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Newtonian Mechanics and Predictive Election Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Dennis Farlie and
Ian Budge
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Extract

Analyses of elections, whether academic or journalistic, are permeated by terms drawn from physics. We discuss the inertia or volatility of an electorate, the momentum of a campaign, pressures and cross-pressures, party actions and reactions, the impact of short-term forces. Although imprecise, these borrowings convey genuine information about the characteristics of an election, and they would be difficult to replace.

Information

Type
Notes and Comments
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 7 , Issue 3 , July 1977, pp. 413 - 418
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1977

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References

1 Converse, Philip, ‘The Concept of a Normal Vote’ in Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren E. and Stokes, Donald E., eds., Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 9–39.Google Scholar

2 For an influential symposium see Pomper, G. M., Brody, R. A., Page, B. I. and Boyd, R. W., ‘Issues and American Voters 1956–68’, American Political Science Review, LXVI (1972), 417–78.Google Scholar For an up-to-date review see Margolis, M., ‘From Confusion to Confusion: Issues and the American Voter 1956–72’, American Political Science Review (forthcoming, 03 1977).Google Scholar

3 Budge, Ian and Farlie, Dennis, ‘Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Elections: Assessing the Impact of Campaign Cues’ (in preparation).Google Scholar

4 This statement over-simplifies in that it presupposes some ability to measure first what the vote would have been under predispositions, then under predispositions plus a particular kind of cue, and from the comparison to estimate the net effects associated with a particular kind of cue. This is possible in terms of the procedures we suggest in our own paper (fn. 4). Converse's normal vote measure simply compares the net effects on one direction or the other (cont) produced by all election cues acting together, with what would have been produced under predispositions or in a situation where short-term effects balanced each other out. The pure predispositional situation is thus not distinguished from a situation involving a balance between the short-term cues.

5 The concept of predispositions is discussed at length by Budge, Ian and Farlie, Dennis in Voting and Party Competition (London and New York: Wiley, 1977), Chap. 2, section 4 and Chap. 7, section 4.Google Scholar

6 The First Law of Inertia seems applicable to many political fields – from budgeting and judicial discussions to the political stability of regimes – where the basic starting question is whether the outcome will be the same as last time or whether (and in what direction) it will change under the impact of new forces. This also raises the question of whether the definition of force for elections might also be applicable to these other areas.

7 We hope to do this in the paper on campaign cues cited in fn. 4 above.