Elected pope in September 1914, Benedict xv had to cope with the First World War and the post-war period, which left many geo-political questions open, both in Europe and the Near East. When Benedict became pope the Holy See found itself in the most isolated position that it had encountered in its recent history. Marginalised in a highly secular Europe, it had seen its traditional relationship with France collapse, whereas that with Italy remained complicated.

This situation did not improve during the war, when the neutrality of the pope was seen as a sign of impotence. Despite these difficulties, the post-war period would see a growth in the prestige of the Holy See as an active player on the world's stage. This was a result of the Vatican's astute positioning of itself during the war and of the deep crisis that hit many European nations, leading to a re-evaluation of the role of religion.

Benedict xv’s policy has been the focus of numerous analyses. This volume focuses its attention on the Holy See's Middle Eastern policy during his papacy: a very interesting subject considering the developments in that area during and after the war, with the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the modern carving up of the region between the French and the British.

Researching through a vast bibliography and the Vatican archives, Agnes de Dreuzy traces the main lines of Vatican policy, connecting events which occurred in the Levant and its diplomatic activity with Istanbul. There, Vatican diplomats tried to limit measures against the Catholic clergy taken by the ‘Young Turks’ government, without establishing diplomatic relations with a state which was on the point of collapse.

The situation was complicated by the status of the empire's Catholic subjects. When the Ottoman Empire joined the war in autumn 1914 it put an end to the long-standing French protectorate of Middle Eastern Catholics. The situation worsened with Italy's entry into the war. Most of the Franciscans entrusted with the Custody of the Holy Land and a goodly number of Latin clergy were Italian: in this situation, while the Ottoman authorities acted against the clergy, the Church could only rely on the protection of the consulates of neutral nations or the empire's allies.

Protecting Catholic institutions during the war turned out to be a difficult task. It was, however, a vital one considering the importance of the Holy Land to Christian identity and the ties that connected Lebanon to Rome and France. Given that this was the case, it should come as no surprise that the conquest of Jerusalem by Allenby was greeted with joy by Catholic observers.

It was, however, more difficult to respond to the new dynamics emerging in the area after the conflict. First and foremost were the relations to be developed with the powers that had become hegemonic, France and Britain. Secondly, how to weigh the various national claims which were emerging: Arab nationalism, that had arisen during the war; Zionism, which was reviving its ambitions, with British support; and, lastly, claims for independence by the Maronites in Lebanon. No less complex were the problems arising from the presence in the region of many Catholic Rites – alongside the Latin there were numerous Eastern Catholic churches – as well as a significant Orthodox presence and a growing Protestant one, which was particularly feared.

The Holy See sought to respond to these challenges by placing new emphasis on a developing native clergy and episcopate and detaching itself from a missionary mindset which had revealed its dangers during the war. Moreover, as de Dreuzy underlines, the Holy See was aware of the transitory nature of the mandates in the Near East, and rather than setting itself short-term objectives it attempted to build conflict-free relations with Arab elites. This was a far-seeing policy but it was hampered by numerous factors, including the French desire to return to a protective role and the tendency of the local clergy to rely on European powers for its protection.

This conflict between a long-term outlook and more immediate objectives is evident when Arab national claims in Syria are considered. The Holy See was cautiously optimistic about this prospect but it encountered opposition from the French. The idea of a unified Arab state was also feared by the local Catholic hierarchy, which preferred the French idea of cantonising Syria and creating a semi-independent Lebanon.

In Palestine Catholic institutions had to deal with a Protestant mandatory government and a growing Zionist movement. Historians have often examined the Holy See's policy in Palestine during the Mandate. De Dreuzy adds some new elements, suggesting that the Holy See, unlike local church authorities, was not hostile to Zionism and its basic objectives. This conclusion is not wholly convincing. Whilst there is no doubt that Benedict xv and Cardinal Gasparri did not share the darkly pessimistic view of Zionism then prevailing internationally in conservative circles, it was equally true that they considered the aims of the Jewish nationalist movement to be contrary to Catholic interests.

Overall, The Holy See and the emergence of the modern Middle East is a most useful work, providing a balanced and clear synthesis of the Holy See's Middle Eastern policy. The Vatican archives are used in a well-balanced way, as are secondary sources. For a better understanding of some aspects of the subject of the subject it would probably have been preferable to make more extensive use of Italian, French and British diplomatic correspondence, as well as the archives of the main Catholic institutions in the Middle East. This oversight, together with the limited use of non-English bibliographic sources, make some interpretative passages too one-sided.

These are, however, limitations that are intrinsic to the vast majority of historical studies. They do not compromise the overall value of this work and nor do they cast doubt on the author's general interpretation of the Holy See's Middle Eastern policy which is expressed with the greatest clarity.