Vicki A. Spencer's Herder's Political Thought: A Study on Language, Culture, and Community is an excellent survey of the political ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder, a late-eighteenth-century historian, translator, educator, and clergyman, whose background influence on long-standing philosophical debates over pluralism, community, nationalism, language, and identity has only lately come to be widely accepted. To have Spencer's readings of Herder collected together into one sustained interpretive argument should come as a pleasant surprise for long-time scholars of Herder; those who have seriously pursued the secondary scholarship on the political implications of his philosophy will no doubt recollect numerous essays (published in both English- and German-language journals and collections) from Spencer, dating back through the 1990s. To see her grasp of Herder's ideas and their significance laid out in full at long last is a true delight.
Spencer does not approach Herder as a philosopher, and so while she is familiar with and makes reference to much recent work on Herder's philosophy of mind, history, and God, resolving all the perplexities and inconsistencies of Herder's often synthesis-resistant arguments is not her primary goal. In this she is, perhaps, a more faithful student of Herder and his first great English-language proponent, Isaiah Berlin—who emphasized above all Herder's pluralism and his denial of uniform standards of happiness across time and space—than may be the case for many of us who became fascinated with his ideas through Charles Taylor and others of a less pluralistic bent. It is certainly true that one can look at Herder's writings and find in them a consistent thread: namely, the common ability human beings have to articulate through language and culture the ethical principle of Humanität, and by so doing broadly contribute to its realization. The question is how to make sense of Humanität as a standard with a universal moral (even Christian) content—a claim which Spencer rightly notes sets Herder in opposition to Berlin's preferred label of him as a “relativist” (see 100–101, 168)—while also taking seriously Herder's famous insistence that, as Spencer quotes him, “each nation has its center of happiness in itself” (72). Doing so requires making various use of Herder's many writings on historical development, organic anthropology, and religion, and even then one would be hard pressed to call the result a rigorous whole. Spencer's preference (which is perhaps unintentional) is to downplay these larger questions, situate Humanität in more individual than cultural or national terms—as she puts it, “individual self-realization and authenticity of the self” (115)—and thus enable us to set aside some of Herder's more ambitious and ontological claims about human sociality and reasoning, and get on to his contributions about important political questions. Those who want to better understand Herder as a whole, particularly as one for whom theology was a major and abiding concern, this interpretive move by Spencer is perhaps somewhat disappointing. The resulting chapters, though, when Spencer digs deep into Herder's scattered comments about government and its relationship to culture, may make even the most hedgehog-inclined of us pleased that Spencer set the deeper philosophical matters aside.
Spencer's primary lens for evaluating Herder's thoughts on politics are the liberal-communitarian debates of the 1980s and 1990s. She defines Herder as a kind of “liberal-communitarian,” for whom the moral priority of community attachments is, above all, a function of the interpenetrative operation of language and reason in the construction of human identity: “Society [according to Herder] is not the motive force for the origin of language, but the human infant in its weakness cannot survive without others. Our necessary social interaction therefore provides the stimulation for the development of a language of communication” (40). Spencer's reading of Herder's seminal study, Treatise on the Origin of Language, is superb, and the case she makes for seeing the balance which it posits between the innate powers of the individual and their collective, historical development into a language capable of culture building as crucial to Herder's whole project is a persuasive one.
By grounding her reading of Herder's account of cultural development and attachment so thoroughly in what he presented as individual processes (however historically mediated) of linguistic realization, Spencer's argument remains compelling as she moves into more audacious interpretive territory—namely, her downplaying of nationalism in Herder's thought. It is, of course, widely recognized among Herder scholars that one cannot easily associate his many references to “national character” and such to his claims about the Volk: that Herder's cultural communities, which he thinks to be so important and so worthy of protection, are not the same as nation-states is well understood. Still, given the way Herder's own writings slide back and forth between these terms (something which Spencer forthrightly acknowledges, 129–31), it is often hard for those struggling to fully work out Herder's insights not to turn to nations as a category with a certain historically essential, even metaphysical, significance for his philosophy of identity. This Spencer strongly argues against—and by so doing, she supplies a fuller case for that reading of Herder which presents him as an enemy not only of imperialism (148–49) but of most kinds of national centralization as well. While other scholars have noted the similarities between Herder's views and republican or even anarchic communitarian claims, Spencer's presentation is the strongest depiction of this reading yet:
Following Montesquieu, and like modern liberal-communitarians, he places his faith in local communities as the basis for public participation. He identifies the lack of public spirit in his own society as party due to the influence of those who believe that true citizenship lies beyond local communities, with civil servants placing their faith in dynastic empires and philosophers supporting the notion of universal citizenship. … In Herder's political thought, the state is by no means a universal necessity or even a desirable unit of association. His form of republicanism does not require the state in its modern form, but he recognizes the need for some form of unifying association among the constituent parts of a whole. Far from being absolute opposites, Herder envisages unity and diversity as two sides of the same interactive process: “In this law: to effect many things in one, and to combine the greatest variety with an unconstrained uniformity: consists the height of beauty.” (164–66).
Spencer's account and defense of Herder's argument for local communities is a strong one, but it admittedly depends upon the above-implied balancing act. Somehow, the public groupings capable of sustaining the natural and historical development of a language and culture had to allow for opportunities for participation and discourse, while nonetheless remaining in some associational connection to one another, reflecting some kind of underlying “uniformity” (though not, Spencer thinks, a “uniform constitutionalism,” 202). This argument leads Spencer into speculations about the match between Herder's ideas and the contemporary reality of immigration and multiculturalism, speculations which seem strained at times. Still, the case she makes for imagining the use Herder's philosophy could be put to in morally validating even multilingual states—something that most readings of Herder have thought impossible; whatever else Herder wanted out of a community, it has been assumed, it was an essential connection between the Volk and their language!—is intriguing, and deserves further thought.
Early in her book, Spencer admits that Herder never produced “one major text to include in the philosophical canon” (20), though she insists that isn't a valid reason for his ideas to have been so rarely incorporated into the debates over the Western tradition. This is something on which all Herder scholars can agree—we rarely actually need complete philosophical arguments to be persuaded of valuable ideas. Herder has many such ideas; Spencer very ably elucidates many of them here. Even if her explorations open up questions which require, if Herder is to be taken fully seriously, more philosophical sophistication than her book provides, she is to be commended for her insightful readings. This is a fine book, one which all scholars of the eighteenth-century roots of contemporary debates over community and identity ought to take seriously.
