Political science professor Adeed Dawisha has provided policymakers with a highly readable interpretive account of Iraq's political history from Britain's creation of the state in 1921 through 2008. Dawisha's contribution to the field holds certain advantages over earlier surveys of Iraqi political history in the 20th century (including those by Longrigg, Khadduri, Sluglett, Marr, and Tripp) in that its narrative continues beyond the 2003 Anglo-American invasion, boasts a lucid analysis of Iraq's national political culture, relies largely on Arabic sources, and is evenly critical of several key players in Iraq's modern stage.
Instead of utilizing a straightforward chronological structure, Dawisha employs a hybrid approach by repeatedly discussing three themes in successive historical periods. This not only allows for a more analytical discussion of his chosen themes of governance, democracy, and national identity but also results in occasional—and perhaps inevitable—redundancy. Following a brief introduction, the first six chapters address these three thematic areas twice in succession, first during the state formation of 1921 to 1936 and then during the dynamic instability of 1936 to 1958. Then, after a chapter summarizing his conclusions regarding each of these topics for the monarchic period, each theme is subsumed within three further chapters devoted to the revolutionary decade of 1958 to 1968, the Baʿathist era of 1968 to 2003, and developments since 2003. This structure devotes more analysis to the monarchic period and offers increasingly less analysis as the narrative approaches the present.
Iraq should be approached as an extended interpretive essay. It is informed by political science paradigms and a “great men” theory of history, designed to influence policy debates and intended for readers reasonably familiar with modern Iraq. It is not ideal as a college textbook because much of the discussion requires prior knowledge of the outlines of modern Iraqi history. It is more suitable as a companion volume for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, or aspiring policymakers striving to engage with historical debates concerning the evolution of Iraq's political culture. As the contribution is not exceedingly theoretical or analytically groundbreaking and does not offer significant new sources to the historical debate, it may prove less interesting for advanced scholars of Iraq.
Although fresh primary-source research is not evident, the author does offer several fascinating historical details previously unknown to this reviewer, largely gained from Arabic sources and, for the 1970s onward, Dawisha's personal recollections. For example, Bakr Sidqi tried to pack the Iraqi military college with Kurdish officer candidates in 1936, Nuri al-Said advised the British to attack Egypt in 1956, Jordan's King Hussein tried to tip off his Hashemite cousins to the pending coup in 1958, and ʿAbd al-Salam ʿAref demanded that ʿAbd al-Karim Qasim admit to ʿAref's role in the 1958 revolution prior to Qasim's execution in 1963. While such intriguing anecdotes spice up an already engaging text, some of Dawisha's statements betray his own cultural proclivities. For example, he argues that Nasser's Egypt was struggling “to stride out beyond the intellectual confines of its own Egyptianness” (p. 166) or that Kurds needed to curb their “feral and more anarchic impulses” (p. 279). These are viewpoints unlikely to gain universal accord.
Some of Dawisha's conclusions will prove contentious to certain readers and gospel truth to others. As one might expect from a historical analysis of Iraqi politics, such statements largely pertain to post-1958 developments. For example, Dawisha's assertion that “any talk of Party autonomy was pure whimsy” (p. 229) after 1968–70 would be countered by those dating Saddam Hussein's complete personal domination of the Baʿath party to 1975, 1979, or even 1990. His characterization of the level of violence surrounding the 2005 elections as no worse than that in other Third World countries (p. 254) and his labeling of the 2006 Badr Corps’ infiltration of the Ministry of Interior as “alleged” (p. 255) also invite disagreement. (Later in the book he actually treats the Badr Corps’ infiltration as a fact [p. 267], which betrays that this section was written relatively rapidly). Finally, the characterization of Diyala and Taʾmim as “predominantly Arab” provinces (p. 250) may be technically true (at times), but it papers over the complex and often sordid history of ethno-sectarian engineering that portions of both provinces experienced.
Dawisha engages the debate concerning the origin, extent, and evolution of certain constants in Iraqi political culture after the state's initial formation with relish. This debate, an attempt to finger the original sinner for as many negative characteristics of Iraqi politics as any analyst may choose to identify, defines the underlying political views of most scholars of modern Iraq. In Dawisha's case, while he does identify such original sinners throughout the period in question, as well as the roots of several phenomena in the monarchic period, most of his analytic conclusions place the blame for Iraq's political problems squarely on the twin legacies of the 1958 revolution and the extremes of the Saddam Hussein regime that evolved out of it. In terms of his discussion of events after 2003, it appears as though Dawisha was either squeezed for space or hedging his analytical bets for the future. While this is certainly understandable considering the potentially positive turn that took place in Iraq as this book was heading to press, the relatively compressed and conservative presentation of events since the fateful Anglo-American invasion renders the final chapter the least convincing of the work. Many American policymakers will feel far more reassured in their own motivations and legacies from Dawisha's recounting than from those of other scholars.
Aimed at informed readers rather than specialists, Iraq does not include a note on transliteration and does include several unconventional, hybrid, dialectical, or simply incorrect transliteration choices and/or typos, such as maddrassa, fetwa, nidham, shiyukh, ʿijmi, Muhamed, and Barazani. This is not a major problem, but the lack of any maps of Iraq and its provinces or of Baghdad neighborhoods will prove disappointing to some and confusing to others. Finally, inclusion of a chronology would have been exceedingly helpful since Dawisha's expository structure is not conducive to readers’ recalling the order of events. In spite of the critiques mentioned here, Dawisha's contribution is on the whole an engaging, lively, thought-provoking, and profitable read.
