A DOUBLE TRANSGRESSION? TWO COMPOSERS, TWO COUNTRIES, A SHARED TRAJECTORY?
Two stereotypes frame this intentionally transgressive essay. The first of these is the persistent misconception that Greece and Italy, which undoubtedly share elements of common cultural history grounded in shared experience through trade and other forms of contact over the longue durée, are as a result uniquely capable of mutual comprehension and engagement. Born of the enthusiasm for ‘Mediterranean studies’ that the work of Fernand Braudel inspired in social anthropologists of the 1960s and later, the research that this view inspired can at least be said to have eventually generated a critical reaction, as scholars began to complicate the idea of a Mediterranean cultural area.
The second stereotype is the idea that popular and classical music share nothing at all. It remains a persistent conceit of the wielders of cultural power, who are either unaware or contemptuous of the deep roots connecting the two musical traditions much as, for example, Charles Stewart (Reference Stewart1989) has shown for ecclesiastical and folk religion in Greece – namely, that they are part and parcel of each other. Such examples should lead us to a radical rethinking of the formal–informal dichotomy in a range of fields that include economics, the study of settlement patterns (Herzfeld Reference Herzfeld, Mack and Herzfeld2020a) and even science (Gupta Reference Gupta1998). Classical music draws on vernacular themes, much as those traditions as well as modern popular music make intertextual allusions to well-known classical motifs.
My goal in this essay is to explore the social and cultural implications of dissecting these two stereotypes in tandem. This is a double exercise in what I like to think of as transgressive comparison – transgressive, that is, in that it deliberately cuts across conventional assumptions about comparability. For such a quest, who better to guide us than Giuseppe Verdi and Mikis Theodorakis? Both have heroic stature in their respective countries; both played unconventional roles in national politics (both served as parliamentary deputies); both have intentionally transgressed the popular–classical divide; and both have exhibited fascination with – and investment in – the complex ways in which music, movement and poetry can interact. Despite these commonalities, comparing these individuals may seem counterintuitive. Some may reject any comparison of a beloved and emblematic musical composer and performer with another, especially given assumptions about the eclectic audiences for opera and the view of Theodorakis as primarily a writer of popular songs. In my view, however, that seeming incongruity affords the best reason for making the attempt.
I write, not as a musicologist, but as a social anthropologist. Unable here to invoke the aid of my discipline's usual method of ethnographic fieldwork, I instead attempt an anthropological reading of both composers’ lives and works with the help of historical and other studies published by other specialists. Notably, Gail Holst's fine study of Theodorakis, which at times rises to the emotive force of the composer's own music (see especially Holst Reference Holst1980, 2–5), addresses the musical dimensions of Theodorakis’ works but places them in the context of his political struggles. Many writers have similarly tackled the complex relation between politics and music in Verdi's life. But with the exception of occasional mention of Theodorakis’ respect for Verdi, there has been little effort to connect the two composers.Footnote 1 In my discipline, which is strongly comparative in nature, stereotypes of the kind just mentioned are themselves a topic of analytical interest. What is the social capital invested in keeping popular and classical (or ‘serious’) music categorically separated? The answer to that question may also help us to understand the cultural and social differences that divide Greece from Italy and that expose the political nature of the frequently reiterated insistence on the two countries’ transcendent commonality.
MUSIC AND THE POLITICS OF GREEK CULTURAL IDENTITY
Music in fact offers a particularly effective context in which to see how much of a hold the prevalent stereotypes retain on our imagination. There is a widespread sense that its music is one of the most ‘Balkan’ aspects of modern Greek culture. Although Greek composers have achieved worldwide fame, notably Nikos Skalkottas and Yannis Xenakis in the area of ‘art’ music and Theodorakis, Manos Hadjidakis and Stavros Xarchakos in both the ‘serious’ and the ‘popular’ spheres, the general perception is comparable to the way Greek and Italian food are represented abroad. In the United States, for example, Greek food is ‘ethnic’, like Thai or even southern Italian, whereas ‘Tuscan’ food is treated as a ‘cuisine’. In this sense, all Greek musical production must to some extent struggle with a ‘peasant’ definition of Greek society, certainly rooted now in an idealised model of ‘the Greek village’ (see Herzfeld Reference Herzfeld2020b), but far more insidious in its derogatory effects on cultural reception than the self-ascription as paysans that Susan Carol Rogers (Reference Rogers1987) has identified as the hallmark of Frenchness. Speak to most British or North American commentators about ‘Greek music’, and the response will be a clicking of the fingers and a clumsily sketched attempt at the syrtaki – itself a by-product of the tourism-orientated manufacture of authentically picturesque Greek popular culture.
At one level, the Balkan connection – and what is more ‘peasant’ to most Western Europeans than ‘the Balkans’? – would be hard to refute; connections with Turkish and Slavic musical traditions are obvious and important, and have been widely documented by ethnomusicologists (e.g. Dragoumis Reference Dragoumis2003–6; Samson Reference Samson2013). Connections with ancient Greek music would have served the nationalist agenda more effectively, but attempts to establish these in a credible way have been few and far between. Purely textual connections between ancient writings and modern folksongs have been more frequent and indeed played an important role in the emergence of modern Greek folklore scholarship, of which such ventures were indeed the principal original raison d’être (Herzfeld Reference Herzfeld2020c).
By contrast, the conservative cultural establishment showed little inclination to include in the realm of the Hellenic heritage any of the urban folk-music varieties, especially the rebetika. The middle class despised these songs in a discourse that allowed them to associate working-class culture with foreignness, much as had happened with the notorious treatment of Greek leftists as ‘Bulgarian’ during and immediately after the Civil War. (There is an interesting parallel here with Thailand, where working-class identity is often treated by the military-backed elite as evidence of a lack of Thainess, this also being a relic of the Cold War but also an extension to class relations of the Buddhist concept of karmic predestination – of being ‘beyond the pale’ in a manner foreordained by one's actions in a previous life.) The rebetika were treated as similarly un-Greek, as were practices such as the famous spasimo (‘smashing’, i.e. of china plates at the feet of talented dancers in the drinking spots of the cities).
Theodorakis, Xarchakos and Hadjidakis all participated, not so much in the rehabilitation of rebetika (although one might argue that something of the sort was an added benefit of their interest) as in the invention of a new musical idiom that drew recognisably from the rebetiko tradition. What they initiated was a Eurocentric but to some extent emancipating instantiation of Norbert Elias’ (Reference Elias and Jephcott1978) ‘civilizing process’ – a process that has also played a role in the aspirations of the Greek middle class to that unequivocally ‘European’ identity to which decades of Eurocentric public discourse about classical origins had led its members to feel entitled, and which is expressed in a range of attitudinal changes evident today in everyday behaviour. Theodorakis would presumably dissent from this description, since his interest was to generate a purely Greek form of music (see Samson Reference Samson2013, 521), but his successful domestication of indigenous musical forms spoke, at the height of his popularity in Greece, to an almost equally rapturous audience in Western Europe and North America.
One of the architects of change in Greece on the political front was the elder Constantine Karamanlis. The epitome of middle-class conservatism in many respects, Karamanlis nevertheless oversaw the transition to a democratic system. He also nurtured Greece's entry into the European Union; he was unquestionably a cultural and political ‘European’. Theodorakis, who was later to serve as a parliamentary deputy for Karamanlis’ New Democracy party (but under Constantine Mitsotakis) despite the unambiguously left-wing political stamp of his earlier years, was widely credited with having supported Karamanlis as the architect of the restoration of democracy with the attributed slogan, ‘Karamanlis or the tanks’. His own account of their relationship was more nuanced: he was unhappy that Karamanlis had tried to stop him from holding concerts outside Athens during that sensitive period on the grounds that the junta's supporters might use the occasion to create trouble.Footnote 2
Yet perhaps there was more sympathy in the relationship than Theodorakis wanted to admit, at least in a cultural sense. In the process of Europeanising Greek society according to middle-class norms and values, Theodorakis’ music was undoubtedly a key element in the alchemy of self-conversion. Although it fell significantly from popular favour after the fall of the junta, perhaps in part because Theodorakis’ complex flirtation with the New Democracy party raised questions about the sincerity of his self-identification as a leftist, it had already achieved the goal of making identifiably rebetiko-derived rhythms acceptable in ‘polite’ Greek society; the most obvious example of this was what to conservative Greek nationalists must have been the familiar – but for that reason all the more disturbing – ‘Turkish’ 9/8 time of the zeïbekiko dance rhythm (see Holst Reference Holst1980, 53). Theodorakis, Hadjidakis and Xarchakos had successfully tamed Greece's allegedly Turkish demons, markers of collective cultural embarrassment, and made their overt expression respectable and even enjoyable. The aura of a composer who had been imprisoned by the junta, and whose songs had become the symbol of defiance and the signal of the impending return to democracy, was the catalyst needed to complete an aesthetic transformation perhaps unprecedented in the history of Greek popular music. Whether this transformation could have happened without the contributions of several other composers, and whether it was a genuine transformation, are questions the answers to which are often guided by ideological rather than by historical or sociological insight. But – at the very least – the association of Theodorakis’ music with this transformation is beyond question.
An important dimension of his success lay in his choice of lyrics. While I have heard it said that George Seferis was rather taken aback by the use Theodorakis made of his poetry in Epifania, there is no doubt that Yannis Ritsos was an enthusiastic collaborator on several song cycles. In this there was perhaps another reversion to neo-classical Eurocentrism, arguably even a conscious one, inasmuch as the new idiom seemed to re-create the ancient Athenian penchant for drama in which poetry and music were combined – a possible precedent, too, for opera. Theodorakis wrote operas as well, but these never acquired the popularity either of his song cycles or of the operas of Verdi, which became well known in Greece as well as around the world. In this context, it makes better sense to compare Verdi's operas with Theodorakis’ song cycles rather than with the Greek composer's own operatic works.
MUSIC AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE AND NATIONHOOD
Music feeds nationalism and regionalism in two directly contrasted ways. On the one hand, scholars love to point out how ‘influences’ spread across borders, which leads to all sorts of claims about who was influenced by whom. Such is the battle that virtually all national folklore establishments love to conduct. On the other hand, the fact that music is not necessarily tied to language renders national borders culturally porous, making for high fluidity in the exchange of styles, motifs and even actual tunes, and enabling the subversive potential of music to operate through its combination of semantic elasticity and allusive tropes with the emotive power of familiar sound features such as Byzantine church rhythms or the blare of local brass bands.
The non-linguistic nature of music – talk of ‘the language of music’ is as reductive and unhelpful as the equally popular and equally misguided expression ‘body language’Footnote 3 – means that even when ‘borrowings’ are recognised, they rarely correspond closely to actual national boundaries. So questions about whether rebetika are ‘Greek’ or ‘Turkish’ are less answerable than those formulated instead in terms of social class. Given the bourgeois nature of nationalism, however, middle-class affectations of horror at the original rebetika and the places where they were usually played easily transformed into nationalistic cultural gatekeeping. It was the peculiar alchemy of Theodorakis’ compositional genius that transcended this class-based division – a transcendence that also, I suggest, explains his curious capacity to serve in a centre-right government while continuing to espouse left-wing causes. I will return later to this political aspect, which suggests another basis for the comparison with Verdi. It was certainly his ability to transcend old cultural boundaries that enabled Theodorakis to merge what had been despised by the bourgeoisie as low-life music with that same bourgeoisie's cultural and political aspirations. The poems of George Seferis, a senior diplomat as well as a poet, could thus, to the plangent twang and excitable scurrying of bouzouki taksimia (virtuosic improvisational passages), be presented to a rapidly widening and appreciative audience.
Music, to be sure, contributes as much as any cultural modality to the production of stereotypes. This may not be the sense in which Theodorakis, as he explained in conversation with Gail Holst (Reference Holst1980, 12), intended music to change society, but it is one arena in which music can at least affirm and strengthen existing images. In the case of Zorba's Dance, it even generated a new dance form – the syrtaki – which became a popular sign of Greekness abroad, an excellent example of authenticity manufactured for external consumption. The fast pendozalis at the end of the dance is barely recognizable as the Cretan dance from which it is derived, and in fact the way it is usually danced is known in Crete as the school (σχολικό) version. The figure of Alexis Zorbas was an ideal self-projection of unconventionality for both Nikos Kazantzakis, the author of the novel on which the film was based, and Theodorakis, and we should not forget that Kazantzakis's original title was not Zorba the Greek but Βίος και Πολιτεία του Αλέξη Ζορμπά; the word πολιτεία denotes as much a ‘way of life’ as a generic political or social institution (Herzfeld Reference Herzfeld2019, 28). All that subtlety is lost in the popularisation of the novel through the Cacoyannis film and the even greater ‘spread’ of Theodorakis’ music. But there can be no doubt that both – and, again, especially the music – contributed significantly to the consolidation of the popular Greek self-stereotype of the amiable rogue and fixer as a globally recognisable image and, as such, a genuine impediment in Greece's valiant attempts to get itself taken seriously as a nation-state on the international stage.
Part of that stereotype is indeed the suggestion that Greeks are a people naturally inclined to music and dance, and therefore not to be taken seriously beyond the services they provide to the arts and to tourism. Until recently, the more Greek official discourse struggled to establish a classical pedigree for the modern land, the more it became the origin of mockery in the foreign media. It is only recently that the insistent theme of ‘ancestor worship’ (προγονολατρία) has begun to fade from the pronouncements of even relatively conservative politicians; its absence has been refreshingly noticeable, for example, in the response to the arrival in Greece of the COVID-19 pandemic, an arena in which the country did in fact manage to garner a good deal of international respect.Footnote 4 But it is also important to recall that the emergence of a recognisable idiom of ‘Greek music’ has also helped to push the classical obsession away from centre stage, and in this process Theodorakis, although not without his own habit of alluding to the ancient past, has played a crucial role. In this sense, music has been an important motor of attitudinal change, and Theodorakis, like Verdi, seized a particularly opportune moment to make it so.
Mention of Verdi returns the discussion to the main theme of this essay: the comparison of Greek with Italian nationalism through the work of these two composers. To understand that comparison, we must recall that the concept of national culture is a product and ideological equipment of the emergence of the middle-class imagination (see Anderson Reference Anderson1991; Gellner Reference Gellner1983; Greenfeld Reference Greenfeld1992; Hobsbawm Reference Hobsbawm1990). In its extreme forms, it produces the violent exclusion of non-members through a transformation of its idealisation of a peaceful national community into one beset by dangerous foreign bodies within.Footnote 5 Nationalism is itself usually both a highly male-inflected and bourgeois ideology.
Such resemblances, however, should not deceive us into treating all nationalisms as fundamentally alike, as Gellner (Reference Gellner1983), for one, was inclined to recommend. Greece and Italy share the distinction of being Europe's classical columns, to be sure, but they have experienced the effects of this status in very different ways. Whereas Italy emerged as a culturally fragmented nation-state from a mosaic of different zones of foreign rule (and with the papacy at its core), Greece – never previously a nation-state – was crafted out of the early crumbling of the Ottoman Empire with the clear mandate to homogenise as rapidly as possible, this being its best guarantee against re-absorption. Greece and Italy are both surprisingly young countries, given that the measure of the success of their emergence is precisely that people think of them as really ancient lands. We should not forget that the dates of emergence – 1821–34 for Greece and 1859–70 for Italy – are often occluded, at least in foreign perceptions, by the two countries’ claims on venerable antiquity. But their claims to unitary identity and statehood took very different forms. Italians did not start out with the sense that Rome should define the point of origin for the nation-state, and have never accepted the moral primacy of Rome (which many Italians call Roma ladrona, thieving Rome); while Mussolini tried that tactic with his bombastic exaltation of romanità, his gambit collapsed in ignominy with his regime. Greece, by contrast, has always treated Athens as representing the retrospective pinnacle of Hellenic achievement, with the result that the all-important emphasis on cultural continuity with the ancient past – considered essential for the survival of the newborn nation-state – had a distinctly Athenocentric character and largely ignored the evidence of strong local cultural continuity on the grounds that it might generate separatist sentiment.Footnote 6
These are important differences. They indicate very divergent conditions and styles of political emergence, and those differences have consequences for the subsequent political development of each country. Politically, indeed, Greece and Italy have less in common, at least over the long haul, than do Greece and Thailand, which had remarkably closely related political trajectories that even converged in their respective student-driven democratic uprisings against dictatorship (at the Athens Polytechnic and at Thammasat University, respectively), just one month apart in 1973; the Polytechnic students even indicated their awareness of the Thai precedent in one of their slogans (see Kallivretakis Reference Kallivretakis2004). Greece today has been more fortunate than Thailand, which seems unable to escape the cycle of uprising and repression. Indeed, the Thai generals might do well to contemplate the eventual fate of the Greek colonels and Greece's remarkably smooth transition back to a more secure democracy,Footnote 7 a phase in which Theodorakis was a controversial minor political player but an important cultural symbol. Others have written about the dangers of ‘methodological nationalism’ (notably Wimmer and Glick Schiller Reference Wimmer and Glick Schiller2002); here, by contrast (but also in parallel), I would point to the equally serious risk posed by geographical determinism and especially to the necessity of breaking away from stereotypes of Mediterranean culture if we are to understand Greek cultural history on its own terms.
MIDDLE-CLASS REBELS
Greece and Italy do nevertheless share at least one major common element in the history of their respective nationalisms: the role of a bourgeoisie – composed of rural land-owners and urban merchants and intellectuals in Greece, the proud local remnants of old imperial class systems uneasily allied to a newly wealthy class of construction magnates (palazzinari) in Italy – struggling, as they tried to keep their heads above the European backwash from colonialism, to achieve respectability as true cosmopolitans in the wider world. In that struggle, the Italian middle class was clearly ahead of its colleagues in Greece; its power rested on a more varied economy and a growing level of industrial development, as well as on its complex relations with the Catholic establishment and especially with the papacy.
As Greece and Italy struggled to define themselves as unified cultural entities against the background of Great Power machinations and with all the distortions that nationalistic folklore studies often introduced (Cocchiara Reference Cocchiara1981; Herzfeld Reference Herzfeld2003; Reference Herzfeld2020c; Kyriakidou-Nestoros Reference Kyriakidou-Nestoros1978), another important difference became apparent. In Greece the music of the countryside was largely relegated to the domain of folklore and, as such, was relevant to internal debates about the origins of modern Greek culture but not to Greece's standing in the world of art music; the music of the church never attracted significant individualistic innovations in composition as happened with the religious music of Italy. Italy, by contrast, was already recognised as a major source of musical inspiration on the cosmopolitan stage, with opera among the inventions it claimed as its own.
Aginst that background, Mikis Theodorakis and Giuseppe Verdi, at formative moments in national self-realisation, both played with the emotive power of familiar musical themes and styles. Both encountered some scorn from artistic snobs and conservatives. Verdi, again, had one great advantage: he entered a scene already fashioned by other composers of pan-European renown, with access to theatres frequently visited by wealthy northern Europeans hailing from countries with opera houses already sharing their talented singers with these Italian counterparts. Indeed, ironically, the role of the ‘Italian’ heroine Odabella of Verdi's Attila – noi donne italiche (‘we Italian women’), she sings, are ready to fight, while the women of the barbarian Huns cower and weep – was first performed, under the composer's baton, by a German soprano (Toye Reference Toye1931, 46).
The larger context was thus already an unequal playing-field before, many decades later, Mikis Theodorakis began his multi-decade effort to create a distinctive Greek musical genre that would transcend the social gap between art music and the musical entertainment of ordinary folk. Yet there were, even under such unpropitious circumstances, certain important points of convergence – less in their music, perhaps, than in their structural relation with the nation-states that gave context and meaning to that music. Their somewhat unconventional political trajectories particularly reflect the impact on the lives of these two composers of tectonic shifts in the global understanding of cultural identity. Nothing in musical production takes place in a vacuum, and the echoes of familiar musical idioms in carefully staged performances – frequently engaging with poetry by noted authors as well – has offered an important challenge to the formalism of official cultural management.
UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACHES TO CONVENTIONAL STEREOTYPES: THE MUSIC OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM
Comparison is more rather than less interesting when we place greater emphasis on unexpected divergences than on obvious similarities. In that spirit, we should pay close attention to the topical themes and subjects preferred by each of the two composers. The contrast is of considerable interest in the context of my proposed framework because it highlights the differences between the composers’ respective understandings of their role in historical moments of national self-definition. The main difference is clear: Verdi was especially concerned with romantic themes of honour, revenge and love, often choosing libretti that highlighted these themes, and framed them as transcending Italy to encompass the larger western Mediterranean world. Many, indeed, had nothing to do with Italy at all. Theodorakis’ choices were more explicitly political and, at least in his song cycles, emphasised working-class solidarity and the evils of foreign and establishment oppression. Such political themes were far from absent from Verdi's libretti, but where Verdi chose to express them through the medium of the ineluctable forces of society (especially in terms of a concept of honour grounded in the defence-to-the-death of female chastity) and destiny, Theodorakis focuses more on the agency that springs from the anger and horror of those who have experienced oppression and violence.
Even Theodorakis’ love songs – Aprilis, for example, or Varka sto yalo – are about vigorous action rather than romantic self-pity or the inevitability of a fated end. Like the laments of the Greek countryside, they are not fatalistic in the sense of a resignation to inevitable disaster, but are framed more as reactions to events that should never have happened but should now be rectified through proactive acts of vengeance and commemoration. The deaths celebrated in the Epitafios cycle and Enas Omiros (Brendan Behan's The Hostage Footnote 8) are inspirations, especially in Theodorakis’ often remarkably militant sounding rendition of the traditional dirge (miroloi) in the Epitafios cycle, to hatred of the oppressor and, ultimately, to militant action and liberation. Verdi participated, if perhaps at first unwittingly, in the genesis of national independence in Italy; Theodorakis, arriving post festum (as Bourdieu [Reference Bourdieu and Nice1977] would express it), sees the work of independence as still dominated by a foreign-directed and oppressive establishment and calls for commemoration as a stance of political activism.
Verdi's choices might often seem made to order for a Mediterraneanist agenda. Indeed, it is tempting to trace a genealogy of ideas from the romantic playwrights who inspired his music to the exoticist strain that dominated the anthropology of the Mediterranean region for at least two decades, producing an image of Mediterranean people as fatalist in a more literal sense. In reality, as I have suggested elsewhere (Herzfeld Reference Herzfeld1987, 34–9, 50), fatalism in its most literal sense probably does not actually exist anywhere in the world. Rather, as I have suggested for Greek rural dwellers, the rhetoric of fate serves agential ends. That sense of an active use of fate to explain failure and disaster and so to carve out a better future from the ruins of the past does not appear anywhere in Verdi's operas, which, to the contrary, represent the romantic obsession with the inevitability of tragedy. The title of La forza del destino, for example, expresses precisely this sense of ineluctability.
This opera takes up a classic Spanish theme of vengeance, purity of blood and female culpability for the failings of men. The plot could hardly have suited the ‘honour and shame’ literature more fully, as does Ernani (based on another Spanish story, although one penned by a French novelist, Victor Hugo, and then remodelled to Verdi's demands by the Italian librettist, Francesco Piave). Un ballo in maschera moves a very similar concern with the inevitability of tragic conclusions to Boston or Stockholm, according to which version one is watching, but the themes are surprisingly similar. Here, however, Verdi, while occasionally mentioning the theme of honour (and more prominently of the reciprocal obligations of friendship and the role of vengeance when it is betrayed), shows himself to be more interested in exploring the dynamics of masking and unmasking (Herzfeld Reference Herzfeld and Ruta2005), also a feature of the Mediterraneanist stereotype. Verdi allows the seducer-king, assassinated by his lover's husband as revenge for friendship betrayed, to pay the price for his sins, so that vengeance falls, not on the woman (as one would expect from the ethnographies of the region [e.g., Campbell Reference Campbell1964, 303]), but on the seducer. The betrayed husband, after first threatening to kill his errant wife, repents of an intention that would have fitted the Mediterraneanist playbook perfectly, and lashes out instead at the perfidy of his erstwhile friend the king:
It is not on her, on her fragile breast, that my blow must fall. Another's blood – indeed another's – must requite the offence.
Vengeance belongs to a larger complex of social values clustered around the organising principle of reciprocity. The classic Mediterraneanist theme of hospitality, first analysed by that early ethnographer of rural Spanish society Julian Pitt-Rivers (Reference Pitt-Rivers and Peristiany1968), and the corresponding reciprocity of violence return again and again in Verdi's operas, notably in Ernani. Verdi was apparently interested in exploring alternatives to traditional morality, and in one of his most remarkable (but little-known) operas, Stiffelio, he portrays a German Protestant minister's eventual forgiveness for a wife who has committed adultery. Stiffelio has never gained much popularity; in mid-nineteenth-century Italy, it must have seemed almost blasphemous. The trajectory it marks is from a narrow patriotism to something more cosmopolitan. Although Verdi was not himself the author of his libretti, we do know that he chose his themes with passion and care (see, e.g., Toye Reference Toye1931, 39–40). We may therefore legitimately see his narrative predilections following the path once described by Anton Blok (Reference Blok1981, 435–6) as a devolution of such values as the honour–shame complex toward the nation itself: national honour displaces the sexual honour of the villager, much as the nation-state absorbs the loyalty of kinship beyond that of the nuclear family. This was an appropriate trajectory for an active participant in, and emblematic figure of, the Risorgimento, the Italian struggle for independence and a unified nation-state. By the end of his life, jealous honour and the male defence of female chastity were of much less interest to him, or (we may assume) to his largely urban audiences, than they would have seemed before the mosaic of Italian cultural difference coalesced into a semblance of at least political, if not cultural, unity – a new unity that required a code of honour to make its encompassing significance palpable to its newly minted citizens.
Theodorakis, though not oblivious to such considerations of either national yearning or moral ideals, was more interested in the explicitly political drama of the struggle against right-wing tyranny and foreign (especially British and American) interference in Greece's political process. His political commitment also made him aware of the emergence of class inequality in a society that had boasted of being relatively classless. In reality, the class dimension is central to his musical production; cultural differences within Greece were not of obvious importance and would have contradicted the logic of the nationalism that Theodorakis shared with his right-wing foes (and that perhaps explains his willingness, in his later political evolution, to join in a conservative government).
Verdi wrote for a society that was divided into culturally quite distinct zones in a way that Greece had managed to shed very rapidly. In Italy, the unifying force was not language (some Italian dialects are mutually unintelligible), not food (Italians are scathing about each other's regional tastes), not even a more general italianità (most Italians are still unsure what that might be!), but class. If Greeks prided themselves on having been a near-classless society (despite the obvious exaggeration of such claims), Verdi was writing operas for a bourgeois elite that celebrated its italianità as exactly the concept of ‘high culture’ that has led some official sources to claim that the country possesses 70 per cent of the world's great artworks.Footnote 10 Such claims, whatever we may think of them (and they make no sense anthropologically), provided a unifying focus for people of widely divergent local cultural identity. But the trajectory of Verdi's operatic choices, which led from the biblical and heroic to the intimacy of Luisa Miller and La traviata and to the ultimate nonconformity of Stiffelio, clearly lay in the direction of a growing embourgoisement. William Weaver (Reference Weaver1976, 4) wrote of Verdi's enthusiasm for Luisa Miller that it indicates how far Verdi at that time ‘was becoming more and more an established member of the middle-class’. But that same drift to middle-class identity also allowed him to defy the conventions of the inflexibly parochial society of his home town, Busseto, and of its opinionated local clergy (see, e.g., Martin Reference Martin1992, 233–5). In this sense his life reflects the underlying paradox of bourgeois identity: that its sometimes relentless conventionality also contains the seeds of its own disruption from within, the result of a freedom that the old hierarchies would not have tolerated. Contrary to what most observers might assume about nationalism, its middle-class character creates conditions under which flouting the rules becomes the ultimate expression of one's mastery of them. Verdi remained deeply loyal to his regional and civic identity; that, according to one commentator (Martin Reference Martin1992, 235), is probably why he insisted on returning to Busseto with his as-yet-unwed partner, the soprano Giuseppina Strepponi, in the face of scandalised disapproval.
Here he confronted the confluence of supposedly Mediterranean values with those of the Victorian north, potentially – as has also been persuasively argued for Greece (Bakalaki Reference Bakalaki1994) – the real source of what northern anthropologists were later to regard as typically Mediterranean values and specifically the concern with female chastity and the consequences of its defilement. Perhaps, as Kerman (Reference Kerman2006) has speculatively suggested, the trigger for this sudden concentration in his works of themes of women killed for honour was Busseto's frigid reception of his relationship with Strepponi, a singer of impressive capabilities and considerable fame in her professional environment. The conflict between his national and regional loyalties thus frames and parallels the conflict between his middle-class aspirations and his testy refusal of middle-class conventions. By the time he wrote La traviata, he was openly at odds with the values of a class with which he nevertheless sought to identify himself.
The contradiction remains equally strong in his music. Some have sought to see Italian provincialism in the strong, driving rhythms that characterise the operas of his early and middle periods (e.g. Toye Reference Toye1931, 31: ‘Connoisseurs might sneer at the crude vehemence of the peasant-lad from Busseto’). Yet those rhythms also indexed connections with the European middle-class salon life portrayed in La traviata and musically highlighted the painful contradictions of bourgeois morality (see, notably, Sala Reference Sala and Casadei2013, 166–7). This opera, its theme perhaps the most unabashedly bourgeois of Verdi's works, was booed at its first appearance but soon became one of Verdi's best-known operas. Tension between Verdi's provincialism and his nationalist aspirations there may have been, but it was the latter that domesticated the ‘oom-pah-pah’ effect, using it to extract the maximum of emotional power over listeners culturally predisposed to experience it as comfortingly familiar in the novel and heady atmosphere of burgeoning nationalism, and, by doing this in the context of the grand opera house, Verdi made the echo of the provincial brass band respectable to the well-bred burghers of Milan and Parma and highly appealing to the insurgent Italian political leadership. Whether or not we should place any credence in the story of how the first performance of Nabucco evoked cries of ‘Viva Verdi’, playing on the acronym for Vittorio Emanuele Re d'Italia long before the Italian kingdom had actually been established, the story itself is an index of how successfully Verdi appealed, consciously or otherwise, to the nationalist cause. As Italians proverbially say, ‘If it's not true, it's well invented.’Footnote 11 Verdi's contribution to the aesthetics of Italian nationalism, however unintentional it may have been initially, earned him a prominent and lasting place in the history of the Risorgimento. And it seems clear that four years and six operas later, with the 1846 premiere of Attila with the Roman general Aëtius’ cry to the protagonist Attila – ‘You will have the universe; let Italy remain for me!’ – he had become quite explicit in his linkage of music to the cause of national redemption (see Toye Reference Toye1931, 46).
Just as he was often unconventional and unpredictable in the directions his nationalism took, Verdi the innkeeper's son both resented middle-class snobbery and yet also aspired to the status it represented. In that sense, too, he embodied the emergent Italian nation even in his obstinate provincial loyalties – loyalties that remain far more significant than national identity for many citizens of the Italian state. He never entirely lost those regional and rural working-class resentments,Footnote 12 which neatly mapped on to the ressentiment (Greenfeld Reference Greenfeld1992) of middle-class nationalism; he could be enthusiastic about the achievement of national independence and feel greatly relieved that it had effectively banished the capricious hand of foreign censorship.Footnote 13 Censorship also plagued Theodorakis during the junta years, but in his case the political issues at stake were more directly related to his leftist activism, and the censors imposed a comprehensive ban on all of his music, whereas Verdi faced foreign rulers’ nervousness about the possibility that specific scenes of his operas (such as the assassination of the Swedish king in Un ballo in maschera) might trigger violent revolution. Verdi was not an activist for class struggle as such, but he deplored many of the class-based attitudes that nationalism and the achievement of unified statehood perpetuated. At the same time, he remained loyal to his provincial base even when its inhabitants treated him badly, and that loyalty seems also to have informed his musical style. It is the driving rhythms of so many of his operas, dismissed as crude intrusions from his provincial past by some, that nevertheless provide so much of the visceral excitement that many audiences experience.Footnote 14 The internal contradictions and tensions of his identity are thus very present in the stylistic idioms of his music.
In Theodorakis’ music, powerful dance rhythms play a similar role, soldering literary verse to memorable tunes to create a sense of a community that transcends the gulf separating middle-class literati from the urban and rural proletariat. Like Verdi, whose characteristic aria-cabaletta combination for all lead singers reproduced the standard convention of his time but then gave way to a far less predictably structured melodic line that achieved high popularity at the time, Theodorakis progressed from a simple verse-and-refrain format to a much freer structure – what Holst (Reference Holst1980, 149) aptly calls a ‘flow-form’ – in which an initial, rhythmic form gives way to open variations that, by changing tempo and time signature, preclude a simple repetition such as one finds in the early songs. These changes also increased the range of influences, notably including Byzantine liturgy (Holst Reference Holst1980, 173). Such shifts nevertheless ran the risk of losing early enthusiasts who may have felt uncomfortable with such experimentation.
Whereas Verdi was writing for a predominantly middle-class audience that increasingly treasured connoisseurship and more generally ‘distinction’ in Bourdieu's (Reference Bourdieu and Nice1984) sense of the possession of prestigious cultural capital, Theodorakis has often seemed torn between an international arts-focused middle-class audience that rarely and reluctantly acknowledges him as a ‘serious’ composer – especially, as Holst (Reference Holst1980, 39) notes, because his international fame and complex political identity made critical judgement virtually impossible – and a denser local public. That public wanted rhythms which pulsed and throbbed and lent themselves to collective singing and dancing – to the Durkheimian effervescence, that is, that seemed to promise, in the heady but dangerous weeks following the collapse of the military junta, a new unity of purpose with democratic and socialist values. It is against this background that Theodorakis’ fury at Karamanlis’ original refusal to allow him to conduct concerts outside Athens becomes especially understandable; it must have seemed to the composer like a frighteningly rapid return to the authoritarianism of the past and a rejection of the emotive power he understood his music to be capable of unleashing.
The socio-cultural transformation that Theodorakis achieved with his ‘taming’ of rebetika and other popular forms rested on its wide appeal. The junta feared him, and with reason; the first publicly observable signs of the junta's disintegration and eventual demise came as half-murmured snatches of Theodorakis songs heard on buses and in the streets of Athens (see Herzfeld Reference Herzfeld1997, 223–6). It is in fact Theodorakis’ song cycles, rather than his self-conscious attempts at ‘serious’ or ‘classical’ music in symphonic and ballet form, that generated this kind of reaction.
But his real innovation was to replace the saccharine or saucily risqué lyrics of the music played in working-class dens with the sturdy poetry of some of the most acknowledged writers of Greek poetry of his time or, occasionally, of earlier periods. Just as Verdi would set the poetic diction of highly respected librettists to music that often distorted the words, Theodorakis – himself equally capable of shifting the stress pattern of a word or phrase in order to satisfy the demands of musical form – set to music the words of Seferis, Ritsos, Gatsos, Sikelianos and many others (see Fabbri and Tsioulakis Reference Fabbri, Tsioulakis, Williams and Williams2016, 317–20; Holst Reference Holst1980, passim).
One of his most extraordinary and influential achievements was the marriage of poetry and music in his setting of Vasilis Rotas’ powerful translation of Brendan Behan's The Hostage – a work that, in its simple applicability to more than one situation of a generic type, took the entire endeavour back into the triumph of event-genre over historical literalism that was the hallmark of much Greek folksong since Byzantine times. Relatively early in the history of Greek folklore studies, it became apparent that the same basic text could be used, as often happens in folksong traditions elsewhere, to commemorate or lament events widely separated from each other in time and geographical space. That idiom was also popular with the urban youth of those days, so that the traditional rizitiko celebrating the defeat of the Turkish or perhaps Venetian enemy on Crete – a song, significantly, that also appears in the score of Zorba the Greek – appeared on the streets of Athens in this form in the early days of the junta before King Constantine was ignominiously routed and expelled:
When will the stars come forth, when will the dawn break, so I can go down to Syntagma Square, to Stadiou Street, to make mothers without sons, wives without husbands, and kill members of the royal court …
In like manner, Theodorakis’ To yelasto pedhi (Behan's ‘The Laughing Boy’) was picked up by countless protesters in the streets of the Greek cities and towns; after the junta's murderous attack on the Athens Polytechnic students in the November of 1973, the song, with appropriately adjusted words, became a lament for the students who died in the confrontation.
DEEP TEMPORALITY: A CRITICAL COMPARISON IN THE POLITICS OF TIME
For Theodorakis as for Verdi, music was a way of doing politics. With apologies to J.L. Austin (Reference Austin, Urmson and Sbisà1975), we might say that he was interested in exploring ‘how to do things with notes’ (see also Holst Reference Holst1980, 12). Perhaps, as Holst implies, it was utopian to think that one could change an entrenched socio-political world through music, but Theodorakis has always clearly intended to try. In that effort he has sometimes, as in the dramatically rhetorical Pnevmatiko emvatirio (‘March of the Spirit’), grasped the need to cross the line between the cerebral and the visceral. Did he succeed? The relative obscurity in which his more cerebral works have languished suggests that they have never achieved the popular appeal of the song cycles. Perhaps they too far transgress familiar expectations of what music was for; people do not always enjoy having their entertainment too radically politicised or intellectualised.
Verdi often crossed the same line; it was a necessary political move, but it apparently also worked for him because of his audience's appetite for the cultural capital of aesthetic sophistication. Despite the contrast in the effects of the two composer’ innovations, however, there were also similarities in their political self-positioning. In particular, both composers became members of parliament in their respective countries; music, for both of them, was always a necessarily political act, although in Theodorakis’ case the goal is explicit whereas in Verdi's it worked itself out through encounters with censorship and through largely allegorical allusion on stage. In some regards, both composers were also politically unconventional – Verdi because his nationalism was neither intensely exclusive of others nor aggressively Catholic (his Stiffelio was a remarkable rejection of that worldview), Theodorakis because, while he never abjured leftist positions on social or international matters, he has been willing to cooperate with some rightists and even participated in the first Mitsotakis government as a minister. It is not my intention to explain or justify what many took as a betrayal at the time, nor to endorse or criticise all the other positions that Theodorakis has taken on political matters at various moments, but simply to emphasise the enormous prestige his unifying music gave him in the aftermath of the colonels’ ignominious collapse. His reputation as a fighter for whom music could never be anything other than political was part of a larger process of democratic consolidation at the national level. While it has allowed him great latitude in his choice of political identities and actions, that latitude has also arguably served to marginalise him in the eyes of his erstwhile comrades and disappointed admirers and effectively condemned his more recent works to a severely restricted public appreciation.
A further problem faced by both composers lay in the ease with which their music could be adopted for causes that might be considered antithetical to their own political viewpoints. As the anthropologist Bruce Kapferer (Reference Kapferer1988) has sagely noted, however, symbols of any ideology can always be turned against the ostensible intentions of those who initiated their use. Indeed, that is the process of re-use, already mentioned, that folksongs undergo; we might think of it as the recontextualisation and reinterpretation of conceptual spolia. Va pensiero, Verdi's famous chorus of the Hebrew slaves in Nabucco, which has often been performed in Greece, became known (and was described in many publications) as ‘the unofficial national anthem of Italy’ (e.g. Hutcheon and Hutcheon Reference Hutcheon and Hutcheon1995, 2). More recently, however, it was accorded that role for the imagined breakaway state of Padania – the would-be independent state dreamed up by the Northern League (a right-wing political party that has now instead shelved separatism in favour of national aspirations and has also re-named itself as, simply, ‘the League’). Padania's creation was intended to keep southerners (and foreign migrants) out of the region. Its adoption of Va pensiero is perhaps made more significant by the fact that the original Fascist Party's anthem, Giovinezza, had been widely considered the unofficial national anthem during the heyday of Mussolini's rule; now the Northern League sought to reverse the process by reclaiming a northern Italian composition from its national significance (and, perhaps, its association with Jewish history as well).Footnote 15
There have been other well-known appropriations of the extremely popular Va pensiero. Nana Mouskouri – a Greek singer more associated with Manos Hadjidakis than with Mikis Theodorakis, and with an adoring following in France – performed it as a solo piece with choral backup, to words that spoke to humankind's shared desire for freedom, perhaps echoing her rejection of the tyranny of the dictatorship in Greece that had ended only eight years earlier.Footnote 16 Her performance unquestionably represented a far more noble endeavour than that of the Northern League. It is nevertheless instructive in that it shows how a tuneful set piece, but one that still exhibits the unpredictable lability of such symbols, can serve many different ideologies.Footnote 17 Its emotive force is not the result of tunefulness alone; its intertextual resonance with familiar musical works allows those who hear it and join in singing it to imagine themselves as part of something greater even than the party or nation that it is being used to celebrate.
To say that music is timeless is a cliché; it is also misleading. Music has a more significant and complex relation to temporality: in its semiotic lability,Footnote 18 it is a device that calibrates the time of both social and musical performance (or tempo, as Bourdieu [Reference Bourdieu and Nice1977, 6–7] appropriately calls it) with the historical time of cultural institutions and transformations. It alludes to connections that may be explicitly understood but equally may be all the more effective for not being recognised. The brass-band marches and the dance rhythms of the bouzouki are not so much timeless as, on the contrary, devices for linking the time of the immediate moment to the deeper temporality of history.
Verdi and Theodorakis both understood this deep temporality, and exploited it to the full. That, rather than the precise details of their musical production, allows us to recognise an important measure of common ground shared by these two notably uncommon politician-musicians. If some would consider it heresy (or at least scandalous) to juxtapose them in this way, that is because of existing assumptions about high and low culture – a distinction that for anthropologists is nothing more than a class-based device of exclusion, and that for these two composers was a challenge each sought to transcend.
Nevertheless, neither could entirely break with such class-entrenched assumptions; it is clear that Theodorakis wanted to be recognised as a ‘serious’ composer, while Verdi worked in the mainstream of Italian classical music of his time. Indeed, matters could hardly have been otherwise; in their otherwise quite different careers, these composers, as I have tried to suggest here, both represent the fruition of middle-class cultural aspirations.
In both, however, the ambiguity of their political and social views on the one hand and the memorability and intertextuality of their music on the other virtually guaranteed their music, not the eternity sought by all nationalist movements, but certainly a longue durée, a long musical shelf life as we might say, as popular (and sometimes populist) rallying cries for political mobilisation across a wide range of ideological positions. They successfully rode the waves of bourgeois and national emancipation; they enjoyed the pleasures of popularity and the pain of vituperation; and they battled, each in a distinct political context, forces that they viewed as the incarnations of moral wrong.
When we listen to their music today, conscious as we should be of the significant differences between the two composers, we can learn a great deal from it about the common humanity that we share even with those with whom we may sharply disagree. That insight offers us the best possible way of defending an inclusive civility that recognises our shared passions, our shared emotions and our susceptibility to the seductive allure of music. The music of Verdi and Theodorakis alike recalls times gone by and calls us to a new future – a future in which we may listen to performances of their music with rejuvenated hearing and a historically and culturally alert sensitivity to the multiple meanings which others have found in the works of both composers.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This essay is based on a keynote address delivered to the BSA conference on ‘Popular Music of the Greek World’ on 17 May 2019. I am most grateful to Chris Williams for contacting me about the event, and to all the organisers for the invitation to deliver the talk. I also thank John Bennet for the invitation to offer the resulting essay for publication here, and an anonymous reviewer for some helpful suggestions in the final stage of writing. Many thanks, too, are due to the BSA staff for their hospitality and efficiency at the conference.
