claimed that the demonstrations proposed in the Meditationes de prima philosophia (Paris, 1641) aimed to establish the existence of God against the atheists.

Besides the relationship with atheism, however, there is another side to the intellectual context. Despite their novelty, Descartes's demonstrations also need to be related to the treatment of the question of God's existence in late Scholastic thought, in which the Jesuit theologian and philosopher Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) played a determining role. Descartes cites very few sources, but we do know for certain that he read Suárez's main philosophical work, the Disputationes metaphysicæ (1597), which he quotes in the Quartæ responsiones.Footnote ² It is for this reason that so much attention in the scholarship has been devoted to the relationship between Descartes and Suárez on the existence of God.Footnote ³

However, this is only a part of the whole story. The unremitting focus on Suárez in the literature risks, in my opinion, obscuring the more relevant aspects of the context. In this paper, I offer a broader picture of this context, arguing that Suárez's treatment of the existence of God is just one step in a process that began much earlier, and in which the role played by the famous sixteenth-century Dominican commentator Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1469–1534) is central. Cajetan claimed that Thomas's famous five ways do not demonstrate the existence of God per se, but “quasi per accidens” by proving the existence of properties that can only belong to God. This is the origin of a crisis in Thomism concerning the conclusions of the five ways, i.e., the identification of the subject of the conclusions of Aquinas's arguments with God. On Cajetan's interpretation, they seem to be subjected to the challenge of insufficiency as demonstrations of God's existence. In this article, I aim to connect the crisis of Thomas's five ways to Descartes's metaphysical project of furnishing new proofs of God's existence. In order to do this, I will analyze some passages of the Epistola ad Voetium (Amsterdam, 1643), where Descartes defends his demonstrations of the existence of God against the charge of atheism raised against him by Voetius and Schoock. In particular, I will deal with Descartes's appeal to the authority of one of the most important theologians of the day, the Jesuit Gregory of Valencia (1545–1603). Gregory was a major figure in the debate on the validity of Thomas's five ways, and he discussed Cajetan's interpretation at length. Descartes's reference to Gregory is important because it allows us to relate Descartes's metaphysical reflection on the existence of God to the crisis of Thomas's five ways generated in the hearth of early modern Thomism.

Moreover, this connection between Descartes and the Scholastic debate on Thomas's five ways will be discussed at length in the context of early Cartesianism. In order to substantiate this point, I will provide an analysis of the debate between the Calvinist theologian Jakob Revius (1586–1658) and the Cartesian philosopher Tobias Andreæ (1609–1676), in which Descartes's proofs of God's existence are again put in relation to Gregory of Valencia's criticism of Cajetan.

II

In the Epistola dedicatoria of his Meditationes de prima philosophia, addressed to the Doctors of the Sorbonne, introducing the proofs of God's existence, Descartes writes:

I will add that these proofs are of such a kind that I reckon they leave no room for the possibility that the human mind will ever discover better ones. The vital importance of the cause and the glory of God to which the entire undertaking is directed here compel me to speak somewhat more freely about my own achievements than is my custom.Footnote ⁴

The history of the Epistola dedicatoria is very well known among Descartes scholars. As Descartes's correspondence shows, the Epistola dedicatoria was composed to obtain the approbation of the Meditationes from the Doctors of the Sorbonne. Descartes devised this strategy together with Mersenne. In his letter of July 30, 1640, Descartes writes to him that he planned his manuscript to be “seen and approved by various doctors, and if I can, by the Sorbonne as a whole”;Footnote ⁵ some months later, on September 30, Descartes claims that, if Mersenne agrees, “I would dedicate it to all the masters of the Sorbonne, asking them to be my protectors in God's cause.”Footnote ⁶

However, in spite of the fact that the defense of God and religion (“Dei et religionis causa”)Footnote ⁷ is actually the leitmotif of the Epistola dedicatoria, interpreters have always been divided on the true intentions lying at the basis of Descartes's apologetic project. The Epistola dedicatoria is indeed at the origin of two opposite interpretations of Descartes's philosophy.

The first, advocating Descartes's sincerity, sees in the metaphysics of the Meditationes a defense of the truth of Christian beliefs. This is the apologetic reading, proposed, among others, by Descartes's first great biographer Adrien Baillet (1649–1709),Footnote ⁸ and, in more recent times, by scholars like Henri Gouhier (1898–1994), Alfred Espinas (1844–1922), and Jean Laporte (1886–1948).Footnote ⁹ The second interpretation, seeing in the Epistola dedicatoria a simple strategy that Descartes followed in order to ensure that his Meditationes were approved by the Sorbonne, reads the Epistola dedicatoria as the apologetic mask of a subversive project. Such an interpretation has been proposed in different forms. A moderate version of this reading is the physicalist interpretation by Étienne Gilson (1884–1978), according to whom Descartes's goal was to impose a new physics under the guise of a metaphysics built up from many elements of traditional Scholastic doctrines.Footnote ¹⁰ A much more radical version is the atheistic interpretation of Descartes's philosophy that can be found, for example, in the Athei detecti of the Jesuit Jean Hardouin (1646–1729)Footnote ¹¹ and in the Scrutinium atheismi of the German theologian Theophil Gottlieb Spitzel (1639–1691).Footnote ¹²

The principal source of the accusation of atheism addressed against Descartes in these pamphlets is the Admiranda methodus, published in Utrecht in March of 1643. This book, which appeared under the name of Maarten Schoock, but in fact was composed by him under the dictate of Gijsbert Voetius,Footnote ¹³ is at the origin of a long querelle. Under pressure exerted by Voetius, a lawsuit was brought against Descartes by the city of Utrecht.Footnote ¹⁴ It is not necessary, here, to reconstruct the history of the controversy.Footnote ¹⁵ Indeed, I will focus on Schoock's accusation of atheism against Descartes, which is developed especially in the Præfatio and in the third chapter of the fourth section of his book (Cartesii nova philosophandi methodus ad scepticismum viam sternit), entitled “Atheismi muros dum subvertere Cartesius laborat, fulcit et ædificat.” Let me now consider some passages from the Admiranda methodus.

Schoock claims that, if we pay attention to Descartes's words only, there is no one who appears to be so far (“alienissimus”) from the suspicion of atheism.Footnote ¹⁶ According to Schoock, the Meditationes contain so many passages that supposedly prove the inapplicability of the accusation of atheism that it is not necessary to quote them all. In particular, there is a text from the Epistola dedicatoria that is remarkably clear:

I will not mention here all the passages of the six Meditations. However, in the same Dedicatory letter to the Sorbonne, he clearly and boldly shows that he is not at all troubled by suspicion of Atheism.Footnote ¹⁷

Schoock here refers to the passage of the Epistola dedicatoria where Descartes boasts that the human mind will never discover better (“meliores”) arguments than the ones he proposes in his Meditationes. However, according to Schoock, we should not trust Descartes here. His words, in spite of their apologetic style, will never deceive careful readers. And the proof that Descartes is not sincere is that such deceptive words were employed, before him, by Giulio Cesare Vanini (1585–1619), who was burned alive in Toulouse as an atheist and an apostle of atheism.Footnote ¹⁸

This is the same accusation that Shoock formulates against Descartes in the Præfatio:

I knew a man equal to Vanini, a man who, though he wants to give the impression that he battles Atheism by means of Achillean arguments, subtly and covertly instills the poison of Atheism in people who, lacking intelligence, are not able to discover the snake hidden in the grass.Footnote ¹⁹

Just like Vanini, Descartes aims to reject all the traditional proofs of God's existence and replace them with those proposed in his Meditationes, and he presents them in the Epistola dedicatoria as the best (“meliores”) possible proofs. However, as in the case of Vanini's arguments, Descartes's proofs turn out to be, if carefully analyzed, weak and deceitful (“elumbia et siculentua”). After all—Schoock claims—Descartes himself, in the Epistola dedicatoria, ends up confessing that even though he “regard[s] the proofs as quite certain and evident,” he still “cannot . . . persuade [himself] that they are suitable to be grasped by everyone.”Footnote ²⁰ But if not everyone is capable of grasping Descartes's proofs, how is it possible to pass them off as the best, as he claims? Just like any other battle, the war against atheists requires weapons without defects. However, according to Schoock, the weakness of Descartes's arguments is intentional. Descartes is applying complete and utter artifice here: he aims at denying the existence of God by proposing arguments that leave themselves open to the objections of the atheists. In spite of what Descartes claims, the arguments of the Meditationes cannot defend the cause of God. On the contrary, they aim to ruin it. Accordingly, the comparison with Vanini is completely justified.

III

Descartes answered the Admiranda methodus with the Epistola ad Voetium, published in May of 1643, in Amsterdam, by Elzevier.Footnote ²¹ As is well known, in his reply Descartes unmasks Voetius as the true author of the Admiranda methodus.Footnote ²² Consequently, his replies are actually addressed to Voetius. In particular, as concerns the accusation of atheism, Descartes distinguishes four claims in Voetius's attack in the Admiranda methodus: (1) Descartes writes against atheists; (2) Descartes affirms that his arguments are the best; (3) Descartes rejects the traditional arguments; and (4) Descartes proposes new arguments that are weak and flattering. According to Descartes, the first and second claims are absolutely true (“verissima”), while the third and the fourth are absolutely false (“falsissima”). Nevertheless, even if all four claims were true, it would not follow that he should be accused of atheism:

If someone tries to refute Atheism and adduces arguments that are inadequate to the task, he should be accused of incompetence only, but not of Atheism.Footnote ²³

Indeed, Descartes claims, the refutation of atheists is a very difficult task, as Voetius himself shows in his De atheismo.Footnote ²⁴ Thus not everyone who is unsuccessful in the battle (“omnes qui certarunt”) against atheists should be considered incompetent (“imperiti”), as Voetius argues.Footnote ²⁵ If the demonstrations of the Meditationes fail, Descartes should not be considered more unsuccessful than many other renowned theologians who preceded him.

However, Descartes does not limit himself to the generic claim “omnes qui certarunt.” He mentions both Thomas Aquinas and Gregory of Valencia, one of the most important Jesuit theologians of the end of the sixteenth century:

See Gregory of Valencia, the strong and celebrated Theologian. He refutes all the arguments Thomas employed in order to prove the existence of God and he shows that all these arguments are invalid. And other important [gravi] and orthodox [pii] theologians did the same.Footnote ²⁶

Were Voetius's arguments to be taken seriously, Descartes objects, even Thomas's proofs might be considered weak and flattering, and Thomas himself compared with Vanini. In fact, there would be even greater reason to compare Thomas, rather than Descartes, to Vanini, since the proofs of the Meditationes were never so widely criticized as Thomas's (“mea argumenta nunquam fuerunt ita refutata”). But how could one suspect Thomas of atheism?Footnote ²⁷

In his letter dated January 22, 1644, to the French Ambassador to The Hague, Monsieur Gaspard Coignet de la Thuillerie (1594–1653), Descartes complains about the accusation of atheism and the comparison with Vanini raised against him in the Admiranda methodus. Descartes asks him to intervene on his behalf with the magistrates of Utrecht and to plead his cause in the lawsuit started by the city of Utrecht:

He [Schoock] explicitly claimed that I secretly teach Atheism, in the same way as Vanini, who was burned in Toulouse.Footnote ²⁸

Again, in a letter to the University of Groningen dated February 16, 1645, Descartes claims:

There can truly be no greater crime than the Atheism of which he [Schoock] he accuses me. . . . He proves that I am an Atheist by no other arguments except that I wrote against atheists and, according to many people, my efforts were not poor.Footnote ²⁹

This is a well-known controversy,Footnote ³⁰ but I would like to focus on a lesser-known aspect of the story. It concerns the passage of the Epistola ad Voetium, quoted above, where Descartes appeals to the authority of Gregory of Valencia. Indeed, despite what Descartes claims there, Gregory never rejected Thomas's arguments. On the contrary, he strongly defended Aquinas's five ways from the criticisms leveled against them. What is remarkable here is that Gregory's defense of Thomas's arguments was addressed to an author of the Dominican Order, the most famous commentator of Thomas's Summa theologiæ of the sixteenth century, Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1469–1534). To understand Gregory's defense of Thomas's proofs, it is therefore necessary to refer to Cajetans's commentary on the first part of Summa, published in 1507.Footnote ³¹

Cajetan claims that Thomas's five ways can be considered as aiming to achieve two different conclusions. The first is the existence of an infinite, immaterial, eternal, supremely perfect, immutable being, which everyone calls God. But, if this conclusion were the aim of the five ways, its achievement would then be controversial (“istæ rationes habent plurimum disputationis”). For example, Thomas's “prima via” demonstrates the existence of an unmoved mover, and this mover could be nothing other than an intellective soul; the “secunda via” demonstrates nothing more than the existence of a celestial being; and the conclusions of the other three proofs do not reach higher. Accordingly, they do not prove the existence of God, insofar as they still need to prove that the unmoved mover or the first efficient cause is God. However, it is not in this sense that Thomas's proofs, according to Cajetan, should be read.

There is indeed a second possible conclusion at which the five ways can be considered to aim: the existence of some properties belonging “secundum veritatem” to God. And, if they are interpreted in this way, Thomas's arguments prove God's existence without difficulty.Footnote ³² In particular, Cajetan holds that Thomas's “prima via” aims to prove nothing else but the existence of a first unmoved mover. Its task is not to establish the nature of this first unmoved mover (for instance, to establish whether this first mover is the soul of the world or the soul of heaven). Indeed, it is only in the following question of the Summa, on God's simplicity (“De simplicitate Dei”),Footnote ³³ that Thomas aims to determine the nature of the first mover.Footnote ³⁴ Similarly, Thomas's “secunda via” is meant to prove the existence of a first efficient cause without establishing whether this cause is corporeal or incorporeal (again, this point will be decided in quæstio 3). In the same way, the aim of the “tertia via” is to demonstrate the existence of a necessary uncaused being, and not to prove his oneness, since such a conclusion will be reached only in quæstio 11.Footnote ³⁵ The same goes for the final two of Thomas's ways: the “quarta via” is intended to prove the existence of a “maxime ens, verum, bonum, nobile”; finally, the “quinta via” aims to demonstrate the existence of a first being governing the world by its intellect, without establishing who this being is.Footnote ³⁶

Despite their conclusions, though, Thomas's five ways are still valid, since the properties that they demonstrate can belong only to God. The predicates of being a first unmoved mover, first efficient cause, necessary uncaused being, maximal being, and first governor of the world are “secundum veritatem” peculiar (“propria”)Footnote ³⁷ to God. Accordingly, by demonstrating the existence of these properties, Thomas's five ways prove the existence of God too, insofar as he is the only being to whom these properties can belong.

However, such a demonstration, as Cajetan himself acknowledges, is not a per se demonstration. Indeed, what is directly (“directe”) established here is not the existence of God as God (“Deus ut Deus”), but the existence of God insofar as a certain property belongs to him (“Deus ut habens talem conditionem”). The existence of God as God (“Deus ut Deus”) is demonstrated only in a second step (“consequenter”): it is deduced from the former conclusion (“Deus existit ut habens talem conditionem”), by means of the intermediate premise that God is the substratum of the properties (“conditiones”) belonging to him.Footnote ³⁸

IV

Cajetan's interpretation of Thomas's five ways did not go unnoticed, especially among Dominicans. In the middle of the seventeenth century, as I will explain below, the discussion on his interpretation was still open.

A very important step in the history of Thomas's five ways between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries is marked in 1584 by Domingo Báñez's (1527–1604) discussion of Cajetan's interpretation in his influential Scholastica commentaria.Footnote ³⁹ Báñez agrees with Cajetan's claim that the five ways can be interpreted as reaching two different conclusions. The first is the existence of an infinite, immaterial, etc., being called God. The second is the existence of some properties belonging in some way “secundum veritatem” to God.Footnote ⁴⁰

However, this premise does not entail the consequence that Cajetan claims follows from it. According to Báñez, it is just false that God's existence can be demonstrated only “per accidens,” and it is not true that what is proven is nothing more than the existence of some properties belonging “secundum veritatem” to God.Footnote ⁴¹ To support this claim, Báñez provides two arguments. The first argument is grounded on the premise that the predicate attributed to God in the five ways can be considered in two different manners: 1) as belonging uniquely to God (“propria Dei”); 2) as belonging to God in common with other beings (“communia”). In the first case, Cajetan's statement that Thomas's proofs are not sufficient to prove per se God's existence is simply false. In the second case, Cajetan's claim that the five ways prove the existence of attributes belonging uniquely to God is false too; indeed, if these attributes are common, they cannot be “propria” of God. As a consequence, in spite of Cajetan's claim, Thomas's proofs would not even prove God's existence “per accidens.” For example, if we demonstrate (“prima via”) the existence of an unmoved mover, we are not yet allowed to affirm that the existence of God has been demonstrated, because the property of an unmoved mover is a common one and does not belong uniquely to God.Footnote ⁴²

However, according to Báñez, there is no doubt that the predicates demonstrated by the five ways belong uniquely to God. As a consequence, the five ways directly (“directe”) prove the existence of God. And this is Báñez's second argument against Cajetan.Footnote ⁴³

Báñez acknowledges that the five ways do not prove the existence of God immediately and explicitly (“immediate et explicite”); even less do they prove that God is a supremely perfect being (this is a task performed in the following questions of the Summa). However, inasmuch as they prove the existence of properties belonging uniquely to God, they demonstrate virtually and implicitly (“virtualiter et implicite”) the existence of God (for example, in the first way, the property of an unmoved mover).Footnote ⁴⁴

To strengthen his conclusions, Báñez adds to these first two arguments a third one, grounded on the authority of two other Dominican authors, John Capreolus (1480–1544) and Sylvester of Ferrara (1474–1528) (Ferrariensis). According to Báñez, Capreolus and Sylvester of Ferrara never claim that Thomas's five ways are insufficient to prove directly the existence of God: “This is the sentence of Capreolus in I. d. 3. q. 1 and of Ferrariensis in I. con. gen. cap. 13.”Footnote ⁴⁵ This was a strategic move. In appealing to Capreolus and Sylvester of Ferrara, Báñez did not simply mean to set the authority of two theologians in opposition to Cajetan's interpretation. Báñez aimed to establish an out-and-out orthodoxy. His strategy was not just to demonstrate that Cajetan's interpretation was false, but that it was unorthodox.

Nevertheless, Báñez's attempt did not succeed. There will not be space to cover the entire history of the crisis of the five ways in early modern Thomistic theology, but I will adduce some evidence showing that, despite Báñez's attempt to dismiss it as unorthodox, Cajetan's interpretation was widely diffused between the end of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth.Footnote ⁴⁶ Three or four relevant examples will be sufficient to substantiate this point.

The 1584 Commentaria by the Spanish Mercedarian theologian Francisco Zumel (ca. 1540–1607) clearly accepts Cajetan's interpretation:

Cajetan observes in this article that the arguments advanced here to prove that there is only one God . . . do not prove very much. On the contrary, they run into a great difficulty. . . . These demonstrations do not prove explicitly and formally that God is.Footnote ⁴⁷

Again, in 1592, the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina (1535–1600) writes in his Commentaria:

Cajetan observes that these arguments are not advanced to prove the existence of God as an immaterial and immutable being, etc. They only aim to prove the existence of some properties belonging to God, such as “unmoved mover,” “first cause,” etc. Indeed, in what follows it will be shown that there are other attributes of God and that there is only one God, and not many.Footnote ⁴⁸

But what is still more interesting is that, despite Báñez's accusations about its unorthodoxy, Cajetan's interpretation was also accepted among the Dominicans. A striking case is that of John Poinsot (1589–1644). In the first volume of his monumental and influential Cursus theologicus, published in eight volumes since 1637, he claims:

Thomas chooses five main arguments in order to prove God's existence in article 3. By means of these arguments, as Cajetan claims (in commenting on this article), what Thomas directly proves is the existence of five divine conditions, or attributes, which can be found only in an uncreated being; accordingly, once these conditions or attributes are proven, the existence of an uncreated being is also proven.Footnote ⁴⁹

By the middle of the seventeenth century, therefore, the question concerning the conclusions of the five ways was still entirely open and unresolved. It will be worth quoting here the words of one of the most important Dominican theologians of the seventeenth century, Xantes Mariales (ca. 1580–1660), the author of the monumental Bibliotheca interpretum ad universam “Summam theologiæ”:

I find a great controversy [iurgium] among our theologians: do Thomas's and Aristotle's arguments prove the existence of God directly and absolutely, or only indirectly?Footnote ⁵⁰

Báñez's attempt to reject Cajetan's interpretation of Thomas's proofs on the basis of purported Thomistic orthodoxy had not been successful. However, it is true that, especially at the beginning of this debate, Cajetan's interpretation was very often rejected, including from outside the Dominican Order. This is what happened in 1591 in the Commentaria of Gregory of Valencia.

Gregory begins his discussion by specifying a distinction between the validity of Thomas's arguments and the possibility of demonstrating the existence of God:

It should be observed that, even if no one among such arguments could reach its own conclusion, nevertheless what has been established before should be considered as certain, i.e., that it is possible to demonstrate that God exists. And when the existence of God is demonstrated by means of this or that argument, it is not certain by faith.Footnote ⁵¹

In this way, Gregory acknowledges that other arguments for God's existence than Thomas's five ways could be given. In spite of this, however, Gregory claims that in what follows he will support Thomas's proofs: “Nevertheless, we will defend too the arguments of S. Thomas.”Footnote ⁵² Now, in his defense of Thomas's proofs, Gregory admits that the five ways do not prove, per se, that the unmoved mover is a unique, immaterial, and infinite being. However, all that follows from this is that Thomas's arguments are insufficient to prove who God is, or what his nature is. It does not follow that Thomas's proofs do not demonstrate that God exists, at least in the form of demonstration that is required to answer the question “an sit,” which is the only pertinent one here.Footnote ⁵³

Gregory's argument is grounded on the distinction, established by Thomas in the Summa, between the “quid sit” and “an sit” questions. According to Thomas, who follows Aristotle's Posterior Analytics at this point, the knowledge of the essence of a thing (“quid sit”) always follows the knowledge of its existence (“an sit”), insofar as it is impossible to establish what a thing is without previously knowing that it is.Footnote ⁵⁴

Now, Gregory capitalizes on this distinction to reject Cajetan's interpretation of the five ways. Insofar as the only pertinent question addressed by the five ways is that of God's existence (“an sit”), and not that of his essence (“quid sit”), Thomas's proofs are absolutely sufficient demonstrations. This is confirmed by the fact that answering the “an sit” question requires nothing more than proving the truths of the concepts that we form, in an imperfect and confused way, when we hear the name of a thing (that is, it requires nothing more than proving that these concepts are not fictitious ones, but correspond to reality). On the contrary, it is a completely different matter to form a distinct concept of God; it is a task belonging to the “an sit” question. Otherwise, there would be no difference between the “an sit” and the “quid sit” questions.Footnote ⁵⁵

Therefore, according to Gregory, Cajetan does not distinguish carefully enough (“non satis distinxisse”) between the “an sit” and the “quid sit” questions.Footnote ⁵⁶

V

In light of the analysis of Gregory's position that I have sketched here, it is clear that, far from criticizing Thomas's five ways, Gregory defends them against Cajetan's interpretation. Accordingly, in presenting Gregory as a critic of the five ways, Descartes committed a clear mistake.

This mistake was immediately challenged by Descartes's contemporaries. In his Methodi cartesianæ consideratio theologica, published in Leiden in 1648, the Calvinist theologian Jakob Revius (along with Voetius, the most important theological critic of Cartesianism during Descartes's time in the Netherlands), writes:

If Gregory were still alive, the praises that Descartes, as a flatterer, attributes to him could not prevent him from rejecting such an atrocious insult. Gregory is so far from refuting Thomas's arguments of God's existence that, on the contrary, he defends all of them against the quibbles of their adversaries.Footnote ⁵⁷

One can hardly blame Revius for this remark.Footnote ⁵⁸ Nevertheless, ignoring the obvious mistake it contains, the passage of the Epistola ad Voetium criticized by Revius seems to me particularly important as documentation of Descartes's judgment concerning Thomas's five ways, especially since Descartes presents this judgment here as neither a personal evaluation nor as the result of a comparison with the alternative model of demonstrating God's existence proposed in the Meditationes. In this respect, Descartes's attitude towards Thomas's proofs in the Epistola ad Voetium seems to me quite different from the one in the Third Meditation, where, speaking about his first proof of God's existence, Descartes writes: “Despite a most careful and comprehensive survey, this is the only argument I have so far been able to find.”Footnote ⁵⁹ Descartes claims here that he has examined every proof of the existence of something distinct from himself very carefully, and that, so far, he has not been able to find any argument other than the one he proposes in the Third Meditation.

Now, this is not the point Descartes makes in the Epistola ad Voetium. Here, Descartes aims to ground his judgment about the traditional arguments (and, precisely, about Thomas's proofs) on authorial and historical bases, and this is the reason he appeals to the criticism addressed to the five ways by “graves et pii theologi.” In other words, what I think Descartes is trying to do in this passage of the Epistola ad Voetium is to point out that the crisis of the Thomistic model originates within Scholastic theology itself.

And in this sense, despite Descartes's probably mistaken attribution to Gregory of Valencia of a thesis that he never held, his diagnosis was fundamentally correct. In the seventeenth century, the validity of the five ways had became disputable within Thomism itself, at least since the most influential commentator of Thomas's Summa theologiæ, Cajetan, argued, as we have seen, that the five ways do not demonstrate per se the existence of God.

However, in stressing the importance of the Epistola ad Voetium as a historical document testifying to Descartes's awareness of the crisis of Thomas's five ways, I do not want to connect Descartes to Cajetan directly—first, since, as we have seen, Descartes never explicitly cites Cajetan, and, second, because it is not necessary to go so far in the Scholastic debate as to look to its origins. Indeed, the thesis that Thomas's proofs do not directly demonstrate the existence of God was disseminated in the very same Faculty of Theology at the Sorbonne to which, as we have seen, Descartes addressed the Epistola dedicatoria of his Meditationes. In 1627, the Sorbonne Professor of Scholastic Theology Philippe de Gamaches (1568–1625) claimed in his Summa theologica that, although the unicity of God can be inferred from the conclusions of the a posteriori proofs, it will in fact be proven only in a second step, i.e., in question 10:

We will answer that the question of the singularity or of the numerical unity of that principle is not yet posed. We will deal with this in question 10. Nor do we inquire now whether that principle is spiritual and incorporeal, or whether it is eternal and immutable, etc. Indeed, although in light of what we stated before about the truth of such claims, it is evident, these questions nevertheless need to be developed later, in their own place. Now, we only prove that this supreme and independent principle really exists in act, and that its existence is manifest to the natural light.Footnote ⁶⁰

It might be useful (to restrict the inquiry to an author we can be sure Descartes read) to remember that the question of the necessity of demonstrating the unicity of the first cause in order to prove God's existence was a subject of lengthy discussion by Francisco Suárez. In his Disputationes metaphysicæ (1597), Suárez claims that proving that God exists is not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a necessary and independent being. Indeed, what is still required is proof that this being is unique:

And therefore in order to demonstrate that God exists it is not enough to show that there is in reality some being which is necessary and from itself, unless it is also proven that that [being] is unique and that it is the source of all being, on whom all things that participate in that being in any way depend and which [all things] receive. But when this has been demonstrated it is sufficiently shown that God exists. For the rest of his attributes which have a necessary connection with a being of this kind have to be demonstrated afterwards.Footnote ⁶¹

In response to this problem, Suárez states that, in God, the “quid sit” and “an sit” questions cannot be separated:

We can only demonstrate that God exists by in some way demonstrating what he is, as will become clear from what will be said.Footnote ⁶²

In the case of God these questions cannot be entirely separated, for the reason that the existence of God is [the same as] the essence of God and the properties of that existence, by means of which it can be shown that that existence is proper to God, constitute (so to speak) the quiddity and the essence itself of God.Footnote ⁶³

In claiming the inseparability of the “quid sit” and “an sit” questions, Suárez overturns the traditional thesis of the priority of the “an sit” question defended by Gregory against Cajetan. In addition, as some scholars have already suggested,Footnote ⁶⁴ Suárez's solution would later be adopted by Descartes in his response to the first objector to his Meditationes, Johannes Caterus, to whom he explains that the difference between his second proof of God's existence (which starts from the ego as containing the idea of God) and Thomas's second way:

This idea contains the essence of God, at least in so far as I am capable of understanding it; and according to the laws of true logic, we must never ask about the existence of anything until we first understand its essence.Footnote ⁶⁵

Suárez's claim of the inseparability of the “quid sit” and the “an sit” questions gets stretched by Descartes here to such an extent that he makes the “quid sit” question come before the “an sit.” Moreover, in contrast to Suárez, Descartes thinks that the priority of the “quid sit” question is not only valid in the case of God, but expresses a universal law of true logic (“vera logica”). On the main point, however, Descartes agrees with Suárez: the knowledge of the “quid sit” is a necessary condition for identifying the being reached by the a posteriori proofs with God. Descartes claims that, unlike Thomas's second way, his proof does not only demonstrate the existence of a cause, but also demonstrates that this cause contains every perfection and, as a consequence, is God:

It is this same idea which shows me not just that I have a cause, but that this cause contains every perfection, and hence that it is God.Footnote ⁶⁶

In reversing the traditional thesis of the priority of the “an sit” question, however, both Suárez and Descartes merely take the final step in a process that began much earlier. The role played here by Henry of Ghent (1217? –1293) and John Duns Scotus (1266–1308) is a decisive one.Footnote ⁶⁷ According to both of them, God's existence is reached only through our knowledge of God's essence or quiddity. Otherwise, the proof of God's existence will not reach God as he is in himself. Accordingly, the question of whether God exists is answered only through the question of what God is, and God's existence is deduced from God's nature.

It is certain that Descartes did not ignore the existence of theologians claiming that the “quid est” question precedes the “an sit” question in God. This is what he states explicitly in the letter to Mersenne of December 31, 1640, although with the precise sources undisclosed:

In the place where I put “in accordance with the laws of my logic”, please put “in accordance with the laws of the true logic”; it is near the middle of my Replies to Caterus, where he objects that I have borrowed my argument from St Thomas. The reason why I add “my” or “the true” to “logic” is that I have read theologians who follow the ordinary logic and inquire what God is before inquiring whether God exists.Footnote ⁶⁸

However, if I insist on the importance of Cajetan in the whole story, it is because his own interpretation of Thomas furnishes, in my opinion, the perfect evidence for the crisis of the model of the five ways insofar as it shows that this crisis was not merely the result of some external attack, but that it penetrated into the stricter orthodoxy of Thomism itself.

VI

The last point that I would like to stress is that the connection that I propose here between Descartes's proofs of God's existence, on the one hand, and the debate between Cajetan and Gregory, on the other, is not just the result of retrospective interpretation. A reading relating Descartes's proofs of the existence of God to the positions of Gregory and Cajetan had already been proposed in the work of some of Descartes's contemporaries, who discuss Descartes's reference to Gregory in the Epistola ad Voetium at length. This is what happens in the discussion of the Cartesian proofs of God's existence that is at the center of the long debate between Jakob Revius and Tobias Andreæ, an eminent follower of Descartes, who introduced his philosophy to the University of Groningen.

This controversy, which began with the publication of Revius's Consideratio theologica in 1648, marks one of the most radical moments of the crisis of the Cartesian method in the Netherlands.Footnote ⁶⁹ However, in spite of both the importance of this debate and the considerable quantity of words that the critical literature has devoted to Revius, especially in more recent times,Footnote ⁷⁰ the debate with Tobias has never been analyzed in terms of its theological aspects, which are nevertheless crucial.

Revius's criticism of Descartes began in 1643, in his Suarez repurgatus,Footnote ⁷¹ and it continued through a group of disputations held in 1647 at the University of Leiden between February 4 and March 2, which were later republished in the Consideratio theologica.Footnote ⁷² The theological analysis of Cartesian philosophy, which undergirds many of the criticisms raised by Revius against Descartes in his writings, would become crucial in the Consideratio theologica. In fact, what constitutes the most peculiar aspect of Revius's pamphlet is the theological perspective from which its attacks against Cartesian philosophy are directed: although (with the exception of its last part) it is a commentary on the autobiographical account of Descartes's Discours de la méthode, the Consideratio theologica aims to analyze this account in light of the very objective that, according to Revius, Descartes had proposed in his work since 1637—that is, demonstrating the existence of God.Footnote ⁷³

Now, in Revius's attack against Descartes's proofs of God's existence the charge of having dismissed Thomas's five ways is central: “Descartes rejects all of Thomas's arguments for the existence of God.”Footnote ⁷⁴ Revius develops in his attack the arguments brought against Descartes in the Admiranda methodus, in which Descartes was accused of having rejected the traditional arguments for the existence of God. According to Revius, the arguments rejected by Descartes are Thomas's proofs. The charge of the Admiranda methodus becomes more detailed here, insofar as Revius presents Descartes as an adversary of Thomas.

What allows Revius to see Descartes's project as directly opposed to Thomas's is Descartes's statement in the Epistola ad Voetium where he claims, as we saw above, that his proofs of God's existence have never been criticized as much as Thomas's (“mea argument nunquam fuerunt ita refutata”).Footnote ⁷⁵ But what is worse, according to Revius, is that Descartes does not limit himself to declaring the superiority of his arguments. Descartes also claims to support his statement with the authority of Gregory of Valencia:

And, to avoid giving the impression of being the only madman, he associates himself with the Jesuit Gregory of Valencia.Footnote ⁷⁶

It is in this context that Revius makes the accusation quoted above: Descartes, as a flatterer, attributes to Gregory a position that Gregory actually never held. The answer to this accusation constitutes one of the main themes of the reply to Revius made by Andreæ in his Methodi cartesianæ assertio, published in Groningen in two volumes in 1653.

Here, Andreæ replies that if Revius had written that Gregory tried to defend Thomas's argument, he would not have found fault with him, and Descartes would not have either. However, Gregory's purposes are not what is in question here. The question is not whether Gregory tried to defend (“conatur defendere”) Thomas's arguments, but whether he did in fact defend (“defendat”) them successfully. And the answer to that question is simple: it is false that Gregory succeeded in defending Thomas's proofs.Footnote ⁷⁷ According to Andreæ, Descartes claims that Gregory showed that Thomas's arguments are false just because, even when trying to defend them, he could not defend them successfully. In other words, it is the ineffectiveness of Gregory's defense of Thomas's arguments that shows that they are false.

Andreæ's exegesis of Gregory clearly distorts the true sense of Descartes's and Gregory's texts. However, Andreæ uses another argument, grounded on Gregory's claim that, even if Thomas's arguments were not sufficient to prove God's existence, it would not follow that demonstrating God's existence is impossible. According to Andreæ, Gregory here in some way acknowledges that Thomas's arguments are not demonstrative proofs. It is true that, some lines below, Gregory also claims to defend Thomas's proofs (“Sed tamen defendemus etiam has divi Thomæ rationes”), but this does not mean that Gregory was persuaded by Thomas's arguments. Indeed, the claim testifies to nothing but the necessity of complying with Thomas's authority.Footnote ⁷⁸

Even here, Tobias distorts Gregory's text. Nevertheless, Andreæ does not try to defend Descartes purely by means of this exegesis of Gregory's text. Andreæ makes use of a more complex strategy here, where the real issue at stake is the defense not of Descartes himself against the accusation of behaving as a flatterer, but of the value of his proofs of the existence of God. It is for this reason that Andreæ introduces another argument, which aims to show the superiority of Descartes's treatment of the question of God's existence over Gregory's. Andreæ focuses on the distinction between the “an sit” and “quid sit” questions stressed by Gregory and Revius. Andreæ claims to follow Descartes against Gregory hereFootnote ⁷⁹ and concludes that answering the “quid sit” question is a necessary and previous condition for answering the “an sit” question:

Indeed, in contrast to the common and wrong opinion, it is impossible to answer the “an est” question before answering to the “quid est” question, or independently from it, insofar as it contains the demonstration of that quiddity whose existence has to be inferred. And if someone answers the “an est” question without establishing what [QUID] the thing that needs to be proven as existing is, he does not truly conclude that this thing is, or exists, because concluding that it exists without knowing the “Quid” or the “de quo” of his conclusion is nonsense.Footnote ⁸⁰

The comparison between Descartes and Gregory is essential here in order to reach the following twofold conclusion. On the one side, Andreæ can now state that, on the basis of the distinction established by Gregory and Revius, it is not possible at all to demonstrate the existence of God. On the other side, Andreæ claims that insofar as Descartes's arguments start from knowledge of the essence of God, they can prove the existence of a being that contains all the perfections, and that, therefore, they successfully prove the existence of God, because the being whose existence is demonstrated cannot lack any perfection contained in his essence.Footnote ⁸¹

Andreæ develops his comparison further by connecting Descartes with Cajetan. According to Andreæ, the criticism leveled by Gregory against Cajetan—that he does not distinguish between the “an sit” and “quid sit” questions (which is the same criticism Revius levels against Descartes in his Consideratio theologica)—should be addressed against Gregory and Revius themselves:

Therefore, I say of [Gregory of] Valencia and, even more truly, of Revius, the same thing that Valencia objects to in Cajetan (i.e., that he did not sufficiently distinguish between the “an est” and “quid est” questions), and the same thing that Revius the fool says of Descartes: they were not able to distinguish those questions or, at least, they did not know the right way to deal with them.Footnote ⁸²

In claiming that Gregory and Revius do not distinguish correctly between the two questions, what Andreæ means is that to pose the “quid sit” question after the “an sit” question is to confuse the distinction between the two, insofar as knowledge of the essence of a thing is required before demonstrating its existence.

However, more than on the argument in itself, I would like to insist on the connection that Andreæ establishes between Descartes and the Scholastic background here: his entire defense of the Cartesian proofs of the existence of God is conducted through the constant evocation of the comparison between Descartes and Gregory. Moreover, with Andreæ, this comparison becomes integrated with the crucial reference to Cajetan. In the picture sketched by Andreæ we have Descartes and Cajetan on one side, both claiming that the “quid sit” question cannot be answered before the “an sit” question, and, on the other, Gregory and Revius, who both claim that the “quid sit” question comes after the “an sit” question. In the whole discussion between Andreæ and Revius, this is the moment where the connection between Descartes and the Scholastics, on the question of the existence of God, becomes more complex.

The comparison between Descartes and the Scholastic debate on the five ways is also at the center of Revius's reply to the Methodi cartesianæ assertio. This constitutes the last chapter of this long controversy. Revius's reply came in the form of the impressive, although little-known, pamphlet published in Leiden in 1654 under the title of Kartesiomania, hoc est, furiosum nugamentum, quod Tobias Andreæ, sub titulo “Assertionis methodi cartesianæ,” orbi literato obstrusit, succincte ac solide confutatum.

Revius's Kartesiomania discusses at length the comparison among Descartes, Gregory, and Cajetan proposed in Andreæ's Methodi cartesianæ assertio, although Revius challenges Andreæ's presentation of the comparison and, especially, his exegesis of Gregory:

Gregory rejects Thomas's arguments . . . because he defends them unsuccessfully. This is the same as rejecting them. Whoever heard of such conjuring tricks?Footnote ⁸³

According to Revius, the interpretation of Gregory proposed by Andreæ is completely wrong. How is it possible to assume that defending unsuccessfully (“non recte defendere”) is the same as rejecting (“confutare”)? It is also unacceptable to attribute to Gregory, as Andreæ does, the idea that Thomas's arguments would not be demonstrative proofs. Gregory writes “quamvis nulla harum rationum concluderet,” and not “quamvis nulla harum rationum concludat.” Therefore, according to Revius, Andreæ confuses a hypothetical proposition with an assertoric one.Footnote ⁸⁴

In this way, Andreæ comes to make a mistake even bigger than Descartes's. While Descartes errs through ignorance (“inscitia”), insofar as he mentions an author he does not know, Andreæ opposes Gregory to Descartes, making Gregory an adversary of Descartes:

Here Descartes is certainly overly ignorant, insofar he appeals to the authority of a writer whom he did not read. But the author of the Assertio prefers to oppose Gregory to Descartes. Descartes places himself under the protection of Gregory and, in order to be trusted, calls him “theologum solidissimum et celeberrimum.” In contrast, he [Andreæ] presents Gregory as an adversary of Descartes, aiming to persuade that he is an incompetent disputer.Footnote ⁸⁵

It is interesting to observe that the strategy followed by Revius consists in contrasting Descartes's exegesis of Gregory to Andreæ's. By interpreting Gregory in the way he does, Andreæ, according to Revius, far from following Descartes's exegesis, presents a completely different reading of the same text by Gregory. In this way, in order to reject the theses defended in the Methodi cartesianæ assertio, Revius dissociates Andreæ's position from Descartes's, although he continues to criticize both.

Revius understands perfectly well not only the aim of Andreæ's strategy, but also his grounds: in order to claim the superiority of the Cartesian arguments over Thomas's, Andreæ needs to oppose Descartes's position to Gregory's. If read in this light, the arguments put forward by Revius and Andreæ, although conflicting, reveal an interesting convergence: both Andreæ and Revius, in fact, develop their argumentation along a common perspective, connecting Descartes's new proofs of the existence of God, along with his judgment on Thomas's five ways, with the interpretations given by Cajetan and Gregory of Valencia.

Andreæ defends Descartes's interpretation of Gregory and assimilates Descartes's position to Cajetan's. In contrast, Revius challenges both Descartes's and Andreæ's interpretations of Gregory. But, in spite of this difference, both Andreæ and Revius relate Descartes to Cajetan and Gregory and situate Descartes's metaphysical project in the context of the crisis of the five ways in early modern Thomistic theology.

This convergence should be carefully considered. In contrast to the majority of more recent scholarship, which focuses overwhelmingly on Descartes's relationship with Suárez, seventeenth-century authors like Andreæ and Revius, following Descartes's reference to Gregory of Valencia in the Epistola ad Voetium, directly related Descartes's attempts to provide new proofs of the existence of God to the historical moment that, long before Suárez, had marked the internal crisis of Thomas's five ways. In other words, both Andreæ and Revius, in spite of their contrast, link Descartes's search for new proofs to Cajetan's interpretation of the five ways, and the debate it originated.

In this sense, Descartes's contemporaries allow us to look at his metaphysical project from a more complete historical perspective than is granted by the Cartesian scholarship of recent times.

VII

After an introduction (I) where I sketched the object and the aim of the present article, I addressed the question of the alleged atheism of Cartesian philosophy, the long story of which is grounded, in the seventeenth century, in the accusation raised against Descartes by Voetius and Schook in the Admiranda methodus (II). Then, I outlined Descartes's response to this accusation in the Epistola ad Voetium, focusing in particular on Descartes's claim that, were Voetius's arguments to be taken seriously, Thomas himself should have been charged with atheism, since his five ways had been more widely criticized than the proofs from the Meditationes. Here, I focused on the passage of the Epistola ad Voetium where Descartes names Gregory of Valencia among the theologians who criticized Thomas's five ways. In order to reconstruct the context of Descartes's claim, I analyzed the positions of some of the major contributors to the seventeenth-century Scholastic debate about the conclusions of the five ways. My analysis shows that, far from criticizing Thomas's five ways, Gregory (along with the Dominican Domingo Báñez) defended the five ways against Cajetan's claim that they prove the existence of God “quasi per accidens.” However, Cajetan was not the only one who held this thesis, and he was followed by others both outside the Dominican Order (such as Zumel and Molina) and inside it (such as John Poinsot).

On the basis of this historical analysis, I argued that, although Descartes was wrong in presenting Gregory as a critic of the conclusions of the five ways, he was fundamentally right in stressing the contested character of Thomas's proofs (V). In the last part of the article, I showed how a connection between Descartes and the Scholastic debate on the conclusions of the five ways, and in particular the criticism addressed by Gregory to Cajetan, was established by some of Descartes's contemporaries. In order to substantiate this point, I analyzed the debate over Descartes's proof of God's existence between the Dutch Cartesian Tobias Andreæ and the Calvinist theologian Jakob Revius, both (despite the difference in their evaluation of Cartesian philosophy and its theological aspects) relating Descartes's new proofs of the existence of God to the controversy between Cajetan and Gregory on Thomas's five ways (VI).

Footnotes

To the memory of Ettore Lojacono

The following acronyms are used:

AT: René Descartes, Œuvres de Descartes (ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery; rev. ed. ed. Joseph Beaude et al.; 11 vols.; Paris: Vrin, 1964–1974).

B: René Descartes, Tutte le lettere, 1619–1650 (ed. Giulia Belgioioso, with the collaboration of Igor Agostini et al.; 2nd ed.; Bompiani: Il pensiero occidentale; Milan: Bompiani, 2009).

B Op 1: René Descartes, Opere 1637–1649 (ed. Giulia Belgioioso, with the collaboration of Igor Agostini, Francesco Marrone, and Massimiliano Savini; Bompiani: Il pensiero occidentale; Milan: Bompiani, 2009).

B Op 2: René Descartes, Opere postume 1650–2009 (ed. Giulia Belgioioso, with the collaboration of Igor Agostini, Francesco Marrone, and Massimiliano Savini; Bompiani: Il pensiero occidentale; Milan: Bompiani, 2009).

CSM: René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vols. 1–2 (ed. and trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984–1985).

CSMK: René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 3: The Correspondence (ed. and trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

References

¹ See Armogathe, Jean-Robert, “Proofs of the Existence of God,” in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (ed. Garber, Daniel and Ayers, Michael; trans. Carlson, Thomas A. and Garber, Daniel; 2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 1:305–30Google Scholar, esp. 305–9.

² Secundæ responsiones; CSM 2:164 / B Op 1:997 / AT 7:235.

³ See, in particular, Dutton, Blake D., “Suarezian Foundations of Descartes’ Ontological Argument,” The Modern Schoolman 20 (1993) 245–58CrossRef Google Scholar; Scribano, Emanuela, L’esistenza di Dio. Storia della prova ontologica da Descartes a Kant (Rome: Laterza, 1994Google Scholar; French transl.: L’existence de Dieu. Histoire de la preuve ontologique de Descartes à Kant [trans. Charles Barone; Paris: Seuil, 2002]); Goudriaan, Aza, Philosophische Gotteserkenntnis bei Suárez und Descartes. Im Zusammenhang mit der nederländischen reformierten Theologie und Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History; Leiden: Brill, 1999)Google Scholar; and Secada, Jorge, Cartesian Metaphysics: The Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000)CrossRef Google Scholar.

⁴ As translated in CSM 2:4; Meditationes, Epistola dedicatoria; B Op 1:684 / AT 7:4, 8–13: “Addamque etiam tales esse, ut non putem ullam viam humano ingenio patere, per quam meliores inveniri unquam possint: cogit enim me causæ necessitas, et gloria Dei, ad quam totum hoc refertur, ut hic aliquanto liberius de meis loquar quam mea fert consuetudo.”

⁵ As translated in CSMK, 150; To Mersenne, July 7, 1640; B, 1232–1234 / AT 3:126, 23–127, 1: “fait voir et approuver par divers Docteurs, et si je puis, par le Corps de la Sorbonne.”

⁶ As translated in CSMK, 153; To Mersenne, September 30, 1640; B, 1284 / AT 3:184, 18–20: “je le dédierais, si vous le trouvez bon, à Mrs de la Sorbonne en général, afin de les prier d’être mes protecteurs en la cause de Dieu.” The Meditationes would be published with the notice “Cum Privilegio et Approbatione Doctorum,” which explains why scholars sometimes claim that the approbation was in fact accorded: see Armogathe, Jean-Robert, “L’approbation des Meditationes par la Faculté de Théologie de Paris (1641),” Bulletin cartésien 21 (1994) 1–3Google Scholar; Hatfield, Gary, Descartes and the “Meditations” (London: Routledge, 2003) 44Google Scholar. However, there are at least three reasons for concluding that the Meditationes never received the approbation: 1) Descartes's complaint in his letter of January 19, 1642 to Guillaume Gibieuf, who had tried to plead with the Sorbonne for him (To Gibieuf, January 19, 1642; B, 1561 / AT 3:473, 13–474, 8); 2) the lack of the approbation in the first edition of the Meditationes (Paris: Soly, 1641); 3) the fact that in the second edition (Amsterdam: Elzevier, 1642) the notice “Cum Privilegio et Approbatione Doctorum” was deleted. See Baillet, Adrien, La vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes (2 vols.; Paris: Horthemels, 1691; repr., New York: Garland, 1987) 2:137Google Scholar; Adam, Charles, Vie et œuvres de Descartes. Étude historique (Paris: Cerf, 1910 = AT 12) 302Google Scholar; AT 3:419 n.; Crapulli, Giovanni, “La prima edizione delle Meditationes de prima philosophia di Descartes e il suo ‘esemplare ideale,’” Studia cartesiana 1 (1979) 37–90Google Scholar; and van Otegem, Matthijs, A Bibliography of the Works of Descartes (1637–1704) (2 vols.; Quaestiones infinitae 38; Utrecht: Zeno, 2002) 1:160Google Scholar. It should be added also that the fact that the Meditationes did not receive the approbation is one of the arguments addressed against Descartes by Gassendi in the Disquisitio metaphysica, Scribendi occasio, inst. 3: “Abfuit sublimis Facultas, ut votis tuis annueret” (Gassendi, Pierre, Disquisitio metaphysica seu dubitationes et instantiæ adversus Renati Cartesii Metaphysicam et Responsa [ed. Rochot, Bernard; Paris: Vrin, 1962] 21Google Scholar).

⁷ Meditationes, Epistola dedicatoria; B Op 1:686 / AT 7:6, 19–20.

⁸ See Baillet, La vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes, 2:101.

⁹ Gouhier, Henri, La pensée religieuse de Descartes (Paris: Vrin, 1924; 2nd ed., 1972)Google Scholar; Espinas, Alfred, Descartes et la morale (Études sur l’histoire de la philosophie de l’action; 2 vols.; Paris: Bossard, 1925)Google Scholar; and Laporte, Jean, Le rationalisme de Descartes (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1945; 2nd ed., 1950)Google Scholar. For a recent theological approach see also Teologia fondamentale. Testi antologici (ed. Antonio Sabetta and Pierluigi Sguazzardo; Rome: Città nuova, 2004) 71–80.

¹⁰ Gilson, Étienne, La liberté chez Descartes et la théologie (Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine; Paris: Alcan, 1913; 2nd ed., Paris: Vrin, 1987)Google Scholar.

¹¹ Hardouin, Jean, Athei detecti, in Opera varia (Amsterdam: Du Sauzet, 1733) 1–273Google Scholar. On Hardouin's interpretation of Descartes, see Fabro, Cornelio, Introduzione all’ateismo moderno (Cultura 28; Rome: Studium, 1964) 99–126Google Scholar.

¹² Spitzel, Theophil Gottlieb, Scrutinium atheismi historico-ætiologicum (Augsburg: Prætorius, 1663)Google Scholar. See also Fabro, Introduzione all’ateismo moderno, 111 and 120–22.

¹³ Schoock, Maarten, Admiranda Methodus novæ philosophiæ Renati Des Cartes (Utrecht: Janssonius van Waesberge, 1643; repr., Whitefish, Mont.: Kessinger, 2010)Google Scholar. See also the French translation La querelle d’Utrecht. René Descartes et Martin Schoock (trans. Theo Verbeek; Paris: Les impressions nouvelles, 1988) 153–320. On Voetius, see Duker, A. C., Gisbertus Voetius (4 vols; Leiden: Brill, 1897–1915; repr., Leiden: Groen, 1989)Google Scholar; Janse, L., Gisbertus Voëtius (1589–1676) (Banier bibliotheek voor het gezin; Utrecht: De Banier, 1971)Google Scholar; De scholastieke Voetius. Een luisteroefening aan de hand van Voetius’ “Disputationes selectæ” (ed. W. J. van Asselt and E. Dekker; Zoetermeer, Holland: Boekencentrum, 1995); van Asselt, W. J., “G. Voetius, gereformeerd scholasticus,” in Vier eeuwen theologie in Utrecht. Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de theologische faculteit aan de Universiteit Utrecht (ed. de Groot, Aart and de Jong, Otto J.; Zoetermeer, Holland: Boekencentrum, 2001) 99–108Google Scholar; Goudriaan, Aza, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 1625–1750: Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus van Mastricht, and Anthonius Driessen (Brill's Series in Church History 26; Leiden: Brill, 2006)Google Scholar; and Beck, Andreas J., Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676). Sein Theologieverständnis und seine Gotteslehre (Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 92; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007)CrossRef Google Scholar. On the controversy between Voetius and Descartes, see Thomas Arthur McGahagan, “Cartesianism in the Netherlands, 1639–1676: The New Science and the Calvinist Counter-Reformation” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1976); Verbeek, Theo, “Voetius en Descartes,” in De onbekende Voetius. Voordrachten wetenschappelijk symposium Utrecht 3 maart 1989 (ed. van Oort, J.et al.; Kampen, Holland: Kok, 1989) 200–219Google Scholar; idem, Descartes and the Dutch: Early Reactions to Cartesian Philosophy, 1637–1650 (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992); idem, “Descartes and the Problem of Atheism: The Utrecht Crisis,” Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis / Dutch Review of Church History 71 (1991) 211–23, esp. 213; van Ruler, J. A., The Crisis of Causality: Voetius and Descartes on God, Nature, and Change (Leiden: Brill, 1995)Google Scholar; and idem, “Waren er muilezels op de zesde dag? Descartes, Voetius en de zeventiende-eeuwse methodenstrijd,” in Kometen, monsters en muilezels. Het veranderende natuurbeeld en de natuurwetenschap in de zeventiende eeuw (ed. Florike Egmond, Eric Jorink, and Rienk Vermij; Haarlem, Holland: Arcadia,1999) 120–32.

¹⁴ Lettre apologétique de M. Descartes aux magistrats de la ville d’Utrecht, contre MM. Voétius père et fils; B Op 2:116–92 / AT 8.2: 201–73. See also Verantwoordingh van Renatus Descartes aen d’Achtbare Overigheit van Uitrecht. Een onbekende Descartes-tekst (ed. Erik-Jan Bos; Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996) and the French translation in La Querelle d’Utrecht (ed. Verbeek), 406–37.

¹⁵ See Bos, Erik-Jan, “Descartes's Lettre Apologétique aux Magistrats d’Utrecht: New Facts and Materials,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (1999) 415–33CrossRef Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Schoock, Admiranda methodus, 13: “Etenim si verba semper virtutem arguerent, iisque tuto fides adhiberi deberet, ab Atheismi levissima etiam suspicione homo noster alienissimus esset.”

¹⁷ Schoock, Admiranda methodus, 262: “Ut alia enim multa loca passim in sex Meditationibus occurrentia omittamus, in ipsa Dedicatoria epistola ad Sorbonam parisiensem evidenter ac audacter satis ostendit se Atheismi suspicione nequaquam lavorare velle.”

¹⁸ Schoock, Admiranda methodus, 262: “Similibus verborum ampullis Atheismi suspicionem a se averuncare laborabat Cæsar Vaninus, et tamen publice Tolosæ est combutus non tantum quod Atheus esset, sed Atheismi Apostolus” (quoted in Epistola ad Voetium; B Op 1:1670 / AT 8.2:174, 25–27). On the question of Vanini's atheism, see Scribano, Emanuela, “Le tracce dell’ateo. Da Lessius a Descartes via Vanini, Mersenne e Petit,” Rivista di storia della filosofia 62 (2007) 677–98Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Schoock, Admiranda methodus, xiii (quoted in Epistola ad Voetium; B Op 1:1644–46 / AT 8.2:142, 1–6): “Cognovi hominem cum Vaninio paria facere, et dum videri vult Atheos Achilleis argumentis oppugnare, subdole ac admodum occulte Atheismi venenum iis affricare, qui anguem in herba latitantem præ ingenii imbecillitate ubique deprehendere non possunt.”

²⁰ As translated in CSM 2:5; Meditationes, Epistola dedicatoria; B Op 1:684 / AT 7: 4, 13–15: “Atqui quamtumvis certas et evidentes illas putem, non tamen ideo mihi persuadeo ad omnium captum esse accommodatas.”

²¹ A Dutch version of the Epistola ad Voetium was published at the same time as the Latin edition: Brief van Rene Des Cartes, aen den vermaerden D. Gisbertus Voetius (Amsterdam: Van Baardt, 1643).

²² Epistola ad Voetium; B Op 1:1567 / AT 8.2:65, 5–8: “Non opus sit aliis argumentis ad probandum eam, non ab illo cujus nomen feret, vel certe non ab illo solo, sed præcipue a te conscribi.” See also Lettre apologétique; B Op 2:117–93 / AT 8.2:201–73.

²³ Epistola ad Voetium; B Op 1:1670 / AT 8.2:175, 22–25: “Quamvis enim quis, putans refutare Atheismum, rationes afferat quæ ad hoc non sufficiant, imperitiæ tantum, non ideo statim Atheismi, est accusandus.”

²⁴ Descartes refers here (see also B Op 1:1668 / AT 8.2:173, 11–12) to the disputations defended by Voetius on June 22 and 29 and July 6 and 13, 1639: Disputationum theologicarum . . . de atheismo . . . sub præsidio D. Gisberti Voetii . . . tueri conabor Gualterus de Bruyn (Utrecht: Roman, 1639). A revised version of the disputations, containing explicit references to Descartes, would be published by Voetius in 1648–1649 in Disputationes theologicæ selectæ (5 vols; vols. 1–3: Utrecht: Janssonius van Waesberge, 1648–1659; vol. 4: Amsterdam: Janssonius van Waesberge and Weyerstraet, 1667; vol. 5: Utrecht: Smytegelt, 1669). The text of the disputations of 1639 was discovered by Theo Verbeek: see “From ‘Learned Ignorance’ to Scepticism: Descartes and Calvinist Orthodoxy,” in Scepticism and Irreligion in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (ed. Richard H. Popkin and Arjo Vanderjagt; Leiden: Brill, 1993) 31–45. A partial English translation of the Disputationes theologicæ selectæ is available in Reformed Dogmatics: J. Wollebius, G. Voetius, F. Turretin (ed. and trans. John W. Beardslee III; Library of Protestant Thought; New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).

²⁵ Epistola ad Voetium; B Op 1:1670 / AT 8.2:175, 25–176, 4: “Quin etiam profecto, cum Atheorum refutatio sit difficillima, ut ipse testaris in ultimo tuo libro de Atheismo, non omnes qui contra Atheos infeliciter certarunt habendi sunt imperiti.”

²⁶ Epistola ad Voetium; B Op 1:1670–72 / AT 8.2:176, 4–8: “Vide Gregorium de Valentia, Theologum solidissimum et celeberrimum: ille refutat omnia argumenta quibus usus est D. Thomas ad existentiam Dei probandam, et invalida esse ostendit. Idemque etiam alii graves et pii theologi fecerunt.”

²⁷ Epistola ad Voetium; B Op 1:1670–72 / AT 8.2:176, 8–16: “Adeo ut ab iis qui vestro more loquuntur, dici possit de D. Thoma (qui, si quis unquam alius, ab omni Atheismi suspicione quammaxime fuit remotus), ejus argumenta contra Atheos, penitius inspecta et examinata, elumbia et ficulnea deprehendi; eademque comparatio de illo cum Vanino possit institui, et ausim addere (absit tamen invidia dicto) aptius quam de me, quia mea argumenta nunquam fuerunt ita refutata.”

²⁸ To La Thuillerie, January 22, 1644; B Op 1:1844 / AT 4:89, 19–21: “Diserte affirmabat me hic, tanquam alterum Vaninum, Tholosæ combustum, subdole et admodum occulte Atheismum docere.”

²⁹ To the University of Groningen, February 17, 1645; B Op 1:1974 / AT 4:178, 8–13: “Nulla manifestior calumnia, quam cujus nulla probatio est, nisi ex qua contrarium ejus quod affirmatur possit inferri: ut ille non alio argumento me Atheum probat, quam quod scripserim contra Atheos, et, multorum judicio, non male.”

³⁰ For a general presentation, see Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch, 13–33.

³¹ Despite its relevance, both from a theoretical and historical point of view, and despite the long debate that it generated at the time, Cajetan's interpretation of the five ways has never received systematic attention in the modern literature. There are, however, two excellent works in which the theoretical relevance of this topic is stressed: O’Brien, Thomas C., Metaphysics and the Existence of God: A Reflexion on the Question of God's Existence in Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (Washington, D.C.: Thomist Press, 1960) 38–39, 235–40, and esp. 241Google Scholar, and Twetten, David B., “Clearing a ‘Way’ for Aquinas: How the Proof from Motion Concludes to God,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 70 (1996) 259–78Google Scholar, esp. 267–68 and 275–76. From a more historical perspective, there is Carlo Giacon, I grandi commentatori di San Tommaso (vol. 1 of La seconda scolastica; Archivum philosophicum Aloisianum, series 2, 3; 3 vols; Milan: Bocca, 1944–1950; 2nd ed., Turin: Nino Aragno, 2001) 133–40. See also Brockhoff, J., “Die Lehre des hl. Thomas von der Erkennbarkeit Gottes,” Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie 3 (1889) 182–97Google Scholar, at 184–85; Geny, Paul, “A propos des preuves thomistes de 1’existence de Dieu,” Revue de philosophie 31 (1924) 575–601Google Scholar, at 577; van Steenberghen, Fernand, Le problème de l’existence de Dieu dans les écrits de S. Thomas d’Aquin (Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l’Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1980) 296Google Scholar; Elders, Leo J., The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1990) 131 n. 264Google Scholar; Johnson, Mark F., “Why Five Ways?,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 65 (1991) 107–21CrossRef Google Scholar, at 110; and Stéphane-Marie Barbellion, Les “preuves” de l’existence de Dieu. Pour une relecture des cinq voies de saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Cerf, 1999) 279–80. See also the writings of Mauro Mantovani: “Ratio e demonstratio: L’argomentazione dell’esistenza di Dio. I commenti universitari alle cinque vie del maestro Juan de Guevara (OSA, 1518–1600),” in Momenti del logos. Ricerche del “Progetto LERS” (logos, episteme, ratio, scientia) in memoria di Marilena Amerise e di Marco Arosio (ed. Flavia Carderi, Mauro Mantovani, and Graziano Perillo; Rome: Nuova cultura, 2012) 351–383, esp. 353 and 381–82; An Deus sit (Summa Theologiæ I, q.2). Los commentarios de la “primera Escuela” de Salamanca (Salamanca: Editorial San Esteban, 2007); and La discussione sull’esistenza di Dio nei teologi domenicani a Salamanca dal 1561 al 1669. Studio sui testi di Sotomayor, Mancio, Medina, Astorga, Báñez e Godoy (Rome: LAS, 2011).

³² Thomas de Vio Cajetanus, Commentaria in primam partem “Summæ theologiæ” (1507), q. 2, a. 3, n. 3, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (Leonine edition; Rome: Typographia polyglotta, 1882 –) 4:32: “Circa has rationes in communi, advertendum est diligenter quod possunt afferri ad duo. Primo, ad concludendum illud ens incorporeum, immateriale, æternum, summum, immutabile, primum, perfectissimum, etc., quod et quale Deum tenemus esse. Et sic istæ rationes habent plurimum disputationis: eo quod prima via . . . non ducit ad motorem magis immobilem quam sit anima intellectiva; secunda . . . non ducit nisi ad corpus cæleste et ejus motorem; reliquarum quoque nulla magis sursum ducere videtur. Et ad hoc intentum non afferuntur hoc in loco hæ rationes, ut nunc nunc patebit. Alio modo afferri possunt ad concludendum quædam prædicata inveniri in rerum natura, quæ secundum veritatem sunt propria Dei: non curando quomodo vel qualiter sint, etc. Et ad hoc intentum hic afferuntur: et sunt nihil fere difficultatis habentes secundum philosophiam.”

³³ Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiæ, I, q. 3, in Opera omnia 4:35–49.

³⁴ De Vio, Commentaria, 4:32: “Et ut melius intelligatur quod dicimus, singillatim explanando dicitur quod primæ viæ ex parte motus, sat est quod inferatur, ergo datur primum movens immobile, non curando utrum illud sit anima cæli aut mundi: hoc enim quæretur in sequenti quæstione.”

³⁵ Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiæ, I, q. 3, in Opera omnia 4:107–13.

³⁶ De Vio, Commentaria, 4:32: “Secundæ quoque viæ ex parte efficientis, sat est quod ducat ad primum efficiens, non curando an illud sit corpus vel incorporeum: hoc enim quæretur in sequenti quæstione. Tertiæ vero viæ ex parte necessarii, sat est quod ducat ad primum necessarium non ex alio, non curando an sit unum vel plura: hoc enim quæretur in questione XI. Quartæ quoque viæ, ex gradibus rerum, sat est ducere ad maxime ens, verum, bonum, nobile a quo sunt omnium participationes. Et similiter quintæ viæ, ex gubernatione, sat est ducere ad primum gubernantem per intellectum, quicumque sit ille.”

³⁷ I think that Cajetan employs the term “proprium” here in the Aristotelian sense, as a predicate that belongs to the subject alone and necessarily (Aristotle, Top. 102a20–25). See Twetten, “Clearing a ‘Way’ for Aquinas,” 266: “A proof's nominal definition, for Thomas, must be proper to God; that is, it must belong to God and only to God—it must be convertible with ‘God.’”

³⁸ De Vio, Commentaria, 4:32: “Omnia enim hæc prædicata, scilicet movens immobile, primum efficiens, necessarium non ex alio, maxime ens, et primum gubernans intelligendo, sunt secundum veritatem propria Deo: et ideo, concludendo hæc inveniri in rerum natura, concluditur directe, quasi per accidens, quod Deus est, idest, Deus non ut Deus, sed ut habens talem conditionem, est; et consequenter, ipsum substratum, scilicet Deus ut Deus, est.”

³⁹ On the historical importance of Báñez's Scholastica commentaria, see Belda, Juan Plans, La Escuela de Salamanca y la renovación de la teología en el siglo XVI (Madrid: Biblioteca de autores cristianos, 2000) 918Google Scholar. On Báñez's criticism of Cajetan, see Mortimer J. Adler, “The Demonstration of God's Existence,” The Thomist 5 (1943) 188–218, at 189–90; Twetten, “Clearing a ‘Way’ for Aquinas,” 267–68 and 276; and Mantovani, La discussione sull’esistenza di Dio, 266–69. See also Knasas, John F. X., “Ad Mentem Thomæ: Does Natural Philosophy Prove God?,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 61 (1987) 209–20CrossRef Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Báñez, Domingo, Scholastica commentaria in universam primam partem Angelici Doctoris D. Thomæ, in duos tomos divisa (2 vols; Venice: Bertano, 1602)Google Scholar I, q. 2, a. 3, 1:137: “Tertio notandum est, quod hæ rationes ad duo possunt afferri. Primo ad probandum esse in rerum natura ens quoddam infinitum, immateriale, etc. quale dicimus esse Deum. Secundo, ad concludendum inveniri in natura quædam prædicata, quæ secundum veritatem sunt propria Deo, non curando quomodo illi conveniant.”

⁴¹ Báñez, Scholastica commentaria, I, q. 2, a. 3, 1:137: “Cajetanus in hoc articulo dicit rationes istas quasi per accidens concludere Deum esse, scilicet quod invenitur primus motor, quod est prædicatum proprium Dei secundum veritatem. Hæc tamen sententia falsa est.”

⁴² Báñez, Scholastica commentaria, I, q. 2, a. 3, 1:137: “Et probatur primo. Nam vel prædicata, quæ hic de Deo concluduntur, sunt propria Deo, vel communia sibi, et corpori cælesti, sive motori ejus. Si primum, ergo male docet Cajetanus per has rationes non concludi motorem magis immobilem, quam anima intellectiva vel forma cæli. Si secundum, ergo non concludunt aliqua prædicata, quæ secundum veritatem sunt propria Deo: siquidem communia, non sunt propria. Nam si hoc commune tantum concluditur sequitur, neque etiam per accidens, istas rationes probare, Deum esse. Nam illud prædicatum motor immobilis, non curando an aliquo modo saltim per accidens sit mobilis, potest competere alteri quam Deo, scilicet intelligentiæ motrici cœli, ergo etiam si probetur, hujusmodi motorem esse, nihil proprium de Deo probatur.”

⁴³ Báñez, Scholastica commentaria, I, q. 2, a. 3, 1:137: “Nam prædicata, quæ in cæteris rationibus probantur de Deo, non possunt alteri ab ipso competere. v.g. esse primum efficiens, ens non ab alio, ens omnium perfectissimum, ergo directe istis rationibus probatur, Deum esse.”

⁴⁴ Báñez, Scholastica commentaria, 1:137: “Licet omnes illæ rationes simul sumptæ non probent immediate et explicite, Deum esse, et multo minus, Deum esse illud ens perfectissimum, quo perfectius quid excogitari nequit (hoc enim reservatur ad probandum in sequentibus quæstionibus) nihilominus rationes illæ efficacissime probant, quod in rerum natura reperiuntur perfectiones quædam, et proprietates, quæ alteri quam Deo nequeunt competere, et ex consequenti virtualiter, et implicite probant, Deum esse. Nam prima ratio convincit reperiri in rerum natura primum movens immobile, et sic aliæ probant efficaciter alias proprietates, quæ soli Deo convenire possunt.”

⁴⁵ Báñez, Scholastica commentaria, 1:137: “Ita sentiunt Capre. in I. d. 3. q. 1 Ferr. I. con. gen. cap. 13. circa secundam rationem D. Thom.” See John Capreolus, Defensiones theologiæ divi Thomæ Aquinatis (ed. Ceslai Paban and Thomas Pègues; 7 vols.; Tours: Cattier, 1900–1908) lib. 1, dist. 3, q. 1, 1:164–72; Francis Sylvester of Ferrara (Ferrariensis), Commentaria in “Summam contra Gentiles” St Thomæ Aquinatis (1522), lib. 1, cap. 13, n. 22.3, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia, 13:39a.

⁴⁶ For more details on the history of the crisis of the five ways, see Agostini, Igor, “Suárez e Descartes e il problema della dimostrazione dell’esistenza di Dio,” in Francisco Suárez and His Legacy: The Impact of Suárezian Metaphysics and Epistemology on Modern Philosophy (ed. Sgarbi, Marco; Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2010) 169–204Google Scholar. See also O’Brien, Metaphysics and the Existence of God, 38–44.

⁴⁷ Zumel, Francisco, In primam D. Thomæ partem commentaria (2 vols.; Venice: Prati, 1597)Google Scholar I, q. 2, a. 3, 1:75b: “Caietanus in hoc articulo notat, quod rationes, quæ adducuntur ad probandum esse unum Deum . . . non multum probant: imo habent ingentem difficultatem. . . . Istæ demonstrationes non colligunt explicite et formaliter Deum esse.”

⁴⁸ de Molina, Luis, Commentaria in primam Divi Thomæ partem, in duos tomos divisa (2 vols.; Venice: Societas minima, 1602–1604)Google Scholar I, q. 2, a. 3, 1:38b: “Notat Cajetanus, non afferri ad probandum, Deum existere, quatenus ens quoddam a concretione materiæ, ac mutatione liberum est, etc. sed solum ad probandum prædicata quædam, quæ Deo conveniunt, ut movens immotum, primam causam etc. existere in rerum natura. In progressu namque ostenduntur alia ipsius Dei attributa, necnon esse unum tantum, et non plures.”

⁴⁹ John of St. Thomas (John Poinsot), Cursus theologicus (vols. 1–3; Paris: Desclée et Socii, 1931–1937) q. 2, a. 1, 419a: “Quinque rationes principales elegit D. Th. in hoc. art. 3. ad probandum Deum esse; ex quibus, ut advertit Cajetanus (in præsenti), directe probat quinque conditiones, seu attributa divinitatis, quæ non possunt inveniri nisi in ente increato; et sic illis probatis, remanet probatum dari aliquod ens increatum.” On the importance of Poinsot's Cursus theologicus, see Ramón Ceñal, “La filosofia española del siglo XVII,” Revista de la Universidad de Madrid 11 (1962) 373–410, esp. 382. See also Forlivesi, Marco, “Le edizioni del Cursus theologicus di Johannes a S. Thoma,” in Divus Thomas (Bon.) 93 (1994) 9–56Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Mariales, Xantes, Bibliotheca interpretum ad universam “Summam theologiæ” Divi Thomæ Aquinatis Ecclesiæ Doctoris (4 vols.; Venice: Combi and La Noú, 1660)Google Scholar controv. 14, c. 6, 1:28: “Inter nostrates iurgium magnum invenio, utrum D. Thomæ Aristotelisque discursus, directe, absolute probent Deum esse; an potius solum indirecte?”

⁵¹ Gregory of Valencia, Commentariorum theologicorum tomi quatuor. In quibus omnes materiæ, quæ continentur in “Summa theologica” D. Thomæ Aquinatis, ordine explicantur (4 vols.; Venice: Ciotti, 1592) pa. 1, q. 2, punct. 3, 1:83: “Est autem observandum, quod quamvis nulla hujusmodi rationum concluderet, tamen pro certo nihilominus habendum esset id quod diximus punto precedente, nempe demonstrari posse quid sit Deus. Neque certum est ex fide, quod per hanc vel illam rationem demonstretur.”

⁵² Gregory of Valencia, Commentariorum theologicorum tomi quatuor, 1:83: “Sed tamen defendemus etiam has divi Thomæ rationes.”

⁵³ Gregory of Valencia, Commentariorum theologicorum tomi quatuor, 1:84: “Concedo, nullam harum rationum, aut omnes simul provare per se, quod primum illud movens, sit etiam unum numero, infinito, immateriale, etc. Cæterum ex hoc non sequitur aliud, quam non probari his rationibus quis sit Deus, seu qualis sit natura Dei, prout nostro modo imperfecte potest etiam a nobis cognosci, ut in sequentibus quæstionibus videbimus. Minime autem inde sequitur, non probari his rationibus Deum esse, eo modo probationis, qui sufficiat ad satisfaciendum quæstioni, an est, de qua tantum iam agimus.”

⁵⁴ Thomas Aquinas, I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2um, in Opera omnia 4:30b: “Quæstio quid est, sequitur ad quæstionem an est.” See Aristotle, An. post. 1.1.74 a; 2.8.93a.

⁵⁵ Gregory of Valencia, Commentariorum theologicorum tomi quatuor, 1:84: “Et ratio est, nam huic questioni an est, satisfiat per se, satis est probari veritatem illorum conceptuum, quos imperfecte et confuse solemus in mente formare, cum rei nomen audimus; ita scilicet ut constet ex probatione, eos conceptus non esse commentitios, sed aliquod ens omnino esse in rerum natura, quod illis respondeat. Probare vero conceptus alios magis distinctos, quibus ulterius cognoscimus, nam cujusmodi sit ea res, pertinet ad quæstionem quid sit, non autem ad quæstionem an est. Alias istæ duæ quæstiones minime distinguerentur.”

⁵⁶ Gregory of Valencia, Commentariorum theologicorum tomi quatuor, 1:85: “Quocirca, cum Caietanus hic negat, probari per se his rationibus divi Thomæ Deum esse . . . et concedit tantum, id probari per accidens . . . non satis distinxisse videtur inter quæstionem an est, et quid est.”

⁵⁷ Revius, Jakob, Methodi cartesianæ consideratio theologica (Leiden: De Vogel, 1648) 84Google Scholar: “Si viveret Valentia, laudes quas ei assentator Cartesius adscribit, non impedirent, quo minus tam atrocem iniuriam ad animum revocarer. Tantum enim abest omnia Thomæ argumenta pro existentia Dei refutet, ut contra ea omnia contra adversariorum cavillationes defendeat” (also in Revius, Jakob, A Theological Examination of Cartesian Philosophy: Early Criticisms (1647) [ed. Goudriaan, Aza; Leiden: Brill, 2002] 160Google Scholar).

⁵⁸ Although contemporaneous scholars also shared Revius's criticism (see, e.g., Aza Goudriaan's remarks in Theological Examination, by Revius, 4, 54), André Robinet has tried to clear Descartes of this accusation (Descartes. La lumière naturelle. Intuition, disposition, complexion [Paris: Vrin, 1999] 195–97). Robinet's point is that Descartes's reference to Gregory is correct because Gregory would accept, as Descartes does, the antithomistic thesis that the “quid sit” question precedes the “an sit.” Such an interpretation does not seem correct to me, for two reasons: first, Gregory does not hold the thesis attributed to him by Robinet; second, even supposing that Gregory does indeed have this thesis, he nevertheless defends Aquinas's five ways.

⁵⁹ As translated in CSM 2:29; Descartes, Meditationes, III; B Op 1:736 / AT 7:427–28: “Omnia enim diligentissime circumspexi, et nullum aliud potui hactenus reperire.” See also Descartes's Conversation with Burman (transl. with intr. and comment. by John Cottingham; Oxford: Clarendon, 1976) 12: “After a most careful survey of all the effects, he found none which would serve to prove God's existence except from the idea of God”; B OP 2: 1258 / AT 5:153: ‘Omnia effecta diligentissime circumspexit et nullum reperit quod Deum inferat praeter ejus ideam.”

⁶⁰ de Gamaches, Philippe, Summa theologica. Cum indice triplici quæstionum et capitum, rerum ac verborum, et locorum concionibus utilium (Paris: Sonnius, 1634)Google Scholar q. 2, cap. 2, 38b: “Respondemus non esse nunc quæstionem de singularitate, aut unitate numerica illius principiii, de ea enim inferius quæst. X. sicut nec quærimus nunc, an sit spirituale et incorporeum, an ternum et immutabile, etc. Quamvis enim veritas ex prædictis facile appareat, tamen istæ quæstiones sunt postea suis locis seorsim pertractandæ, nunc autem solum probamus tale principium supremum, et independens vere esse actu, eiusque existentia esse naturali lumine manifesta.”

⁶¹ Suárez, Francisco, Disputationes metaphysicæ, disp. 29, sect. 2, n. 5, in Opera omnia (28 vols.; Paris: Ludovicus Vivès, 1856–1878Google Scholar) 26:35b–36a: “Et ideo ad demonstrandum Deum esse non satis est ostendere dari in rerum natura ens quoddam necessarium et a se, nisi etiam probetur illud esse unicum et tale ut sit fons totius esse, a quo pendent et illud recipiunt omnia quæ ipsum esse quoquo modo participant. Hoc autem demonstrato, sufficienter ostenditur Deum esse; nam reliqua ejus attributa quæ cum hujusmodi ente necessariam connexionem habent, postea demonstranda sunt”; for English translation I have relied on The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God: Metaphysical Disputations 28–29 (ed. and trans. John P. Doyle; South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2004) 85.

⁶² Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicæ, disp. 29, sect. 1, n. 41, 26:33b: “Nos non possumus demonstrare Deum esse nisi demonstrando aliquo modo quid sit, ut ex dicendis clarius patebit” (Metaphysical Demonstration, 80).

⁶³ Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicæ, disp. 29, sect. 3, n. 2, 26:47b–48a: “In Deo non possunt omnino seiungi hæ quæstiones eo quod et esse Dei sit quidditas Dei et proprietates illius esse, quibus ostendi potest illud esse proprium Dei, constituunt (ut ita loquamur) ipsam quidditatem et essentiam Dei” (Metaphysical Demonstration, 114–15).

⁶⁴ On this topic, see Scribano, L’existence de Dieu, 99–106.

⁶⁵ As translated in CSM 2:78; B Op 1:822 / AT 7:107, 25–108, 1: “In illa idea continetur quid sit Deus, saltem quantum a me potest intelligi; et, iuxta leges veræ Logicæ, de nulla unquam re quæri debet an sit, nisi prius quid sit intelligatur.”

⁶⁶ As translated in CSM 2:78; B Op 1:822 / AT 7:108, 3–6: “Illa est quæ docet non modo aliquam esse mei causam, sed præterea etiam in causa illa contineri omnes perfectiones, ac proinde illam Deum esse.”

⁶⁷ See Henry of Ghent, Summa quæstionum ordinarium theologiæ (Paris: Ascensius, 1520) 22.5, 134C; John Duns Scotus, Opera omnia (ed. Charles Balić et al.; Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950) 1.3.1, 3:6.

⁶⁸ As translated in CSM 3:165; To Mersenne, December 31, 1640; B Op 1:1356 / AT 3:272, 25–273, 3: “Je vous prie, à l’endroit où j’ai mis juxta leges Logicæ meæ, de mettre au lieu juxta leges veræ Logicæ; c’est environ le milieu de mes réponses ad Caterum, où il m’objecte que j’ai emprunté mon argument de S. Thomas. Et ce qui me fait ajouter meæ ou veræ au mot Logicæ, est que j’ai lu des Théologiens qui, suivant la logique ordinaire, quærunt prius de Deo quid sit, quam quæsiverint an sit.” On this point, see Landucci, Sergio, I filosofi e Dio (Rome: Laterza, 2005) 143Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ See Savini, Massimiliano, Johannes Clauberg. “Methodus cartesiana” et ontologie (de la philosophie, Bibliothèque d’histoire; Paris: Vrin, 2011) 102–9Google Scholar; 139–60.

⁷⁰ See esp. Aza Goudriaan, introduction to Theological Examination, by Revius, 1–61.

⁷¹ Revius, Jakob, Suarez repurgatus, sive syllabus “Disputationum metaphysicarum” Francisci Suarez . . . (Leiden: Heger, 1643) 207–9Google Scholar; 504–7; 518–19; 872. See the texts in Revius, Theological Examination, 181–90.

⁷² The texts are now available in Revius, Theological Examination, 63–108.

⁷³ Savini, Johannes Clauberg, 105.

⁷⁴ Revius, Methodi cartesianæ consideratio theologica, 84; also in Revius, Theological Examination, 160: “Argumenta Thomæ pro existentia Dei . . . omnia rejicit Cartesius.”

⁷⁵ Epistola ad Voetium; B Op 1:1670–72 / AT 8.2:176, 16.

⁷⁶ Revius, Methodi cartesianæ consideratio theologica, 84; also in Revius, Theological Examination, 160: “Neve solus insanire videatur, Gregorium de Valencia Iesuitam sibi socium assciscit.”

⁷⁷ Andreæ, Tobias, Methodi cartesianæ assertio, opposita Jacobii Revii . . . “Considerationi theologicæ” quam vocat (2 vols.; Groningen: Collën, 1653–1654) 2:297Google Scholar: “Si diceret quod conetur defendere, nil haberem quod ipsum arguerem, sed nec ille eopse coargueret Cartesium, qui id non negavit, nec de eo quod conatus sit, voluerit, sibi propositum esse professus sit, sed de eo quod egerit, locutus est. At quod defendat falsum est. Quia, quæ profert quibus ea invalida ostendat, etsi conetur solvere, non tamen solide solvit, et sic quod Cartesius dixit revera ea reputat et invalida esse ostendit.”

⁷⁸ Andreæ, Methodi cartesianæ assertio, 2:300: “Sed tamen defendemus etiam has divi Thomæ rationes, nempe quia est Doctor Angelicus, cui sacramentum dixerat, et militare decreverat.”

⁷⁹ Andreæ, Methodi cartesianæ assertio, 2:299: “Id vero Cartesius negat, et nos cum eo, et MAXIME id inde sequi asseveramus.”

⁸⁰ Andreæ, Methodi cartesianæ assertio, 2:299: “Nec enim, ut perperam vulgo, quæstio An est, potest demonstrari aut determinari ante quæstionem Quid est, aut sejunctim ab ea, sive involvente demonstratione quidditatem, cujus existentiam debet inferre; nec concludens An est, non includens id QUID, quod esse demonstrandum est, vere concludit id esse vel existere, cum sit absurdum velle probare, existere, nescientem Quid aut de quo concludat.”

⁸¹ Andreæ, Methodi cartesianæ assertio, 2:300: “Et ita argumenta Cartesii concludunt de ipso Deo, de ente omnimodis perfecto, qualem homo natura concipere, et studio et revelatione accedente perfectius cognoscere potest: ut de ejus demonstrationibus dici nequeat, quod Valentia de argumentis Thomæ, neque singulis neque omnibus rationibus probari quasdam perfectiones sine quibus non est Deus, adeoque neque singulis neque omnibus probari Deum esse. Qui enim probat de ente omnimodis perfecto, vel omnes perfectiones habente, id existere, non omittit quasdam perfectiones, sine quibus non est Deus, proindeque nec deficit in probando, Deum esse; sed probat ipsum Deum esse, præter quem non queat esse tale ens, nec etiam cogitari possit ulla perfectio ulterior, quæ inesse debeat enti, cujus existentia demonstratur, ut id Deus esse agnoscatur, cui ei tributæ omnes.”

⁸² Andreæ, Methodi cartesianæ assertio, 2:301: “Quare, quod Valentia Cajetano reponit, Non satis distinxisse videri inter quæstionem AN EST et QUID EST, quod Revius ineptiens, idem de Cartesio dicit, ego de ipso Valentia, ipsoque Revio verius, nescisse distinguere illas quæstiones, aut saltem recte eas tractandi modum ignorasse.”

⁸³ Revius, Jakob, Kartesiomania, hoc est, furiosum nugamentum, quod Tobias Andreæ, sub titulo “Assertionis methodi cartesianæ,” orbi literato obstrusit, succincte ac solide confutatum (2 vols.; Leiden: Lopez de Haro, 1654)Google Scholar 2:203: “Quis similes præstigias unquam audivit? Refutat Valentia argumenta Thomæ . . . quia illa non recte defendit, id autem re ipsa refutare est.”

⁸⁴ Revius, Kartesiomania, 2:205–6: “Hactenus nihil audio moliri Gregorium adversus Thomam, sed potius pro eo. Nam illud, quamvis nulla harum rationum concluderet etc. hypotheticum est, alioqui dixisset, quamvis nulla concludat.”

⁸⁵ Revius, Kartesiomania, 2:205: “Sed Cartesius hic inscitia haud dubie peccavit, dum auctorem non inspectum in subsidium vocat. Assertor vero mavult eum Cartesio opponere, et quem ille pro se citat, atque ut ei fidem conciliet, theologum solidissimum et celeberrimum vocat, eum hic ut Cartesii adversarium introducit, et ineptissimum disputatorem esse persuasum vult.”

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Descartes's Proofs of God and the Crisis of Thomas Aquinas's Five Ways in Early Modern Thomism: Scholastic and Cartesian Debates*

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