The caliber of Mohanty’s work is well known among Husserl scholars; the depth of his insights, his amazing clarity concerning even the most perplexing of materials, and his dedication to be as objective as possible with Husserl’s ideas and the comments or interpretations offered by critics, are all things we come to expect of Mohanty and all are contained within this present volume. In this book, Mohanty explores the development of Husserl’s thought from his days as a mathematician at Halle up to 1916 when Husserl, now the master and artificer of the phenomenological movement, moved from Göttingen to Freiburg. The relationship between Husserl’s early work in mathematics and his later phenomenological work is rarely discussed in current phenomenological literature; albeit most scholars are aware of the feuds happening between Husserl and Frege during this early period. So, Mohanty is treading novel ground here by clearly demonstrating that Husserl’s beginnings in the abstract entities of mathematics, inspired by greats like Leibniz, Bolzano, Weierstrass, and his good friend Cantor, directly inform his anti-psychologistic views (and his ability to overcome the Brentanian psychologistic theory of numbers), and his ideas concerning formal ontology, pure logic, intentionality, and knowledge. With this work Mohanty establishes beyond a shadow of a doubt that understanding Husserl’s mathematical work allows one a more profound understanding of the core ideas contained within Logical Investigations and Ideas I, if not Husserl’s body of work inclusive.
Mohanty’s tracing of Husserl’s development is vast, intellectually stimulating, and carried out with the precision only a seasoned scholar and admirer of Husserl can perform. His survey of this period in Husserl’s life is impressive for several reasons, but what I find most formidable is the way it is written — with a sense of warmth and depth of character. This is not some cold, dry observation of a philosopher’s intellectual development, but rather a personal and intellectual journey where you get a sense that Mohanty truly understands Husserl, as if he knew Husserl. Mohanty offers comprehensive comparative analyses between Husserl and Kant, on topics that range from logic to consciousness to ethics. He also provides some detailed comparative discussion of Husserl’s work with that of Th. Lipps, a figure who seems to have slipped into obscurity today, and as to be expected there are comparisons of Husserl and Frege. There is also an excellent discussion of psychologism in Chapter 4, where Mohanty differentiates between several kinds of psychologism to provide the reader a clear and accurate representation of the antipsychologism Husserl espoused. Furthermore, Mohanty highlights sections of Logical Investigations that contain specific attacks, e.g., on the psychologistic theory of truth, the psychologistic theory of meaning, the consequences of psychologism for logic, etc. Here, we also find an interesting discussion of the responses to Husserl’s antipsychologism, some from Husserl’s peers like Sigwart, Natorp, and Brentano, and some from contemporary scholars like Dallas Willard, Barry Smith, and Michael Dummett. This chapter shifts naturally to a discussion of pure logic, since Husserl conceived of pure logic as a “theory of all theories irrespective of what theories are about and therefore so far as their forms are concerned, is also concerned with the forms of reality,” thus, capable of escaping psychologism’s grasp.Footnote 1 Mohanty is also careful in his usage of Platonism as a label, concerning Husserl and others like Bolzano and Frege, which is refreshing.
It is very difficult to find anything critical to say about this volume, but I have managed to find two bits of criticism. First, when Mohanty quotes a German philosopher like Frege or Brentano, from a text or a personal letter in the original German, an English translation is not provided either in the main text or in the endnotes. This should be corrected as it creates accessibility issues for newer Husserl or phenomenology scholars who haven’t quite achieved German fluency, or who are still unfamiliar with specific translations of terms, e.g., such terms as Vorstellung, Gegenstand, or Sinne can have author-specific interpretations. A translation should also be offered just as good measure: Even a fluent scholar might prefer to have the English translation available to check that their interpretation of the text is accurate. Second, I think Mohanty’s discussion of the Göttingen Period and sections on Logical Investigations could have benefited from some discussion of Husserl’s students who were studying with him at that time. Mohanty does include two small appendices to Chapters 7 that contain a brief summarization of discussions held between Husserl and Daubert concerning intentional experience, but this is still slight when one notices the wealth of comments and proposed amendments offered by the Göttingen Circle as a whole. To illustrate, this early circle was not convinced by parts of § 69 and 70 of Logical Investigations, specifically the distinctions Husserl made between statements expressing judgment, wishing, questioning, and commanding, and how these different types of grammatical constructions come to have meaning. As early as 1904, Daubert writes to a friend that he disagrees with Husserl’s status of the question and is attempting to create his own solution, and Pfänder too has a similar problem in that he disagrees with the notion that question, wishing, and commanding being reducible to judgments, and he too proposes to write his own solutions (which he publishes in 1909). Adolf Reinach, fellow student and good friend of Daubert, dedicated his energies to a phenomenological analysis of promising and obligation, publishing his ideas in 1913. Reinach also worked on clarifying the concept of presentation, elaborated on Husserl’s (and Brentano school’s) work on states of affairs, and attempted to show that negative judgment held a special, independent status from affirmative judgment. Did responses such as these to the first editions of Logical Investigations have any effect on the later revised editions or on Husserl’s work generally? Were any of these early students successful in changing Husserl’s perspective? These are important questions, especially when one considers that these students did not agree with Husserl’s transcendental turn or his phenomenological reduction. And I think any discussion of this particular period of Husserl’s intellectual life should attempt to address these questions as well as explore Husserl’s relationships with his early students, not just his later relationships with Stein or Heidegger.
This book is a must have for any scholar studying Husserl and will be a great reference to read alongside Logical Investigations or Ideas I, to either encapsulate or elucidate core ideas of Husserl’s, like his views on intentionality, time-consciousness, ethics and theory of values, or Epoché. Mohanty also does an excellent job of probing Husserl’s problems and perplexing ideas, discussing in detail where scholars have differing opinions on how best to interpret or reconcile certain ideas, and this affords the reader a more comprehensive picture of Husserl and the world of Husserlian scholarship with its interpretations both past and present.
