Recent years have seen an ever-growing interest in the seventh-century Roman Empire. At least three doctoral theses focusing on Heraclius have been published within the last year or so, not to mention John Haldon's The Empire that Would Not Die (2016), a survey of how the Roman Empire survived Arab expansion. Yet the Mediterranean world faced major upheavals even before the rise of Islam and the Arabs’ growth to power. The first half of the century witnessed the clash of two great empires, the Roman and the Sasanian, which may well be labelled ‘the last great war of Antiquity’. James Howard-Johnston dedicated himself to the study of this period long before the revival of academic interest. In numerous articles and books on the sources and on Roman–Sasanian warfare, he has contributed substantially (though not in an uncontested manner) to our understanding of the Middle East during the seventh century. The book under review may thus be regarded as the culmination of a scholarly enterprise that has lasted as long as the Roman–Sasanian war (as the author admits ironically). Its aim is to offer a full account of the war. H.-J.'s approach is to disentangle the sometimes difficult chronology of events, to survey closely the geography of the theatre of war and to identify thereby factors which influenced the course of the war (7). He thus refuses an examination of structures or ideological factors as explanation for the outcome of war and directs his attention to actions in the political sphere and their timing (372).
This approach sets the structure of the book. It follows the Roman–Sasanian war chronologically through eleven chapters. In addition, there are thirty-two illustrations, some of which are the author's own photographs. After the overthrow of Maurice in a.d. 602, the Sasanian king Khusro used the removal of his former benefactor as a pretext to attack the Roman Empire under its new ruler Phocas. The Persian offensive facilitated the success of a second rebellion, this time by the future emperor Heraclius and his father (chs 1–2). According to H.-J., however, these domestic difficulties were not the main cause of Persian military successes, since the Roman troops could at best have delayed the Persian breakthrough (70–1). Somewhat inconsistently, H.-J. goes on to argue that the change of regime in Constantinople did cause an interruption in its military command, during which the Persians managed to occupy large parts of Roman territory, including the conquest of Jerusalem in a.d. 614 and Alexandria in a.d. 619 (chs 3–4). Besides their military successes, H.-J. highlights the Persians’ dilemma in keeping the occupied territories under control, as they had to balance tensions between the Jewish and Christian populations and therefore could not answer the anti-Sasanian propaganda emanating from Constantinople with anti-Christian propaganda of their own (101). H.-J. pauses his chronological narrative to survey the Middle East under Persian control in the 620s (ch. 5). While he is certainly right to characterise Persian policy in Egypt as conciliation rather than coercion (154–5), he may be a bit too optimistic regarding the ‘careful’ handling of local elites (134). Moreover, Khusro is portrayed simplistically as arrogant king whose downfall was brought about by his personal hubris, in contrast with Heraclius, whose personal engagement in war boosts Roman morale (183–91). The Avar surprise attack in summer 623, which H.-J. interprets as first evidence of collusion between the Khaganate and the Persians (212), dealt a serious blow to that morale (ch. 6). In what follows, H.-J. traces Heraclius’ first counteroffensive (ch. 7), the events surrounding the siege of Constantinople in a.d. 626 and the emperor's second campaign into Persia (chs 8-9). H.-J. denies that Heraclius divided his army into three parts to send relief troops to the besieged capital — though that is attested by the sources — and claims that Heraclius returned to Constantinople later that year — without any support in the sources (260–1). The reader is thus left in the dark as to why the emperor had not personally intervened at this decisive moment. Instead, H.-J. concentrates on the military movements and actions ultimately leading to the fall of Khusro (chs 9–10). He rightly stresses the importance of the alliance with the Turks whose threatening presence played an essential part in the victory over Persia (369–70). His reconstruction of the events after Khusro's death is a detailed version of earlier analyses (War in History 6 (1999), 1–44). He adds three appendices which offer short lexicographical articles on the main participants in the war; a brief overview of the (military) infrastructure and geography of the theatres of war; and a summary of the results of his earlier survey of the extensive source material and its reliability (Witnesses to a world crisis (2010)). Attached is a useful index of good quality.
This well-written overview delivers on its promise to provide a narrative history of the Roman–Sasanian war. Its strength lies in its profound knowledge of geographical conditions, which adds to our understanding of single military decisions and manoeuvres. So do the maps. Yet the book offers few fresh insights. Following traditional lines, Heraclius is portrayed as a military commander ‘of rare boldness’ (229). Along with the Romans’ superior strategic mobility and their use of intelligence and disinformation, these aspects are stressed as key reasons for their ultimate victory (362–6). Yet the cases in which H.-J. sees propaganda at work are not always conclusive. Likewise, his chronological reconstructions have been contested, but this criticism is rarely mentioned in the footnotes and does not receive any adequate response. Finally, it would have been exciting to learn how H.-J. assesses the impact of the war on the structures and imaginaires of the two great powers.
