Introduction: Rights-Based Discourse or Common Good–Based Discourse?
With the development of large-scale health registries and human biobanks to be used as research infrastructures, bioethicists, lawyers, philosophers, and social scientists have worked intensely to cast light on current challenges to the principle of informed consent. In terms of regulation, there appears to emerge a conclusion that full-blown informed consent procedures are incompatible with, or at least highly impracticable to, some of the new research practices. Accordingly, there is a regulatory trend toward so-called broad and open consent procedures, and a debate on the adequacy of rights-based ethics discourse as opposed to common good–based discourse. In this article, I wish to comment on this debate from my perspective as philosopher of science. I do not pretend to give an original contribution to ethics. Rather, I wish to identify and critically discuss the status of some epistemic claims that frequently appear to be assumed, explicitly or implicitly, in the aforementioned debate. These claims regard (1) the utility of actual and/or future medical research and (2) the epistemic status of scientific evidence and the role of scientific expertise in the ethics debate. I argue that a discussion of these claims has implications for the meta-ethics debate on the choice between the concept of rights and that of the common good as the basis for the debate on the ethical aspects of health registries and biobanks.
In the following, I conclude that the status of the claims to be discussed is one of uncertainty, and I argue for the need for ethics frameworks that can accommodate that uncertainty about factual matters in a robust manner. Specifically, the epistemic uncertainty is used as an argument against certain ways of making decisions based in judgments on the common good. If the common good is uncertain and disputed, ethics, law, and public decisionmaking should attend to the question of the rights of those holding the minority view on the factual matters about the common good. A particular case emerges if this minority—I call them the dissidents—also is a party affected by the decision, perhaps negatively affected according to their own (contested) opinion. Equally important, however, is the case in which the minority believes the decision to go against the common good.
Before entering into details, I should clarify that I do not claim to have a ready-made answer to the question of the rights of dissidents. In particular, I cannot see that there can be a general, universal answer to the question. Rather, on the normative plane I would appeal to, and on the descriptive plane I contend that most of us subscribe to, some kind of gradualist position with regard to this issue, as well as the issue of rights-based versus common good–based perspectives in general. Let me illustrate this with two examples.
First, there is no doubt that the right to personal autonomy and integrity has a very strong standing in clinical medicine, for instance, surgery. There may be complicated assessments and regulations in situations in which there is doubt about or evidence against the patient’s competence to give her or his informed consent, but there is no doubt in the simple cases of a competent adult whose lack of consent to a surgical procedure does not constitute evidence of serious mental illness: the consent or lack of consent must be respected, and the patient doubtlessly has the right to be fully informed about the procedure and its possible consequences. Otherwise, the surgical intervention into the patient’s body would constitute a violation of personal integrity. There are, however, many other situations in everyday life in which individuals experience interventions into their bodies. This may happen at the hairdresser, in crowds, in sports, and so on—the reader may think of other examples. The similarity to the clinical situation is that the interventions at least ideally are consensual. Another similarity is that the subject may feel pain or discomfort during the intervention, or experience other negative consequences from it. Nevertheless, there is a striking difference. There is no information sheet, no written consent, and no insistence on the quality of the required information on which the individual can make an autonomous decision. To this author, this difference seems to be explained by the (presumed) minor consequences of these other bodily interventions. Hence, the right seems to be conditioned on a gradualist assessment of the factual matter of what is at stake, above all the magnitude of the harm that may be inflicted on the individual. Indeed, written informed consent procedures are sometimes required in activities in which the risk of adverse events and harm is deemed notable (e.g., nonmedical body modifications for cosmetic purposes or competitions in full-contact martial arts).
Second, there seems to be gradualism operating in regulatory frameworks and policies with regard to the rights of dissidents. For instance, in some countries, national law installs a general duty for parents or guardians to have their children attending school. Still, in some of these countries, parents who are opposed to the content or organization of public schooling may exert a right to keep their children at home for homeschooling. On the other hand, to my knowledge, similar rights do not exist for parents who are dissidents with regard to the need for any education at all, or with regard to children’s use of drugs or alcohol. The difference could be explained by the difference in how reasonable the dissident claims are: it is possible to make an argument against the benefits of attending school rather than homeschooling that would be rendered reasonable even by the majority who concludes otherwise.
We may conclude that the rights of dissidents within a common good–centered discourse may depend on at least two types of factual matter. First, they depend on the importance of what is recognized to be at stake, or even what is claimed to be at stake by the minority. Second, they depend on the reasonableness, plausibility, or legitimacy of the dissident view. How that legitimacy should be assessed, and by whom, is clearly a complicated question that shall be left for later for the sake of argument.
Health Ideologies and the Common Good
For this article, I have chosen the Norwegian Strategy for Modernisation and Coordination of Central Health Registries and Medical Quality Registries 2010–2020 as the empirical case. In the Norwegian context, this is an important piece of health policy. I also think the case is interesting because it is so explicit in its expression of a particular health ideology. The strategy was developed by a broad steering committee with high-level government officials, and it was formulated in two extensive documents: the full versionFootnote 1 (184 pages) and the short versionFootnote 2 (47 pages). The following is my translation of passages from the short version:
The overall objective of the national strategy is to obtain more knowledge on the prevalence, causes and the course of diseases, and on the quality of different types of treatment and services. This will provide a basis for better treatment, prevention and contingency measures. Better health registries will lead to better health services and better health.Footnote 3
Throughout the short version there are similar claims. Indeed, the title of both documents is “Good Health Registries—Better Health.” The full version does not include explicit, unconditional claims of this type; rather, it presents the objective of improving public health. That is, it repeatedly and unconditionally states that the health registries and the knowledge they will produce are necessary, and that “we must do research to monitor the health state of the population.”Footnote 4
Chapter 4 of the full version of the strategyFootnote 5 contains a discussion of ethical issues. It is concluded that although informed consent is the main rule, “not all” health registries can be based on consent. Indeed, the practical implication of the strategy, if implemented, is that a number of large, non-voluntary clinical health registries in Norway can be used (and coupled) for research purposes without specific informed consent. The main part of the discussion is framed as a “balancing” between the public health benefits and “negative consequences for privacy and confidentiality.”Footnote 6 Next, the text discusses how consent requirements may jeopardize completeness of data and hence the health benefits, and how the same requirements may be experienced as harmful or irrelevant by certain patient groups. Finally, the text performs a bioethical analysis referring to the well-known textbook of Beauchamp and Childress.Footnote 7 Interestingly, their principles are reinterpreted into a common good–based discourse:
Medical ethics has four basic principles: self-determination, beneficence, non-malfeasance and justice. These principles are intended for the health service, the objective of which is to improve the health of the individual patient. Health registries and epidemiological research, however, direct themselves to a larger extent to the community, and are dependent on a good interplay between patient, health service and society. Accordingly, the four ethical principles may in this context be reformulated to integrity, safety, utility and solidarity.Footnote 8
The relevance of the reformulated principles is explained as follows: Integrity is a question of violation of privacy, or also a perceived violation of privacy. Safety is a question of safe storage of data. Utility is health benefit. It can be small for the individual but is large on the collective level. Solidarity is a reason for participation in the registries. The chapter ends at this point.
A lot can be said about the presented case. My main interest here is to see the case as an example of the explicit expression of health ideology, in the sense that the strategy takes for granted the following claims:
1) More epidemiological research on health registries will lead to better public health services and better public health (and will do so in a cost-effective manner compared to other health strategies).
2) Improvements in health services are unequivocally a good thing.
3) There are no other relevant negative consequences than the possible threat to privacy and confidentiality.
Opponents to these claims could choose a number of paths for their criticism. For instance, they could contend that claim (1) is a hypothesis, and not a piece of evidence-based knowledge. At least in some cases, one could argue that epidemiological (or other medical) research produces little clinical utility, or perhaps also negative utility due to more worries without good therapeutic or preventive measures, or more clinical mistakes due to the increased complexity of the health services.Footnote 9 Next, one could accuse claim (2) of “healthism” in the sense that it unconditionally equates health utility and general utility, disregarding the economic costs of the health services at the expense of other needs, and the personal and cultural costs of investing ever more attention, time, and energy to actual and hypothetical medical problems, at the expense of other individual and collective activities. This would invoke the old debates on healthism and medicalization, in which one side of the debate would clearly tend to disagree with claim (3) and argue that society would be better served by not such a rapid acceleration of medical research. Consequently, they would question the entire ethics assessment being made in the strategy, because they would find the health utility to be overestimated or uncertain, and the balancing to be incomplete, as it did not include the potential negative consequences in terms of economic costs or the cultural processes of medicalization.
It is not the objective of this article to judge whose set of claims is the more plausible. I do think, however, that we can reasonably take at least some of these issues to be open and depending on future developments. The epistemic status appears to be one of uncertainty; that is, it is possible to imagine a set of future scenarios, but there is no accurate knowledge about which of the scenarios will come true, or even of their probabilities. It is in this sense that I invoke the concept of health ideologies: ideology not as false consciousness, but as a set of general, uncertain beliefs about future matters of fact, combined with normative claims about what should be done now. Perhaps we could label the Norwegian strategy documents as health optimist, and the corresponding dissident position as health skeptic.
The work of Beauchamp and ChildressFootnote 10 served as the authoritative source for the ethical assessment in the Norwegian strategy (albeit in a form that I suspect might not entirely please the authors). This is not so surprising. Although the textbookFootnote 11 includes a careful discussion of problematic life-sustaining technologies, clinically nonbeneficial interventions, and medical risks, it does not mention the debates on medicalization. For instance, there is no reference to authors such as Ivan Ilich, Petr Skrabanek, or James Le Fanu, who—each in his own way—have raised critical questions about the development of modern medicine. Indeed, Beauchamp and Childress’s treatment of the balancing of benefits, costs, and risks is quite similar to the Norwegian case: “This criterion [the balance of probable benefits and harms] is also used in judgments about the ethical acceptability of research involving human subjects; these judgments consider whether the probable overall benefits—usually for society—outweigh the risks to subjects.”Footnote 12 The possibility that research outputs (knowledge, practices, technology) may not be desirable and good in themselves appears not to be considered at all. In this sense one may identify an implicit health optimist ideology in the work of Beauchamp and Childress.
Objectivism and the Common Good
From the perspective of philosophy of science, one may identify implicit or explicit epistemological assumptions in the debate on research biobanks and health registries. I have called this section “objectivism” because I think that concept summarizes quite well the implicit epistemological position in the case study of this article, the Norwegian strategy on health registries. The term “objectivism” is used in many ways. Here, I let it denote the position that embraces the following claims:
1) Well-performed, high-quality science is objective in the sense that it produces value-free descriptions of matters of fact in the external world. Competent scientists may differ with regard to their interests, ideological beliefs, and personal and cultural identity, but such differences will not translate into different descriptions of the matters of fact, that is, different scientific knowledge.
2) All relevant matters of fact can be given a scientific description that is adequate for decisions on these matters.
In the Norwegian strategy texts, these claims are not explicitly made. Still, they seem to be implicitly assumed, because the strategy insists that decisions on registries and consent requirements should be based on case-by-case assessments of the balance between the (future) utility of a registry and the “negative consequences for privacy and confidentiality.” There is no mention of the possibility that the utility or the harm cannot be robustly assessed, or that there could be controversial or even value-laden issues in the choice of assessment methods.
In a similar manner, Beauchamp and Childress’s textbook appears to implicitly embrace objectivist claims. Admittedly, it explains that moral disagreement may be caused by factual disagreement, and it contains thorough discussions of the value-ladenness of quality-of-life measures. When it comes to assessment of risk, however, it is simply stated without any critical discussion that “[s]tatements of risk are descriptive inasmuch as they state the probability that harmful events will occur. These statements of risk are also evaluative inasmuch as they attach a value to the occurrence or prevention of these events.”Footnote 13 This view has, of course, been subject to immense debate throughout the latter three decades and has been criticized from the quite different perspectives of cultural studies of risk,Footnote 14 science and technology studies,Footnote 15 and post-normal science.Footnote 16 Issues of contestation include the definition and ontological status of probability and the possibility of objective measurements of probabilities. Indeed, there is a whole literature on the theoretical and practical problems of leaving the responsibility for risk assessment to scientific expertise alone. Beauchamp and Childress, however, address the citizen-expert relationship merely by discussing how to deal with the public’s subjectivity and possible error in their perception of risk. It is almost as if the authors were unaware of academic debates about risk.
Whether objectivism and its alternatives are ideologies in the sense used here is perhaps not so important. As a philosopher of science, I rather think of them as philosophical positions, not in the sense that they cannot be informed by empirical evidence—they can—but in the sense that the question is not easily settled once and for all. There are plausible and reasonable arguments to be made by both sides of the debate. Indeed, such arguments are being made as a matter of theoretical research.
Informed Consent and the Rights of Dissidents
Why do some individuals choose not to participate in medical research? A plausible reason in some research contexts is that they think their personal risk or sacrifice is too high. Still, in biobank and health registry research, the personal risk—except that of violation of privacy and confidentiality—is likely to be assessed as low. There is, however, at least another possible reason: that they are dissidents with respect to the health optimist and objectivist assumptions underlying the belief in the utility of the research to be undertaken. They may believe that the utility is overestimated and that there may be general negative consequences of the research (for instance, higher health costs or medicalization). Furthermore, they may believe that this will not be identified and corrected by the scientific and political institutions, because the criteria for what counts as success are also shaped according to health optimist beliefs. As for the empirical assessment of health optimist beliefs, the dissidents may be non-objectivists, or they may believe that in the actual world we live in, economic and political power is distributed and exerted in such a way that the objective truth about the nonutility of medical research is obstructed from entering the public sphere, or even the public domain. In sum, the dissident reason is that the research will not serve the common good.
At least some individuals think in this way. I can confirm this because I have personally refused to give consent to medical research participation on such grounds—not because I am against medical research in general, but because I believed that those particular projects would not serve but rather be harmful to the common good.Footnote 17
A first observation is that from the moral perspective of the dissident, with respect to herself or himself, she or he has a moral duty to abstain from contributing to harming the common good. The choice to not participate is hence seen by the actor as a moral choice. A second observation is that the institution of informed consent provides a mechanism to act on that moral choice. Of course, there are other possibilities, above all public protest. Still, informed consent requirements provide the dissident with a very simple and practical way of avoiding becoming part of something she or he believes to be harmful to the common good. Indeed, a move toward a weakening of the rights-based discourse centered around informed consent seems to reduce the possibility of acting on one’s common good–based reasons for concluding that a research activity (or infrastructure) is ethically unjustifiable. We should think carefully about a development in ethics that appears to weaken individuals’ possibilities of making and enacting moral choices when they differ from those of the political majority or power elites. Indeed, one could argue that a lot of modern ethics, beginning with the Nuremberg code, took as its point of departure the need to secure exactly that kind of possibility.
What rights should dissidents have, and will they be implemented if informed consent requirements are loosened or removed? Previously, I advocated gradualism: not any dissident claim merits a strong right to obstruct the plans and endeavors of the majority. It will have to depend on what is perceived by the different parties to be at stake, and what arguments can be made for a plurality of reasonable and plausible perspectives. To say this is to call for an element of discourse ethics. A common good–based discourse could be very well suited for the purpose if implemented in good, inclusive, ideally herrschaftsfreie (equal and domination-free) public debates, in which different perspectives, facts, values, majority and minority ideologies, and critiques of ideologies are welcomed to the table. It would constitute major progress if this ideal were implemented in the design of, say, public fora, policy work, and textbooks in bioethics.
