There are a growing number of books available on the history of computing and the manufacture of computers. Much of this history is a well-trodden path—the early pioneers, the first machines and so on. Or so it might seem. Arthur Norberg has taken some of the most well-known episodes and, by looking at them in an interconnected way, and by asking the questions that technology, business, and economic historians should be interested in, has come up with an elegantly written and convincingly argued book that gives a refreshing new perspective on the emergence of the computer into the 1950s.

The book deals with the development of two key businesses, the Eckert-Mauchly Computer Company (EMCC) and Engineering Research Associates (ERA), as they struggle to become established manufacturers of computers or key components. It then examines their eventual absorption into Remington Rand. Remington Rand and the Univac computer is widely remembered as a business failure, eclipsed by IBM in the later 1950s, following an early lead in some aspects of the manufacture of general purpose computers. Norberg's book stands, if not as a corrective, then as a more convincing anatomy of relative decline. The technical developments during this period have been covered in previous accounts, though the decision-making processes involved, less so. Norberg's book is invaluable on both counts. The transition from mechanical to electromechanical, the competing forms of storage media, the development of early programming, and so on are all exhaustively detailed, but more importantly the ambitions and constraints facing the early engineers and entrepreneurs are charted in parallel, to give us one of the most well-rounded histories in the field.

EMCC and ERA represent two similar yet different entry routes into the computer manufacturing world. ERA was formed after World War II in order to keep together a team of engineers that had been working on applied research for the military, particularly the U.S. Navy. Norberg provides concise and useful biographies of all the key personal involved in the establishment of this and other enterprises under scrutiny. He also traces networks and tracks the technologies as they develop. In the case of ERA the emphasis in the early years is on the Navy's sponsorship and the development of magnetic drum storage devices. EMCC represents Eckert and Mauchly's attempt to build on the ENIAC developments through their own private company. As with ERA, however, despite efforts to get funding and contracts from a wider commercial arena, it is government contracts that keep the fledgling firm going, funding by the National Bureau of Standards being vital in the early stages. This is unsurprising given the volatile and uncertain world of early computer technology, its temperamental nature, bewildering complexity, and rapid evolutionary cycle—new systems were often superseded before they were completed. The story of both ERA and EMCC is one of over-optimistic designs, cost overruns, constant contract renegotiation, and delayed deliveries. Norberg provides comprehensive accounts of a number of contract histories and their endemic difficulties. Only state purchasers could perhaps survive in such a world. Of the early contracts secured by EMCC, those with the Prudential Life Insurance make it stand out as the pioneering commercial company.

Eventually, both companies needed to become part of a larger-scale operation in order to survive. Norberg explains that a different mix, indeed a different culture of management and technical expertise evolved at ERA and EMCC. Norberg's essential message is that when the two companies were eventually folded into Remington Rand, it is the failure of the latter to effectively reconcile these different cultures which was to handicap the company in its contest with IBM. In charting the progress of ERA and EMCC, and the effect of their incorporation into Remington Rand, Norberg confronts a series of crucial issues and debates. Engineers and entrepreneurship—can boffins be effective managers and achieve commercial success? Funding and investment—where do advanced technology firms get funding in a pre–venture capital world? Government funding and control—how does this affect the direction of technology and the competitiveness of firms, and what competences do government staff possess in assessing technologies or supplier companies? What interests do they have in securing the future of fledgling, strategically important companies? Are such companies viewed as strategically important from an economic or military point of view? Norberg's book is replete with information, most of it garnered from archive sources, that addresses and informs these questions. It is a very fine piece of scholarship that will be invaluable to a wide range of historians seeking to understand the evolution of both technology and U.S. business.