Laura Ephraim's Who Speaks for Nature arrives, as the author is aware, in the midst of two movements: one academic, the other all too earthly. The former involves disrupting a “nature-politics binary” in scholarship (10)—what Ephraim terms the “two sciences settlement”: “the view that natural and political science should respect the essential differences between their respective objects of study” (34). The latter concerns a growing awareness of the need to pay more attention to nature in the face of debates about climate change, and water crises such as those in Flint, Michigan (148–49). Through a history of political thought, Ephraim seeks to bring these two movements together in her “worldly approach to the politics of science” (25). Natural science is always political. Ephraim claims that this is due to the emphasis on world building: “the politics of science, thus conceived, creates a tissue of affinities, habits, rhetorics, and affects, that hold disparate human and non-human bodies together in a common world and enable some of them to speak for others” (142). It is thus Ephraim's thesis that contrary to our impulse to protect the sciences, and their claims to truth, from politics, we must “make science more—not less—political” (143). If we want to let nature speak (so to speak), we must speak for nature. Indeed, nature has always had spokespersons and partitioners of the perceptible (a term Ephraim borrows from Rancière). It is this fusion of the natural and the political that Ephraim seeks to establish throughout the book, continually working—in her words—both “with and against” (5, 21, 58, 116) the thinkers she employs to her purposes.
In a counterchronological genealogy (9), Ephraim offers sharp and creative analyses of Arendt, Vico, Descartes, and Hobbes (in that order). These begin and are initially grounded in the discussion, in chapter 1, of Arendt's simultaneous antipathy to the “tunnel vision” of the scientific worldview and her valorization of “the world” grounded in common sense (that is, sensing: aesthesis). The movement of the book is set up, from the outset, to adopt certain portions of Arendt's argument while rejecting others. In particular, chapter 2 opens with the claim that Arendt's rejection of Vico—as capitulating too much to Descartes's cycloptic scientific vision—was misplaced. Like Arendt, Ephraim claims, Vico put “common sense at the center” of his philosophy (69). Supplementing Arendt with Vico's “imaginative genealogy” (69), Ephraim can employ Vico to affirm “the receptivity and the creativity of both politics and science” (70). The reading here of Vico is exciting. The emphasis on the metaphorical grounds of world making in historical change is illuminated through shifts in the periodic common sense of human beings. “Natural things become both newly sensible and newly speakable at the birth of the world of nations” (81); common sense is thus the power “of concerted activity to create a world of relationships among men and things” (82). Vico is thus made into an Arendtian; and a better (or more positive) Arendtian than Arendt herself. Contra Arendt, the “Vichian perspective” does not see the scientific world as “antagonistic to the common world” (90)—it is still world building, not world denying.
Arendt and Vico do, however, share a common enemy: Descartes. The subject of chapter 3, Descartes appears not in his usual form as the founding villain of “modern scientific rationalism” (92), but as a creative “partitioner of the perceptible.” Despite the fact that Arendt sees him as a participant in the scientific worldview that she casts as tragic, and despite the fact that Vico “sees Descartes's new science as both potentially pernicious and scientifically bankrupt” (88), Descartes is cast here in a new role: as a copilot (with Arendt and Vico) of a plane that none of them knew they were flying. As with her reading of Vico, the reading Ephraim offers here of Descartes (grounded in The World and the Discourse on Method) is intriguing, highly creative, and challenging. However, it involves (explicitly) “reading Descartes against Descartes and with Rancière and Arendt” (113). Descartes too, for Ephraim, opens us up to seeing a world of “common sense” that is at once natural and political, but only through his apparent disavowal of the same: “Descartes's opposition to common sense opens the door to common sense” (114). Hobbes closes the book's main chapters with an analysis of his rhetorical method and the “common world” it constructs, and that is itself constructed by the covenanters of his state. This is a compelling reading of Hobbes's political science, though here there is a notable lack of discussion of the relationship and exchanges between Hobbes and Descartes (which would seem to have made a nice tie between the last two chapters), and of Hobbes's own address of natural science (I am thinking here of De Corpore).
The book concludes with a short epilogue, transitioned into by once again “reading Hobbes against Hobbes” to conclude “with cautious optimism that a rhetorical micropolitics of enacted meanings could offer a powerful, if uncertain, means to pursue a justice of our own making” (140). The call of the epilogue is to orient ourselves around contemporary crises such that we see that only “a collective politics of world-building” (143) can save us through asserting a common world—a new partition of the sensible.
The counterchronological genealogy of Who Speaks for Nature ends in the present (as a good genealogy ought to do), but this reader was left with the distinct sense that the present was in fact omnipresent. There is no address of the past—of a thinker in the past—that is not already, and explicitly, refracted through a thesis that they themselves would, and did, actively deny. Reading a politics of “world building” in Arendt against Arendt through Vico, against Descartes through Descartes against himself, through reading Hobbes against Hobbes seems to be itself a politics of world building; of creating a common world that asserts itself over and above its parts. The message of the book is, it seems, the method. Ephraim writes that “the politics of world-building … is the right context in which to consider the foundations of the natural sciences to speak for their objects of study” (116). This is also the politics of the book itself: speaking for the objects of study (the theorists) in a manner that illuminates things that they did not say or see themselves. Like the politics of “world building,” each of the parts—each interpretative chapter—is a valuable and creative contribution, and scholars of the theorists contained in Who Speaks for Nature would be well served by consulting these ambitious readings. The real argument of the book, however, is in its “tissue of affinities” and “rhetorics” (142)—its common world—that enables these thinkers to speak both with and against themselves. It is a world of its own, that in making it possible to “recognize political complexities that even the [philosophers] overlooked in their respective accounts of the key moments of crisis and renewal of authority in the history of science” (31) may indeed illuminate the contemporary crisis for us.
